Review of the UN-REDD Programme Policy Board Structure

UN-REDD PROGRAMME TENTH POLICY BOARD MEETING

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Review of UN-REDD Programme Policy Board Structure

Final Review Report

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Acronyms

Acronym	Definition
AA	Administrative Agent
AF	Adaptation Fund
CCO	Committee of Cosponsoring Organizations (of UNAIDS)
CGIAR	Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
CNA	Country Needs Assessment
COP	Conference of the Parties
CSOs	Civil Society Organization
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FCPF	Forest Carbon Partnership Facility
FMT	Facility Management Team (of the FCPF)
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GHG	Greenhouse Gas
GJP	Global Joint Programme
IA	Implementing Agency
IAG	Independent Advisory Group
IFI	International Financial Institution
IPs	Indigenous Peoples
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
ITTO	International Tropical Timber Organization
IUCN	International Union for the Conservation of Nature
JI	Joint Implementation
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MG	UN Management Group
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MDG-F	Millennium Development Goals Achievement Fund
MDTF	Multi-Donor trust Fund (now MPTF)
MPTF	Multi-Partner Trust Fund
MRV	Measurement, Reporting and Verification
NFEs	National Funding Entities
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NJP	National Joint Programme
PA	(FCPF) Participants Assembly
PB	(UN-REDD Programme) Policy Board
PC	(FCPF) Participants Committee

PCB	Programme Coordinating Board (of UNAIDS)
RBM	Results-based Management
REDD	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries
R-PPs	Readiness Preparation Proposals
RoPs	Rules of Procedures
RRI	Rights and Resources Initiatives
SAA	Standard Administrative Arrangement
SG	UN Strategy Group
SNA	Global Programme / Support to National REDD+ Action Programme
TAP	Technical Advisory Panel
ToRs	Terms of Reference
UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNDG	United Nations Development Group
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNRCs	United Nations Resident Coordinators
UN-REDD	United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries
WB	World Bank
WG	Working Group

1. Executive Summary

Introduction

The United Nations Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (UN-REDD) Programme provides technical and operational support to REDD+ readiness. As defined in its Programme 2011-2015 Strategy, the UN-REDD 2011-2015 Programme objective is "to promote the elaboration and implementation of National REDD+ Strategies to achieve REDD+ readiness, including the transformation of land use and sustainable forest management and performance-based payments."[1] The UN-REDD Programme now currently supports 46 partner countries across three regions - Africa, Asia-Pacific and Latin America and the Caribbean. The programme assists them in two ways: (i) direct support to the design and implementation of UN-REDD National Programmes; and (ii) complementary support to national REDD+ action through common approaches, analyses, methodologies, tools, data and best practices developed through the UN-REDD Support to National REDD+ Action Programme (SNA).

The UN-REDD Programme is currently funded by Norway, Denmark, Japan and Spain and now includes an additional US$13 million from the European Commission and funds from Luxembourg (US$2.6M) as a new donor

Review Objectives and Scope

As stated in the Review ToRs, the three main objectives of this assessment are to:
1. Examine the composition and governance structure of the Policy Board (PB), how it conducts its business and how it assists the Programme in the fulfillment of its mandate compared to other UN-administered Programmes, including Multi Partner Trust Funds (MPTFs) and REDD Readiness initiatives;
2. Assess the existing UN-REDD Programme Rules of Procedure and Guidelines and Policy Board Terms of Reference, evaluate fit-to-purpose, consistency with meeting objectives, and identify any gaps that need to be addressed;
3. Within the context set out above, the expected future implementation of the UN-REDD Programme based on the 2011-2015 Strategy and relevant Policy Board decisions, and considering best practices of transparency and good governance, propose changes, if necessary, to the existing UN-REDD Programme Rules of Procedure and Guidelines and Policy Board Terms of Reference.

This Review covers a timeframe of the UN-REDD Programme from inception up to 2015, in order to fall in line with the UN-REDD Programme Strategy 2011-2015 and previous Policy Board decisions. The Review covers the *role & relevance*, *effectiveness*, *efficiency*, and *sustainability/leveraging* of the PB, and aims to respond to the following questions:
- **Role and Relevance:** Is the organization and management of the PB's functions, composition, and structure conducive to fulfilling program objectives?
- **Effectiveness:** Does the PB conduct business effectively and responsively, with appropriate guidance and oversight in order to reach programme objectives?
- **Efficiency:** Does the PB have a clear functional role in order to conduct business in a timely fashion, and in such a way that reduces duplicate efforts?
- **Sustainability/Leveraging:** Is the UN-REDD Programme PB positioned to enable fulfillment of the Programme Strategies?

Methodology

The evaluation methodology followed three main phases:
- **The Inception phase** laid the foundation for methodology, sampling, and scope of the Review

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[1] UN-REDD Programme Strategy 2011-2015

- **The Data collection phase** permitted collection of both primary (through documentation review) and secondary data. Secondary data was obtained mainly from the PB members, including REDD+ countries, donors, Indigenous Peoples' and civil society representatives, UN-REDD Secretariat and Implementing Agencies, as well as other relevant partners and other organizations. To this end, 40 key informants were contacted by phone for direct, semi-structured interviews. In addition, in order to integrate experiences from a rather large number of PB members, observers and other key UN-REDD stakeholders and informants, an online survey, made available in English, French and Spanish, was completed.
- **During the Analysis and reporting phase,** the Reviewer compiled and analysed all collected data on results achieved and gaps reported and prepared its draft Review report. Comments on this draft were duly collected and thoroughly considered while preparing a final Review report.

Review Context

As one embarks on this Review, it is important to clearly spell out the context within which the UN-REDD programme is evolving. This context comprises the following main elements:

- **Global challenges to REDD+:**
    i. State of REDD+ in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations process: the REDD+ agenda is now mainly blocked by the question of financing that in turn provokes discussions on issues surrounding the verification of carbon emissions.
    ii. Financing REDD+: REDD+ is unlikely to deliver direct finance for quick or cheap emissions reductions. Nevertheless, it provides an important opportunity for countries to address the structural causes of deforestation and start a process of transformational change in considering forest resources.
    iii. The Green Climate Fund (GCF): the Long Term Financing plan of the GCF aims at raising $100 billion per year by 2020. In the medium term the GCF will become a central tool through which significant REDD+ support will be channelled. Therefore, it is important to ensure that current delivery channels for REDD+ can adjust to the foreseen requirements of the GCF in terms of operational modalities and governance requirements if they want to tap the GCF window.

- **Trends Surrounding UN-REDD:**
Numerous global trends influence the UN-REDD Programme, offer opportunities for positioning and beg for a redefinition and sharpening of its role in the sphere of REDD+ activities in the medium term. These changes can result in a number of operational and structural challenges for the programme, as well as potential opportunities for additional resources, harmonization of actions, and forming constructive partnerships

- **Trends in the UN-REDD Programme**
Influenced by this dynamic global context of national and sub-national actions, by UNFCCC decisions on deforestation and forest degradation and by other external trends in REDD+ and its funding, the UN-REDD Programme has seen rapid changes in its three years of operation.

It is therefore within the context of both an evolution of delivery mechanisms (towards Direct Access in the GCF and the AF), and a stronger piloting role of developing countries in climate funds, that tensions within the UN-REDD PB emerge, and within which the UN-REDD programme must review its strategy, which will **need to establish a shared Vision** of Board members on what is, and what should be after 2015, the UN-REDD Programme, its role and positioning vis-à-vis these global trends.

Review Findings

1. Role and Relevance

The main findings of the Review, when it comes to the *Role and Relevance* review criteria, are as follows:
- Whereas the current functions of the PB are rather clear and relevant, some of them would benefit from being adjusted to bring balance to the split between strategic level functions and administrative/operational functions and respond to the concerns expressed at this level from numerous stakeholders.

- This could, by the same token, provide an opportunity to slowly evolve the governance structure of UN-REDD in a way that would allow both for a more effective governance between now and 2015 and to prepare the ground beyond 2015, should the vision for UN-REDD evolve towards alignment with emerging international financing windows for REDD+. At the same time, the ToRs and RoPs would benefit from an update to bring out clearly the rules of games to ensure transparency in this governance structure.
- The PB operations are not fully satisfactory nor fully conducive to fulfilling programme objectives due to a number of factors including:
  o The lack of shared vision amongst PB members as to what UN-REDD should be and what it should become after 2015, creating a source of latent tension throughout the PB operations;
  o The lack of clarity in membership, in the role of different PB members and in the decision-making processes, calling for enriched and clarified procedures and an adaptation of the governing structure of the Programme to streamline operations;
  o Heterogeneity in the profiles of the delegates and their level of knowledge/competencies versus what is necessary to fulfil their role in the PB.

2. Effectiveness

On the question of the effectiveness of the PB conduct of business, the Review found that:

- Many of the procedures used in the conduct of meetings have considerably improved over time and now follow standards used in other comparable funds and are considered by PB members and observers as sufficient, including when it comes to those not existing formally on paper. That being said, some confusion remains, calling for a more detailed set of procedures to be described in the RoPs and validated by the PB.

- As far as financial reporting is concerned, it is hoped that the recent decisions reached regarding unified reporting formats between the three UN agencies will help meet the needs for reporting from the PB to ensure reporting at the impact, outcome and output level, with activity level information also available for consultation, as required.

- The level of responsiveness of the PB can be qualified as relatively good, with well-appreciated material and knowledge products, strong coherence with UNFCCC guidance and relatively good responsiveness to participating countries' requests. Areas for improvement mainly reside in ensuring an even better feedback from experience to the UNFCCC and responding to the demands for increased country ownership. Responsiveness is an area of possible continuous improvement and future reforms to the governing structure of the Programme, as well as to the procedures in place, will certainly need to be mindful of this.

- The level of guidance and oversight on financial matters is rather good and in line with international fiduciary standards.

That being said, the Review clearly outlines that there remains significant room for improvement, in particular with respect to:

- Procedures for the conduct of meetings, which need to be completed and better detailed;
- Financial reporting, which requires unified reporting formats;
- Budget discussions, which need to enable PB members and observers to clearly understand the choices proposed in terms of budget allocations, without getting into micro-management;
- Ensuring a good feedback from experience to the UNFCCC;
- Monitoring and reporting of programme progress to the PB;
- Harmonisation of reporting procedures; and
- The overall organisation of the conduct of business, which includes, among other elements, the possibility for the PB to concentrate on more strategic level issues.

3. Efficiency

Efficiency has been analysed in the Review so as to establish whether the PB has a clear functional role in order to conduct business in a timely fashion, and in such a way that reduces duplication of efforts. In this regard, the Review found that:

- The functional role of the PB needs to be clarified in relation to the respective roles and responsibilities of the other elements of the governance structure of the UN-REDD programme, namely the Secretariat, the Strategy Group (SG) and the Management Group (MG), and the implementing agencies;

- Whereas the prevailing model does present a number of advantages (e.g. rapidity in the delivery of funds), duplication of efforts and overlaps do exist at different levels, leading to efficiency losses; and

- Although a number of those aspects may not be amenable to change between now and 2015, following the new Strategy and the Vision that will be developed for the UN-REDD Programme, changes and adjustments in the organizational structure of the UN-REDD Programme should aim to improve efficiency and reduce overlaps, in addition to responding to the evolving context around REDD+ and climate finance more generally.

4. Sustainability/Leverage

Investigating whether the UN-REDD Programme Policy Board is positioned to enable fulfillment of the Programme Strategies, the Review found that:

- UN-REDD has established and benefitted from a structure to experiment with "Delivering as One" under the UN system. The structure developed has its merits and has allowed, amongst other things, prompt implementation and disbursement that assists in meeting programme objectives. It is, however, clear that this structure also faces challenges, a number of which derive directly from the vision underpinning the approach of different constituencies to their representation on the UN-REDD Policy Board. When a shared vision for the future of the UN-REDD Programme and its positioning is developed in the years to come, more in-depth modifications to the currently established structure, procedures and funding channels can then be envisaged.

- Given the recent establishment of the Tier 2 modality and the resulting lack of experience to date, it is too early to assess whether the relationship between the PB and Tier 2 contributors will be conducive to meeting programme objectives. That being said, this modality is an innovation that (i) modifies the relative power of the PB in the conduct of the UN-REDD programme; (ii) positions the UN-agencies as 'gatekeepers' of the Programme's principles, criteria, guidelines and quality assurance measures; and (iii) opens the Programme to new funding possibilities and can contribute to its adaptation to future climate finance funding modalities. Therefore, while reviewing the Strategy of the UN-REDD Programme, the Tier 2 modality will need to be fully considered within the possible funding options of the Programme.

- With respect to the PB structure and composition, as mentioned previously, the appropriate set-up option largely depends on the vision one has of UN-REDD for the future. What are the role and comparative advantages of UN-REDD until and after 2015? What should the programme become and how should it be positioned in the global REDD+ arena beyond 2015? Those questions will need to be openly discussed in the course of the review of the Programme Strategy planned in 2013.

Recommendations

Based on the findings and conclusions above, the Reviewer proposes the following set of recommendations.

On the Terms of Reference (ToRs)/Rules of Procedure (RoPs):

1. Both the ToRs and the RoPs need to clarify the status of each category of stakeholders and their specific role in the PB, in order to avoid any confusion.

2. The rationale behind the inclusion in the ToRs of section *5. Participating UN Organizations' Coordination Group* needs to be clarified, completed (e.g. including the UN Strategy Group) or deleted.

3. In order to avoid inconsistencies and possible discrepancies as mentioned above, one could recommend that PB membership be defined in detail in the ToRs.

On the conduct of business:

4. **Clarify and better detail procedures for the conduct of meetings**, in particular with respect to (i) the scope and form of the inter-sessional decision-making process; (ii) the use of working groups; (iii) the publication of ToRs for Board delegates (qualification, tasks and responsibilities, necessary availability) and the publication of delegates' short CVs on the UN-REDD website; (iv) the decision-making process (who participates in consensus?, what is the role of observers?); (v) the clear assignment of responsibilities for each decision point of the PB, within a clear time-frame; (vi) the publication of ToRs for the co-chairs, specifying their role, tasks and responsibilities and the competencies required; (vii) the possible assignation of co-chairing roles to each of the following constituencies: One member country and One donor member; (viii) the inclusion of a time management section into the RoPs, setting the rules on which PB co-chairs can rely for time management during meetings; and (ix) the set-up of a coordination mechanism between the countries of each sub-region prior to each PB meetings so that members can speak for their constituency.

5. To avoid any conflict of interest in the discussion on funding allocations, countries and UN Agencies who have been working on specific allocation demands and are interested in their implementation, should not participate in the consensual decision on that specific allocation. Their representatives could, however, act as resource persons prior to the decision time to help inform it. Specific procedures shall be designed and implemented in this regard.

6. **Ensure discussions on financial matters occur**: in addition to the detailed documentation provided, financial issues should be presented and discussed thoroughly at some point, including on the distribution of funds between the SNA and the National Programmes. If PB meetings are too short for this, setting up specific Working Groups with representatives of all constituencies might be a good avenue. This could be detailed in the updated procedure for SNA budget approval, which is very concise in the current RoPs.

7. For a stronger cooperation between actors at the national level, **continue to promote the establishment of 'National Coordination Groups' in REDD+ countries**, gathering all relevant stakeholders and governmental institutions in order to ensure the coordination of REDD+ activities at country level with all relevant stakeholders and assist in better addressing the drivers of deforestation, which often fall outside the forestry sector as such.

8. **Ensure feedback from experience to the UNFCCC is sufficiently organized** with the nomination of a responsible staff within the Secretariat, who is well-versed in Convention processes and politics, to ensure a permanent link with the UNFCCC Secretariat.

On the evolution of the Policy Board structure and its composition:

9. **Depending on the answers to the questions on the role and comparative advantages of UN-REDD until and after 2015**, and on the positioning of the Programme in the global REDD+ arena beyond 2015, one can therefore **envisage the following options**:

    a. **OPTION A:** Given that the life expectancy of the UN-REDD programme is likely to be short (not much beyond 2015) and therefore not require any alignment to emerging international governance models in the climate change arena, the PB remains essentially as is.
        i. Under this scenario, the main changes in governance are minor and relate mostly to rules of procedures for the conduct of meetings as recommended above, to ensure slight improvements in efficiency.
        ii. A Bureau is established to assist with the preparation of meeting Agendas and inter-sessional decision making mainly to help ensure a better balance between strategic and

administrative/operational matters during PB meetings. Such a Bureau should meet (virtually as much as possible) at least twice a year and could be formed of constituency elected representatives from the following: one representative from beneficiary countries, one donor representative, the two elected co-chairs of the PB and a representative from the Secretariat.

b. **OPTION B:** Given that UN-REDD wants to be well-positioned for the long-term under the global REDD+ agenda and prove by the same token its effectiveness in the short-term: the PB undergoes a progressive transformation, allowing it to keep its options open for the future, while improving the efficiency of the decision making structure. In addition to the changes under Option A above, changes in the PB set-up would be as follows:

i. A Broadened PB/UN-REDD participants' Forum gathering all UN-REDD Programme constituencies, all recipient countries, all donors, the three UN agencies, and a defined number of IPs/CSOs and a defined number of observers, whose position and role during meetings would be clarified. The Broadened PB/Forum meets once a year and approves the Programme's framework documents, its strategy, ToRs and RoPs of the Executive Committee(see below), the UN-REDD overall programme budget, and follows performance in implementation. It focussed on strategic functions and issues only, and allows all interested parties to exchange views and opinions on the Programme and potential innovative approaches and lessons learned. It also nominates or reconfirms delegates to the Executive Committee from each constituency.

ii. An Executive Committee gathering a limited number of elected representatives from each group of stakeholders from the broadened PB (to be reconfirmed every year): 3 recipient countries, 3 donors (with rotation), 1 UN Agency (speaking for all), 1 CSO lead, 1 IP lead, 1 representative from MPTF office as ex-officio member and 1 representative of the UN-REDD Secretariat as resource agent/observer. The Executive Committee meets twice a year and takes all operational and administrative decisions, including detailed funding allocations and is co-chaired by a donor and a recipient country representative.

10. This division of labour would be facilitated further by:
   a. A clarified status and role of the Secretariat, the SG and the MG (e.g. as internal coordination units of the three agencies, i.e. not officially represented in the PB);
   b. A well established Monitoring and Evaluation Plan, enabling the PB and the Executive Committee to assess progress towards objectives and ensure that the funds spent actually deliver the expected results, without the need to get involved in project-level management;
   c. The addition of the two elected co-chairs of the Executive Committee meetings to the newly created Bureau for the purpose of setting the Executive Committee meeting Agendas.

2. Introduction

2.1   About REDD+

"Reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries and approaches to stimulate action" was first introduced into the Conference of the Parties (COP) agenda at the eleventh session of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Montreal (December 2005). In the same year, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) reported alarming rates of deforestation (approximately 13 million hectares per year for the period 1990–2005), mainly due to conversion of forest to agricultural lands leading to both immediate and slower release of largely CO_2 GHG emissions estimated by the IPCC in the 1990s to be 5.8 $GtCO_2$/yr.[2]

Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) is an effort to create a financial value for the carbon stored in forests thus offering incentives for developing countries to reduce emissions from forested lands and invest in low-carbon paths to sustainable development. "REDD+" goes beyond deforestation and forest degradation to include the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks[3].

Within the REDD+ readiness process at the national level, activities are broken down into three subsequent phases:
- Phase 1: Development of national strategies or action plans, policies and measures, and capacity building;
- Phase 2: Implementation of national policies and measures and national strategies or action plans that could involve further capacity building, technology development and transfer, and results-based demonstration activities;
- Phase 3: Results-based actions that are fully measured, reported and verified.

2.2   About the UN-REDD Programme

Under the leadership of three UN agencies, the Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (UN-REDD) was formed in 2008 in order to assist developing countries to reduce global emissions and prepare them to participate in a REDD+ mechanism. The programme also addresses UNFCCC Decisions 1/CP.13, 2/CP.13 and 4/CP.15 by encouraging the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks.[4]

The UN-REDD Programme provides technical and operational support to REDD+ readiness. As defined in its Programme 2011-2015 Strategy, the UN-REDD 2011-2015 programme objective is "to promote the elaboration and implementation of National REDD+ Strategies to achieve REDD+ readiness, including the transformation of land use and sustainable forest management and performance-based payments[5]."

Following a pilot of 9 developing countries, the UN-REDD Programme was originally approved to support 17 developing countries. It now currently supports 46 partner countries across three regions – Africa, Asia-Pacific, and Latin America and the Caribbean. The programme assists them in two ways: (i) direct support for the design and implementation of UN-REDD National Programmes; and (ii) complementary support for national REDD+ action through common approaches, analyses, methodologies, tools, data and best practices developed through the UN-REDD Support to National REDD+ Action Programme (SNA)[6].

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[2] UNFCCC: http://unfccc.int/methods_and_science/lulucf/items/4123.php.
[3] http://www.un-redd.org/AboutREDD/tabid/102614/Default.aspx.
[4] UN-REDD Programme Strategy 2011-2015.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Formerly denominated 'Global Programme'.

As of 15 September 2012, the two streams of support to countries totalled US$117.5 million, with US$67.3 million for National Programmes and US$50.2 million for the SNA[7]. Sixteen of the participating countries are part of the UN-REDD National Programme.

The UN-REDD Programme is currently funded by Norway, Denmark, Japan and Spain and now includes an additional US$13 million from the European Commission and funds from Luxembourg (US$2.6M) as a new donor[8] [9].

2.3   Review of the UN-REDD Programme Policy Board

As stated in the UN-REDD Programme 2011-2015 Strategy, the Policy Board is "responsible for oversight, strategic direction and financial allocations"[10] of the programme.

The governance structure of the PB is a reflection of its intended role and functions in the UN-REDD Programme Framework and therefore was designed to include the implementing agencies (United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), United Nations Development Program (UNDP), FAO), MPTF donors and it "may" include representatives from other REDD partners and stakeholders (such as the UNFCCC Secretariat, UNPFII Secretariat, Coalition for Rainforest Nations, CGIAR organizations, International Tropical Timber Association, World Conservation Union (IUCN), non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society organisations (CSOs).[11]

The 2009 Policy Board Terms of Reference (ToRs) outline the full members, observers and ex-officio members of the Board, respectively, while the UN-REDD Secretariat provides the secretariat to the Policy Board. This role includes the duty of ensuring that decisions made by the PB are "duly recorded and communicated" to its members.[12] Table 1below illustrates the original PB structure and composition.

Table 1: Original Policy Board Membership from 2009 Terms of Reference

Full Members	Observers	Ex-Officio Member
• UN-REDD Programme countries (See the Rules of Procedure for the process of determining membership based on regional representation.) • Donors to the UN-REDD Programme Multi-donor Trust Fund (MPTF[13]) (See the Rules of procedure for the process of determining donor membership.) • Civil Society (See the Rules of Procedure for the process of determining membership.) • UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (Chairperson) • FAO • UNDP • UNEP	• UNFCCC Secretariat • Forest Carbon Partnership Facility represented by The World Bank • GEF Secretariat • Regional representatives of Indigenous Peoples • CSOs[14]	• Multi Donor Trust Fund Office, UNDP

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[7] UN-REDD Programme Funding Framework (as of 15 September 2012), UN-REDD Programme Ninth Policy Board Meeting, October 2012, p6.

[8] Report of the Ninth Policy Board Meeting, 26-27 October 2012, Brazzaville, Republic of the Congo, p 8.

[9] MPTF Office Gateway: http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/CCF00.

[10] UN-REDD Programme 2011-2015 Strategy, p 19.

[11] Ibid.

[12] UN-REDD Programme Policy Board ToRs, March 2009, p 4.

[13] Now MPTF (Multi-Partner Trust Fund). For consistency, the acronym MPTF will be used throughout the report even when original citations use MDTF.

[14] CSOs omitted in 2009 ToRs, corrected in PB1 minutes

Whereas the UN-REDD programme has evolved during the last three years involving more donors and countries and managing a larger portfolio of services offered to countries, the PB is still governed by the same composition as in the 2009 ToRs. As time went by, it has become clear to a majority of PB members, including countries, donors and UN agencies, that the PB faces challenges to its effective and efficient functioning.

In light of these challenges, the present Review comes at the request of the UN-REDD Programme for a comprehensive Review of the Policy Board structure, as agreed during the Seventh Policy Board Meeting in October 2011.[15] In order to oversee the Review process, a self-selected Working Group was set up by the Eighth Board Meeting (March 2012), and consists of two representatives from each main PB stakeholder group: partner countries (Papua New Guinea and Viet Nam), donors (Japan and Norway), UN Agencies (FAO and UNEP), Civil Society organizations (NGOCE and EDF) and Indigenous Peoples (NEFIN and UNPFII).[16] The Review is facilitated by the UN-REDD Secretariat which has designated a staff member to serve as Secretary to the Review and for coordination of logistics.[17]

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[15] Report of the Seventh Policy Board Meeting, 13-14 October 2011, Berlin, Germany, p 3.
[16] Report of the Eighth Policy Board Meeting, 25-26 March 2012, Asunción, Paraguay, p 3 (updated from comments on draft inception report).
[17] PB Review ToRs, p 5.

3. Review Objectives and Scope

As stated in the Review ToRs, the three main objectives of this assessment are to:

1. Examine the composition and governance structure of the Policy Board, how it conducts its business and how it assists the Programme in fulfilling its mandate compared to other UN-administered Programmes, including MPTFs and REDD Readiness initiatives;
2. Assess the existing UN-REDD Programme Rules of Procedure and Guidelines and Policy Board ToRs, evaluate fit-to-purpose, assess consistency with meeting objectives and identify any gaps that need to be addressed;
3. Within the context set out above, the expected future implementation of the UN-REDD Programme based on the 2011-2015 Strategy and relevant Policy Board decisions, and considering best practices of transparency and good governance, propose changes, if necessary, to the existing UN-REDD Programme Rules of Procedure and Guidelines and Policy Board Terms of Reference.

This Review covers a timeframe of the UN-REDD Programme from its inception up to 2015 in order to fall in line with the UN-REDD Programme Strategy 2011-2015 and previous PB decisions. The final product is a reflection on the existing policy and procedures developed and facilitated by the PB, and how the PB can successfully navigate and manage the internal and external challenges and opportunities posed to the programme and its governance through 2015 and beyond.

Due to the potentially sensitive and highly political nature of this Review, the Reviewer closely engaged and collaborated through meetings, phone calls, email and other exchanges, as needed, with UN-REDD PB members and other key stakeholders in order to carefully inform the Review criteria and processes used for this assessment. Whenever possible, multiple sources of information were used to validate and triangulate data for more robust analysis.

The draft Review approach and methodology stated below (see Section 4) suggests that the Review covers the *role & relevance*, *effectiveness*, *efficiency* and *sustainability/leveraging* of the PB. These questions are:

- **Role and Relevance:** Is the organization and management of the PB's functions, composition, and structure conducive to fulfilling program objectives?
  1. What are the functions of the PB and how are they aligned with the present environment?
  2. What is the structure and composition of the PB and potential areas for adjustments in light of the current programme objectives?
- **Effectiveness:** Does the PB conduct business effectively and responsively, with appropriate guidance and oversight in order to reach programme objectives?
  3. Does the PB conduct business in a manner that is appropriate in light of the challenges surrounding the evolution of REDD+ and the UN-REDD Programme's response to those challenges?
  4. Is the PB responsive to partners and stakeholder needs?
  5. Does the PB provide guidance and oversight adequate for delivering Global and National programme objectives, and up to international standards?
- **Efficiency:** Does the PB have a clear functional role to conduct business in a timely fashion, and in a way that reduces duplicate efforts?
  6. What is the functional role of the PB relative to other UN-REDD Programme key actors?
  7. Is there clarity of roles and responsibilities between key programme partners?
- **Sustainability/Leveraging:** Is the UN-REDD Programme Policy Board positioned to enable fulfillment of the Programme Strategies?
  8. Is the relationship between the PB and participating agencies (FAO, UNEP, UNDP) conducive to meeting programme objectives?
  9. Is the relationship between the PB and Tier 2 contributors conducive to meeting programme objectives?
  10. In light of the challenges surrounding the evolution of REDD+ and the UN-REDD Programme's response to those challenges, what is an appropriate structure and composition of the PB?

11. In light of the challenges surrounding the evolution of REDD+ and the UN-REDD Programme's response to those challenges, where does the PB stand relative to other actors in the REDD arena?

The Review Matrix in Annex C further details the questions that this Review intended to answer followed by sub-categories, indicators for assessment, data collection, methodology and sources, respectively. Section 4 below explains in detail the Review Approach and Methodology, and how this matrix was used to collect and analyze evaluative evidence.

4. Approach & Methodology

4.1   Approach

Bearing in mind the key purposes of the Review (Section 2 above), the Reviewer was guided by the following pivotal principles to ensure that the review process is "objective, transparent, evidence-based and [providing] impartial assessment and learning"[18]:

- *Focus on results:* Expected results, performance indicators as well as potential risks are identified to ensure coherent and integrated Results Based Management that helps frame this Review.
- *Learning by doing:* The Reviewer adapts RBM principles, tools and indicators, while considering the Review's needs and context, with the aim of increasing the potential for learning and focus on results of UN-REDD objectives.
- *Collaborative approach:* The Reviewer ensures a consultative and collaborative approach with the various PB members, alternates and observers – current and past, to the extent possible – as well as other key stakeholders, such as the UN-REDD Secretariat.

The Review took place over the course of three phases: inception, data collection, and analysis and reporting as described further below. The utility of this phased approach includes regular participation and engagement of stakeholder groups at various points in the analysis, which facilitates information gathering, verification, fact-checking and re-adjustment of the Review or Review process as needed.

4.2   Methodology

Inception Phase

The inception phase laid the foundation for methodology, sampling and scope of the Review. The Reviewer presented a detailed methodology regarding the proposed Review process including a detailed Review matrix (see Annex C) that served as the main data collection tool during the assignment. The inception phase clarified the ToRs by identifying core Review questions to answer through the collection and analysis of data and evidence on agreed indicators. The main steps of the Inception phase included: preliminary literature review, scoping mission and preliminary data collection at the October 2012 PB meeting, and preparation of the draft and final Inception report.

Data Collection Phase

Both primary and secondary data was collected for this review. Secondary data was obtained mainly from the PB members, including REDD+ countries, donors, indigenous peoples' and civil society representatives, UN-REDD Secretariat and Implementing Agencies, as well as other relevant partners and organizations. Primary data was gathered through qualitative and quantitative methods including desk reviews, an on-line survey and semi-structured interviews. For the documentation review, key policy and guidance documents, especially those related to governance systems and operational management of the UN-REDD programme, were analysed. The Reviewer also considered accomplishments and results achieved to date with the clear understanding that this is not a Review of the UN-REDD Programme, but rather of the PB.

Parallel to the in-depth documentation review, the Reviewer conducted a comparative desk review assessment of the governance and institutional set-ups of a selection of three other REDD+ funds and similar global/IFI mechanisms. The different criteria/dimensions around which this comparative assessment was conducted are detailed in the Review matrix. This was instrumental in grounding the assessment provided under this Review in other current and emerging international practices in this fast

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[18] UN-REDD Programme Policy Board Review ToRs, p 5.

evolving international context. The following funds/facilities were selected for this comparative assessment with UN-REDD: the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) administered and Spanish sponsored Millennium Development Goals (MDG) Fund, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), and the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF). The comparative assessment, in addition to building heavily on available documentation from the three funds/mechanisms, was complemented through targeted key-informant interviews with a limited number of knowledgeable staff from each of the three entities (one per entity) to help fill in gaps in data.

In order to integrate experiences from a rather large number of PB members, observers and other key UN-REDD stakeholders and informants, an on-line survey was made available in English, French and Spanish. A Word version of the survey is located in Annex F. A total of 266 past and current PB members and observers were contacted for this survey distributed across the six PB constituencies – namely UN-REDD Programme Countries, Donor Countries, CSOs, Indigenous Peoples, UN Agencies, Ex-officio members and an 'other observers' category. As far as possible, the relative weight of each constituency, as defined in the Rules of Procedures, has been respected in the survey sample, as illustrated in table 3 below, excluding the 'other observers' category which includes staff from the World Bank, UNFCCC Secretariat, IAG, RRI, other developed countries representatives, etc.

The survey was available online from Friday, 11 January to Wednesday, 13 February 2013. An invitation email and three reminders were emailed to the list of invitees. After one month, 27 complete responses were received (see Table 2), and have served as a basis for the subsequent analysis preformed. While the response rate (10%) was low, which is typical for this type of survey instrument, the answers provided were rich, contained good context for the Review and provided feedback from a good cross-section of stakeholders, in line with the Reviewer's aim.

Table 2: Distribution of survey invitees and respondents among their respective constituencies

	Member distribution according to RoPs	Invited Members & observers	Responses (% excludes 'Other' cat.)
Developing Country Partner	50% - 9 members	51% - 105	36% - 9
Development Partner	17% - 3 members	18% - 37	12% - 3
Civil Society Organization (CSO)	6% - 1 member	11% - 22	8% - 2
Indigenous Peoples (IP) organisation	6% - 1 member	5% - 10	12% - 3
UN Agency	17% - 3 members	15% - 32	28% - 7
Ex-officio member	6% - 1 member	0,5% - 1	4% - 1
Other (UNFCCC Secretariat, IAG, RRI, FCPF, etc.)	-	59	2
Total	**18**	**266**	**27**

In addition to the electronic survey, 40 key informants were contacted by phone for direct, semi-structured interviews in order to collect more detailed information. The relevant interview protocols were developed in consultation with the Secretariat and Working Group, and a full protocol is available in Annex G. The interview protocols and respective sampling for each stakeholder group were provided to the Secretariat after approval of the inception report. The list of key informants interviewed is provided in Annex H.

Analysis and Reporting Phase

Following the data collection phase, the Reviewer compiled and analysed all collected data on results achieved and gaps reported. Quantitative data, where applicable, was analysed with appropriate and illustrative tools. Triangulation of data was used in order to ensure that the information was collected and crosschecked by a variety of informants, and can therefore be more readily verified and confirmed. Findings were directly tied to pertinent information through interpretative analysis for which the

Reviewer applied both deductive and inductive logic. This then led to the production of the draft report which was submitted to the UN-REDD Secretariat and the Review Working Group for comments. Table 4below provides an overview of the Work Plan Timetable for this Review process up to the presentation of the present Final version of the Review report.

Table 3: Revised Work Plan Timetable

Work plan steps/tasks	Revised deadline
Start-up meeting	24-Oct
Preliminary document and literature review	9-Nov
Preparation of the inception report	20-Nov
Participation to the 9th policy board in Brazzaville, incl. travel and preparation	27-Oct
Revision of the Review matrix and update of the inception report	21-Dec
DATA COLLECTION PHASE	
In-depth documentation review	1-Feb
Telephone interviews	12-Feb
Online survey	15-Feb
ANALYSIS AND REPORTING PHASE	
Data analysis	1-Mar
Preparation of the draft Review report	31-Mar
Integration of comments and preparation of the final report	6-May
Presentation to the Policy Board in Indonesia incl. preparation	Week of 24 June

5. Review Context

As one embarks on this Review, it is important to clearly spell out the context within which the UN-REDD programme is evolving. This will be paramount down the road to understanding the situation within which the PB finds itself now and will provide context for future recommendations vis-à-vis the operations of the PB.

5.1   Global Challenges in REDD+

State of REDD+ in the UNFCCC Negotiations Process

Whereas important decisions were expected for REDD+ during the last UN climate talks in Doha, no decision on verifying carbon emissions from deforestation has been taken. This constituted a major disappointment to REDD+ promoters since decisions on Measurement, Reporting and Verification (MRV) of emissions reductions are urgently needed for REDD+ activities to keep on track. On a positive note, it does seem that forests and REDD+ will be an integral part of the next international treaty on climate change in 2020.[19] In particular, the negotiation process has established a workshop under the Durban Platform that will discuss mitigation issues and the increasing ambition to reduce emissions in the forestry sector: "the ADP (Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action) intends to hold a series of thematic workshops on areas such as energy, transport, industry, forestry and waste management. The workshops will begin in 2013 and may, inter alia, identify, and catalyse the implementation of, initiatives and actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions as rapidly, cost-effectively, and equitably as possible."[20] This workshop may enable important moves on the REDD+ agenda, now mainly blocked by the question of financing that in turn provokes discussions on issues surrounding the verification of carbon emissions.

Financing REDD+

In the CIFOR publication *Analysing REDD+ Challenges and choices*,[21] Angelsen, A. et al. consider that REDD+ finance is at an inflection point: while short-term finance is available, disbursements are slow and investment opportunities scarce; at the same time, there is no adequate nor predictable long-term strategy to meet the financial needs for REDD+. Additionally, in the absence of ambitious climate change mitigation goals, most REDD+ finance will be mobilised by the public sector. During this interim phase, in which financing for REDD+ is likely to be fragmented and channelled through various agencies, it will be important to test a variety of financing options that leverage private sector finance and directly address the drivers of deforestation. Wealthier REDD+ countries with stronger institutions may opt to self-finance a significant part of REDD+. They may also choose to engage in results-based agreements with donors and international agencies. The more fragile States are likely to rely on official development assistance (ODA)-type finance that combines financial support with technical assistance and policy guidance.

The authors conclude that REDD+ is unlikely to deliver direct finance for neither quick or cheap emissions reductions. Nevertheless, it provides an important opportunity for countries to address the structural causes of deforestation and start a process of transformational change in considering forest resources. Where they are able to act without international support, governments may prefer results-based payments at the national scale (Phase 3); however, many countries will need support in both project set-up and policy reform (Phase 2). In the next years, while REDD+ implementation is scaling up but a legally binding international policy framework for REDD+ is still absent, finance will need to come from a variety of sources that directly engage with the private sector to combat the drivers of deforestation.

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[19] http://blog.cifor.org/13152
[20] DRAFT TEXT on ADP agenda item 3 Version of 18:30 – 6 December 2012,
http://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp/application/pdf/draftadp36dec1830.pdf
[21] Angelsen, A., Brockhaus, M., Sunderlin, W.D. and Verchot, L.V. (eds) 2012 Analysing REDD+:
Challenges and choices. CIFOR, Bogor, Indonesia. (http://www.cifor.org/publications/pdf_files/Books/BAngelsen120107.pdf)

The Green Climate Fund (GCF)

The GCF was established by decision 1/CP.16 of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC in 2010. The global objective of the GCF is to promote the paradigm shift towards low-emissions and climate-resilient development pathways by providing support to developing countries to limit or reduce their greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to the impacts of climate change while taking into account the needs of those developing countries particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.[22]

The Fund aims to provide simplified and improved access to funding, including direct access, and Fund activities are based on a country-driven approach. The Fund also aims to encourage the involvement of relevant stakeholders, including vulnerable groups, and to address gender aspects. The GCF was designated as an operating entity of the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC. The World Bank serves as Interim Trustee for the Fund, subject to a review three years after the operationalization of the Fund.[23]

The Long Term Financing plan of the GCF aims at raising $100 billion per year by 2020. Since there was a lot of uncertainty on where this money would come from, a High Level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing (AGF) was set up by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon in February 2010. Its task was to investigate potential sources of revenue for the fund. The report[24] produced by the Group concluded that funding will need to come from a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources of finance, the scaling up of existing sources and increased private flows. Grants and highly concessional loans are crucial for adaptation in the most vulnerable developing countries, such as the Least Developed Countries, Small Island Developing States and Africa.

In Doha, the decision[25] from the conference encouraged developed countries to keep financial commitments steady over the next two years; however, identifying new sources of funds has been postponed until next year. Many people consider that REDD+ financing may be held hostage of larger political issues.

Notwithstanding these obstacles, the view prevailing at the international level is that in the medium term the GCF will become a central tool through which significant REDD+ support will be channelled and that there is therefore a need to ensure that current delivery channels for REDD+ can adjust to the foreseen requirements of the GCF in terms of operational modalities and governance requirements if they want to tap the GCF window.

5.2   Trends Surrounding UN-REDD

As presented above, numerous global trends influence the UN-REDD Programme, offer opportunities for positioning and beg for a redefinition and sharpening of its role in the sphere of REDD+ activities in the medium term. These changes can indeed result in a number of operational and structural challenges for the programme as well as potential opportunities for additional resources, harmonization of actions and forming of constructive partnerships. Some of the areas for consideration by the PB in decisions and strategic planning therefore revolve around the following:
  o Many countries are moving past Phase 1 and into Phases 2 and 3 of REDD+ implementation[26] and therefore require a different kind of support from those just entering the programme;
  o It is important to acknowledge the evolution of UNFCCC negotiations on REDD+, which are shaping the future of the REDD+ mechanism;

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[22] http://gcfund.net.
[23] http://gcfund.net.
[24] Report of the Secretary-General's High-level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing, November 2010.
[25] http://unfccc.int/meetings/doha_nov_2012/meeting/6815/php/view/decisions.php

     o UN-REDD can provide input towards and integrate guidance and research from the UNFCCC's Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) as it advances the technical work on REDD+ readiness, and vice-versa;

     o There is a proliferation of REDD+ relevant-funds and other IFIs, such as the GEF, Adaptation Fund, FCPF, FIP, and others that are growing in size and/or number and are experimenting with different models of governance and financing (e.g. direct access); especially in light of the design and development of the GCF;

     o Future actions for REDD+ face an increasing need for more tailored, targeted advice at a national level but also the need for more standardized tools that enable consistency in technical application and reduce duplication of efforts.

5.3   Trends in the UN-REDD Programme

Influenced by this dynamic global context of national and sub-national actions, UNFCCC decisions on deforestation and forest degradation, and other external trends in REDD+ and its funding, the UN-REDD Programme has seen rapid changes in its three years of operation. Some examples of the trends and remaining needs for the PB to consider in its decisions and strategic planning include the following:

     o Meet increasing operational and technical demands from countries as the programme has moved from 17 (2009) to 46 member countries (2012), and more countries enter Phase 2 and 3 of REDD+;

     o Coordinate and manage the now nearly $170 million[27] combined in SNA and National Programme activities;

     o Incorporate funding and develop the role of the Tier 2[28] funding mechanism as agreed in the Seventh, Eighth and Ninth PB meetings;

     o Update lessons learned from the pilots (in Asia and Africa, respectively) over the past three years;

     o Integrate findings of the country needs assessment into programme work and operations;

     o Manage the multiple partnerships[29] between the UN-REDD Programme and the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) and the Forest Investment Programme (FIP), for example, to continue to streamline REDD+.

As far as the internal context of the UN-REDD Programme is concerned, the Review has confirmed that governing and implementing bodies of the Programme face significant criticism, in particular from recipient countries. PB meetings have seen tension between constituencies, and the Programmes' governing and delivery structure has been frequently challenged leading to losses in efficiency and frustration for many UN-REDD participants. Hence the need arises to explore, analyze and assess the PB's "mandate, composition, role, responsibilities, governance structure, practices, procedures and accountability"[30] in light of the various challenges described.

5.4   Placing this Review in Context

The Review therefore is mindful of these various internal and external factors that present potential challenges and opportunities for the governance and management of the UN-REDD Programme, which must acknowledge the existence of different governance models established by new climate funds such as the Adaptation Fund and the GCF.

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[27] MPTF gateway, http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/CCF00, 21 February 2013
[28] UN REDD Website: http://www.un-redd.org/UNREDD_Japan_Partnership_Project/tabid/6379/Default.aspx
[29] e.g. Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO), the National Institute for Space Research in Brazil (INPE), the UNFCCC and the United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF)

Indeed, the decision of the Adaptation Fund (i) to establish a Board composed of parties to the Kyoto Protocol with a majority of developing countries (11 out of 16 members), and (ii) to open the implementation of funded projects to any national,[31] regional and multilateral institutions accredited by the Adaptation Fund Board, has established a new standard that many beneficiary countries would wish to see replicated in other current and future climate change funds and programmes.

The GCF Board is composed of an equal number of members from developing and developed country Parties to the UNFCCC. Whereas its business model is yet to be defined, and options are numerous considering the wide array of action of the GCF, it is most probable that (i) the GCF will adopt Enhanced Direct Access[32] through National Funding Entities (NFE) as one of its access modalities (acknowledging that many countries are in the process of setting up national climate change funding instruments e.g. the Bangladeshi Climate change resilience fund (BCCRF[33]) and the Brazilian Amazon Fund (BAF[34]) as their preferred conduit for climate change finance, both for domestic and international support); and (ii) enter into arrangements with some existing multilateral funding instruments to serve as Multilateral Funding Entities for the GCF in order to deal with funding for countries that do not have an NFE.[35]

It is within this context of both an evolution of delivery mechanisms towards Direct Access and even Enhanced Direct Access (i.e. through National Funding Entities) and a stronger piloting role of developing countries in climate funds that the tensions within the UN-REDD Policy Board emerge and within which the UN-REDD programme must review its strategy. Such a strategy will need to establish a shared Vision of Board members on what is, and what should be after 2015, the UN-REDD Programme, its role and its positioning vis-à-vis the above-mentioned global trends. Does the UN-REDD Programme wish to participate in the implementation of GCF actions in the future and become one of its delivery agents? Does it want to follow international trends that consist in (i) providing more weight to recipient countries in the governance structure, (ii) positioning multilateral agencies in support rather than in leadership of the Programme, and (iii) opening windows to some sort of Direct Access? Or does it want to remain a UN Programme, necessarily implemented by UN agencies?

It is certainly not the Reviewer's role to choose between different Visions on the future of the UN-REDD Programme, which will need to be discussed during the process of review of the UN-REDD Strategy beginning in 2013. Once a Vision has been agreed on, further changes in the functions of the PB and in the governing structure of the Programme will be made possible, so that the choices made are actually aligned with and contribute to positioning UN-REDD to achieve this Vision. However, the series of key informant interviews conducted within the framework of this Review have confirmed that the existence of different latent Visions and how to go about achieving them has been a key driver behind tensions in the PB. This has to be kept in mind as the reader goes through this Review report and as options for reform of the PB are proposed, when relevant. Some actions may be taken now to alleviate some of these tensions and increase efficiency of the PB in its work while positioning UN-REDD for the future, while other actions and decisions may have to wait until a future strategy is decided upon.

In the next section, the Reviewer will analyse (i) the organization and management of the PB's functions, composition and structure (role and relevance); (ii) if the PB conducts business effectively and responsively (effectiveness); (iii) if the PB conducts business in a timely fashion and in such a way that reduces duplicate efforts (efficiency); and (iv) whether the UN-REDD Programme Policy Board is positioned to enable fulfillment of the Programme Strategies (sustainability/leveraging). This analysis will lead to a number of recommendations and options on the PB composition, governance, management and

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[31] At present, the AF has 14 accredited National Funding Entities (NFEs)

[32] Enhanced direct access is defined as access through national Funding Entitites (NFEs), which are given the right to take operational implementing decisions on behalf of the GCF. Funding Entities would have to be accredited by the GCF in order to receive funding (see Müller, B. A Delhi Vision for the Green Climate Fund Business Model Framework – Some thoughts on Access and Disbursement)

[33] http://bccrf-bd.org/

[34] http://www.amazonfund.org/

[35] Ibid.

procedures that help inform the upcoming review of the UN-REDD Programme strategy and, above all, its practical implementation.

6. Findings by Review Criteria

6.1   Role and Relevance

Is the organization and management of the PB's functions, composition, and structure conducive to fulfilling programme objectives?

Summary of Findings:

The main findings of the Review, when it comes to the *Role and Relevance* review criteria, are as follows:

- Whereas the current functions of the PB are rather clear and relevant, some of them would benefit from being adjusted to bring balance to the split between strategic level functions and administrative/operational functions and respond to the concerns expressed at this level from numerous stakeholders.
- This could by the same token provide an opportunity to slowly evolve the governance structure of UN-REDD in a way that would allow for both more effective governance between now and 2015, and prepare the ground beyond 2015, should the vision for UN-REDD evolve towards alignment with emerging international financing windows for REDD+. By the same token, the ToRs and RoPs would benefit from an update to bring out clearly the rules of games to ensure transparency in this governance structure.
- The PB operations are not fully satisfactory and fully conducive to fulfilling programme objectives due to a number of factors including:
  - The lack of shared vision amongst PB members as to what UN-REDD should be and what it should become after 2015, creating a source of latent tension throughout the PB operations;
  - The lack of clarity in membership, in the role of different PB members, in the decision making processes, calling for enriched and clarified procedures and an adaptation of the governing structure of the Programme to streamline operations;
  - Heterogeneity in the profiles of the delegates, and their level of knowledge/competencies vs what is necessary to fulfil their role in the PB.

In line with these findings, the Reviewer recommends the following to start addressing these issues in the short term:

On the governance structure:
1. The UN-REDD programme could benefit from relying on a more broadly representative governance body when it comes to updating and approving the 'regulatory' framework of the UN-REDD Programme: Framework Document, Terms of Reference of the PB, Approval of Overall Budget and Performance Review. This could potentially be done, once a year, through a broadened PB meeting. This broadened PB meeting could bring together all member countries and donor, as well as observers. This broadened PB would focus on strategic functions and issues only.
2. Broadened PB meetings would also have to remain an opportunity for experience sharing and debates. Besides the invitation of strategic partners to PB meetings, or the organisation of specific events enabling IPs and CSOs to voice their opinions, sufficient time should be allocated during these meetings to experience sharing between countries.
- More administrative and procedural issues that have been assigned up to now to the PB could be dealt with by a smaller Executive Committee which would be formed of elected members of this broadened PB (to be reconfirmed every year). Its composition could be as follows: 3 countries (1 representative per region), 3 donors, 1 lead CSO, 1 lead IP, 1 lead UN Agency, the MTPF as ex-officio member and the Secretariat as Resource Agent/Observer;
3. This division of labour would be facilitated further by:
  - A clarified status and role of the Secretariat, the SG and the MG, and
  - A well established Monitoring and Evaluation Plan, enabling the PB and the Executive Committee to assess progress towards objectives and ensure that the funds spent actually

deliver the expected results, without the need to get involved into project-level management.

o The set up of a Bureau tasked with preparing the draft agenda for each PB and Executive Committee meeting well in advance of each meeting. Such Bureau should meet (virtually as much as possible) at least twice a year and could be formed of constituency elected representatives from the following: one representatives from beneficiary countries, one donor representative, the two elected co-chairs of the PB and EC meetings, and a representative from the Secretariat

4. To avoid any conflict of interest in the discussion on funding allocations, countries and UN Agencies who have been working on specific allocation demands and are interested into their implementation, should not participate to the consensual decision on that specific allocation. Their representatives could however act as resource persons prior to the decision time to help inform it. Specific procedures shall be designed and implemented in this regard.

On the ToRs/RoPs:
- Both the ToRs and the RoPs need to clarify the status of each category of stakeholders and their specific role in the PB, in order to avoid any confusion.
- The rationale behind the inclusion into the ToRs of section *5. Participating UN Organizations' Coordination Group* needs to be clarified, or completed (e.g. including the UN Strategy Group) or deleted.
- In order to avoid inconsistencies and possible discrepancies as mentioned above, one could recommend that PB membership be defined in detail into the ToRs.

6.1.1 What are the functions of the PB and how are they aligned with the present environment?

PB Current Functions

Following the principle that function defines form, an initial step of the Review consists in analysing the current functions of the PB and how they are aligned to the present environment. The PB current functions, as detailed in the UN-REDD Programme 2011-2015 Strategy and in the PB ToRs, are presented in Table 4together with the functions of 3 other funds/programmes for comparison purposes – the MDG-F fund, UNAIDS and the FCPF. This comparison aims to provide examples of what are the typical governance functions of other funds/programmes comparable in some ways to UN-REDD that can feed into the analysis.

Table 4: Key tasks and responsibilities of the PB and in governing bodies of other global programmes/funds

	MDG-F	UNAIDS	FCPF	UN-REDD
General governance structure	Fairly light structure at the global level with a two-member Steering Committee (UNDP and the government of Spain), a Secretariat and Technical Subcommittees (TSC). The Multi-Partner Trust Fund is the Administrative Agent for the MDG-F and provides financial and reporting services.[36]	The Executive Director of the programme, appointed by the UN Secretary-General upon the recommendation of the Cosponsors (UN Organisations) reports directly to the Programme Coordinating Board (PCB) that serves as the governance structure for the programme. The membership of the PCB comprises 22 Member States. The cosponsors have formed a Committee of Cosponsoring Organizations (CCO), which serves as a standing committee of the board.[37]	The FCPF governance structure includes a Participants Assembly (PA) including all participant countries and donors, and a 28 member Participants Committee (PC), which acts as the governing and decision-making body of the FCPF. The role of the PA is to provide general guidance to the PC at each Annual Meeting on the decisions made by the PC and, where appropriate, other issues discussed by the PC.[38]	UN-REDD programme is governed by an 18 member PB made up of representatives from partner countries, donors to the Multi-Partner Trust Fund, civil society, Indigenous Peoples and the three Participating UN Organizations (FAO, UNDP and UNEP)[39], and includes a large number of observers.
Functions of the 'Board' or equivalent	Overall leadership of the MDG-F is provided by the MDG-F Steering Committee. The Steering Committee: - Sets the strategic direction of the Fund; - Decides on individual financial allocations; - Monitors strategic allocations and delivery amongst priorities and countries; and - Tracks Fund-wide progress.[40]	The PCB acts as the governing body on all programmatic issues concerning policy, strategy, finance, and monitoring and evaluation of UNAIDS. The functions of the PCB are: - To establish broad policies and priorities for the Joint Programme; - To review and decide upon the planning and execution of the Joint Programme; - To review and approve the plan of action and budget for each financial period prepared by the Executive Director and reviewed by the CCO; - To review proposals of the Executive Director and approve arrangements for the financing of the Joint Programme; - To review longer-term plans of	The PA shall provide general guidance to the PC. The PC shall be responsible for: - Selecting an Eligible REDD Country to participate in the Facility; - Reviewing the Readiness Preparation Proposal submitted by a REDD Country Participant and providing guidance to the relevant components of the Readiness Preparation proposal; - Developing the criteria and procedures for grant allocation for Readiness Preparation Proposals and the criteria and procedures for review of the Readiness Preparation Proposals; - Making a decision on the grant allocation for preparing the Readiness Package by a REDD Country Participant; - Upon request by a REDD Country Participant, taking into account the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Technical Advisory Panel that may be established for this purpose in accordance with Article 13, endorsing some or all elements of the REDD Country Participant's	As stated in the UN-REDD Programme 2011-2015 Strategy, the PB is "responsible for oversight, strategic direction and financial allocations[43]" of the Programme. The 2008 UN-REDD Programme Framework Document specified the tasks it was originally charged with completing, that were to: • Provide overall leadership and set the strategic direction of UN-REDD; • Decide on Programme document financial allocation in line with budget parameters in the Framework document; • Develop monitoring mechanisms with a view to fund-wide success; and • Ensure coordination with REDD actors at a global scale, such as the FCPF participants' committee.[44] The 'tasks and responsibilities' (functions) outlined in the 2009 Policy Board ToRs are: - To review and approve [the PB] ToRs and Rules of Procedures (RoPs), and update and/or modify them, as necessary, in case of compelling requirements; - To set the strategic direction of the UN-REDD Programme,

[36] http://www.mdgfund.org/content/governancestructure
[37] Modus Operandi of the Programme Coordinating board, 2011
[38] First Programme Evaluation of the FCPF, 2011
[39] http://www.un-redd.org/PolicyBoard/tabid/102628/Default.aspx
[40] MDG-F Framework document, 2007
[43] UN-REDD Programme 2011- 2015 Strategy, p 19.
[44] UN-REDD Framework Document, Annex 2: MPTF Terms of Reference, p 22.

action and their financial implications;
- To review audited financial reports submitted by the Joint Programme;
- To make recommendations to the Cosponsoring Organizations regarding their activities in support of the Joint Programme, including those of mainstreaming; and
- To review periodic reports that will evaluate the progress of the Joint Programme towards the achievement of its goals.[41]

Readiness Package;
- Adopting policy guidance on pricing methodologies for Emission Reductions Payment Agreements pursuant to Section 3.1(b);
- In the absence of relevant UNFCCC Guidance on REDD, advising on modalities for determining how to attribute Emission Reductions generated from REDD activities to the provision of REDD incentives;
- In the absence of relevant UNFCCC Guidance on REDD, establishing a list of Independent Third Parties to deliver services related to Emission Reductions Programmes and/or other activities undertaken in the Facility;
- On the basis of the recommendations from the Facility Management Team, providing guiding principles on the key methodological framework on REDD;
- Approving the General Conditions of the Emission Reductions Payment Agreements, which set out general rights and obligations of the parties to the agreement;
- On the basis of recommendations from an Ad Hoc Technical Advisory Panel that may be established for this purpose, adopting guidelines on achieving Additional Benefits;
- Evaluating the operation of the Facility in accordance with Section 17.1;
- Approving the establishment of Ad Hoc Technical Advisory Panel(s) to provide technical advice and findings in order to fulfill its functions;
- Addressing defaults referred to in Sections 6.5, 7.3 and 8.4 of the FCPF Charter;
- Approving the Annual Budget of the Readiness Fund and the Shared Costs;
- Reporting to the PA at each Annual Meeting on the decisions made by the PC and, where appropriate, other issues discussed by the PC; and
- Performing any other functions necessary to facilitate operation of the Facility. [42]

responding to decisions of the UNFCCC CO and other bodies, based on inputs from the Secretariat, the UNDG, the Chief Executives Board (CEB) and others;
- To approve Joint Programme budget allocations submitted by the Secretariat, verify that the Secretariat has adequately applied the quality assurance standards and review implementation progress as set out in the RoPs;
- To approve ToRs for advisory bodies;
- To ensure appropriate coordination and collaboration with relevant initiatives, processes and funding mechanisms;
- To facilitate appropriate consultative processes with key stakeholders, in particular, Indigenous Peoples and other forest-dependent communities and CSOs;
- To review and approve periodic progress reports (programmatic and financial) consolidated by the Administrative Agent based on the progress reports submitted by Participating UN Organizations and to ensure consistency in reporting between countries with consolidated annual reports included in a section on the activities of the PB;
- To agree to the Evaluation Plan mentioned in the UN-REDD Programme Fund ToRs (Annex 2 of the Framework document);
- To review and approve the draft/final reports on lessons learnt, ensure the implementation of recommendations and identify critical issues follow up;
- To discuss the MPTF requirements and priorities concerning information management including appropriate MPTF and MPTF donor visibility; and
- To ensure alignment of the UN-REDD Programme activities with the Framework Document, the MoU between the Participating UN Organizations and the Administrative Agent and any Standard Administrative Arrangements signed between a donor and the Administrative Agent. [45]

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[41] Adapted from the MODUS OPERANDI of the Programme Coordinating Board, 2011.
[42] Adapted from the FCPF Charter, 2011.
[45] UN-REDD Programme Policy Board Terms of Reference. March 2009. P3-4.

There are many similarities in the functions of the governing bodies of the four programs/funds, as illustrated by the colored text in the above table. The four 'basic' functions of the governing boards consist in:

- Defining the strategic directions and priorities of the program/fund;
- Reviewing funding proposals;
- Deciding on financial allocations and agreeing on budgets; and
- Monitoring progress and fund utilization.

In addition, other functions relevant to a particular programme/fund are generally defined (e.g. "make recommendations to the Cosponsoring Organizations regarding their activities" (UNAIDS)). As far as the FCPF is concerned, its governance structure provides the Participants Committee with a strong operational role that is more usually shared with the Secretariat of the programmes/funds, such as "Developing the criteria and procedures for grant allocation", "advising on modalities", "providing guiding principles on the key methodological framework", and "adopting guidelines". This is inherent to the specific governance structure of the FCPF, with two Assemblies, that enables it to share the functions defined for the governing structure of the Facility.

The UN-REDD PB functions are rather clear and complete as long as one keeps in mind the strong operational role of the Secretariat. From this point of view, the Secretariat should really be defined as the operational arm of the PB, supporting the PB meetings, implementing its decisions and centralising the programme's follow-up and normative framework, supporting delivery of Programme services and results, and developing partnerships at the Programme level among other tasks. Therefore, in such a set up, the relationship between the Policy Board and the Secretariat should be very close, and logically the Secretariat should refer and be accountable to the PB and its co-chairs.

This, however, apparently contradicts the statement that "The Head of the Secretariat is accountable to the Strategy Group (SG), and administratively supervised by the Director, Division of Environmental Policy Implementation (UNEP)[46]" as written into the Secretariat revised ToRs dated 15 June 2012. This statement provides the SG with an authority over the Secretariat beyond the PB, which may introduce some confusion in the role of the Secretariat, its 'room for manoeuvre' and whom it is actually working for (PB members as a whole or UN agencies?). Such a set-up also goes against one of the visions that prevails amongst PB members as to where UN-REDD should be headed in the medium term, as eluded to in a previous section.

Compared to other funds/Programmes, the UN-REDD PB functions are unique in a number of aspects, in particular "To review and approve these Terms of Reference (ToRs) and Rules of Procedures (RoPs), and update and/or modify them, as necessary, in case of compelling requirements", "To ensure appropriate coordination and collaboration with relevant initiatives, processes and funding mechanisms", "To facilitate appropriate consultative processes with key stakeholders, in particular, Indigenous Peoples and other forest-dependent communities and civil society organizations". Table 5 below analyses the impact of each of the UN-REDD programme functions on the governance mechanism of the Programme.

Table 5: Impact of each of the UN-REDD programme functions on the governance mechanism of the Programme

UN-REDD	Impacts on governance mechanisms
To review and approve these Terms of Reference (ToRs) and Rules of Procedures (RoPs), and update and/or modify them, as necessary, in case of compelling requirements.	The question of the legitimacy of a governance body to review and approve its own ToRs comes out clearly, especially considering the limited representativeness of this body of 18 members only, whereas the Programme gathers 46 partner countries and six donors. In the FCPF, the PA, which gathers all participating countries (donors and recipients), is legitimate to define terms of reference and scope of work for the PC. At UNAIDS, the PCB responds to the decisions of

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[46] Management Note for Improved Delivery of the UN-REDD Programme, Annex A: Revised ToRs for the Strategy Group, the Management Group and the Secretariat, UN-REDD Programme, 15 June 2012.

	the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.
To set the strategic direction of the UN-REDD Programme, responding to decisions of the UNFCCC CO and other bodies, based on inputs from the Secretariat, the UN Development Group (UNDG), the Chief Executives Board (CEB) and others.	The PB must be able to maintain a certain distance from individual projects and activities and from procedural and administrative matters in order to set the strategic direction and demonstrate leadership of UN-REDD in the REDD+ process globally. The danger is that the significant involvement of the PB in specific country and project level issues and administrative issues will hinder the PB's strategic role.
To approve Joint Programme budget allocations submitted by the Secretariat, verify that the Secretariat has adequately applied the quality assurance standards and review implementation progress as set out in the RoPs.	A potential conflict of interest can be perceived if PB members benefitting from a programme can vote on its allocation. The lack of an institutionalized, independent strategic review process within UN-REDD also deepens this concern.
To approve the ToRs for advisory bodies.	This is indeed a function that can be played by the PB, as long as the members of the technical bodies are not also members of the PB to limit conflicts of interest.
To ensure appropriate coordination and collaboration with relevant initiatives, processes and funding mechanisms.	This strategic level function involves specific initiatives from the PB such as inviting relevant initiatives to specific events during PB meetings, participating in relevant events, meetings between the co-chairs and their counterparts from other initiatives, reporting on joint work with FCPF, etc. Whereas the strategic role of the PB logically embraces a function of positioning of the Programme within its global context and promoting partnerships and collaboration with relevant initiatives, the operational function of ensuring "coordination and collaboration," would typically be delegated to a Secretariat and implementing entities.
To facilitate appropriate consultative processes with key stakeholders, in particular, Indigenous Peoples and other forest-dependent communities and CSOs.	This function provides the UN-REDD PB with a specific role of consultation of key stakeholders, which is reflected in the composition of the PB with the integration of representatives of IPs and CSOs as full members (and not only observers as is the case with the FCPF). The extent of the representativeness of those organisations and the depth of the expected induced consultative process are important issues to keep in mind when analysing performance of the PB. The PB meetings must be an opportunity for key stakeholders to voice their opinions and participate in debates. Therefore, the PB must leave room for stakeholders to intervene during meetings and facilitate their participation, e.g. by covering participation costs.
To review and approve periodic progress reports (programmatic and financial) consolidated by the Administrative Agent based on the progress reports submitted by the Participating UN Organizations, and to ensure consistency in reporting between countries. Consolidated annual reports will include a section on the activities of the Policy Board.	Independence of the review and approval of periodic progress reports is ensured through this mechanism on the basis of the consolidated report from the Administrative Agent.
To agree to the Evaluation Plan mentioned in the UN-REDD Programme Fund ToRs (Annex 2 of the Framework document).	This function requires that an Evaluation Plan be actually proposed, validated and implemented for the Programme as a whole, which is not the case to date. Such a Measurement & Evaluation Plan would indeed be very useful to the PB for assessing in real time the results of the Programme and reviewing, as necessary, its interventions.
To review and approve the draft/final reports on lessons learnt, ensure the implementation of recommendations and identify critical issues for follow up.	The PB will likely require the necessary tools to ensure follow up on the implementation of recommendations, e.g. by setting-up an internal working group for this specific purpose.
To discuss the MPTF requirements and priorities concerning information management including appropriate MPTF and MPTF donor visibility.	Depending on the Vision that is retained for the future of UN-REDD post 2015, this function could be enlarged to include the MPTF MoU as necessary and in line with the evolution of the UN-REDD Programme and the strategic directions it follows. This is an issue to be kept in mind for the future.

| To ensure alignment of the UN-REDD Programme activities with the Framework Document, the MoU between the Participating UN Organizations and the Administrative Agent, and any Standard Administrative Arrangements (SSAs) signed between a donor and the Administrative Agent. | This is an important function of the PB, relating to the respect of the 'regulatory' framework of the Programme as it has been agreed on. It is important to consider, however, that if the PB must ensure alignment of the UN-REDD Programme *activities* with this framework, it should also be the role of the PB, or of an eventual superior entity, to ensure alignment of the framework to the Programme's *strategy*. In other words, the existing framework may strongly restrain possibly desirable strategic evolutions of the Programme and the PB; shall it be the case, there shall be a mechanism allowing adjustments to this framework. |

This analysis of the functions of the PB also leads to questions regarding the **balance between strategic versus administrative tasks and responsibilities of the PB** as well as between short versus medium and long-term tasks and responsibilities. The distribution between strategic and administrative tasks and responsibilities of the UN-REDD ProgrammePB can be broken down as follows:

Table 6: Distribution between strategic and administrative tasks and responsibilities

Strategic responsibilities	Administrative and operational responsibilities
1. To set the strategic direction of the UN-REDD Programme, responding to decisions of the UNFCCC CO and other bodies, based on inputs from the Secretariat, the UNDG the Chief Executives Board (CEB) and others. 2. To ensure appropriate coordination and collaboration with relevant initiatives, processes and funding mechanisms. 3. To facilitate appropriate consultative processes with key stakeholders, in particular, Indigenous Peoples and other forest-dependent communities and CSOs. 4. To ensure alignment of the UN-REDD Programme activities with the Framework Document, the MoU between the Participating UN Organizations and the Administrative Agent, and any Standard Administrative Arrangements (SSAs) signed between a donor and the Administrative Agent. [47]	1. To approve Joint Programme budget allocations submitted by the Secretariat; verify that the Secretariat has adequately applied the quality assurance standards; and review implementation progress as set out in the Rules of Procedure. 2. To approve ToRs for advisory bodies. 3. To review and approve periodic progress reports (programmatic and financial) consolidated by the Administrative Agent based on the progress reports submitted by the Participating UN Organizations; and to ensure consistency in reporting between countries. Consolidated annual reports will include a section on the activities of the Policy Board. 4. To agree to the Evaluation Plan mentioned in the UN-REDD Programme Fund Terms of Reference (Annex 2 of the Framework document). 5. To review and approve the draft/final reports on lessons learnt, ensure the implementation of recommendations and identify critical issues for follow up. 6. To discuss the MPTF requirements and priorities concerning information management including appropriate MPTF and MPTF donor visibility.

Although this distribution seems rather balanced on paper, the data collected during the Review process reveal that many PB members and observers regret that the majority of the time during PB meetings is spent on administrative and procedural issues, whereas the gathering of such a large diversity of members and observers, that is of actors of the REDD+ process, constitutes a unique opportunity for experience-sharing and high-level debates. Interviewees regret, for example, the lack of engaged dialogue on country proposals, the absence of position vis-a-vis the GCF, and more generally speaking the lack of interest in strategic aspects: what will the Programme do in the future? What is the Strategy of the Programme itself? How can the Programme better assist countries in their REDD+ readiness process?

The specific governance structure of the FCPF can be seen as a means to avoid such a problem: the PC discusses all administrative/procedural and operational matters, whereas the PA discussions are set at a more strategic level. This allows, on the one hand, high-level discussions with the participation of all countries and relevant stakeholders during PA meetings once a year, and on the other hand, an effective (and reduced in size) PC for more operational decisions now twice a year. In this regard, the *First evaluation of the FCPF* conducted in 2011 concludes: "The governance structure and processes of the FCPF are seen as highly effective by members and observers alike. This is promoted by the implementation of a

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[47] UN-REDD Programme Policy Board Terms of Reference, March 2009, p 3-4.

learning-by-doing approach, high levels of participation, a good balance in membership and consensus-based decision making."[48] Consultations conducted for this Review do not report the same enthusiasm on the efficiency of the governing structure of UN-REDD.

Looking at the Programme Coordinating Board (PCB) of UNAIDS, whose functions are in many ways similar to UN-REDD, the governance structure is organized so as to avoid, as far as possible, administrative matters that 'pollute' PCB meetings. First of all, the PCB Bureau, composed of a five PCB members, is in charge of setting up the PCB agenda thus choosing which matters should be dealt with in priority. In doing so, the Bureau ensures that agenda items are strategic to the Programme. The Bureau meets at least three times before each PCB meeting and more if needed. Secondly, the PCB does not approve country projects and budgets directly and never goes into micro-supervision of activities but only approves consolidated reports and budgets. This means that a lot of prerogative is left to the Secretariat itself calling for a strong and, above all, fully independent Secretariat. This type of organization, in particular when it comes to the process for setting up the PB meeting agenda, can also be a source of inspiration for UN-REDD. Indeed, it has been noted that the focus on administrative and operational issues by the PB to date is as much a consequence of the Agendas proposed as of the dynamics within the PB.

ToRs and RoPs

Current ToRs for the Policy Board, dated March 2009, define PB membership, functions (see above), Chairs and recognize the Participating UN Organizations' Coordination Group (now Management Group; the Strategy Group was not yet existing). The PB ToRs are very concise (3 pages) and refer to the RoPs and operational guidance for further details on the operational aspects of the PB. The current ToRs have remained unchanged since 2009, and the Review team has identified a number of necessary changes that have drawn the recommendations made in Section 9 of this report.

Specific observations on the ToRs stemming from the Review process are as follows:
- The ToRs only focus on membership, functions, and chairs and do not provide any operational details. Although some clauses included in the RoPs substantially influence this aspect (e.g. the PB composition and decision making), they are not all fully reflected in the PB ToRs. This is the case, for example, with invited observers; indeed, the RoPs state: "Representatives of other countries and organizations may be invited to observe Policy Board meetings at the discretion of the Co-Chairs of the Policy Board in consultation with other Policy Board members." The implementation of this clause has resulted in a total of 104 participants in the PB9, among which only 18 are actually members of the PB with the others having the status of observers. Given that observers are allowed to speak during the PB meetings without procedural time limits, this clause from the RoPs considerably modifies the PB's actual balance. This should be reflected in the ToRs and lead to specific rules for PB meetings. Another example resides in the definition of observers: the ToRs do not mention alternate members from UN-REDD Programme countries as official observers, nor do they include civil society, as defined in the RoPs. However, alternate members for member countries are mentioned in the RoPs in both section *1.2 Full Members* and *1.3 Observers and ex-officio members*. The reality is that alternate members have exactly the same rights as full members and do not have a specifically defined function. On the other hand, the MPTF office, as an ex-officio member, does participate in consensual decisions, which is not the case of the observers mentioned in point 1.3 of the RoPs. The rationale behind the inclusion into the ToRs of section *5. Participating UN Organizations' Coordination Group* is unclear from the documentation and needs either elaboration or reconsideration.
- The PB functions (Section 3 of the ToRs) at the moment come after the Membership section (currently Section 2); the definition of the function here does not precede the definition of the structure and composition, as would be expected.

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[48] First evaluation of the FCPF, June 2011, p11.

In addition, the survey and the interviews conducted during the Review process reveal that a large number of members and observers call for changes in the composition of the PB, and, more generally speaking, changes to the governance structure of the UN-REDD programme as discussed in section 6.1.2 below. Should such changes occur, the PB ToRs would, of course, need to reflect them accordingly.

As they stand now, the PB ToRs do not include any specific mechanisms to support transparency and accountability of the PB. However, such mechanisms do exist within the RoPs and the MPTF MoU. Those include:

- <u>Rules governing the role of the Administrative Agent</u>: The UNDP MPTF Office serves as administrative agent and is entitled to allocate an administrative fee of one percent of the amount contributed by each donor signing and an administrative arrangement to meet its costs.

- <u>Rules for covering indirect cost of Participating UN Organizations</u>: Indirect cost of the Participating UN Organizations recovered through programme support costs is fixed at seven percent in the MoU of the MPTF.

- <u>Rules on reporting requirements</u>: Each Participating UN Organization must provide the Administrative Agent with the following statements and reports: annual narrative progress reports, annual financial statements and reports, final narrative reports after completion of the activities in the approved programmatic document and certified financial statements and final financial reports after completion of the activities. The Administrative Agent will also provide the donors, the UN-REDD PB and Participating UN Organizations with certified annual financial statements and certified final financial statements.[49] In addition, the RoPs specify that (i) The UN-REDD Programme Secretariat will submit biannual progress updates to the PB for review and action as appropriate; (ii) The Administrative Agent will provide regular updates on the financial status of the MPTF to the PB for review and action as appropriate; (iii) In line with the MoU, Participating UN Organizations will submit annual narrative and financial progress reports to the Administrative Agent, as following UNDG financial and progress reporting formats; (iv) The Secretariat shall provide the PB with updates on the implementation progress of Joint Programmes (both Global and National) every 6 months based on information received by the Participating UN Organizations; and (v) In accordance with the MOU and the SAA, the Administrative Agent will submit consolidated narrative and financial reports to all UN-REDD Programme donors. Agreed standard UNDG financial and progress reporting formats will be utilized. The Administrative Agent will also submit to donors a certified annual financial statement (Source and Use of Funds).

- <u>Rules for covering cost of members to attend PB meetings</u>: the RoPs clearly define which members are subject to reimbursement of their costs in order to attend PB meetings.

- <u>Rules on conflicts of interest</u>: the RoPs specify that Members of the PB directly benefiting from or with a specific personal interest, or appearance of an interest, in projects/activities to be approved by the Policy Board, shall disclose such real, perceived or potential conflict(s) of interest to the Co-chairs of the UN-REDD Programme PB and abstain from any decision or vote on the matter involving the conflict(s).

Therefore, the terms of reference themselves do not include specific mechanisms to support transparency and accountability of the PB, but the RoPs and the MoU of the MPTF clearly define who reports to whom, on what, and how often, and what costs should be covered by the Programme and at what level. There could, however, be value in duly integrating such aspects in the ToRs.

Conclusion: What are the functions of the PB and how are they aligned with the present environment?

Whereas the current functions of the PB are rather clear and relevant, some of them would benefit from being adjusted to bring balance to the split between strategic level functions and

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[49] See the Standard Memorandum of Understanding for Multi-Donor Trust Funds Using Pass-Through Fund Management, UNREDD.

administrative/operational functions and respond to the concerns expressed at this level from numerous stakeholders. This could by the same token provide an opportunity to slowly evolve the governance structure of UN-REDD in a way that would allow for both more effective governance between now and 2015 with minimal change and prepare ground beyond 2015, should the Vision for UN-REDD evolve towards alignment with emerging international financing windows for REDD+. By the same token, the ToRs and RoPs would benefit from an update to bring out clearly the rules of games to ensure transparency in this governance structure. Such recommendations for changes in governance structure will be elaborated in the concluding section of this chapter.

6.1.2 What are the structure and composition of the PB and potential areas for adjustments in light of the current Programme objectives?

A review of relevant sections of the ToRs and the RoPs enables an understanding of the PB structure and composition. Besides permanent and occasional observers, PB members (i.e. members who participate in decision making) can be divided into 4 main blocks:

Figure 1: Policy Board structure as of November 2012

UN Org	Donors	Countries	Civil Society
1. UNDP	1. Norway	1. Paraguay	1. CSO
2. UNEP	2. Japan	2. Panama	2. IP (UNPFII)
3. FAO	3. Dk/Spain	3. Ecuador	
4. MPTF office		4. Zambia	
		5. Nigeria	
		6. DRC	
		7. PNG	
		8. Vietnam	
		9. Cambodia	

UN-REDD Secretariat

It remains unclear in the RoPs what is the definition of a full member versus an alternate member. Since alternate members participate in decisions, there is no apparent difference with full members, with the exception of the possibility to co-chair PB meetings that is reserved for full members.

The respective weights of the 4 blocks above differ according to the number of members within each block, but many other factors can actually influence decision making, as for example:

- Representatives from the agencies are strongly involved in the programme and therefore have an in-depth knowledge of the issues around its implementation, which is not necessarily the case of other representatives;
- The UN-REDD Secretariat, if not a member, strongly influences discussions given its role in the preparation of PB meetings and the agenda in particular;
- The co-chairs, who pertain to only two specific blocks at the moment (1 UN Agency, 1 Programme Country) can strongly influence the PB meeting and play an important role in driving discussions to reach consensus;
- Observers reinforce some of the blocks: e.g. the Independent Advisory Group on Rights, Forests and Climate Change (IAG), the UN management group, and other observers present during PB meetings.

Since decisions are taken by consensus of full members and alternate members,[50] the relative 'weight' of each block is more a matter of level of knowledge of the programme, level of experience within such boards and individual capacities to express clear opinions than a direct consequence of the number of members in each block. The question of the choice of delegates (their profile and experience) within each member organisation is also crucial in this regard. This specific point is further discussed in Box 1 below.

The main comments collected during the Review process regarding the current PB structure include the following:

- As far as the size of the PB is concerned, the survey reveals a clear dichotomy between Donors and UN Agencies who largely consider the PB size as too large to be efficient, and developing countries, CSOs and IPs who generally consider the PB size as correct or even insufficient.

- Many critics are formulated regarding the three seats given to UN Agencies, considered by many in a conflict of interest position to decide on funding allocation in particular. With three seats added to the seat of the MPTF and the active presence of the Secretariat, many feel the relative weight of the UN in the Policy Board is too heavy.

- A number of interviewees think that donors are not sufficiently represented in the PB. Not only is their relative weight low, but it is difficult to attract more donors given the rules in place for allocation of seats.

- There is an unclear divide between observers and members; everyone is given the opportunity to speak. As a result, the group is too big to remain manageable and to make informed decisions. In addition, observers do not necessarily understand/accept the final decision taken by 18 members within an assembly of 100 or more.

- With an increasing number of countries interested in REDD+ readiness, and UN-REDD in particular, the adoption of rotation of membership is considered a welcome development. However, such a rotation must be adapted to the specific and evolving context. Representation of each geographical group needs to be duly considered, in particular as regards the constitution of groups with similar interests/contexts (shall Latin America be considered as a single group or divided between Central/South America? Are the interests of South-East Asian countries similar to South Asia and Oceania?). In addition, member countries representing their group shall organize preparation meetings or teleconferences prior to PB meetings in order to reach joint positions of the group. Such meetings could be favored/facilitated by the Programme. The same applies to member CSOs/IPs, as mentioned below.

- Having CSOs/IPs as official members of the PB is generally considered a welcome innovation, and their attributed number of seats is generally considered by interviewees as sufficient/balanced. The UN-REDD programme is unique in this regard, whereas in other funds and programmes CSOs are, at best, observers. This is confirmed by the online survey, in which most respondents (more than 2/3) consider CSOs' engagement as "Just right". A criticism has been formulated, however, regarding the choice of the UN Permanent forum on Indigenous issues as the sole permanent member, whereas seat rotation with other IP organisations would appear more equitable.

- Concerning private sector engagement, the private sector is widely recognised as a key actor of the REDD+ process, but questions arise regarding the representativeness of any private sector organization and the difficulties in bringing the private sector to the UN table, particularly in the present operational context of the PB.

- The competence of the co-chairs is of utmost importance for the PB's efficiency, and many think better rules should be defined on the qualifications required and the choice of co-chairs.

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[50] UN-REDD Programme Rules of Procedures: "The Policy Board makes decisions by consensus of the full members and alternate members."

Box 1: the choice of delegates by PB members

The profile of expertise and knowledge of PB delegates is in majority considered as adequate in the survey conducted; notwithstanding which category of PB member answered, with the exception of donors who tend to consider it as insufficient. However, the fact that the thematic, technical and financial expertise of PB delegates is qualified as insufficient by one third of the survey respondents is significant. In this regard, interviews pointed out difficulties and possible gaps in the type and level of expertise of PB delegates to fulfil their function. There is a lack of clear rules to ensure that the individuals chosen by PB members to represent them have the necessary competencies to fulfil the function. A lack of transparency regarding the background of PB delegates is also highlighted, since nobody actually sees the CV of PB delegates, who come from very diverse origins: high-level administration/political representative, programme officer from the Ministry of environment of a member country, UN administration professional, etc. This diversity can be problematic in terms of type and level of discussions conducted and decisions taken during PB meetings.

Interviewees also mentioned that building the capacities of delegates is important, but they consider this should be done in parallel to their participation to PB meetings, i.e. delegates should not only learn during the meetings but receive briefings prior and in-between meetings in order to be more operational during the meetings.

The question of the tenure of PB representatives is also an important one: the survey reveals that the tenure of PB members (currently 2 years) is in majority considered as adequate, although many participants remain unsure on this aspect. Longer tenure means reduced rotation of seats, but at the same time delegates sometimes need time to effectively contribute to the decision process. For example, CSOs rotate their unique seat every 6 months, a disposition criticized in the on-line survey for not respecting the necessary time for the representative to be fully effective in its position.

It is difficult however to analyse the structure and composition of the PB in a vacuum since the composition and role of other governance structures in UN-REDD are equally important to the Programme's success in meeting its objectives and strongly influence the PB in its functions. In this regard, a quick analysis of the governing structures of other funds/programmes is informative. The table in Annex 1 compares in detail the governance structure and implementation bodies of the MDG-F, UNAIDS and the FCPF. From this comparison, the following items are of particular interest and presented in the summary Table 7 below:

Table 7: Comparative summary of the governance structure and implementation bodies of the MDG-F, UNAIDS and the FCPF

Body	Spanish sponsored MDG Fund	UNAIDS Secretariat	FCPF
Board	Two-member Steering Committee (UNDP + Spain).	the PCB comprises 22 Member States, within which a majority are developing countries.	The Participants Assembly (PA) includes all participant countries and donors, and the Participants Committee (PC) includes 28 members, among which 14 members shall be from REDD Country Participants and 14 members shall be collectively from Donor Participants and Carbon Fund Participants/
	• In UNAIDS (which is a UN Programme as is UN-REDD) and FCPF, (voting) members of the Board are countries only; • Board members are chosen/elected by their peers to represent them; • The FCPF PA offers an opportunity for all Programme members to meet once a year and concentrate on strategic issues, letting the PC deal with more operational matters; • Observers are not voting members. A list of permanent observers is generally proposed. Other observers may be invited to meetings; • The Board is often divided into a Bureau of 5-8 members to liaise with the secretariat, ensure Board decisions are implemented, establish the agenda of Board meetings and deal with all inter-sessional matters.		
Advisory panel/working groups	Technical Sub Committees provide technical and policy advice to the Steering Committee. Technical Sub-Committees were made up of 10-12 UN and independent experts appointed by the Steering Committee meeting under a Convenor. The Sub-Committees advised the Steering Committee on the technical and design merits of applications to the Fund in their area of competence. The Secretariat was therefore not directly involved in the analysis of applications, which was important to avoid any critics regarding its independence or competence in the subject area.	A number of subcommittees are established by theme.	The FCPF's Facility Management Team (FMT) maintains a roster of experts who can be selected to serve on the Technical Advisory Panel (TAP). The FMT invites TAP experts to review Readiness Preparation Proposals (R-PPs) submitted by REDD eligible countries for completeness and quality in meeting the criteria for R-PP set forth by the FCPF Information Memorandum. According to the First evaluation of FCPF, "The review process through the TAP has proved to be an effective and efficient mechanism for providing sound and independent inputs to R-PPs, although the multiple stage TAP review process has meant that in some cases it has been lengthy".

- Clear procedures delegating the review of applications for funds to an independent advisory panel is considered to ensure the objectivity of the review and its technical quality. In UN-REDD, the Operational Guidance[51] specifies that "Depending on the scope of the NJP, the Secretariat may enlist independent technical experts. The Secretariat is not bound by the views of the experts, but will make a synthesis of any independent reviews available to the Policy Board." This procedure may attract critics as per the independence and objectivity of the Secretariat.

| *Secretariat* | The Secretariat represents a link between the Steering Committee and participating countries, providing guidance and day-to-day support. | The Executive Director of the programme (and of the Secretariat) is appointed by the UN Secretary-General upon the recommendation of the Cosponsors. He/she reports directly to the Programme Coordinating Board.
In 2005, the Joint Programme led a process to clarify and cost a Division of Labour for technical support to countries. This culminated in an agreement on a Division of Labour that more clearly differentiated the roles of the UNAIDS Cosponsors and Secretariat in providing, as well as managing, technical support. To avoid duplication between the Secretariat and the Cosponsors, the Secretariat will not convene or co-convene any of the 15 Division of Labour areas but will facilitate and promote cooperation and achievement goals, as stated in the Strategy, in all Division of Labour areas.
UNAIDS Secretariat has its headquarters in Geneva and works on the ground in more than 80 countries. Secretariat staff is directly employed by the Secretariat but legally depends on the World Health Organization. | A Facility Management Team under the Facility is hereby established by the Bank to be responsible for the day-to-day operation of the Facility |

- The precise role of the Secretariat is described in detail in UNAIDS documentation. In addition, work on the division of labour has permitted a more clear differentiation of the roles of the UNAIDS Cosponsors (i.e. agencies) and the Secretariat. The ToRs for the UN-REDD Secretariat, as defined in Annex A of the *Management Note for Improved Delivery of the UN-REDD Programme* (published in 2012), provide a good level of detail as well.
- UNAIDS has a very strong Secretariat, established in more than 80 countries, in charge of coordinating actions of delivery partners, including governments and NGOs at national and regional levels. The head of the Secretariat is the Programme Director and reports to the Board directly.

| *Delivery mechanism* | The UN Resident Coordinators (RC) and Governments rated as highly positive the establishment of a National Steering Committee through which the Government, the UN and Spain are represented by a single voice at the country level.

Over time, the management of the joint programmes have evolved to use Coordination Units with a lead coordinator representing all partners,and located, when possible, in national counterparts central offices and/or in one of the areas of intervention. | The programme builds on the capacities and comparative advantages of its 12 cosponsoring organizations (11 UN agencies and the World Bank).
At the national level, UNAIDS encourages the establishment of National Aids Councils in each country in order to coordinate all actions and stakeholders regarding the fight against Aids | The World Bank was the FCPF initial delivery agent. This has now been extended through to other delivery partners including regional Banks and the UNDP. Through the "multiple-delivery partners" approach, diversifying delivery and implementation partners will most likely help improve disbursement rates. |

- Implementation through the UN or the WB is usual practice. Each delivery agent has then its own way of working with national governments. It is interesting to note, however, that FCPF has broadened its approach to other delivery agents (UNDP, Inter-American Development Bank) in order to improve its delivery rate. This is likely positively received by developing countries who generally wish to be given the chance to choose their delivery agent.
- Coordination teams gathering all relevant stakeholders at the country level (e.g. National Steering Committees) are considered to be an important tool ensuring country engagement, consultation of all concerned parties, efficiency in implementation through coordination and avoided replication.

In light of the current Programme objectives and outcomes as defined in the UN-REDD 2011-2015 Strategy, the various sources of information gathered in the course of this review together reveal a number of areas for potential adjustment in the PB composition as well as in the procedures influencing this composition. Those include:

- Adjustments in the size of the PB;
- Adjustments in the membership and relative weight of each constituency;
- Adjustments in the role of the Secretariat, in particular during PB meetings; and
- The need to clarify the respective rights and privileges of different categories of members – namely full members, alternate members and observers.

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[51] Rules of Procedures and operational Guidance, UN-REDD Programme, March 2009, revised July 2012.

The comparative elements reviewed must also feed into the process of reflection on the future of UN-REDD. In the short term, with respect to increasing the relevance of the PB to the conduct of its current business cycle, the following elements should be taken into account:

- Representativeness of PB members vis-à-vis their constituencies;
- The need to organise larger meetings, with all country participants and a large number of observers, to exchange and decide on strategic issues and reduce the size of what is now called "PB meetings" to allow more efficient operation;
- Clarification of the status of permanent and occasional observers and their respective roles;
- Establishment of a smaller, yet representative PB Executive Committee in lieu of the existing PB structure to enable better operational decision making;
- Publication of ToRs for the 'perfect PB delegate' to help PB member countries and institutions identify sufficiently skilled people and to serve as a good means of ensuring that the high-level of competence and availability required by the PB work is reached. Such ToRs could, for instance, define the necessary competencies of a PB delegate, the role, rights and obligations of a PB delegate, the estimated work load (and necessary availability) of a PB delegate, etc;
- Publish the delegates' Curriculum Vitae on the UN-REDD website to enable more transparency on who represents the members, and their respective profiles, as it is common practice for many funds.

*   *   *

Overall conclusion on relevance: Is the organization and management of the PB's functions, composition, and structure conducive to fulfilling programme objectives?

The data collected and analysis provided reveal that the functions of the PB are somewhat well aligned to the present environment, although a number of adjustments would need to be considered to help streamline its operations in view of the comparative practices in other organisations. Furthermore, implementation is not fully satisfactory nor fully conducive to fulfilling programme objectives due to a number of factors including:

- The lack of shared Vision amongst PB members as to what UNREDD should be and what it should become after 2015, creating a source of latent tension throughout the PB operations;
- The lack of clarity in membership, in the role of different PB members and in the decision making processes, calling for enriched and clarified procedures and an adaptation of the governing structure of the Programme to streamline operations;
- Heterogeneity in the profiles of the delegates and their level of knowledge/competencies versus what is necessary to fulfil their role in the PB.

Recommendations:

Specifically, the following is recommended to start addressing these issues.

On the governance structure:
5. The UN-REDD programme could benefit from relying on a more broadly representative governance body when it comes to updating and approving the 'regulatory' framework of the UN-REDD Programme: Framework Document, Terms of Reference of the PB, Approval of Overall Budget and Performance Review. This could potentially be done once a year through a broadened PB meeting. This broadened PB meeting could bring together all member countries and donors as well as observers. This broadened PB would focus on strategic functions and issues only.

6. Broadened PB meetings would also be an opportunity for experience sharing and debates. Besides the invitation of strategic partners to PB meetings or the organisation of specific events enabling IPs and CSOs to voice their opinions. Sufficient time should be allocated during these meetings to allow for experience sharing between countries.

- More administrative and procedural issues that have been assigned up to now to the PB could be dealt with by a smaller Executive Committee formed of elected members of the broadened PB (to be reconfirmed every year). Its composition could be as follows: 3 countries (1 representative per region), 3 donors, 1 lead CSO, 1 lead IP, 1 lead UN Agency, the MTPF as ex-officio member and the Secretariat as Resource Agent/Observer.

7. This division of labour would be facilitated further by:
    o A clarified status and role of the Secretariat, the SG and the MG, and
    o A well-established Monitoring and Evaluation Plan, enabling the PB and the Executive Committee to assess progress towards objectives and ensure that the funds spent actually deliver the expected results, without the need to get involved into project-level management.
    o The set-up of a Bureau tasked with preparing the draft agenda for each PB and Executive Committee meeting well in advance of each meeting. Such a Bureau should meet (virtually as much as possible) at least twice a year and could be formed of constituency-elected representatives from the following: one representative from beneficiary countries, one donor representative, the two elected co-chairs of the PB and EC meetings and a representative from the Secretariat.

8. To avoid any conflict of interest in the discussion on funding allocations, countries and UN Agencies who have been working on specific allocation demands and are interested in their implementation should not participate in the consensual decision on that specific allocation. Their representatives could, however, act as resource persons prior to the decision time to help inform it. Specific procedures shall be designed and implemented in this regard.

On the ToRs/RoPs:
- Both the ToRs and the RoPs need to clarify the status of each category of stakeholders and their specific role in the PB, in order to avoid any confusion.
- The rationale behind the inclusion into the ToRs of section *5. Participating UN Organizations' Coordination Group* needs to be clarified, completed (e.g. including the UN Strategy Group) or deleted.
- In order to avoid inconsistencies and possible discrepancies as mentioned above, one could recommend that PB membership be defined in detail in the ToRs.
- In the review of the ToRs, it will be important to ensure that those rules are duly integrated into the ToRs and, for some of them, into the RoPs, ensuring that transparency and accountability of the PB is clearly supported by a number of mechanisms.

6.2   Effectiveness

Does the PB conduct business effectively and responsively, with appropriate guidance and oversight in order to reach programme objectives?

Summary of Findings:

The Review found that:

- Many of the procedures used in the conduct of meetings have considerably improved over time and now follow standards used in other comparable funds and are considered by PB members and observers as sufficient, including when it comes to those not existing formally on paper. That being said, some confusion remains, calling for a more detailed set of procedures to be described in the RoPs and validated by the PB.
- As far as financial reporting is concerned, it is hoped that the recent decisions reached regarding unified reporting formats between the three UN agencies will help meet the needs for reporting from the PB, to ensure reporting at the impact, outcome and output level, with activity level information also available for consultation, as required.
- The level of responsiveness of the PB can be qualified as relatively good, with well appreciated material and knowledge products, strong coherence with UNFCCC guidance and relatively good responsiveness to participating countries' requests. Areas for improvement mainly reside in ensuring an even better feedback from experience to the UNFCCC, and responding to the demands for increased country ownership. Responsiveness is an area of possible continuous improvement and future reforms to the governing structure of the Programme, as well as to the procedures in place, will obviously have to be mindful of this.
- The level of guidance and oversight on financial matters is rather good and in line with international fiduciary standards.

That being said, the Review clearly outlines that there remains significant room for improvement, in particular with respect to:

- Procedures for the conduct of meetings, which need to be completed and more detailed;
- Financial reporting, which requires unified reporting formats;
- Budget discussions, which need to enable PB members and observers to clearly understand the choices proposed in terms of budget allocations, without getting into micro-management;
- Ensuring a good feedback from experience to the UNFCCC;
- Monitoring and reporting of programme progress to the PB;
- Harmonisation of reporting procedures; and
- The overall organisation of the conduct of business, which includes, among other elements, the possibility for the PB to concentrate on more strategic level issues.

In line with these findings, it is recommended that the PB needs to:

- **Clarify and better detail procedures for the conduct of meetings, in particular with respect to the following aspects:**
  - Decide on the scope and form of the inter-sessional decision-making process, with a clear definition of what should be decided during meetings only and what cannot be decided inter-sessionally. In particular, decisions on the Programme's budget, on funding allocations, on the PB ToRs and RoPs, and more generally speaking all strategic level decisions must remain within PB meetings, whereas the inter-sessions can expedite more operational matters;
  - Decide, as already suggested, on the pertinence of setting up a PB Bureau or any participatory process for the adoption of PB meeting agendas, but also to assist with

the process of inter-sessional decision making; and to liaise with the Secretariat inter-sessionally;

- o Formalize the use of working groups in the RoPs, including standard terms of reference;
- o Consider the publication of ToRs for Board delegates (qualification, tasks and responsibilities, necessary availability) and the publication of delegates' short CVs on the UN-REDD website;
- o Clarify, in the RoPs, the decision-making process (who participates to the consensus?, what is the role of observers?);
- o Ensure responsibilities for each decision point of the PB are clearly assigned, within a clear time-frame, e.g. in the PB meetings reports, for further follow-up;
- o Consider the publication of ToRs for the co-chairs, specifying their role, tasks and responsibilities, and the competencies required;
- o Consider assigning co-chairing roles to each of the following constituencies: One member country and One donor member.
- o Include a time management section into the RoPs, setting the rules on which PB co-chairs car rely for time management during meetings;
- o Consider a coordination mechanism between the countries of each sub-region prior to each PB meetings, so that members can speak for their constituency.

- **Ensure discussions on financial matters occur**: in addition to the detailed documentation provided, financial issues should be presented and discussed thoroughly at some point, including on the distribution of funds between the Global and the National Programmes. If PB meetings reveal too short for this, setting-up specific Working Groups with representatives of all constituencies might be a good avenue. This could be detailed in the updated procedure for SNA budget approval, which is very concise in the current RoPs.

- For a stronger cooperation between actors at the national level, **continue to promote the establishment of 'National Coordination Groups' in REDD+ countries**, gathering all relevant stakeholders and governmental institutions. This should help ensure the coordination of REDD+ activities at country level with all relevant stakeholders, and assist in better addressing the drivers of deforestation which often fall outside the forestry sector as such.

- **Ensure feedback from experience to the UNFCCC is sufficiently organized** with the nomination of a responsible staff within the Secretariat, well versed into Convention processes and politics, to ensure a permanent link with the UNFCCC Secretariat.

6.2.1 **Does the PB conduct business in a manner that is appropriate in light of the challenges surrounding the evolution of REDD+ and the UN-REDD Programme's response to those challenges?**

PB Conduct of Business for Meetings

The Review process compiled views and suggestions on procedures for the conduct of business from various sources. After analysis of this data, Table 8 below summarizes the main findings stemming from the Review process.

Table 8: Summary of findings on procedures linked to the conduct of meetings

Rules/procedures	Review findings
Rules or criteria in place for determining which matters are handled inter-sessionally vs. during PB meetings	The process seems to be largely handled on a case-by-case basis, inter-sessional decisions being used to avoid important losses of time when a decision cannot be taken during a given meeting and cannot wait for the next meeting 6 months later. There is no real procedure for determining which matters are handled inter-

	sessionally. That being said, the Rules of Procedures detail how such decisions should be taken, as illustrated in Box 2. Some interviewees and survey respondents mentioned they do not really like the process but still consider it as necessary for efficiency purposes.
Procedure for adoption of agenda (before/during PB meetings)	The Agenda is generally proposed by the Secretariat, and PB members can request modifications before the meeting or when approving the agenda at the beginning of the meeting. However, a more participatory approach is call for by some members: it could be useful to have a more consultative process on what would be on the agenda well in advance of the meeting. In addition, it does not seem totally clear to PB members how far they are allowed to comment/request changes on the proposed agenda. It has been commented that the Agenda-setting process has often lost sight of the much needed focus on strategic discussions at the PB level, with a tendency to focus on administrative and operational issues.
Procedure for the adoption of minutes	There is no written procedure regarding the adoption of minutes in the RoPs. Minutes are normally sent by the Secretariat to PB members within 2 weeks after each PB meeting, and 15 days are given for comments/approval. Whereas this procedure is generally considered as sufficient, a number of stakeholders welcome the process that has now been introduced to clarify the list of agreed decisions at the end of each meeting (re. PB9) in order to avoid unproductive losses of time going through the minutes or any further protest on key decision points afterwards. Decisions are now displayed and agreed on-site (and on-screen) and minutes then act more as a formality.
Procedure for establishing Working Groups	The establishment of working groups (WG) is not foreseen in the RoPs. Whereas working groups are generally considered a useful procedure by PB members and observers to help solve issues efficiently, more clarity is required in terms of (i) when a WG should be established; (ii) what should be the composition of the WG; (iii) what are the ToRs of the WG; and (iv) when shall the WG be dismantled?
Procedure for nominating national focal points	Procedures for determining members of the PB are detailed in (i) the Rules of Procedures, and (ii) the Policy Board Composition document, regularly updated. However, interviews conducted suggest that there is a need to clarify the procedure for nominating national focal points. Whereas it is widely accepted that national focal points nomination must remain the decision of countries, some interviewees mentioned a need for improvement in the consistency and clarity of who represents partner countries (delegates). Support could be provided by UN-REDD with respect to (i) the design of ToRs for national focal points, as already suggested in section 6.1, detailing the expertise and competencies needed to play the role of PB member, the tasks and responsibilities of PB members and the necessary time (the availability) for initial training and on-going PB member work; (ii) a clear designation procedure from country authorities with official communication of the nominee and his/her national alternate to the PB. In this respect, during the ninth PB meeting, the Board requested the Secretariat to propose an enhanced process to nominate and revise country focal points for the Programme and to circulate it to the PB for approval. The Secretariat has sent a specific form to countries for this purpose.[52]
Procedure for designating alternates when focal points cannot attend PB meetings	Since there is no clear procedure for identifying focal points, there is no procedure for identifying alternates in the RoPs. Clarification of this issue is widely called upon.
Procedure for agreeing on key decision points	The survey reveals that agreeing on key decision points suffers from insufficient procedures for half of the respondents, which is very significant. The RoPs specify that "the Policy Board makes decisions by consensus of the full members and alternate members". Consensus is also a rule for UN MPTF, the rationale

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[52] Report on the Ninth Policy Board meeting, Dec 2012.

	being the need for the MPTF to have a say in decision making because they have a responsibility for ensuring allocations are made according to ToRs of the fund. However, some respondents/interviewees find consensus sometimes inefficient with examples of extremely lengthy discussions in the attempt to reach consensus on decisions. In addition, the decision making process seems to be often too hasty at the very end of meetings, and there is a call for finding alternatives that would secure a smoother decision making process. Finally, as mentioned in the above section on the adoption of minutes, different interviewees applauded the new approach at the PB to communicate decisions at the end of each PB meeting thus avoiding any further questions on what has been agreed on before. Therefore clarification is needed on the following questions: - Who participates in/qualifies for consensus? What procedure can be followed in order to make it clear when consensus is achieved? - How far (and for how long) can observers participate in debates and have a say in decision making?
Procedure for PB follow-up to decisions (or action items)	At each PB meeting, the Secretariat reports on progress in the follow-up to previous PB decisions and has a tracking system in place, which is positively recognised by PB members and observers. However, a number of interviewees mentioned the need for a clear-cut timeframe and responsible bodies for the implementation of each PB decision to be communicated (e.g. within the summary of decisions of PB meetings reports).
Procedure(s) for determining Chairs for the PB	The procedure described in the RoPs is mostly qualified as sufficient and clear: "The Policy Board agreed on co-Chairs for each Policy Board meetings: one participating country and one participating UN agency. The country co-Chairs will be selected from the three full members and will rotate among the three regional groupings."[53] The importance of the chairs has often been underlined during interviews. They indeed play a major role in the success of PB meetings by ensuring smooth and efficient conduct of meetings. As a consequence, some interviewees stressed the importance of highly skilled chairs with the necessary experience and leadership to drive discussions efficiently. The procedure to choose the chairs may need to be reviewed in order to transparently include such considerations. In light of the comments made on the significant weight of UN agencies in the PB, it would, however, be desirable to follow the model taken by FCPF where co-chairs are selected from the following constituencies: One member country and One donor member.
Procedures/rules for the appointment of IA and/or UN-staff within the UN-REDD Programme	As far as UN agencies representative at the PB are concerned, it is considered that, similarly to governments appointing the appropriate people within their structure, the UN agencies should also have the authority to nominate their representatives. The same occurs with UN staff involved in the UN-REDD Programmes within the three agencies; it is considered to be an internal process and responsibility of the agencies, following UN rules on staff hiring. As far as the staff of the Secretariat is concerned, the issue of the perceived lack of independence of the Secretariat staff vis-à-vis the UN agencies implementing the programme has been raised on several occasions.
Mechanisms in place for time management during PB meetings	There is no real procedure in place for time management, which mostly depends on the capacities and judgment of the co-chairs. A number of key informants consulted consider that a lot of time is spent on issues of lower importance, with some people, including observers, taking too much time to voice their opinion. In addition, the consensus principle makes time management difficult.

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[53] PB composition 1 Oct 2012.

	Suggestions on time management included: - Assistance from the Secretariat to help the co-chairs manage time; - Limiting comments to 2 minutes and possibly the number of interventions by a given member to encourage people to be concise and to the point; - Adding one more day to PB meetings could also help avoid rushing for key decision points at the end of each meeting.
Time allotted to specific agenda items/types of tasks during PB meetings	Consulted PB members and observers underlined the large number of agenda items to be covered during PB meetings and the lack of time to deal with some of them. More time is called upon for strategic and technical exchanges versus time-consuming administrative issues. Scheduling of side events and working groups is appreciated as a good way to manage time, but transparency in the choice of agenda items that should be discussed in plenary vs parallel sessions is being requested.
Time allotted to input from key actors at the PB meetings (individual members, REDD Secretariat, IAs, etc)	If time allotted is generally considered as sufficient for specific agenda items, a number of complaints arose from consultations regarding monopolization of time by a very limited number of PB participants. As it appears, many PB members and observers would like to voice their opinion but just don't dare, calling for "a solution that would enable people who don't have the ability to speak a lot and take the floor with courage to be given the opportunity to speak." As far as country participants are concerned, an idea is to limit speaking time per region and encourage regional meetings prior to PB meetings in order to regionally agree on key decision points and speak as one.
Languages in which PB meetings are conducted and in which PB materials/minutes are published, and timeframe for posting both original documents and their translations	Translation of key documents and interpretation during PB meetings are very widely appreciated by PB members and observers. If gaps in document translation exist with a quantity of material existing only in English, the efforts made are recognised. Those gaps are mostly a problem for civil society and IPs at the national level more than for PB delegates themselves. Although delays in providing documentation in all languages are frequent, it seems that the translations are available within a reasonable time.

> **Box 2: Inter-Sessional" decision-making procedure**
>
> Decisions of the Policy Board may also be made between meetings (referred to as "Inter-Sessional" decision-making). In such cases:
> - The Co-chair will set a date for the Inter-Sessional decisions.
> - The membership invited to the most recent Policy Board meeting shall comprise the membership for Inter-Sessional decisions. Decisions shall be made by the consensus of full members and alternate members.
> - The membership (including full members, alternate members, ex-officio members and observers) will be informed of the date at least 15 working days in advance.
> - The relevant documents will be made available electronically at least 10 working days before the decision date.
>
> (UN-REDD Programme Rules of Procedure)

Comments received on procedures linked to the conduct of meetings reveal that overall, many of the procedures used in the conduct of meetings are considered as sufficient, including those not existing formally on paper. Nevertheless, the consultations conducted also revealed some confusion on a number of procedural items and provided the opportunity to collect a number of suggestions and ideas stressing the importance of setting procedures in detail into the RoPs. Below is a discussion of the main ones.

Funding Approval

The Procedure for funding allocation of National Joint Programme (NJP) is clearly established in the Operational Guidance section of the RoPs. The PB agrees on a global envelop for a given NJP, up to

US$4 million, shared between the three UN agencies, which keeps the freedom for agencies to amend within that envelope (see Box 3 below). Funding approval on the SNA is very briefly described in the RoPs. In practice, it appears to follow a three-step approach: (i) Preparation of an initial draft by the Secretariat following a number of guidance efforts and considerations; (ii) Discussion within a working group in parallel to the PB meeting; and (iii) Draft decisions proposed to the PB for approval. The report of the Ninth PB meeting describes how this process was implemented in 2012.

Box 3: Procedures for approval of budget	
1. International Support functions (Global Joint Programme – GJP)	2. National Support 'Quick Start' Submission and Approval Process
With regard to the approval of the GJP budget, the Policy Board may make the following types of decisions (subject to the availability of funds in the MPTF): • Approve the entire programme budget (including approvals subject to minor revisions) • Approve a portion of the programme budget (including approvals subject to minor revisions) • Reject the GJP and request re-submission.	2.1 Scope of National UN Joint Programmes (NJPs) 2.2 Formulation of draft NJP Documents 2.3 Country Validation of the Draft NJP 2.4 Submission to Secretariat 2.5 Secretariat Review 2.6 Policy Board

Source: UN-REDD Programme Rules of Procedure

As far as the budget of the Secretariat is concerned, it is included as *Outcome 8: Timely and effective Secretariat services provided to the UN-REDD partner countries, Policy Board and the UN organisations* of the GJP and counts for 11% of the overall budget (as presented in the Budget Review 2013-2014 of the SNA Framework prepared for the ninth Policy Board meeting[54]).

In the on-line survey, between one third and half of respondents declared that PB involvement in approval of financial matters is insufficient; the same proportion declare that *Procedures and rules for reporting on expenditures, to whom, and on what level of reporting (by outputs, outcomes etc)* and *Procedures for approval of budgets* are insufficient. Therefore, it seems that the involvement of the PB (or alternatively a representative Executive Committee as was suggested in an earlier recommendation from the Reviewer) in financial matters would need to be reinforced, for example through more transparent and digestible financial information presented and clear indications of budgets in relation to annual work plans. Budgets for the SNA activities are particularly relevant. These types of efforts – an illustration of which stands in PB9's approach through an informal consultation group – are likely to result in PB members being more at ease when financial decisions are taken with the appropriate level of knowledge and detail.

The Balance of allocations to National Programmes and SNA from UN-REDD Programme Fund is a controversial issue which is not the focus of this review. Suffice to say that whereas a slight majority of survey respondents consider that the balance is good, interviews conducted reveal that a majority of developing countries ask that more funds be allocated to National Programmes. As of 15 September 2012, the two streams of support to countries totalled US$117.5 million, with US$67.3 million for National Programmes and US$50.2 million for the SNA.[55] The PB9 decisions – taken by consensus – raised the SNA by US$47 million while other budgets lines remaining unchanged. The rationale behind this resides in (i) Norway's preference as a major donor to limit the number of countries of concentration and to put more funds on the SNA; and (ii) the fact that a number of donor contributions are earmarked to the benefit of the SNA. That being said, it should be kept in mind, as argued by programme management, that the formerly used term of "Global Programme" is a misleading choice of name for this programme, as many of the specific activities under the "Support to National REDD+ Action Programme," as now denominated, are in fact benefitting countries but are pulled together in a cross-programme framework to improve efficiency and effectiveness in delivery.

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[54] Support to National REDD+ Action: Global Programme Framework 2011-2015 Budget Review 2013-2014, UN-REDD Programme Ninth Policy Board Meeting- 26-27 October 2012.

[55] UN-REDD Programme Funding Framework (as of 15 September 2012), UN-REDD Programme Ninth Policy Board Meeting, October 2012, p 6.

Table 9 below provides the funding allocations along with the two main streams of support of the UN-REDD Programme on 12 February 2013:

Table 9: Funding allocations to the UN-REDD National and SNA Programmes

National programmes	In US$
	67,350,441
SNA:	**97,788,940**
UN-REDD International Support	15,895,043
UN-REDD International Support (ear-marked)	8,688,584
UN-REDD support to country activities	73,205,313
TOTAL	**165,139,381**
Total commitments:	169,992,446

MPTF website (http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/CCF00), 12 February 2013

The figures above demonstrate that "UN-REDD support to country activities" within the SNA totals 75% of the funds of the SNA. The question of the type of activities funded under this budget line and whether they really respond to the Programme's objectives and country needs remains open to discussion and should be a key element of the UN-REDD programme evaluation planned for 2013. However, it is important to note that the sum of "UN-REDD support to country activities" and National Programmes reaches US$140 million, which means that 85% of the total UN-REDD programme funds are apparently, directly or indirectly, targeted to countries.

Overall, communication around the SNA and how activities under the SNA are decided (so that they do not seem to be driven by UN-Agencies alone) may be a key factor of improvement in the perception of participating countries. The UN-REDD programme evaluation planned for 2013 shall also provide some responses as to whether the SNA significantly contributes to reaching the UN-REDD Programme's objectives and national expectations.

Procedures and rules for reporting on expenditures are detailed in the RoPs for both programme progress and expenditures:

- The UN-REDD Programme Secretariat submits biannual progress updates to the Policy Board, for review and action as appropriate;
- The Administrative Agent provides regular updates on the financial status of the MPTF to the Policy Board, for review and action as appropriate;
- The Participating UN Organizations submit annual narrative and financial progress reports to the Administrative Agent, as per agreed UNDG financial and progress reporting formats;
- The Secretariat provides the Policy Board updates on the implementation progress of Joint Programmes (both Global and National) every 6 months, based on information received by the Participating UN Organizations; and
- Subsequently, the Administrative Agent submits consolidated narrative and financial reports to all UN-REDD Programme donors. The Administrative Agent also submits to donors a certified annual financial statement (Source and Use of Funds).

As illustrated by Figure 2 below, extracted from the Semi-Annual 2012 Progress report on activities under UN-REDD fund,[56] **reporting on expenditures is done at the outcome level**:

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[56] Semi-Annual 2012 Progress Report on Activities Implemented under the UN-REDD Programme Fund, UN-REDD Programme Ninth Policy Board Meeting, 26-27 October 2012.

Figure 2: Example of reporting at the outcome level in a Semi-Annual 2012 Progress Report

Figure 3: Expenditure for period 1 November 2012 to 30 June 2012 per Programme outcome. (See section 3.2 for outcome descriptions).

It is hoped that current efforts towards unified reporting formats between the three UN agencies should enable a better information-sharing process. In addition, reporting on results and impacts of UN-REDD supported activities is widely called-upon. The upcoming evaluation of the Programme will provide an overview of the Programme's progress towards its objectives. However, a well designed overall monitoring framework would allow for measurement of progress towards objectives, both at the global and national levels, and for regular reporting of results to the PB with concrete examples of success.

In order to complete this analysis on the PB conduct of business, a comparison of practices with other funds and programmes is also informative. The table in Annex B summarizes elements of the conduct of business for the MDG-F, UNAIDS and FCPF. The main particularities highlighted in this comparison for the three studied funds/Programmes in terms of conduct of business and possible suggestions for the UN-REDD Programme consist in the following:

Inter-sessional decision-making process
Generally, no specific procedure exists to determine what decisions should be taken inter-sessionally or during meetings, but rather it is mostly a case-by-case choice when urgent matters arise. Inter-sessional decision procedures are usually briefly defined; however, this is not necessarily the case in the RoPs (or equivalent).

Preparation and adoption of the agenda
Bureaus of the Boards are often set up and used to:
- Prepare the agenda of meetings selecting the most urgent and strategic items;
- To deal with inter-sessional decision making when needed;
- To liaise with the Secretariat and ensure a clear comprehension of the Board's decisions.

Preparation and adoption of minutes
Minutes concentrate on key decision points (recommendations, decisions and conclusions). Adoption of minutes takes place at the beginning of each Board meeting.

Working groups
The set-up of working groups to assist the Board in carrying out its functions is common practice, as is the case under the UN-REDD PB.

Country representatives and national focal points
The MDG-F and UNAIDS insist on coordination of activities at the country level as well as country ownership. To this end, they promote the set-up of 'National Coordination Groups' or 'National-level Policy Boards' gathering all relevant stakeholders and governmental institutions in order to decide on a

specific action plan and coordinate all the activities conducted in the country around the specific themes dealt with by the programme.

Decision making and follow-up
Decisions are generally based on consensus. Voting procedures do exist, even in a UN Programme like UNAIDS, but generally remain unused.
Follow-up on decisions are usually covered at each Board meeting on the basis of a presentation by the Secretariat or equivalent.

Chairs
Chairs (usually two) are elected/selected at each Board meeting for the next meeting, or else they are selected annually during Board meetings. Logically, the selected co-chairs are also members of the Bureau, if any.

Programme staff appointment
It is interesting to see that UNAIDS Secretariat staff is appointed independently from any UN agencies, although it is legally under contract with the WHO. This independence, especially as regards the authority figure the staff must report to, is an important factor of trust in this Secretariat's conduct of business.

Languages
In addition to English, interpretation into French and Spanish is standard rule in multilateral instances. As far as background documents and Programme materials are concerned, translations into French and Spanish are often proposed.

Time management during meetings
In both UNAIDS and FCPF procedures, rules are established for time management.

Reporting on expenditures
Reporting is generally presented in a consolidated manner and does not go into project-level detail on budgets. In all the funds consulted, it is not considered the role of the Board to analyse the budget of each individual project but rather to agree on universal amounts thus leaving some flexibility to the implementing agencies for the best utilization of their respective allocations. Evaluations conducted on the projects or country portfolios then constitute a tool for the Board to assess the results obtained within the allocated envelop, which allows for adjustments. Reporting on expenditure by output at the country level is therefore in-line with common practice.
There are generally no detailed written procedures regarding the adoption of budgets, which is left to the discretion of the Board.

Fiduciary risk management and audits
Little information could be collected regarding audit procedures in the different funds/Programmes. Generally speaking, audits are conducted by the implementing agencies and the trustees according to their own rules and audit procedures, and audit reports are presented to the Board.

Conclusion: Does the PB conduct business in a manner that is appropriate in light of the challenges surrounding the evolution of REDD+ and the UN-REDD Programme's response to those challenges?

Whereas many of the procedures used in the conduct of meetings have improved over time and now follow standards used in other comparable funds and are considered by PB members and observers as sufficient, including when it comes to those not existing formally on paper, some confusion remains calling for a more detailed set of procedures to be described in the RoPs and validated by the PB. Specific suggestions in this regard are made in the Recommendation Section at the end of this Section. As far as financial reporting is concerned, it is hoped that the recent decisions reached regarding unified reporting formats between the three UN agencies will help meet the needs for reporting from the PB to ensure reporting at the impact, outcome and output level, with activity level information available upon request.

6.2.2   Is the PB responsive to partners and stakeholder needs?

PB Responsiveness

Utility of knowledge generated/materials produced

The UN-REDD Programme produces an important amount of material generally aimed at facilitating REDD+ readiness processes in member countries. This includes in particular:

- General information on the UN-REDD programme, e.g. *Fast facts* document, *2011 Year in Review*;
- Procedural and Programme documentation: *UN-REDD Programme Strategy 2011-2015*, *Terms of reference*, *Rules of Procedures and Operational Guidance*, etc.
- Guidelines, templates and recommendation documents, e.g. *Guidelines on Stakeholder Engagement in REDD+ Readiness*, *UN-REDD National Programmes Handbook,* templates for NJP application, progress report templates, etc.;
- Experience sharing material: *lessons learned* and *Success stories* booklets;
- Publications from studies funded by the Programme, e.g. policy briefs on *Multiple benefits of REDD+*, *REDD+ and a Green Economy,* etc.;

Even if a quantity of publications/material is generated from the Secretariat's initiative, the PB is strongly influential in highlighting the needs expressed by countries and designing strategic technical studies to be conducted on REDD+, in particular through the SNA. In the survey conducted for this Review, almost all the respondents considered that the knowledge generated/materials produced by request of the PB are useful for their targeted stakeholders. This has been confirmed by many interviewees, who demonstrated a general satisfaction in this respect.

Level of coherence between UNFCCC guidance and other external sources of guidance and input on REDD+ and PB decision-making

The UN-REDD Programme Strategy 2011-2015 states: "The UN-REDD Programme works in close partnership with other REDD+ initiatives, especially those operated by the World Bank, and supports the implementation of UNFCCC decisions.[57]" It further affirms: "The Programme is responsive to country needs, and is prepared to support the transformation in the forest sector and other sectors that impact land use in developing country economies needed to achieve readiness for REDD+. The Programme is also responsive to the REDD+ decision at the UNFCCC COP16 on policy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to REDD+ and stands ready to support, upon demand by countries, the implementation of the COP16 agreement on REDD+."

REDD+ is a direct consequence of the international climate negotiations conducted under the UNFCCC. While its main principles have been agreed enabling REDD+ readiness initiatives such as the UN-REDD Programme, the FCPF and others to start working with targeted countries, a number of topics remain to be defined, clarified and agreed upon by UNFCCC parties. In such a moving context, initial work implemented also comes to raise many questions that need to be answered.

Therefore, responsiveness of the PB to guidance and input on REDD+, and in particular UNFCCC guidance, is key to the UN-REDD Programme's legitimacy and, in the end, effectiveness in achieving the goal of REDD+, which is to preserve forest carbon sinks. On the other hand, experimentation through UN-REDD and questions raised by implementing partners and countries experiencing this new arena have and can continue to positively feed into UNFCCC discussions.

The survey conducted during this Review reveals that a large majority (three-quarters) of respondents consider that there is coherence between UNFCCC guidance and PB decision-making. This is corroborated by the interviews conducted, which confirm that the PB is very conscious of what's going

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[57] UN-REDD Programme Strategy 2011-2015, p1.

on in the UNFCCC since the UNFCCC informs the general context in which the UN-REDD Programme evolves.

This is supported by the regular mentions of UNFCCC guidance in PB meetings reports: e.g. PB7 p16, "The importance of continued alignment of the monitoring and information needs for REDD+ as defined in UNFCCC with other monitoring and information processes," and PB8 p 21-22, "Better demonstrate alignment of the SEPC with the agreements made under the UNFCCC and ensure that coverage of all safeguards is adequate."

However, according to some interviewees it also happens that decisions of UN agencies on the implementation of some activities are quite far ahead of UNFCCC negotiations. In fact, by a number of respondents, UN-REDD is perceived as a mechanism to help advance the technical debate surrounding REDD+. Therefore, feedback to the UNFCCC process from the UN-REDD experience and 'experimentation' is important to help inform future convention guidance; this arms-length relationship is considered healthy. It has been mentioned during interviews that experiences communicated from the UN-REDD programme to the UNFCCC have had an impact on the decisions taken, but some interviewees also consider that the UN-REDD Programme could do even more to make sure the Programme is really feeding back into the UNFCCC process. In this regard, the role of the UNFCCC as observer during PB meetings is important serving as an information relay in both directions – making sure PB decisions are coherent with UNFCCC guidance and relaying issues arising from the UN-REDD experience to the UNFCCC. In addition, it should be noted that a number of participants to the PB are also themselves negotiators under the auspices of the UNFCCC, therefore also acting as potential feedback channels between the two entities.

Responsiveness

The PB is qualified by many interviewees as quite responsive as long as it actually takes decisions on requests brought up by Programme stakeholders. In terms of funding delivery, the MPTF Office considers that "compared to other funds, the UN-REDD Programme has utilized its funding very efficiently and has had a steady growth in its donor base."[58.] This is an assessment largely shared by a variety of stakeholders who point to the responsiveness to funding requests from UN-REDD seen as a major strength of the programme, in particular when comparing to the FCPF for instance. On the other hand, a number of developing country members felt that the UN-REDD PB could be more responsive regarding participating countries' requests for more national ownership through the process. In a nutshell, working through the agencies has allowed UN-REDD to be more timely in its responses to country requests, but in some cases this may also have impacted negatively on ownership of the process.

Conclusion: Is the PB responsive to partners and stakeholder needs

The level of responsiveness of the PB can therefore be qualified as relatively good, with well appreciated material and knowledge products, strong coherence with UNFCCC guidance and relatively good responsiveness to participating countries' requests. Areas for improvement mainly reside in ensuring an even better feedback from experience to the UNFCCC, and responding to the demands for increased country ownership. Responsiveness is an area of possible continuous improvement, and future reforms to the governing structure of the Programme as well as to the procedures in place will certainly need to be mindful of this.

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[58] Report of the 8th PB meeting, p 12.

6.2.3 Does the PB provide adequate guidance and oversight for delivering programme objectives, and up to international standards?

PB Guidance

Guidance of the PB is provided at all programme levels. For example, when studying NJP fund allocation demands, the PB provides feedback, recommendations and asks for clarifications to the concerned country in order to improve NJPs design. The PB also sets up specific working groups to deal with specific subjects with outcomes in the form of guidance proposals. For example, the Report of the Eighth PB meeting (p 13) notes, "the expected outcomes of the working group are clear guidance for the agencies to review the GP budget and guidance for prioritizing the GP activities where funding is limited. The presenter also sought guidance from the Policy Board on the timeframe for budgeting the GP, the frequency of budget revisions, the frequency of budget approvals and on future application of the roadmap."

Three quarters of survey respondents considered that the PB requests from Working Groups and Implementing Agencies a sufficient amount of quality materials to help support programme objectives. At the same time, two thirds of survey respondents considered that the PB provides sufficient oversight to UN-REDD Programme activities and sufficient strategic guidance and input in terms of assessing programme progress and ensuring auditing of accounts following agreed international standards. Although this confirms that a majority of stakeholders are generally satisfied with these aspects, there remain a significant proportion of informants who consider that the PB does not provide sufficient oversight to UN-REDD programme activities, specifically in terms of sufficient strategic guidance and input in terms of assessing programme progress. In line with a recommendation put forward earlier in this report, the role of the PB may need to be clarified in this regard to help focus on the strategic level and procedures established so that monitoring activities and reporting conducted by agencies and the Secretariat are sufficient - in terms of scope, level of detail, frequency, quality, reporting formats - to inform adequately PB discussions - a point discussed at length at the ninth PB meeting in Brazzaville - enabling PB members to draw appropriate advice and recommendations and provide strategic guidance.

Other past discussions and decisions during PB meetings illustrate this demand from the PB for improved monitoring and reporting:
- Report of the 7th PB meeting, Decision n°7: "[the PB] requested the UN-REDD Programme Secretariat to improve the SNA reporting framework in order to allow assessment of progress in delivery of activities, disbursement of funds per outcome, portion of the targeted support and complementarities between SNA and National Programmes activities."
- Report of the 7th PB meeting (p 8): "The Board provided the following recommendations:
    b- Further strengthen the capacity of the UN-REDD Programme Secretariat to monitor and evaluate progress of UN-REDD National Programmes and SNA and to report to the Policy Board.
    c- Include intermediate indicators to assess progress against the expected targets for UN-REDD Programme implementation.
    d- Stressed the importance of biannual reporting and more detailed reporting on funding allocations."

Overall, interviews conducted confirm that guidance and oversight for delivering programme objectives provided by the PB is generally seen as sufficient. A strong monitoring and evaluation framework, better harmonised reporting procedures and an organisation enabling the PB to concentrate on more strategic-level issues and oversight for delivering programme objectives would be key elements of improvement to PB guidance.

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Conclusion on Effectiveness: Does the PB conduct business effectively and responsively, with appropriate guidance and oversight in order to reach programme objectives?

The PB conduct of business is, overall, relatively effective and responsive, and the level of guidance and oversight rather good and in line with international fiduciary standards. An overall impression shared by many of the people consulted is that the PB has improved a lot in this respect in recent meetings.

That being said, the Review clearly outlines that there remains significant room for improvement, in particular with respect to:
- Procedures for the conduct of meetings, which need to be completed and better detailed;
- Financial reporting, which requires unified reporting formats;
- Budget discussions, which need to enable PB members and observers to clearly understand the choices proposed in terms of budget allocations without getting into micro-management;
- Ensuring a good feedback from experience to the UNFCCC;
- Monitoring and reporting of programme progress to the PB;
- Harmonisation of reporting procedures; and
- The overall organisation of the conduct of business, which includes, among other elements, the possibility for the PB to concentrate on more strategic level issues.

Recommendations:

- **The PB needs to clarify and better detail procedures for the conduct of meetings, in particular with respect to the following aspects:**
  - Decide on the scope and form of the inter-sessional decision-making process with a clear definition of what will be decided during meetings only and cannot be decided inter-sessionally. In particular, decisions on the Programme's budget, on funding allocations, on the PB ToRs and RoPs and more generally speaking all strategic level decisions must remain within PB meetings, whereas the inter-sessions can expedite more operational matters;
  - Decide, as already suggested, on the pertinence of setting up a PB Bureau or any participatory process for the adoption of PB meeting agendas but also to assist with the process of intersessional decision making; and to liaise with the Secretariat intersessionally;
  - Formalize the use of working groups in the RoPs, including standard terms of reference;
  - Consider the publication of ToRs for Board delegates (qualification, tasks and responsibilities, necessary availability) and the publication of delegates' short CV on the UN-REDD website;
  - Clarify in the RoPs, the decision-making process (who participates in consensus? what is the role of observers?);
  - Ensure that responsibilities for each decision point of the PB are clearly assigned within a clear time-frame, e.g. in the PB meetings reports, for further follow-up;
  - Consider the publication of ToRs for the co-chairs, specifying their role, tasks and responsibilities, and the competencies required;
  - Consider assigning co-chairing roles to each of the following constituencies: One member country and One donor member.
  - Include a time management section in the RoPs, setting the rules on which PB co-chairs can rely for time management during meetings;
  - Consider a coordination mechanism between the countries of each sub-region prior to each PB meeting so that members can speak for their constituency.
- **Ensure that discussions on financial matters occur**: In addition to the detailed documentation provided, financial issues should be presented and discussed thoroughly at some point, including on the distribution of funds between the Global and the National Programmes. If PB meetings are too short for this, setting up specific Working Groups with representatives of

all constituencies might be a good avenue to pursue. This could be detailed in the updated procedures for SNA budget approval, which is very concise in the current RoPs.

- For a stronger cooperation between actors at the national level, **continue to promote the establishment of 'National Coordination Groups' in REDD+ countries**, gathering all relevant stakeholders and governmental institutions in order to ensure the coordination of REDD+ activities at the country level with all relevant stakeholders.
- **Ensure that feedback from experience to the UNFCCC is sufficiently organized** with the nomination of a responsible staff within the Secretariat who is well-versed in Convention processes and politics to ensure a permanent link with the UNFCCC Secretariat.

6.3   Efficiency

Does the PB have a clear functional role to conduct business in a timely fashion and in a way that reduces duplication of efforts?

Summary of Findings:

The Review found that :
- The functional role of the PB needs to be clarified in relation to the respective roles and responsibilities of the other elements of the governance structure of the UN-REDD programme, namely the Secretariat, the SG and the MG, and the implementing agencies.
- Whereas the prevailing model does present a number of advantages (e.g. rapidity in the delivery of funds), duplication of efforts and overlaps do exist at different levels, conducting to efficiency losses.
- Although a number of those aspects may not be amenable to change between now and 2015, consecutive to the new Strategy and the Vision that will be developed for the UN-REDD Programme, changes and adjustments in the organizational structure of the UN-REDD Programme should aim to improve efficiency and reduce overlaps, in addition to respond to the evolving context around REDD+ and climate finance more generally.

In light of these findings, the Reviewer recommends the following:

In the short term, it would be useful for UN-REDD to:
- Clarify the position and role of the SG and the MG in the UN-REDD Programme as internal coordination units of the three agencies, i.e. not officially represented in the PB.
- Clarify the position and role of each PB member during PB meetings, as well as observers;
- Consider organizing only one PB meeting a year, completed by a strong inter-sessional decision-making process, and taking advantage of the Executive Committee structure proposed between PB meeting earlier in this Review, to focus on more administrative and operational issues.

As the reflection post 2015 continues, the following broader issue could be reflected upon and tackled later on, as required, depending on the vision that emerges for the future of UN-REDD:
- Explore further and clarify the position and role of the Secretariat vis-à-vis the PB, the SG and the MG, and the UN agencies.

6.3.1   What is the functional role of the PB relative to other UN-REDD Programme key actors? Is there clarity of roles and responsibilities between key programme partners?

Table 10 below provides an overview of the current role, tasks and responsibilities of the different building blocks of the governing structure of the UN-REDD Programme: the Policy Board, the MPTF as the Trustee, the Secretariat, the UN Strategy Group, the UN Management Group, the Implementing agencies (FAO, UNDP, UNEP), as well as the working groups set-up by the PB to deal with specific issues.

Table 10: Roles of the different governing structures of the UN-REDD Programme

Actors/bodies	Roles and responsibilities
Policy Board	The Policy Board is responsible for oversight, strategic direction and financial

	allocations. The Policy Board decides on fund allocation for national and SNA programmes from the UN-REDD Programme Fund, administered by the UNDP MPTF Office, and provides guidance to the UN-REDD Programme, reviews progress, and helps articulate the demand for support and response needed.[59]
MPTF	The UNDP MPTF office is the Administrative Agent of the Fund. On behalf of the Participating UN Organizations, the Administrative Agent will: - Receive contributions from donors that wish to provide financial support to the Fund; - Administer such funds received; - Disburse such funds to each of the Participating UN Organisations in accordance with instructions from the UN-REDD Programme PB; - Consolidate Statements and reports, based on those provided to the Administrative Agent by each Participating UN Organisation, and provide these to each Donor that has contributed to the Fund Account and to the UN-REDD Programme PB; - Provide final reporting, including notification that the Fund has been fully expended or has been wound up; - Disburse funds to any Participating UN Organization for any additional cost of the tasks that the UN-REDD PB may decide to allocate in accordance with the MoU and ToR.[60]
Secretariat	The UN-REDD Programme Secretariat is an inter-agency unit of the three UN-REDD Programme agencies. Among other things, the Secretariat supports the Policy Board by organizing meetings, producing reports and monitoring implementation of Policy Board decisions. It is a central point of contact for the UN-REDD Programme and liaises with other REDD+ initiatives. This includes liaising with existing and potential donors in order to mobilize funds. The Secretariat provides leadership in strategic planning, and the development and management of reporting, monitoring and evaluation frameworks for the Programme, raising awareness of and championing the UN-REDD Programme and providing information to external partners. The Secretariat also facilitates interagency collaboration and communication to ensure the Programme is implemented effectively.[61] The ToRs detail the main roles and responsibilities of the Secretariat: 1. Support the delivery of high quality UN-REDD Programme services and results through the creation and implementation of efficient and effective interagency quality assurance, reporting, and coordination mechanisms; 2. Provide administrative and logistical support to the PB, SG, and MG; 3. Develop and implement innovative approaches to facilitate knowledge sharing among UN-REDD Programme staff, participating countries and interested stakeholders; 4. Develop and nurture existing and new partnerships and manage external relations at the Programme-level; and 5. Develop and seek MG and SG approval of a donor relations and resource mobilization strategy and coordinate SG and MG implementation of such a strategy. The Head of the Secretariat is accountable to the SG and administratively supervised by the Director, Division of Environmental Policy Implementation, UNEP.[62]
UN Strategy Group (SG)	The SG was established by the three participating UN Agencies in 2011 to complement and enhance the role of the UN-REDD Policy Board and to improve the overall performance of the UN-REDD Programme by providing strategic direction to staff members of the UN agencies responsible for managing and implementing the UN-REDD Programme in support of the Partner Countries. Responsibilities include: - Review and endorse a shared Vision and strategy and a clear set of priorities for

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[59] UN-REDD National Programmes Handbook.
[60] MoU for Multi-donor trust fund using pass-through fund management, Annex A: Terms of Reference.
[61] UN-REDD Programme strategy 2011-2015.
[62] Management Note for Improved Delivery of the UN-REDD Programme, Annex A: Revised ToRs for the Strategy Group, the Management Group and the Secretariat, UN-REDD Programme, 15 June 2012.

	the UN agencies regarding management and implementation of the UN-REDD Programme; - Provide strategic guidance and oversight to the MG and the Secretariat to ensure effective delivery of high quality UN agency services, including allocating responsibilities and resources between the UN agencies and the Secretariat to be reviewed and approved by the PB
UN Management Group (MG)	The MG has the responsibility to efficiently and effectively deliver high quality services to participating countries under the UN-REDD programme. The MG will: - Take decisions on programme management and operational issues related to the implementation of the programme, consistent with the strategic direction provided by the both the SG and the PB; - Suggest amendments and refinements to the SG and PB regarding their strategic direction and priorities for the UN-REDD Programme; - Take responsibility for ensuring the effective engagement and operational coordination of UN-REDD Programme staff at the global, regional and national levels; - Support and assist the Secretariat in their role as facilitator of the coordination of UN agency implementation of the results-based management framework for the UN-REDD Programme; - Support and assist the Secretariat in preparations for PB meetings and other UN-REDD activities that require resources beyond the capacity of the Secretariat; - Oversee the development of work plans and proposed budgets for the SNA and related support functions of the UN-REDD Programme; - Provide the enabling conditions for regional and country-level UN agency staff to support the efforts of their national counterparts; and - Establish interagency action teams to develop specific, concrete and actionable recommendations for the MG on how to resolve specific problems.
Implementing agencies (FAO, UNDP, UNEP)	These agencies are responsible for delivering the Programme's output. Agencies have chosen different ways to organize and locate their teams ensuring the maximum support to national readiness efforts backed up by international "normative" support functions. The agencies contribute their diverse and complementary fields of expertise and mandates: FAO on technical issues related to forestry, natural resources and supporting specifically the development of REDD+ monitoring, including MRV systems; UNDP with its near universal country presence, its focus on governance, socio-economic implications of REDD+ and the engagement of Indigenous Peoples and civil society; and UNEP in convening expertise and decision-makers in the REDD+ agenda, increasing knowledge and capacity on multiple benefits of REDD+ and facilitating the conditions to move towards a low carbon economy by transforming the forest sector through analysis, scenario development and assessment of options for investments. In supporting the implementation of national programmes, the UN-REDD Programme agencies are determined to streamline their approaches and have agreed to the following principles specifically concerning implementation arrangements: • *Prima facie*: national programmes shall be nationally implemented and built on previous UN experience in implementing joint programmes; • As per the Accra Agenda for Action, partner country systems will be used as the first option; • The UNDG's Harmonized Approach to Cash Transfers (HACT) will be used to determine how funds are to be disbursed; • All funds transferred to national implementing partners will be transferred in a consistent manner, regardless of which UN-REDD Programme agency is making the transfer; and • Final modalities for managing funds will be determined based upon the circumstances of each country. For thematic work taking place under the SNA, one of the three UN-REDD Programme agencies acts as the coordinating entity according to their comparative advantage drawing expertise from the other two agencies and other relevant

	international sources.[63]
Working Groups (WGs)	Working groups are established by the PB when specific issues need to be dealt with more extensively than actually possible during PB meetings. A limited number of PB members therefore volunteer to participate to a specific working group and meet as appropriate to debate and propose options to the PB, which then can take decision.
	To date, four WGs have been established, for the following thematic issues: • Country Needs Assessment (terminated in October 2012) • Roadmap to Review the Support to National REDD+ Action – SNA (terminated in November 2012 at PB9) • Support National Programming efforts • Review of the Policy Board

The survey results and interviews conducted show that a large majority of respondents consider that PB members and the MPTF office have distinct roles and responsibilities within the UN-REDD Programme. On the other hand, one third of respondents to the survey considered the roles and responsibilities of the Secretariat, the agencies, the MG and the SG to conflict or overlap with each other or other UN-REDD bodies, a view shared by a number of interviewees as well.

A number of overlaps are perceived and were mentioned during the consultations conducted:
• Duplication between agencies and other actors involved in the programme at the national level;
• Overlaps between the Secretariat and the Strategy group;
• Overlaps between the PB and the Strategy group;
• Overlaps between the Secretariat and the UN agencies; and
• Overlaps between the SG and the MG.

The respective roles of the different actors during PB meetings have also generated a number of comments, such as:
• The role of the Secretariat needs clarification;
• The MG and SG should not be officially represented;
• It would be important to distinguish who is sitting on the PB from the UN agencies as a Board member and who is sitting as a resource person. Typically, it seems the UN agency PB member is usually a senior manager who does not directly participate in programme implementation;
• Observers are there to listen to the discussions, but their viewpoints expressed in meetings are not considered binding for PB members' final decision-making.

Overall, the Review suggests there is a lack of clarity leading to confusion in the respective roles and responsibilities of the different actors within UN-REDD, at least on the part of participating countries, NGOs and IPs (whereas things stand clearer for UN Agencies and Secretariat staff). In particular, the roles and responsibilities of the MG and the SG remain nebulous to most of the interviewed stakeholders. Since the Secretariat is defined as "an inter-agency unit of the three UN-REDD Programme agencies," the difference with the MG remains unclear. In addition, "The Head of the Secretariat is accountable to the SG," although a large number of respondents to the survey and interviewees consider the Secretariat should report to the PB only and its Head be independent from the UN Agencies. The positioning of the SG vis-à-vis the PB needs clarification as well; but, what is then the responsible body for the programme's strategy? Finally, there are some calls for a stronger Secretariat with stronger means of action and less dependence on the UN agencies, the SG and the MG.

Therefore, the analysis of the data collected brings upfront four major questions:
• Who is responsible for providing the strategic directions of the UN-REDD Programme? What is the role of the SG versus the PB?
• Who is the Secretariat working for, reporting to, and with what level of independence and transparency? Should the Secretariat remain "an inter-agency unit of the three UN-REDD

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[63] UN-REDD Programme Strategy 2011-2015, p17-20

Programme agencies," as mentioned in the UN-REDD 2011-2015 Strategy, and therefore be accountable to the SG, or should it be the Secretariat of the UN-REDD Programme itself, and therefore ensure the monitoring of and support to activities rather than coordinate agencies?

- What are the specific roles of the SG and MG within the UN-REDD Programme? Are they official 'bodies' of the UN-REDD Programme governance structure or an internal tool of the UN Agencies? Shall the MG constitute the unique representative of the UN-agencies towards the Secretariat and the SG the unique spokesperson of the UN-agencies in the PB?
- How far shall observers participate in the PB? Should their intervention be limited within a clearer framework avoiding important losses in efficiency?

It is interesting in this regard to quickly make a comparison with the UNAIDS organisational structure. Although UNAIDS is far bigger than UN-REDD (193 member States), a number of comparison points can inspire the analysis of the UN-REDD governing structure. UNAIDS is a "**Joint United Nations Programme** on HIV/AIDS"[64] delivered by 11 cosponsors from the UN-System, but **also including the World Bank**. The UNAIDS Programme Coordinating Board (PCB), the equivalent to the UN-REDD Policy Board, comprises 22 Member States. The Executive Director of the programme heads the Secretariat, and is, ex-officio, Secretary of the PCB, of the CCO,[65] of all subcommittees of the PCB and of conferences organized by UNAIDS. He/she is appointed by the UN Secretary-General upon the recommendation of the Cosponsors and **reports directly to the Programme Coordinating Board.** The Secretariat comprises the Executive Director and such technical and administrative staff as the Programme may require contracted directly by the Secretariat (and legally under contract with the WHO). The Secretariat has a role of global and regional coordination of UNAIDS interventions, with a certain level of authority on the Cosponsoring organisations regarding the funds they receive from UNAIDS, and also manages UNAIDS global programme funds directly.

It is therefore interesting to see that UNAIDS, which is also a UN Programme, has:
- a Board exclusively composed of member countries;
- a strong Secretariat able to take decisions on many aspects of the Programme; and
- a Committee of Cosponsoring Organisation, headed by one of the Cosponsors (currently UNESCO) that is the official representative of the CCO for exchanges with the Secretariat and centralizes all technical and financial reporting.

It seems rather clear that the respective roles and responsibilities of those different structures need to be more clearly defined in order to clarify the overall governing structure, the representativeness of each structure within the PB and in the end to improve the efficiency of the Programme. The initial prevailing vision of the UN Agencies relative to the de facto 'UN Programme' nature of UN-REDD, implicitly justifying a very high level of integration between the UN agencies (including the MPTF, the MG and the SG) and both the Secretariat and the PB, would need to demonstrate its efficiency as compared to other models being tested out there and separate more clearly the strategic level (the Board), the operational level (the Secretariat) and the execution level (implementing entities). Whereas the prevailing model does present a number of advantages (e.g. rapidity in the delivery of funds), it may need to evolve overtime should the vision of UN-REDD for the future be to position itself to access the emerging global funds for REDD+ as introduced in section 5. Reforming the Secretariat is certainly not a reform that would be wise at this mid-point in the strategic cycle, and more detailed analysis of its function and role is clearly beyond the scope of the present Review; however, this is an element to be kept in mind as the discussion on the longer term future of UN-REDD unfolds in the years ahead.

6.3.2   Is the Frequency and timing of PB meetings conducive to conducting business in an efficient and timely fashion?

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[64] http://www.unaids.org.
[65] Committee of Cosponsoring Organizations, which is a « forum to consider matters of major importance to UNAIDS, and also where cosponsors provide input to the policies and strategies of UNAIDS."

As established in the RoPs, the PB shall normally meet on a biannual basis. Meeting dates since the start of the UN-REDD Programme have been as follows:

Table 11: List of of UN-REDD Programme PB meetings with dates and locations

	Location	Dates
PB1	Panama	9-10 March 2009
PB2	Montreux (CH)	14-15 June 2009
PB3	Washington (USA)	29-30 October 2009
PB4	Nairobi (Kenya)	17-19 March 2010
PB5	Washington (USA)	4-5 November 2010
PB6	Da Lat (Vietnam)	21-23 March 2011
PB7	Berlin (Germany)	13-14 October 2011
PB8	Asunción (Paraguay)	25-26 March 2012
PB9	Brazzaville (Rep. of Congo)	24-26 October 2012
PB10	*Indonesia*	*Planned in June 2013*

A two-thirds majority of respondents to the online survey considered that PB meetings are well-timed during the fiscal/operational year and that the PB meets the right number of times per year. On the other hand, a significant number of the stakeholders consulted would welcome a change:

- Towards only one PB meeting a year for organisation, efficiency and cost reasons mainly. Besides this unique PB meeting, options considered include (i) having more inter-sessional decisions, and (ii) organizing a second meeting for a reduced number of PB members only, that would be more operational and take decisions regarding in particular the approval of financial allocations to countries (possibly using the Executive Committee structure already proposed by the Reviewer).
- Towards more meetings per year, or at least an efficient inter-sessional mechanism allowing decisions to be taken rapidly and avoiding the 6-month gap that sometimes is too long for some countries willing to implement activities.

In order to improve efficiency, as already mentioned, it has also been suggested that the PB could encourage members to better prepare for PB meetings, for example through regional meetings where countries and/or NGOs/IPs could agree on common positions for the different agenda items of the next PB. That would require the agenda to be prepared and relevant documentation sent well in advance.

*   *   *

Conclusion: Does the PB have a clear functional role to conduct business in a timely fashion, and in a way that reduces duplicate efforts?

The functional role of the PB needs to be clarified in relation to the respective roles and responsibilities of the other elements of the governance structures of the UN-REDD programme – namely the Secretariat, the SG and the MG, and the implementing agencies. Duplication of efforts and overlaps do exist at different levels leading to decreases in efficiency. Although such changes may not be amenable between now and 2015, consecutive to the new Strategy and the Vision that will be developed for the UN-REDD Programme, changes and adjustments in the organizational structure of the UN-REDD Programme should aim to improve efficiency and reduce overlaps, in addition to responding to the evolving context around REDD+ and climate finance more generally.

Recommendations:

In the short term, it would be useful for UN-REDD to:

- Clarify the position and role of the SG and the MG in the UN-REDD Programme as internal coordination units of the three agencies, i.e. not officially represented in the PB;
- Clarify the position and role of each PB member during PB meetings, as well as observers;

- Consider organizing only one PB meeting a year, complemented by a strong inter-sessional decision-making process and taking advantage of the Executive Committee structure proposed between PB meetings earlier in this Review that focus on more administrative and operational issues.

As the reflection on post-2015 continues, the following broader issue could be reflected upon and tackled later on, as required, depending on the vision that emerges for the future of UN-REDD:

- Explore further and clarify the position and role of the Secretariat vis-à-vis the PB, the SG and the MG and the UN agencies;

6.4   Sustainability/leverage

Is the UN-REDD Programme Policy Board positioned to enable fulfillment of the Programme Strategies?

Summary of Findings:

The Review found that:

- UN-REDD has established and benefitted from a structure to experiment "Delivering as One" under the UN system. The structure developed has its merits and has allowed, amongst other things, prompt implementation and disbursement to assist in meeting programme objectives. It is however clear that this structure also faces challenges, a number of which derived directly from the vision underpinning the approach of different constituencies to their representation on the UN-REDD Policy Board. When a shared vision for the future of the UN-REDD Programme and its positioning is developed in the years to come, more in-depth modifications to the currently established structure, procedures and funding channels can then be envisaged.

- Given the recent establishment of the Tier 2 modality and the resulting lack of experience to date, it is too early to assess whether the relationship between the PB and Tier 2 contributors will be conducive to meeting programme objectives. That being said, this modality is an innovation that (i) modifies the relative power of the PB in the conduct of the UN-REDD programme; (ii) positions the UN-agencies as 'gatekeepers' of the Programmes' principles, criteria, guidelines and quality assurance measures; and (iii) opens the Programme to new funding possibilities and can contribute to its adaptation to future climate finance funding modalities. Therefore, while reviewing the Strategy of the UN-REDD Programme, the Tier 2 modality will need to be fully considered within the possible funding options of the Programme.

- With respect to the PB structure and composition, as mentioned previously, the appropriate set up option largely depends on the vision one has of UN-REDD for the future. What are the role and comparative advantages of UN-REDD until and after 2015? What should the programme become and how should it be positioned in the global REDD+ arena beyond 2015? Those questions will need to be openly discussed in the course of the review of the Programme strategy planned in 2013.

Depending on the answers to these questions, one can envisage, as has already been presented in the *Relevance and Role* section of this Review, the following options with respect to the evolution of the Policy Board structure and its composition in the short term:

OPTION A: Given that the life expectancy of the UN-REDD programme is likely to be short (not much beyond 2015), and therefore not require any alignment to emerging international governance models in the climate change arena, the PB remains essentially as is.
  1/ Under this scenario, the main changes in governance are minor and relate mostly to rules of procedures for the conduct of meetings already alluded to earlier in the report, to ensure slight improvements in efficiency.
  2/ A Bureau is established to assist with the preparation of meeting Agendas and inter-sessional decision making mostly to ensure a better balance between strategic and administrative/operational matters in the PB discussions.

OPTION B: Given that UN-REDD wants to be well positioned for the long run under the global REDD+ agenda and prove by the same token its effectiveness in the short-term: the PB undergoes an evolutive transformation, allowing it to keep its options open for the future, while improving the efficiency of the decision making structure. In addition to the changes under Option A above, changes in the PB set up would be as follows:
  1/ A Broadened PB/UN-REDD participants' Forum, gathering all UN-REDD Programme constituencies: all recipient countries, all donors, the three UN agencies, and a defined number of IPs/CSOs. The Broadened PB/Forum meets once a year and approves the Programme's strategy, ToRs and RoPs of the Executive Committee, the associated budget, and follows the performance in

implementation. It allows all interested parties to exchanges views and opinions on the Programme and potential innovative approaches and lessons learned. It also nominates or reconfirms delegates to the Executive Committee from each constituency.

2/ An Executive Committee, gathering a limited number of representatives for each group of stakeholder: 3 recipient countries, 3 donors (with rotation), 1 UN Agency (speaking for all), 1 lead CSO, 1 lead IP, 1 representative from MPTF office as ex-officio member, and 1 representative of the UN-REDD Secretariat as resource agent/observer. The Executive Committee meets twice a year and takes all operational and administrative decisions, in particular regarding detailed funding allocations, and is co-chaired by a donor and a recipient country representative.

6.4.1 Is the relationship between the PB and participating agencies (FAO, UNEP, UNDP) conducive to meeting programme objectives?

UN Delivery Structure

Perceived effectiveness of UN Joint programming

The UN-REDD Programme was created as a partnership among three UN agencies.[66] The UN-REDD National Programmes Handbook underlines that FAO, UNDP and UNEP "have important comparative advantages in supporting the establishment of an international REDD+ regime. As neutral bodies, the agencies are working as 'honest brokers' to support country-led development programmes and to facilitate the informed involvement of national stakeholders, particularly indigenous peoples and forest-dependent communities." It is also considered in this document that "a partnership of the three Participating UN Organizations is consistent with the "Delivering as One" approach advocated by UN members. Participating UN Organizations need to work according to the "Delivering as One" approach in order to build one UN-REDD NP per country. To this end, the UN-REDD Programme's delivery model is intended to be consistent with the United Nations' Delivering as One approach that maximizes efficiencies and effectiveness in programme implementation, building on the catalytic and convening powers of the three UN-REDD Programme agencies."[67]

Although criticisms expressed on UN delivery approach are many, more than two-thirds of survey respondents considered that UN Joint programming is an effective delivery structure for the UN-REDD Programme. This is heavily qualified by other data collected during the Review process. Indeed, many interviewees mentioned the lack of coordination of the UN agencies as a major concern to reaching programme objectives, in particular at the national level. Interviewees underlined the need for UN agencies to harmonize their approach to REDD+ support and deliver really as one, i.e. not in competition with each other or with different procedures or reporting requirements for each agency as is the case at the moment. Stronger focus on Programme execution through national actors (government, civil society) is also called upon, which would also have the advantage of gently moving towards more direct access modalities.

Delivery structures of other UN 'Delivering as One' funds

As a comparison, the MDG-F and UNAIDS are two examples of UN Programmes also committed to 'delivering as one.'

The Millennium Development Goals Achievement Fund (MDG-F)

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[66] Programme strategy 2011-2015.
[67] UN-REDD National Programmes Handbook.

The MDG-Fund was established in 2007 through an agreement signed between the Government of Spain and the UN system with the aim of accelerating progress on the MDGs. With a total contribution of approximately $US 900 million, the MDG-Fund has financed 130 joint programmes in eight programmatic areas in 50 countries around the world, in addition to global partnerships, thematic knowledge management initiatives and the JPO[68] and SARC[69] young development professionals training programmes.

Programmes cover nutrition, youth and employment, gender equality, environment, culture, conflict resolution and peace building, water resource management and private sector development. All programmes are joint programmes, meaning they **bring together an average of six United Nations agencies** in a collective effort, thereby strengthening the UN system's ability to deliver as one entity.[70]

> **Box 4: The MDGF Fund structure**
>
> - The Global Account: US$ 24 million disbursed to select UN agencies as core voluntary contributions in 2007
>
> - The Delivering as One UN Account:
>   - Includes contributions to the Coherence/One UN Funds in the pilot countries (to date US$ 32.5 million)
>   - Expanded multi-donor Delivering as One funding window launched 24 Sept. 2008 (Spain, UK, Norway and the Netherlands)
>
> - The Country Account: Majority of funds (US$ 714 million) go towards joint programmes in 8 thematic windows
>
> - UNDP is the Administrative Agent (though MPTF)
>
> (www.mdgfund.org)

The MDG-F has indeed been triggering an integrated approach of the UN agencies in the direction of Delivering as One.[71] Activities supported by the Fund at the country level were expected to take the form of Joint UN Programmes whereby multiple UN organizations collaborate around a common programmatic goal. Funds are channelled to individual organizations to meet their commitments to the Joint Programme through the Administrative Agent.[72]

Mechanisms for Operational Management: the MDG-F joint programmes are implemented, managed and evaluated in countries with strategic decision-making at the National Steering Committee level and more operational management done by a Programme Management Committee, a national-level body through which the implementing partners participate and are represented. Over time, the management of the joint programmes has evolved to use Coordination Units with a lead coordinator representing all partners, and located, when possible, in national counterparts' central offices and/or in one of the areas of intervention. In this sense, the MDG-F became less a fund of UN Agencies and UN Country Teams and more a fund requiring the joint leadership of United Nations Resident Coordinators (UNRCs)-Governments and beneficiaries. Over the last years, the Fund has seen the establishment of joint monitoring and evaluation units and joint communication strategies under the UNRC leadership and/or the National Steering Committee which is, according to the MDG-F documentation consulted, consistent with the Paris and Accra principles.[73]

The principle of establishing a National Steering Committee through which the Government, the UN and the donor are represented by a single voice at the country level has been rated as highly positive by the UN Resident Coordinators (RC) and Governments.[74]

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[68] Junior Professional Officer.
[69] Special Assistant to the Resident Coordinator.
[70] http://www.mdgfund.org/aboutus
[71] Final Evaluation MDG-F Joint Programme on Gender Equality in Viet Nam, p 27, March 2012.
[72] MDG-F Framework document.
[73] Report for the MDG Achievement Fund Steering Committee, Sept 2010.
[74] Ibid.

UNAIDS

UNAIDS is the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, a partnership that aims to achieve universal access to HIV prevention, treatment, care and support. The programme builds on the capacities and comparative advantages of its co-sponsors, namely the:

- Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
- United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)
- World Food Programme (WFP)
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
- United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)
- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
- UN Women
- International Labour Organization (ILO)
- United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
- World Health Organization (WHO)
- World Bank[75]

At the global level, the programme provides support in policy formulation, strategic planning, technical guidance, research and development, advocacy and external relations. At the country level, the programme provides support to the resident coordinator system.

An important function of the programme is to strengthen national capacities to plan, coordinate, implement and monitor the overall response to HIV/AIDS. The participation in the programme of organizations of the United Nations system is aimed to ensure the provision of technical and financial assistance to national activities in a coordinated multisectoral manner. The objective is to strengthen intersectoral coordination of HIV/AIDS activities and facilitate further incorporation of these activities in national programme and planning processes.[76]

From this point of view, the UN-REDD Programme is relatively similar to UNAIDS: this is a joint UN response to a specific issue with the goal to "ensure the provision of technical and financial assistance to national activities in a coordinated multisectoral manner."

The UNAIDS new Division of Labour was developed in parallel with its new 2011-2015 Strategy and constitutes an example of 'Delivering as One.' It is aimed to consolidate UNAIDS support to countries in fifteen areas in which results are to be delivered through collective efforts around shared goals or targets.

When UNAIDS was established in 1996, the Secretariat consisted of a small Geneva based office whose main focus was coordination among the six founding cosponsors. The evolution of the Secretariat needs to be considered in the context of the increasingly complex global AIDS architecture and the growth in the international AIDS response. While in 1996 some US$300 million were available for the global AIDS response, in 2009 the response expanded to reach US$15.9 billion (50 times the 1996 level). The first independent evaluation of UNAIDS (2002) called for a strengthened UNAIDS at the country level which eventually led to a UNAIDS Secretariat field presence in 92 countries and a scale-up of Secretariat capacity.

The implementation of the Joint UN Programme by Cosponsors and the UNAIDS Secretariat are undertaken through the United Nations Resident Coordinator System.[77] Whereas national government counterparts generally used to be based within the Ministries of Health, UNAIDS has promoted the establishment of national coordination entities ('National Aids Councils'), typically headed by a former Minister, in order to ensure a multisectoral approach to the fight against AIDS. This is reflected in the 'Three Ones' approach promoted by UNAIDS and previously mentioned in this document: "One agreed HIV/AIDS Action Framework that provides the basis for coordinating the work of all partners; One

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[75] www.unaids.org/en/aboutunaids
[76] UN Economic and Social Council, Resolution 1994/24 establishing UNAIDS
[77] http://rconline.undg.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/UNAIDS_InfoBrief2012.pdf

National AIDS Coordinating Authority, with a broad based multi-sector mandate; One agreed country level Monitoring and Evaluation System."[78] This delivery and strongly communicative approach could inspire the UN-REDD Programme.

Delivery structure of other non-UN MPTFs, including REDD and other global IFIs

The Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF)

The FCPF aims to:
1. Provide financial and technical assistance to assist eligible REDD Countries achieve emissions reductions from deforestation and/or forest degradation and build recipient country capacity for benefitting from possible future systems with positive incentives for REDD;
2. Pilot an emissions reduction performance-based payment system generated from REDD activities to ensure equitable benefit-sharing and promote future large-scale positive incentives for REDD;
3. Test ways within the REDD approach to conserve biodiversity and sustain or enhance livelihoods of local communities; and
4. Disseminate the knowledge gained through the development and implementation of the FCPF and related programmes.

The FCPF day-to-day operations are managed by a Facility Management Team (FMT), which shall "make arrangements for assisting the REDD Participant Country to develop and implement its Readiness preparation proposal."[79] In the FCPF, the World Bank assumes the functions of trustee, secretariat and acts as one of the delivery partners.

The financial instrument used by the FCPF for the Readiness Fund is grant-based. Recipient countries determine specific strategy options and the manner in which to use the Readiness Mechanism (to prepare for REDD). The countries are given autonomy to individually prepare and submit proposals to the Facility.

The 2011 evaluation of the FCPF recommends to "Look at the option of further decentralizing FMT staff to other regions beyond the Africa region and for further strengthening the support to REDD countries including through additional support to staff based in delivery partner's country offices to help foster further coordination on the ground and smoother implementation."[80] The World Bank was the first delivery agent of the FCPF, but efforts to identify delivery channels outside of the World Bank, through "multiple-delivery partners," have allowed for a broadening of the options for delivery. During Participants Committees 7 and 8, a range of possible delivery partners was envisaged, such as African and Asian Development Banks and core partners to UN-REDD (UNDP, UNEP and FAO). To date, The Inter-American Development Bank and United Nations Development Programme are in the process of becoming Delivery Partners under the Readiness Fund.[81] The ADB has also made a provisional submission to become an FCPF Delivery Partne.r[82]

In summary, both the MDG-F and UNAIDS insist on the organisation of **delivery at the national level**, and both have given a central role to the UN Resident Coordinator System. Whereas the clearly leading role of UNDP has facilitated coordination between agencies in the MDG-F delivery, UNAIDS has chosen to establish country offices to coordinate the programme's interventions at national and regional levels.

As far as the FCPF is concerned, delivery at the national level is managed by country institutions directly. Whereas the advantages of this model in terms of country ownership are recognised, it often generates

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[78] "Three Ones" key principles, UNAIDS.
[79] FCPF Charter, 2011.
[80] First Programme Evaluation for the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), 2011, p 32.
[81] http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/node/12
[82] http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/node/304

long delays before countries are actually ready to receive and manage FCPF funds. The relative speed of UN-REDD fund delivery is, in this regard, widely appreciated.

In the other international mechanisms reviewed, **delivery at the global level** is generally coordinated by the Secretariat or equivalent, where implementing agencies are providers of expertise and services to the various projects and studies launched. It is also the case within UN-REDD, but the relationship between the UN agencies and both the Secretariat and the PB is very much influenced by the strong integration of the agencies into both entities, which is not necessarily the case in other funds/programmes taken as examples above.

Processes and mechanisms in place for PB to manage governance challenges associated with global changes in REDD+

As introduced in Section 5 of this document, a number of governance challenges are associated with global changes in REDD+ and in climate finance more generally speaking. Those include in particular the possibility for the UN-REDD Programme to (i) respond to the demands of an increased number of countries willing to start a REDD-readiness process; (ii) offer continuous support to countries evolving from Phase 1 to Phases 2 and 3 of the REDD-readiness process; (iii) attract an increased number of donors and diversify sources of funding; and (iv) respond to the desire of emancipation of many countries through more direct access to funds, the possibility to choose their delivery partners and an increased power into the governing structures of the Programme in line with the tendencies of new climate funds (GCF, AF).

Processes and mechanisms in place to manage those challenges mainly include:
- This Review process, whose objective is to "assess and evaluate the current Policy Board mandate, composition, role, responsibilities, governance structure, practices, procedures and accountability;"[83]
- The current process of harmonization of reporting standards between the three UN agencies;
- The foreseen review of the UN-REDD Programme strategy 2011-2015;
- The evaluation of the UN-REDD Programme planned for 2013; and
- The new funding options promoted through the Tier 2 modality.

Those processes shall enable UN-REDD to identify clearly all avenues to modify its structure and introduce new working modalities, rules and procedures, as relevant, in order to adapt to global changes in REDD+, including a renewed, clear and widely supported Vision for the UN-REDD Programme.

Degree of flexibility in place between MPTF and PB to manage changes in REDD+ implementation

The UNDP MPTF Office provides dedicated fund administration services to the UN system and national governments. When contributors/partners – both developed and developing countries – provide funds for multi-agency operations, the MPTF Office may be appointed as the fund administrator. The MPTF Office is an ex-officio member of the PB. The MoU with MPTF requires that at least one UN Agency be represented in the PB as a full member. From the MPTF perspective, the discussions on Direct Access modalities are qualified as irrelevant to the MPTF; UN-REDD is a UN Programme designed to pass through funds only to UN agencies. In this context, opening the door to some kind of direct access modalities, including Enhanced Direct Access as described in section *5. Review Context* of this document, if such is the desire of the PB, would require adaptations to the currently established financial channels.

It should be noted in this respect that the MPTF has a modality enabling it to establish a national fund on behalf of, and upon the request of national governments where national implementing partners can access funds directly. Whereas the MPTF only has this experience so far with a single national partner, establishing a single fund for multiple countries could also be envisaged. At the national level, the Tier 2

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[83] Review of UN-REDD Policy Board Structure, ToRs, May 2012.

modality is a first example of a new funding modality being currently experimented following these principles.

UN-REDD has established and benefitted from a structure to experiment 'Delivering as One' under the UN system. The structure developed has its merits and has allowed, amongst other things, prompt implementation and disbursement that assists in meeting programme objectives. It is however clear that this structure also faces challenges, a number of which derive directly from the vision underpinning the approach of different constituencies to their representation on the UN-REDD PB. When a Vision for the future of the UN-REDD Programme and its positioning is developed in the years to come, more in-depth modifications to the currently established structure, procedures and funding channels can then be envisaged.

6.4.2 Is the relationship between the PB and Tier 2 contributors conducive to meeting programme objectives?

Although discussions have been on-going for almost 2 years, Tier 2 is a relatively new modality in the UN-REDD programme. To date, the sole Tier 2 contributor is Norway, and only Vietnam and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have been allocated funding.

As introduced in the Tier 2 ToRs published in December 2012 after the Ninth PB meeting, "The Tier 2 modality is intended to enable countries to benefit from the expertise of the UN agencies' UN-REDD Programme team to ensure the quality standards of activities funded from sources beyond the UN-REDD Programme Fund, and to provide greater flexibility of funding arrangements.[84]" The mechanism is aimed at creating flexibility for donors while expanding the funding base for the Programme.[85]

The eligibility criteria defined in the Tier 2 ToRs are as follows: "To be eligible for Tier 2, the association with the UN-REDD Programme will be requested by the country or by a group of countries, together with one or more UN-REDD Programme Agencies, including for global activities, and the proposal should:
- be supported by one or more donors;
- be implemented in partnership with one or more UN-REDD Programme agencies (FAO, UNDP, UNEP);
- advance the objectives of the UN-REDD Programme;
- be consistent with the UN-REDD Programme principles, criteria, guidelines and quality assurance measures, including the Social and Environmental Principles and Criteria;
- contribute to learning opportunities for the UN-REDD Programme."[86]

The Tier 2 modality was extensively debated during the PB meetings 7, 8 and 9:
- PB7: "[The PB] requested the UN-REDD Programme Secretariat to share the terms of reference for Tier 2 funding with its members. The terms of reference should reflect how Tier 2 recipient countries will engage with donors and the procedure and specific bodies of the Programme that will ensure Tier 2 funding will be aligned with the UN-REDD Programme at the policy level. The Secretariat was also requested to look into how to engage Tier 2 donors in strategy and policy discussions."

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[84] UN-REDD Programme, Tier 2 Terms of Reference, December 2012
[85] UNREDD programme strategy 2011-2015
[86] Ibid.

- PB8: "14. The Board requests the Secretariat: (i) to re-circulate the Tier 2 Terms of Reference for comments to the Policy Board members; and (ii) the Secretariat to circulate a review of the procedures adopted to develop and share the Tier 2 Terms of Reference.
  a. Following up (i) and (ii) above, the Secretariat will circulate an updating note consolidating comments received and advising the Board on possible next steps.
  b. The Board requests an information session on Tier 2 to be held at the ninth Policy Board meeting."

- PB9: Session VI: Strategic and Policy Issues
  "16. The Board approved the establishment of the Tier 2 modality and the attached Terms of Reference and requested to review the Terms of Reference periodically, as appropriate, as part of the learning process.
  17. The Secretariat will provide clarification on the principles, criteria, guidelines and quality assurances procedures referred to in the Tier 2 Terms of Reference, as well as on the level of compliance required.
  18. The Board endorsed the association of the Viet Nam and the DRC Tier 2 proposals with the UNREDD Programme, subject to the Secretariat confirming that both proposals are in accordance with the Tier 2 Terms of Reference."

The respective responsibilities of REDD+ countries, donors, UN-REDD Programme Agencies, the Secretariat and the Policy Board are detailed in the Tier 2 ToRs (see Box 5) ensuring a certain level of transparency and accountability for Tier 2 funding.

Box 5: Responsibilities under the Tier 2 modality (as per Tier 2 ToRs, Dec. 2012)

REDD+ Countries:
- initiate the Tier 2 association (for national and regional activities)
- confirm partnership with one or more donors
- invite one or more UN agencies to partner in implementation
- lead the implementation of the Tier 2 activity at the national and regional levels
- present updates on implementation of Tier 2 activities to the Policy Board.

Donors:
- commit to provide financial support in agreement with the requesting country.

UN-REDD Programme Agencies:
- assess whether proposed activities meet the above Tier 2 criteria
- provide clearance of the Tier 2 proposal and forward it to the Policy Board through the UNREDD
- Programme Secretariat
- ensure that the UN-REDD Programme quality assurance measures are properly applied
- throughout implementation
- support resource mobilization for Tier 2 activities
- ensure, through the Management Group, that Tier 2 activities are coordinated and coherent
- with the UN-REDD Programme objectives and approach
- for global Tier 2 activities, initiate and lead the implementation.

UN-REDD Programme Secretariat:
- coordinate the process for reviewing draft proposals
- develop and maintain a registry of Tier 2 activities in the Voluntary REDD+ Database
- provide regular consolidated updates on Tier 2 activities to the UN-REDD Programme Policy
- Board
- support resource mobilization efforts for Tier 2 activities
- facilitate information sharing on Tier 2 activities among stakeholders.

Policy Board:
- endorse the association of the proposed Tier 2 activities with the UN-REDD Programme at a
- Policy Board meeting, with an option for inter-sessional endorsement to be followed by a
- presentation at the subsequent Policy Board
- create opportunities to share lessons with, and learn from, Tier 2 activities.

The first two countries to access the Tier 2 modality are Viet Nam and DRC. Viet Nam's Phase II Programme is a Tier 2 programme and its implementation shall follow the ToRs of Tier 2. Vietnam shall receive up to US$ 30 million from Norway through UN agencies and the MPTF. DRC should receive US$2.5 million, also from Norway.

The UN-REDD Viet Nam Phase II MPTF has been established to channel and manage contributions from Viet Nam's development partners in support of actions described in its ToRs.[87] Those ToRs also establish that "the Participating UN Organizations will have full programmatic accountability, and also be accountable for implementation of their financial, social and environmental standards. The funds will be implemented by them in accordance with their own regulations, rules, directives and procedures, including social and environmental procedures." The Fund flow of the UN-REDD Viet Nam Phase II Programme is established as per Figure 3 below.

Figure 3: Fund Flow of the UN-REDD Viet Nam Phase II Programme under the Tier 2 modality

The advantages of the Tier 2 modality, as highlighted during the Review process, include in particular (i) the enhanced ownership from national governments in the process, the PB having no decision authority in budget approval between a recipient country and a donor; (ii) Tier 2 offers the possibility to keep countries more advanced in their REDD+ readiness process engaged in UN-REDD; and (iii) the fact that Tier 2 funding does not necessarily go through the MPTF, offering the flexibility for any fund, from one or more donors, to contribute the UN-REDD programme.[88] The example of Viet Nam above demonstrates that a specific MPTF can be established in order to attract funds from any donors for a specific country or group of countries.

Although the Tier 2 modality seems to have been set up in order to respond to pressing demands from both recipients and some donor countries, here again the future shared vision of the UN-REDD Programme shall enable it to better locate the Tier 2 modality within the desired evolution of the Programme. Should some kind of Direct Access modalities be put in place, the Tier 2 window may become either irrelevant or a strategic example of the possibilities offered by the UN-REDD Programme.

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[87] UN-REDD Viet Nam Phase II Multi-Partner Trust Fund: ToRs, 30 November 2012.
[88] "For Tier 2 activities, funding arrangements include the full range of options that the UN-REDD Programme agencies offer as part of their operations. This includes multi-donor trust funds, joint programmes, as well as other project agreements between individual countries, donors and agencies. The actual management and fiscal arrangements will be determined through discussions between agencies, donors and recipient countries" (Tier2 ToRs).

Conclusion: Is the relationship between the PB and Tier 2 contributors conducive to meeting programme objectives?

Given the recent establishment of the Tier 2 modality and the resulting lack of experience to date, it is too early to assess whether the relationship between the PB and Tier 2 contributors will be conducive to meeting programme objectives. That being said, this modality is an innovation that (i) modifies the relative power of the PB in the conduct of the UN-REDD programme; (ii) positions the UN-agencies as 'gatekeepers' of the Programme's principles, criteria, guidelines and quality assurance measures; and (iii) opens the Programme to new funding possibilities and can contribute to its adaptation to future climate finance funding modalities. Therefore, while reviewing the Strategy of the UN-REDD Programme, the Tier 2 modality will need to be fully considered within the possible funding options of the Programme.

6.4.3   In light of the challenges surrounding the evolution of REDD+ and the UN-REDD Programme's response to those challenges, what is an appropriate structure and composition of the PB?

As mentioned previously, the appropriate governing structure for the UN-REDD programme, and in particular the structure and composition of the PB, largely depends on the Vision one has of UN-REDD for the future. What are the role and comparative advantages of UN-REDD leading up to and following 2015? What should the programme become and how should it be positioned in the global REDD+ arena beyond 2015? Those questions will need to be openly discussed in the course of the review of the Programme strategy scheduled for 2013.

To date, only a limited number of countries are beginning Phase 2 of the REDD+ readiness process with many others remaining at Phase 1 or having not started yet. Therefore, should the international negotiation process confirm the interest in REDD+ by securing future funding for soil and forest carbon, significant support will still be needed for Phases 1 and 2 in the coming 5 to 10 years.

The UN-REDD Strategy 2011-2015 notes that "The UN-REDD Programme is already active in phase 1 and has delivered technical support and funding for the development of national REDD+ strategies in pilot countries. While the phases are country-specific, and many countries are likely to remain at phase 1 for some time yet, there is also a clear role for the UN-REDD Programme in phase 2, in areas such as further capacity development and policy and institutional strengthening."

If the PB does not confirm this statement in the revised Strategy and decides that the UN-REDD programme should concentrate on phase 1 of REDD+ only and remain a time-limited and purely UN programme based on direct donor funding, its current structure and organization may remain relatively similar in the next three to five years notwithstanding small adjustments enabling better efficiency and stronger impacts as already proposed in this document. Although this is certainly the simplest option, the risk of such a strategy is to strongly limit the possible leveraging effect of the Programme on the REDD+ agenda and to limit its access to new climate and REDD funds – in particular the GCF. This option is also unlikely to resolve the latent tension at the PB between UN Agencies on the one hand, and beneficiary member countries on the other.

If, alternatively, the UN-REDD PB, donors and recipient countries confirm the role and strengths of the UN-REDD Programme in both Phase 1 and Phase 2 of the REDD+ process, the needs to be covered are huge and support will be requested from REDD+ countries over a longer time period, up to 10-15 years. In this case, the governing structure and the funding scheme of the UN-REDD Programme should adapt to the evolving context of both climate finance and climate negotiations to better position UN-REDD in the global arena. The Programme should in particular adapt to new funding mechanisms and offer flexibility to attract funds from all types.

As the GCF is likely to channel significant climate change mitigation and adaptation finance in the future, the UN-REDD programme structure must be able to accommodate a strategic partnership with the GCF.

As already argued, in the medium-term it is likely that the UN-REDD programme will have to better align with the emerging strategies and funding allocation procedures of the GCF to become one of the delivery mechanisms of the GCF.

In the longer term, such perspective would strongly impact the role of the UN-REDD Programme PB, which would have to ensure it does not duplicate or contradict the GCF strategy and governance structure. In such a context, the PB function would need to evolve from a strategic and decisions-making body to a kind of forum for experience and sharing of lessons-learned, within the framework of the GCF directives, with the GCF Board as the ultimate governance body setting the broader strategic framework. The Secretariat could evolve into a joint verification body of country applications, ensuring they conform with GCF directives and strategies in order to obtain funding, The Secretariat and the agencies would continue to do what they do best, providing technical know-how and capacity building through both country targeted and multi-country support, therefore assisting countries while they develop the competencies and systems required to meet direct access requirements down the road. The Secretariat would also likely ensure a close and central monitoring of UN-REDD results providing guidance to the countries and agencies on building adequate monitoring and evaluation functions and consolidating reporting to the GCF.

In this scheme, the Strategy Group could remain the coordination body of UN Agencies to define their joint strategy on UN-REDD, but should certainly remain an internal body of the UN-Agencies with no official existence within the UN-REDD Programme.

As for the Management Group, it could also become an important internal coordination body for the implementation of UN-REDD activities by agencies ensuring UN agencies actually cooperate at national, regional and global levels building on their respective strengths and delivering results.

Building on this logic, one can envisage, as has already been presented in the *Relevance and Role* section of this Review, the following options with respect to the evolution of the PB structure and its composition in the short term:

OPTION A: Given that the life expectancy of UN-REDD is likely to be short (not much beyond 2015), and therefore not require any alignment to emerging international governance models in the climate change arena, the PB remains essentially as is.

    1. Under this scenario, the main changes in governance are minor and relate mostly to rules of procedures for the conduct of meetings already alluded to earlier in the Report, to ensure slight improvements in efficiency.

    2. A Bureau is established to assist with the preparation of meeting Agendas and the inter-sessional decision making process to help provide more balance between Strategic and operational/administrative matters in PB discussions.

OPTION B: Given that UN-REDD wants to be well positioned for the long term under the global REDD+ agenda and prove by the same token its effectiveness in the short-term: the PB undergoes an progressive transformation, allowing it to keep its options open for the future, while improving the efficiency of the decision making structure. In addition to the changes under Option A above, changes in the PB set-up would be as follows:

    1. A Broadened PB/UN-REDD participants' Forum gathering: all UN-REDD Programme constituencies, all recipient countries, all donors, the three UN agencies and a defined number of IPs/CSOs. The Broadened PB/Forum meets once a year and approves the Programme's strategy, ToRs and RoPs of the Executive Committee, the associated budget, and follows the performance in implementation. It allows all interested parties to exchange views and opinions on the Programme and potential innovative approaches and lessons learned. It also nominates or reconfirms delegates to the Executive Committee from each constituency.

2. An Executive Committee, gathering a limited number of representatives for each group of stakeholders: 3 recipient countries, 3 donors (with rotation[89]), 1 UN Agency (speaking for all), 1 CSO lead, 1 IP lead, 1 representative from MPTF office as ex-officio member and 1 representative of the UN-REDD Secretariat as resource agent/observer. The Executive Committee meets twice a year and takes all operational and administrative decisions, including detailed funding allocations, and is co-chaired by a donor and a recipient country representative.

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[89] Rules for rotation need to be clearly defined. Whereas one can imagine members are in place for 2 years, the respective 'weight' of each donor should probably be taken into account in this regard, avoiding that the donor group be represented by 3 'minor' donors at some point.

7. Proposed Modifications to the ToRs and RoPs

7.1   Recommendations for the Review of the ToRs and the RoPs

Following the analysis presented in Section 6, it would seem rather logical to envisage a merger between the ToRs and the RoPs documents. Gathering all the information within one single document would avoid repetitions and discrepancies.

The proposed sections for the document are the following:
1. Introduction: objective of the document and content, with a reference to the Programme's strategy
2. PB functions and composition
3. PB conduct of business
4. Programme delivery and reporting
5. Operational guidance

7.2   Proposed Content and Changes for Each Section and Sub-section

1.   Introduction:

1.1   UN-REDD Programme objectives.

1.2   Type of participants and eligible participants.

1.3   Overall governance structure: PB, MPTF, Secretariat, UN-agencies.

2.   PB functions and composition:

2.1   Description of the PB functions.

2.2   Membership section: this section should incorporate the membership section of the RoPs, and (i) detail the status of members, alternate members (if appropriate to keep this distinction) and observers; (ii) detail the constituencies, their members and the rules of rotation between them; (iii) detail who are permanent observers and who are invited observers, with a clear reference to their respective rights and obligations.

2.3   Co-chairs section: currently, it describes the constituency of the co-chairs, but the section lacks description on the process of choosing co-chairs. Given the importance of the qualification of co-chairs, a description is necessary for (i) the tasks and responsibilities of co-chairs before, during and after PB meetings, including during inter-sessional decision processes, and (ii) the necessary qualification to fulfil the co-chairs mandate. In addition, the way co-chairs are elected/chosen must be clarified (and qualification of volunteers made transparent), so that the role is not taken up by certain individuals.

2.4   Bureau of the PB: if it is decided to set up a Bureau of the PB, its composition, role and responsibilities should be described.

2.5   The UN-REDD Secretariat: function, tasks and responsibilities, composition, ToRs as an annex (which should include sections on Secretariat personnel and Secretariat indemnification among others).

2.6   Working groups: description of the definition and role of working groups, description of the procedure to set up a working group, refer to an annex with standard terms of reference for working groups that will be established.

2.7   SG and MG: should those two bodies remain as official parts of the UN-REDD governance structure, their roles and responsibilities should be precisely described in this specific section. It is proposed to rather present them as internal, UN coordination mechanisms.

3. PB conduct of business:

3.1   Choice and nomination of delegates: describe the procedure for the choice of delegates in each constituency, refer to annexed ToRs for delegates, establish procedure for official nomination of delegates and their alternates, and publication of short CV on the website.

3.2   PB meetings: purpose and scope of discussions/decisions, timing, place, duration and general organization.

3.3   Agenda, meeting documentation and meeting preparation by constituencies: describe how the different PB members are involved in agenda and meeting preparation, e.g. supporting preparation meetings by region/constituency.

3.4   Decision making process: quorum, consensus, independence and conflicts of interest (describe rules to avoid any conflicts of interest in decision making), follow-up to decisions and inter-sessional decision-making process.

3.5   Preparation and adoption of minutes.

3.6   Time management: define specific rules for time management: limits of intervention of observers, speaking time limits for members, etc. (see Box 6 below for examples of such rules)

3.7   Languages: interpretation during meetings, type of documents subject to systematic translation and delays.

4. Programme delivery and reporting:

4.1   Delivery mechanisms of PB decisions: role of the three UN agencies for both NJPs and the GJP, lead agency, relevance of National-level Steering Committees and role of the UN Resident Coordinator.

4.2   Monitoring and evaluation: roles and responsibilities for the design and implementation of the M&E Plan.

4.3   Reporting: this includes progress reports and updates from the National and SNA Programmes, financial reporting and audits. This section should define:
    4.3.1   Responsibilities in reporting;
    4.3.2   Reporting frequency;
    4.3.3   Reporting formats and templates.

4.4   Communication and Public Disclosure.

5. **Operational guidance:**

     5.1   International Support functions
             5.1.1   Budget and strategy approval
             5.1.2   SNA projects: preparation and presentation of costed proposals to the PB for validation
             5.1.3   PB validation and release of funds

     5.2   National Support functions
             5.2.1   Scope of NJPs
             5.2.2   Formulation of NJP documents
             5.2.3   Country validation of the draft NJP
             5.2.4   Submission to the Secretariat: independent technical assessment; review of the secretariat; validation for presentation to the PB
             5.2.5   Policy Board
             5.2.6   Country Approval
             5.2.7   Release of Funds

Box 6: Time management during Board meetings: examples of rules from the CDM Executive Board, the GEF council and UNAIDS PCB

Rule 14 of the *Rules of procedure of the Executive Board of the clean development mechanism* specifies : "3. The Chair may propose to the Executive Board a **limitation on the time to be allowed to speakers and on the number of times each member may speak** on a question, the adjournment or closure of the debate and the suspension or adjournment of a meeting."

Rules of Procedures of the GEF council, conduct of business[2]: "35. With the consent of the Council, the **Chair may limit the time allowed to speakers and the number of times a speaker may speak on any question**"

Rules of Procedures of the Programme Coordinating Board (PCB) of UNAIDS, Conduct of Business[3]:
*   Rule 1: The PCB **may limit the time allowed to each speaker**.
*   Rule 2: During the discussion of any matter, a member may rise to a point of order, and the **point of order shall be immediately decided by the Chairperson**. A member may appeal against the ruling of the Chairperson, in which case the appeal shall immediately be put to the vote. A member rising to a point of order may not speak on the substance of the matter under discussion but on the point of order only.
*   Rule 3: During the course of a debate the Chairperson m**ay announce the list of speakers** and, with the consent of the PCB, **declare the list closed**. The Chairperson may, however, accord the right of reply to any member if in his/her opinion a speech delivered after the list was declared closed makes it desirable.
*   Rule 4: During the discussion of any matter, the Chairperson, with the consent of the PCB, **may adjourn the debate** on the item under discussion.
*   Rule 5: The **Chairperson may at any time**, with the consent of the PCB, **close the debate** on the item under discussion **whether or not any other member has signified the wish to speak**.

Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its first session, held at Montreal from 28 November to 10 December 2005, Addendum Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol at its first session, Annex 1
[2] Rules of Procedures of the GEF council, p15
[3] Modus operandi of the Programme Coordinating Board of the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS)(Revised December 2011), Annex 2

8. Conclusions

8.1 Role and Relevance

Is the organization and management of the PB's functions, composition and structure conducive to fulfilling programme objectives?

The main findings of the Review, when it comes to the *Role and Relevance* review criteria, are as follows:

- Whereas the current functions of the PB are rather clear and relevant, some of them would benefit from being adjusted to bring balance to the split between strategic level functions and administrative/operational functions and respond to the concerns expressed at this level from numerous stakeholders.

- This could by the same token provide an opportunity to slowly evolve the governance structure of UN-REDD in a way that would allow for both more effective governance between now and 2015, and prepare the ground beyond 2015, should the vision for UN-REDD evolve towards alignment with emerging international financing windows for REDD+. By the same token, the ToRs and RoPs would benefit from an update to bring out clearly the rules of games to ensure transparency in this governance structure.

- The PB operations are neither fully satisfactory nor fully conducive to fulfilling programme objectives due to a number of factors including:

  - The lack of shared vision amongst PB members as to what UN-REDD should be and what it should become after 2015, which creates a source of latent tension throughout the PB operations;

  - The lack of clarity in membership, in the role of different PB members and in the decision-making processes, calling for enriched and clarified procedures and an adaptation of the governing structure of the Programme to streamline operations;

  - Heterogeneity in the profiles of the delegates and their level of knowledge/competencies versus what is necessary to fulfil their role in the PB.

8.2 Effectiveness

Does the PB conduct business effectively and responsively, with appropriate guidance and oversight in order to reach programme objectives?

The Review found that:

- Many of the procedures used in the conduct of meetings have considerably improved over time and now follow standards used in other comparable funds and are considered by PB members and observers as sufficient, including when it comes to those not existing formally on paper. That being said, some confusion remains calling for a more detailed set of procedures to be described in the RoPs and validated by the PB.

- As far as financial reporting is concerned, it is hoped that the recent decisions reached regarding unified reporting formats between the three UN agencies will help meet the needs for reporting from the PB to ensure reporting at the impact, outcome and output level, with activity level information also available for consultation, if required.

- The level of responsiveness of the PB can be qualified as relatively good, with well appreciated material and knowledge products, strong coherence with UNFCCC guidance and relatively good responsiveness to participating countries' requests. Areas for improvement mainly reside in ensuring an even better feedback from experience to the UNFCCC and responding to the demands for increased country ownership. Responsiveness is an area of possible continuous improvement and future reforms to the governing structure of the Programme, as well as to the procedures in place, will clearly need to be mindful of this.

- The level of guidance and oversight on financial matters is rather good and in line with international fiduciary standards.

That being said, the Review clearly outlines that there remains significant room for improvement, in particular with respect to:

- Procedures for the conduct of meetings, which need to be completed and more detailed;
- Financial reporting, which requires unified reporting formats;
- Budget discussions, which need to enable PB members and observers to clearly understand the choices proposed in terms of budget allocations, without getting into micro-management;
- Ensuring a good feedback from experience to the UNFCCC;
- Monitoring and reporting of programme progress to the PB;
- Harmonisation of reporting procedures; and
- The overall organisation of the conduct of business, which includes, among other elements, the possibility for the PB to concentrate on more strategic level issues.

8.3   Efficiency

Does the PB have a clear functional role to conduct business in a timely fashion, and in a way that reduces duplication of efforts?

The Review found that:

- The functional role of the PB needs to be clarified in relation to the respective roles and responsibilities of the other elements of the governance structure of the UN-REDD programme, namely the Secretariat, the SG and the MG and the implementing agencies.
- Whereas the prevailing model does present a number of advantages (e.g. rapidity in the delivery of funds), duplication of efforts and overlaps do exist at different levels, leading to decreases in efficiency.
- Although a number of those aspects may not be amenable to change between now and 2015, following the post 2015 Strategy and Vision that will be developed for the UN-REDD Programme, changes and adjustments in the organizational structure of the UN-REDD Programme should aim to improve efficiency and reduce overlaps, in addition to responding to the evolving context around REDD+ and climate finance more generally.

8.4   Sustainability/Leverage

Is the UN-REDD Programme Policy Board positioned to enable fulfillment of the Programme Strategies?

The Review found that:

- UN-REDD has established and benefitted from a structure to experiment "Delivery as One" under the UN system. The structure developed has its merits and has allowed, amongst other things, prompt implementation and disbursement that assists in meeting programme objectives. It is, however, clear that this structure also faces challenges, a number of which derive directly from the vision underpinning the approach of different constituencies to their representation on the UN-REDD Policy Board. When a shared vision for the future of the UN-REDD Programme and its positioning is developed in the years to come, more in-depth modifications to the currently established structure, procedures and funding channels can then be envisaged.
- Given the recent establishment of the Tier 2 modality and the resulting lack of experience to date, it is too early to assess whether the relationship between the PB and Tier 2 contributors will be conducive to meeting programme objectives. That being said, this modality is an innovation that (i) modifies the relative power of the PB in the conduct of the UN-REDD programme; (ii) positions the UN-agencies as 'gatekeepers' of the Programme's principles, criteria, guidelines and quality assurance

measures; and (iii) opens the Programme to new funding possibilities and can contribute to its adaptation to future climate finance funding modalities. Therefore, while reviewing the Strategy of the UN-REDD Programme, the Tier 2 modality will need to be fully considered within the possible funding options of the Programme.

- With respect to the PB structure and composition, as mentioned previously, the appropriate set-up option largely depends on the vision one has of UN-REDD for the future. What are the role and comparative advantages of UN-REDD leading up to and following 2015? What should the programme become and how should it be positioned in the global REDD+ arena beyond 2015? Those questions will need to be openly discussed in the course of the review of the Programme strategy planned in 2013.

9. Recommendations

Based on the findings and conclusions previously presented, the Reviewer proposes the following set of recommendations.

On the Terms of Reference (ToRs)/Rules of Procedure (RoPs):

1. Both the ToRs and the RoPs need to clarify the status of each category of stakeholders and their specific role in the PB, in order to avoid any confusion.

2. The rationale behind the inclusion in the ToRs of section *5. Participating UN Organizations' Coordination Group* needs to be clarified, completed (e.g. including the UN Strategy Group) or deleted.

3. In order to avoid inconsistencies and possible discrepancies as mentioned above, one could recommend that PB membership be defined in detail in the ToRs.

On the conduct of business:

4. **Clarify and better detail procedures for the conduct of meetings**, in particular with respect to (i) the scope and form of the inter-sessional decision-making process; (ii) the use of working groups; (iii) the publication of ToRs for Board delegates (qualification, tasks and responsibilities, necessary availability) and the publication of delegates' short CVs on the UN-REDD website; (iv) the decision-making process (who participates in consensus?, what is the role of observers?); (v) the clear assignment of responsibilities for each decision point of the PB, within a clear time-frame; (vi) the publication of ToRs for the co-chairs, specifying their role, tasks and responsibilities and the competencies required; (vii) the possible assignation of co-chairing roles to each of the following constituencies: One member country and One donor member; (viii) the inclusion of a time management section into the RoPs, setting the rules on which PB co-chairs can rely for time management during meetings; and (ix) the set-up of a coordination mechanism between the countries of each sub-region prior to each PB meetings so that members can speak for their constituency.

5. To avoid any conflict of interest in the discussion on funding allocations, countries and UN Agencies who have been working on specific allocation demands and are interested in their implementation, should not participate in the consensual decision on that specific allocation. Their representatives could, however, act as resource persons prior to the decision time to help inform it. Specific procedures shall be designed and implemented in this regard.

6. **Ensure discussions on financial matters occur**: in addition to the detailed documentation provided, financial issues should be presented and discussed thoroughly at some point, including on the distribution of funds between the SNA and the National Programmes. If PB meetings are too short for this, setting up specific Working Groups with representatives of all constituencies might be a good avenue. This could be detailed in the updated procedure for SNA budget approval, which is very concise in the current RoPs.

7. For a stronger cooperation between actors at the national level, **continue to promote the establishment of 'National Coordination Groups' in REDD+ countries**, gathering all relevant stakeholders and governmental institutions in order to ensure the coordination of REDD+ activities at country level with all relevant stakeholders and assist in better addressing the drivers of deforestation, which often fall outside the forestry sector as such.

8. **Ensure feedback from experience to the UNFCCC is sufficiently organized** with the nomination of a responsible staff within the Secretariat, who is well-versed in Convention processes and politics, to ensure a permanent link with the UNFCCC Secretariat.

On the evolution of the Policy Board structure and its composition:

9. **Depending on the answers to the questions on the role and comparative advantages of UN-REDD until and after 2015**, and on the positioning of the Programme in the global REDD+ arena beyond 2015, one can therefore **envisage the following options**:

   a. **OPTION A:** Given that the life expectancy of the UN-REDD programme is likely to be short (not much beyond 2015) and therefore not require any alignment to emerging international governance models in the climate change arena, the PB remains essentially as is.
      i. Under this scenario, the main changes in governance are minor and relate mostly to rules of procedures for the conduct of meetings as recommended above, to ensure slight improvements in efficiency.
      ii. A Bureau is established to assist with the preparation of meeting Agendas and inter-sessional decision making mainly to help ensure a better balance between strategic and administrative/operational matters during PB meetings. Such a Bureau should meet (virtually as much as possible) at least twice a year and could be formed of constituency elected representatives from the following: one representative from beneficiary countries, one donor representative, the two elected co-chairs of the PB and a representative from the Secretariat.

   b. **OPTION B:** Given that UN-REDD wants to be well-positioned for the long-term under the global REDD+ agenda and prove by the same token its effectiveness in the short-term: the PB undergoes a progressive transformation, allowing it to keep its options open for the future, while improving the efficiency of the decision making structure. In addition to the changes under Option A above, changes in the PB set-up would be as follows:
      i. A Broadened PB/UN-REDD participants' Forum gathering all UN-REDD Programme constituencies, all recipient countries, all donors, the three UN agencies, and a defined number of IPs/CSOs and a defined number of observers, whose position and role during meetings would be clarified. The Broadened PB/Forum meets once a year and approves the Programme's framework documents, its strategy, ToRs and RoPs of the Executive Committee(see below), the UN-REDD overall programme budget, and follows performance in implementation. It focussed on strategic functions and issues only, and allows all interested parties to exchange views and opinions on the Programme and potential innovative approaches and lessons learned. It also nominates or reconfirms delegates to the Executive Committee from each constituency.
      ii. An Executive Committee gathering a limited number of elected representatives from each group of stakeholders from the broadened PB (to be reconfirmed every year): 3 recipient countries, 3 donors (with rotation), 1 UN Agency (speaking for all), 1 CSO lead, 1 IP lead, 1 representative from MPTF office as ex-officio member and 1 representative of the UN-REDD Secretariat as resource agent/observer. The Executive Committee meets twice a year and takes all operational and administrative decisions, including detailed funding allocations and is co-chaired by a donor and a recipient country representative.

10. This division of labour would be facilitated further by:
    a. A clarified status and role of the Secretariat, the SG and the MG (e.g. as internal coordination units of the three agencies, i.e. not officially represented in the PB);
    b. A well established Monitoring and Evaluation Plan, enabling the PB and the Executive Committee to assess progress towards objectives and ensure that the funds spent actually deliver the expected results, without the need to get involved in project-level management;
    c. The addition of the two elected co-chairs of the Executive Committee meetings to the newly created Bureau for the purpose of setting the Executive Committee meeting Agendas.

ANNEXES

Annex A: Governing structure and implementation bodies of MDG-F, UNAIDS and FCPF

Body	Spanish sponsored MDG Fund[90]	UNAIDS Secretariat[91]	FCPF[92]
General governance structure	The Governance of the MDG-F is reflected in a fairly light structure at the global level, with a two-member Steering Committee, a Secretariat, and Technical Subcommittees (TSC) led by UN Agency Convenors who have been responsible for coordinating the review of proposals for funding submitted to the MDG-F. 	The Executive Director of the programme, appointed by the UN Secretary-General upon the recommendation of the Cosponsors (UN Organisations), reports directly to the Programme Coordinating Board (PCB) that serves as the governance structure for the programme. The membership of the PCB comprises 22 Member States The cosponsors have formed a Committee of Cosponsoring Organizations (CCO), which serves as a standing committee of the board.	The FCPF governance structure includes a Participants Assembly (PA) including all participant countries and donors, and a 28 member Participants Committee (PC), which is, overall, the governing and decision-making body of the FCPF. The role of the PA is to provide guidance to the PC and at each Annual Meeting on the decisions made by the PC and, where appropriate, other issues discussed by the PC.
Board	Overall leadership of the MDG-F is provided by the MDG-F Steering Committee. The Steering Committee sets the strategic direction of the Fund, decides on individual financial allocations, monitors strategic allocations and delivery amongst priorities and countries, and tracks Fund-wide progress. The Steering Committee is made up of a representative of UNDP and the Government of Spain. Additional members may be invited at the discretion of the Steering Committee. The Steering Committee meets after the closure of a Request for Proposal round to review the recommendations of the Technical Sub-Committees. The Steering	The Programme Coordinating Board (PCB) acts as the governing body on all programmatic issues concerning policy, strategy, finance, monitoring and evaluation of UNAIDS. The membership of the PCB comprises 22 Member States, elected from among the Member States of the Cosponsoring Organizations during the annual ECOSOC General Assembly, with the following regional distribution: • Western European and Others Group 7 seats • Africa 5 seats • Asia and Pacific 5 seats	Participants Assembly : Frequency of Meetings and Participation: (a) An Annual Meeting of the Participants Assembly shall be held each year at a time and place as shall be determined by the Facility Management Team. (b) The Eligible REDD Countries, Eligible Donors and Eligible Prospective Carbon Fund Participants, which have expressed interest in participating in the Facility, and representatives of Relevant International Organizations, Relevant Non-governmental Organizations, Forest-Dependent Indigenous Peoples and Forest Dwellers and Relevant Private Sector Entities, may be invited by the Facility Management Team to attend Annual Meetings as

[90] Sources : MDG-F Framework document; MDGF website www.mdgfund.org; Report for the MDG Achievement Fund Steering Committee, Sept2010

[91] Sources : MODUS OPERANDI of the Programme Coordinating board, 2011; UNAIDS division of Labour, 2010; UNAIDS Governance Handbook ; ECOSOC resolutions establishing UNAIDS

[92] Sources: First Programme Evaluation of the FCPF, 2011; FCPF Charter, 2011; FCPF website www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/node/23; www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/node/12;
 Amendment to Rules of Procedure for the Meetings of the Participants Committee, 2011

Committee approves an 'indicative' budget on the basis of the Concept Note and the recommendations of the Technical Sub-Committee. Steering Committee approval is then transmitted to the Resident Coordinator who should then proceed with the full formulation process.	• Latin America and the Caribbean 3 seats • Eastern European/Commonwealth of Independent States 2 seats Each sub-region elects its representatives. The term of membership of these 22 members is three years. Each of the Cosponsors shall have full rights of participation in the PCB but without the right to vote. Five nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), three from developing countries and two from the developed countries or countries with economies in transition, shall be invited to participate in meetings of the PCB but without the right to take part in the formal decision-making process and without the right to vote (ECOSOC resolution 1995/2). The selection of the five nongovernmental organizations would be determined by the NGOs themselves from among those either in consultative status with ECOSOC or in relationship with one of the cosponsoring organizations or on the roster of NGOs dealing with matters pertaining to HIV/AIDS. The PCB shall formally approve the NGOs nominated. The terms of office of the selected NGOs shall not exceed three years. Observers: Upon written application, which expresses a manifest interest, observer status for PCB meetings may be granted by the Executive Director, in consultation with the chairperson of the PCB, to any Member State of any of the Cosponsoring Organizations, and any intergovernmental or nongovernmental organization. Observers will make their own arrangements to cover expenses incurred in attending meetings of the PCB. Observers may participate, when invited to do so by the chair, in the deliberations of the PCB on matters of particular concern to them. Observers may have access to PCB background documents. They may submit memoranda to the Executive Director who shall determine the nature and scope of their circulation. Observers must work through the Board members/participants to propose decision points or introduce new agenda items. The Programme Coordinating Board (PCB) Bureau is intended to maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of the PCB. Specifically, the PCB Bureau has the responsibility for coordinating the PCB's programme of work for the year, including: i. Facilitating the smooth and efficient functioning of PCB sessions; ii. Facilitating transparent decision-making at the PCB; iii. Preparing the PCB agenda, and recommending the allocation of time to, and the order of, discussion items; iv. Providing guidance on PCB documentation, as needed; and v. Carrying out additional functions as directed by the PCB. The PCB Bureau is comprised of representatives of the officers of the PCB (chairperson, vice-chairperson and rapporteur), the Chair of the Committee of Cosponsoring Organizations and the PCB NGO Delegation. They may be accompanied by advisers.	observers. (c) The Vice President of the Sustainable Development Network of the Wolrd Bank or his or her representative shall chair Annual Meetings of the Participants Assembly. <u>Membership of the Participants Committee</u> The Participants Committee shall consist of 28 members, among which 14 members shall be from REDD Country Participants and 14 members shall be collectively from Donor Participants and Carbon Fund Participants, among which the Donor Participants and the Carbon Fund Participants shall collectively determine the number of the members allocated to either group for each term, taking into account the objective of having equal representation of both groups in the Participants Committee. The members of the Participants Committee shall be elected by the respective Constituency. Elected members shall regularly consult with their Constituencies to ensure that the views of the relevant Participants are represented at the meetings of the Participants Committee. <u>Delegates</u>: elected members of the Participants Committee shall be officers, directors, employees or officials of Participants, provided that not more than one member shall be a representative of the same Participant. Elected members of the Participants Committee who cease to be officers, directors, employees or officials of the Participant which nominated them will no longer be eligible for membership of the Participants Committee. Unless the Participants Committee decides otherwise, the Vice President of the Sustainable Development Network of the Bank or his or her representative shall chair the meetings of the Participants Committee <u>Bureau of the PC</u>: Up to eight members of the Participants Committee, including five REDD Country Participants and, up to three financial contributors (i.e., Donor Participants and Carbon Fund Participants collectively), shall serve as the Bureau of the Participants Committee to liaise with and provide guidance to the Facility Management Team during intercessional periods." The Bureau also submits nominations of co-chairs two weeks prior to each Meeting for approval by the Participants Committee members at the start of the Meeting and information of the Facility Management Team." <u>Observers</u>: Participants that are not members of the Participants Committee may attend the meetings of the Participants Committee as observers. One representative from Relevant International Organizations, one representative from Relevant Non-Governmental Organizations, one representative from Forest-Dependent Indigenous Peoples and Forest Dwellers and one representative from Relevant Private Sector Entities, one

			representative from the UN-REDD Programme and one representative from UNFCCC Secretariat, shall be invited to attend the meetings of the Participants Committee as observers without voting rights to any decision by the Participants Committee The Facility Management Team, in consultation with the Bureau of the Participants Committee, may invite any other entity to participate in a Meeting as an observer. However, for any specific agenda item, the Co-Chairs may decide to limit participation in the Meeting to the Members and the observers identified in Section 11.7(a) and (b) of the Charter. Without prejudice to Section 5.01 of the Rules, all Observers may express their views on topics or issues related to the adopted agenda of the Meeting but shall not vote on any decision by the Participants Committee.
Advisory panel/working groups	Technical review Committees : MDG-F Technical Sub Committees provide technical and policy advice to the Steering Committee. A number of Technical Sub-Committees were constituted, reflecting the 8 thematic areas of focus of the Fund. Technical Sub-Committees were made up of 10-12 UN and independent experts appointed by the Steering Committee, meeting under a Convenor. The Sub-Committees advised the Steering Committee on the technical and design merits of applications to the Fund in their area of competence (MDG-F Framework document). The Secretariat was therefore not involved into the analysis of applications, which was important to avoid any critics regarding its independance or competence in the subject area.	A number of subcommittees are established by theme	One or more Ad Hoc Technical Advisory Panels may be established by various bodies under the Facility including the Participants Committee or the Facility Management Team, for the purpose of providing technical advice and information to these bodies. Each Ad Hoc Technical Advisory Panel shall be independent, impartial and proportionate to the tasks being undertaken. The FCPF's Facility Management Team (FMT) maintains a roster of experts who can be selected to serve on the Technical Advisory Panel (TAP) as needed, offering a wide range of technical and policy expertise and knowledge of specific country conditions. The FMT invites TAP experts to review Readiness Preparation Proposals (R-PPs) submitted by REDD eligible countries, for completeness and quality in meeting the criteria for R-PP set forth by the FCPF Information Memorandum. The TAP review of a country's R-PP is led by an expert who serves as the lead reviewer. To achieve consistency, each individual expert selected to review an R-PP completes his or her review according to a standard template, and the lead reviewer is then responsible for synthesizing the various individual reviews into one summary panel-wide review. The summary review is made public in order to encourage transparency of the FCPF process. These lead reviewers may also be requested to attend one or more meetings of the FCPF TAP and/or FCPF Participants Committee, to present the outcomes of TAP reviews, offer advice, and serve as experts for any discussion or questions that arise on review methods, results, or general technical issues. The TAP reviews countries' R-PPs by a scheduled date, as directed by the FMT. According to the First evaluation of FCPF, « The review process through the TAP has proved to be an effective and efficient mechanism for providing sound and independent inputs to R-PPs, although the multiple stage TAP

			review process has meant that in some cases it has been lengthy. This process has been further strengthened by the addition of PC members from participating countries in the review process, which has proven to be a valuable peer-to-peer mechanism. »
Secretariat	The MDG-F Secretariat is the operational coordination unit for the Fund and services the Steering Committee and other Trust Fund mechanisms. The Secretariat sits in the Partnerships Bureau of UNDP headquarters. The Secretariat is delegated by the Steering Committee to ensure policies and strategies decided by the Steering Committee are implemented and adhered to. The Secretariat also coordinates the proposal review process and manages the Fund's overall monitoring and evaluation strategy. Funding of the Secretariat is provided for directly from Fund resources and from interest income from the Fund account, on the basis of annual work plans approved by the Steering Committee. The Secretariat, in addition to supporting the Steering Committee (e.g. preparation of the agenda of meetings), has been essential in ensuring the operationalization of the MDG-F Framework and all the country programmes. The Secretariat has also played an important role in guaranteeing transparent processes, establishing clear criteria with the TSC and improving the quality of Joint Programme formulation. The Secretariat represents the link between the Steering Committee and participating countries, providing guidance and day-to-day support.	The Executive Director of the programme, appointed by the UN Secretary-General upon the recommendation of the Cosponsors, will report directly to the Programme Coordinating Board which will serve as the governance structure for the programme. The cosponsors have formed a Committee of Cosponsoring Organizations (CCO) The Secretariat comprises the Executive Director and such technical and administrative staff as the Programme may require. The Executive Director is, ex-officio, Secretary of the PCB, of the CCO, of all subcommittees of the PCB and of conferences organized by UNAIDS. He/she may delegate the functions. The Executive Director shall, in the exercise of providing leadership and guidance to the programme: (i) Prepare and submit to the PCB, after review by the CCO, the workplan and budget for each biennium; (ii) Mobilize and manage, in accordance with the financial regulations and rules of WHO (the agency providing administration of UNAIDS), programme financial resources on the basis of the budget approved by the PCB; (iii) Select, supervise, promote and terminate all staff of the Secretariat acting within the staff regulations and rules of WHO which shall be adjusted, as necessary, to take into account the special needs of UNAIDS. (iv) Establish such policy and technical advisory committees as he/she deems necessary in order to advise him/her on any aspect of UNAIDS. The Executive Director shall make available to the PCB and the CCO, as appropriate, the reports of such technical advisory committees. The members of such committees, to be selected by the Executive Director, shall serve in a personal capacity and represent a broad range of disciplines and experience; (v) Delegate to the staff of the programme the authority necessary for the effective implementation of UNAIDS' activities. In the performance of their duties the Executive Director and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any authority external to the Programme. In 2005, the Joint Programme led a process to clarify and cost a Division of Labour for technical support to countries. This culminated in an agreement on a Division of Labour that more clearly differentiated the roles of the UNAIDS Cosponsors and Secretariat in providing, as well as managing, technical support. To avoid duplication between the Secretariat and the Cosponsors, the Secretariat will not convene or co-convene any of the 15 Division of Labour areas but will facilitate and promote cooperation and achievement goals, as stated in the Strategy, in all Division of Labour areas.	A Facility Management Team under the Facility is hereby established by the Bank to be responsible for the day-to-day operation of the Facility. The size of the Facility Management Team shall be proportionate to its functions, which shall include: (a) Conducting the initial review of a Readiness preparation proposal Readiness Idea Notes submitted by Eligible REDD Countries. Such initial review will be focused on completeness and accuracy of the information; (b) Proposing Criteria for Grant Allocation for Preparing and Implementing the Readiness preparation proposal and the budget for a REDD Participant Country in preparing and implementing the Grant Agreements; (c) Upon request by a REDD Country Participant, making arrangements for assisting the REDD Participant Country to develop and implement its Readiness preparation proposal.

		UNAIDS Secretariat has its headquarters in Geneva and works on the ground in more than 80 countries. Secretariat staff is directly employed by the Secretariat but legally depends on the World Health Organization.	
Trustee	Administration of the Fund is entrusted to the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MPTF) Office of UNDP. The MPTF Office is responsible for consolidated reporting to the Steering Committee at the country and global level. The Multi-Partner Trust Fund, which also sits at the global level, is the Administrative Agent for the MDG-F and provides financial and reporting services.	Funds for programme activities at the global level will be obtained through appropriate common global means. Contributions to the programme are channelled in accordance with the global budget and work plan. Funding for country-level activities shall be obtained primarily through the existing fund-raising mechanisms of the co-sponsors. These funds shall be channelled through the disbursement mechanisms and procedures of each organization. Administration of the funds of the Global Joint Budget is ensured by UNADIS Secretariat itself. The World Health Organization is responsible for the administration in support of the programme	The WB acts as trustee for the Readiness Fund and the Carbon Fund.
Implementing agencies	UN agencies have jointly implemented the programme, with shared responsibilities according to the thematic areas of the Programme. Each Participating UN Organization shall assume full programmatic and financial accountability for the funds disbursed to it by the Administrative Agent.	The programme builds on the capacities and comparative advantages of its 12 co-sponsoring organizations (11 UN agencies and the World Bank). Co-sponsors incorporate the normative work undertaken at the global level on policy, strategy and technical matters into their HIV/AIDS activities, consistent with national plans and priorities. The participation in the programme of organizations of the United Nations system shall ensure the provision of technical and financial assistance to national activities in a coordinated multisectoral manner. This is supposed to strengthen intersectoral coordination of HIV/AIDS activities and facilitate further incorporation of these activities in national programme and planning processes.	The Bank is the FCPF delivery agent. The idea of identifying delivery channels outside the WB through "multiple-delivery partners" has been widely discussed, recognizing the fact that diversifying delivery and implementation partners will most likely help to improve disbursement rates. A range of possible delivery partners was envisaged, such as African and Asian Development Banks and core partners to UN-REDD (United Nations Development Programme -UNDP, United Nations Environment Programme-UNEP and Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)). At PC7 a decision was taken to consider piloting in two countries, namely Cambodia and Panama (possibly through UNDP). Much work has still to be done for this to be effective, such as developing generic operational guidance (such as safeguards) that could be adopted by all potential delivery partners. The Inter-American Development Bank and United Nations Development Programme are in the process of becoming Delivery Partners under the Readiness Fund
Donors	Spanish Government only	UNAIDS received funds from variety of donors, in particular governments and private foundations.	An Eligible Donor may participate in the Readiness Fund through entering into a Donor Participation Agreement. Each Donor Participant will be required to make a Minimum Contribution of US$5 million to the Readiness Fund.
Beneficiary countries	Beneficiary countries were represented in national steering committees, together with UN and Spain. Indeed, the Fund recommended that Resident Coordinators institute a small Steering Committee at the country level, with representation of the Government, the UN Country Team and the Spanish Government (where resident, alternatively a dialogue with the closest representation office should be initiated) in order to oversee the development of applications to the Fund. Where the Fund has approved funding of a Joint Programme, such a Committee is mandatory, and should provide ongoing oversight of Fund-supported activities.	Beneficiary countries represent the majority of PCB members.	Process for becoming a REDD Country Participant: An Eligible REDD Country may submit a Readiness Preparation Proposal Idea Note to the Facility Management Team to apply for participation in the Facility. A REDD Country Participant may, at any time, withdraw its participation in the Facility, provided at least three (3) months prior written notice is given to the Facility Management Team

	The UN Resident Coordinators (RC) and Governments rated as highly positive the establishment of a National Steering Committee through which the Government, the UN and Spain are represented by a single voice at the country level.		
Additional information	The operation of the Fund's Steering Committee (SC), the strictly technical vision of the Technical Subcommittees (TSC) and the separation of the financial aspects in the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MPTF) have been positive, subject to a greater coherence in the transfer of funds directly to the country. The facilitation provided by the MDG-F Secretariat to the TSCs was a determining factor ensuring a balance across UN Agencies and preset criteria to improve the quality of JP design, synthesis of shared lessons, and operational solutions to questions raised. The Secretariat also provided some standardization and independence in processes related to M&E and KM. Mechanisms for Operational Management The MDG-F joint programmes are implemented, managed and evaluated in countries with strategic decision-making at the National Steering Committee level and more operational management is done by the Programme Management Committee as the body through which the implementing partners participate and are represented. Over time, the management of the joint programmes have evolved to using Coordination Units with a lead coordinator representing all partners, and located, when possible, in national counterparts central offices and/or in one of the areas of intervention. In this sense, the MDG-F is becoming less a fund of UN Agencies and UN Country Teams and more a fund requiring the joint leadership of UNRCs-Governments and beneficiaries. Over the last years, the Fund has seen the establishment of joint monitoring and evaluation units and joint communication strategies under the UNRC leadership and/or the National Steering Committee which is consistent with the Paris and Accra principles[93].	The President and the Director of UNAIDS have recently recalled the strategic position of the PCB, which must remain at the political level, and not enter into country level decisions, which leads to useless debates since all countries are at a very different level of implementation, and therefore have different needs. The PCB does not approve country programmes.	-

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[93] Refers to the 'Paris Declaration' five fundamental principles for making aid more effective: (i) Ownership, (ii) Alignment, (iii) Harmonization, (iv) Results, and (v) Mutual Accountability and the **Accra Agenda for Action which** proposed the following three main areas for improvement of the Paris declaration: (i) Ownership, (ii) Inclusive Partnerships, and (iii) Delivering Results.

Annex B: Comparison with MDG-F, UNAIDS and FCPF conduct of business

Criteria	Spanish sponsored MDG Fund	UNAIDS Secretariat	FCPF
Procedures in place for determining which matters are handled inter-sessionally vs. during Board[94] meetings	Need for rapid decisions infrequent, since Secretariat was allowed to take most decisions once the strategy and budget for a given project were approved. In case of urgent need, questions used to be sent to the Steering Committee members by email.	"When a decision is required by the PCB that cannot wait until the next scheduled PCB meeting the PCB Bureau, composed of the PB chair, vice-chair, rapporteur, one NGO and the lead cosponsor organization (+ the Secreatariat) may use the following inter-sessional process. This process is only applicable for decisions that are required by the PCB Bureau to complete functions that have been specifically mandated to it by the Board" (MODUS OPERANDI CPB UNAIDS)	"In the event that the Facility Management Team determines that action required or permitted to be taken at a Meeting should not be postponed until the next Meeting, such action may be taken without a Meeting through electronic means on a no-objection basis in accordance with the procedures set forth under Sections 6.02 through 6.05 of the Rules". (RoP 2011)
Procedure for adoption of agenda (before/during Board meetings)	Agenda proposed by the Secretariat.	The PCB Bureau meets at least 3 times before each PCB meeting in order to select priority decisions to be taken during the PCB meeting, on the basis of previous PCB meeting's decisions and reports on emerging issues to be considered by the Programme.	"IV. Agenda 4.01 The Facility Management Team shall prepare, on the basis of the conclusions of the previous Meeting referred to in Section 10.02 of the Rules and in consultation with the Bureau of the Participants Committee, the provisional agenda for each Meeting. 4.02 The provisional agenda together with supporting documents shall be distributed to the Members and the Observers at least fourteen (14) calendar days before the Meeting. 4.03 The Participants Committee shall adopt the provisional agenda at the beginning of each Meeting." (RoP 2011)
Procedure for the adoption of minutes	Given the very small size of the Steering Committee, any comments to the minutes were duly discussed and corrected.	"18. PCB decisions will include clear language on who is responsible for their implementation, and also a time frame, costing, source of funds and identified reporting mechanisms and should take into account the linkages to, and impact of, the decision for existing workplans and priorities. 30. Recommendations, decisions and conclusions shall be submitted for adoption by the members prior to the close of PCB meetings and distributed to all participants preferably within one week of the close of the meeting. 31. A report of the PCB meeting shall incorporate the recommendations, decisions and conclusions referred to in paragraph 30 above and be distributed to members and other participants within sixty days of the close of the meeting." (MODUS OPERANDI CPB UNAIDS)	"X. Resolution and Meeting Record 10.01 The Participants Committee may adopt its decisions in the form of resolutions. 10.02 At the end of each Meeting, the Facility Management Team shall prepare a record of the conclusions of the Meeting for approval by the Members." (RoP2011)
Procedure for establishing Working Groups	N/A	"28. The PCB may establish subcommittees and ad hoc working groups to assist it in carrying out its functions". (Modus Operandi)	"XIII. Contact Groups 13.01 Contact groups may be established by Co-Chairs, during a Meeting, to prepare draft resolutions in the context of the Participants Committee's

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[94] For the means of the comparison between the MDG-F, UNAIDS, the FCPF and the UN-REDD Programme, the word 'Board' in this table and subsequent analysis refers to the main governing body of the fund/programme, i.e.: the Steering Committee (SC) of the MDG-F, the Programme Coordinating Board of UNAIDS, the Participants Committee (PC) of the FCPF and the Policy Board of the UN-REDD Programme.

			responsibilities as stipulated in Section 11.1 of the Charter, and report back to the plenary for further consideration and adoption. 13.02 Contact groups shall represent a balanced composition of interested financial contributors (i.e., the Donor Participants and the Carbon Fund Participants), REDD Country Participants, and the observer groups as described in section 11.7 of the Charter. Facility Management Team staff shall facilitate the work of the Contact Groups". (RoP2011)
Procedure for nominating national focal points/country representatives	The entry point in each country is the UN Resident coordinator, who collaborates with relevant government counterparts	Generally speaking, national focal points are within the Ministry of health. However, the Programme promoted a multi-sectoral approach of HIV/AIDS and the set-up of a national coordination entity chaired by the Ministry of health (National AIDS Council or Authority). UNAIDS three ones: - One agreed HIV/AIDS Action Framework that provides the basis for coordinating the work of all partners. - One National AIDS Coordinating Authority, with a broad based multi-sector mandate. - One agreed country level Monitoring and Evaluation System.	The FCPF works with government ministries directly. Since the initiative comes from the government itself, there is no specific procedure in place for nominating focal points.
Procedure for agreeing on key decision points	Consensus is the rule for decision making in the Steering Committee (which is only composed of UNDP and Spain).	The PCB endeavours to adopt its decisions and recommendations by consensus. This has been the case for all decisions taken since the Programme's start. In practice, the 22 PCB members speak first, then the head of the Committee of Cosponsoring Organisations and the NGOs. In practice, the decision is then taken by consensus of all participants; the process is facilitated by the Secretariat. "Should decisions by voting or other procedural advice be necessary, the PCB uses the Rules of Procedures in Annex 2 of the Modus Operandi. Two thirds of the voting members of the PCB, i.e., fifteen member states, constitute a quorum. (Modus Operandi item. 20)" (UNAIDS governance Handbook)	Decisions are generally taken by consensus. "Section 11.4 Voting (a) Each member of the Participants Committee shall be entitled to cast one vote. (b) The members of the Participants Committee shall make every effort to make decisions by consensus. If all efforts to reach consensus have been exhausted, and no decision has been made, decisions shall be taken by two-thirds majority of the members present and voting at the meeting (FCPF Charter, 2011) IX. Voting Method 9.01 Any voting referred to Section 11.4 of the Charter, shall normally be held by written ballot or by show of hands. – RoP2011 X. Resolution and Meeting Record 10.01 The Participants Committee may adopt its decisions in the form of resolutions. 10.02 At the end of each Meeting, the Facility Management Team shall prepare a record of the conclusions of the Meeting for approval by the Members." (RoP2011)
Procedure for Board follow up to decisions (or action items)	In each Secretariat report to the Steering Committee, an update on the implementation of the last Steering Committee recommendations is provided.	A matrix on decisions follow-up is presented at each PCB meeting in order to present how each decision was implemented. The tendency is now to present concrete examples of PCB's decisions application, in order to explain the consequences of such decisions and the difficulties in applying them into specific country contexts.	The FMT ensures implementation/monitoring/reporting on decisions to the Participants Committee

Procedure(s) for determining Chairs for the Board	N/A	The PCB shall "elect from among its members and States elected as members as of 1 January of the following calendar year a chair, a vice-chair and a rapporteur. Officers shall be elected taking into account a fair geographical distribution". (MODUS OPERANDI CPB UNAIDS) In practice, the vice-chair of the current year becomes the chair of the next year, so elections are focused on the vice-chair each year.	"PA : (c) The Vice President of the Sustainable Development Network of the Bank or his or her representative shall chair Annual Meetings of the Participants Assembly. "(RoP 2011) "PC: 5.03 At the beginning of each Meeting, the Members shall select two Co-Chairs for the Meeting to exercise the responsibilities stipulated in Sections 5.01 and 5.02 of the Rules based on the nomination s provided by the Bureau in accordance with Section 7.03 of the Rules". (RoP 2011) "The Bureau of the Participants Committee is constituted by a selection of eight members of the Participants Committee, including five REDD Country Participants and up to three financial contributors". Its role is "to liaise with and provide guidance to the Facility Management Team". "The Bureau submits nominations of two Co-Chairs to the Members and the Facility Management Team two weeks prior to each Meeting for approval by the Participants Committee. One Co-Chair shall be nominated from the Members of REDD Country Participants and one Co-Chair shall be nominated from the Members of the financial contributors (i.e., the Donor Participants and Carbon Fund Participants collectively)". (RoP2011)
Procedures/rules for the appointment of IA and/or UN-staff within the programme	Staff is appointed according to UN rules within UN agencies	Agencies appoint their own staff to the Programme. Personnel from the secretariat are appointed independently by the Secretariat, although administratively linked to the World health Organization.	FMT staff appointed according to WB rules.
Languages in which Board meetings are conducted, materials/minutes are published, and timeframe for posting both original documents and their translations	N/A	"Simultaneous interpretation is provided for all PCB meetings in English and French. Simultaneous interpretation into other UN official languages may be provided on written request submitted by a member to the Secretary no later than six weeks prior to a full meeting of the PCB." (Modus operandi item 19) "Background documents are prepared in English and French". (Modus Operandi item 17) except for "Conference Room Papers which are only made available in English. Documents for the PCB are prepared in English and French and are made available eight weeks before a meeting when possible, and as soon as possible thereafter". (UNAIDS governance Handbook)	"The Meetings shall be conducted in English and all documents of the Meetings shall be in English. However, the Facility Management Team shall normally arrange for simultaneous translation from English to French and Spanish" (RoP2011)
Mechanisms in place for time management during Board meetings (Time allotted to specific agenda items, to input from key actors)	N/A	The Rules of Procedure of the Programme Coordinating Board (PCB) of UNAIDS establish the following rules for time management: - "Rule 1: The PCB may limit the time allowed to each speaker. - Rule 2: During the discussion of any matter, a member may rise to a point of order, and the point of order shall be immediately decided by the Chairperson. A member may appeal against the ruling of the Chairperson, in which case the appeal shall immediately be put to the vote. A member rising to a point of order may not speak on the substance of the matter under discussion	"The Co-Chairs may limit the time allowed to each speaker and the number of times each speaker may speak on a specific topic or issue related to the adopted agenda of the Meeting". (RoP 2011)

		but on the point of order only. - Rule 3: During the course of a debate the Chairperson may announce the list of speakers and, with the consent of the PCB, declare the list closed. The Chairperson may, however, accord the right of reply to any member if in his/her opinion a speech delivered after the list was declared closed makes it desirable. - Rule 4: During the discussion of any matter, the Chairperson, with the consent of the PCB, may adjourn the debate on the item under discussion. - Rule 5: The Chairperson may at any time, with the consent of the PCB, close the debate on the item under discussion whether or not any other member has signified the wish to speak".	
Procedures and rules for reporting on expenditures Does the Board go to project level finance, or only global envelops? What level of flexibility is left to implementing agencies?	At country level, results monitoring is realized during Project management committees' meetings (every 3 months). Every semester, an approved progress report is sent to the Secretariat. "Participating UN Organization in receipt of MDG-F resources will be required to provide the Administrative Agent with the following statements and reports: o Narrative progress reports for each twelve-month period ending 31 December, to be provided no later than two months after the end of the applicable reporting period; o Annual financial reports as of 31 December each year with respect to the funds disbursed to it from the Joint Programme Account, to be provided no later than three months after the end of the applicable reporting period; o A final narrative report and financial report, after the completion of all Joint Programme activities financed from the Fund, to be provided no later than 30 April of the year following the financial closing of Joint Programme activities; o A final certified financial statement, to be provided no later than 30 June of the year following the financial closing of Project activities. The Administrative Agent shall prepare consolidated narrative progress and financial reports consisting of the reports referred to above submitted by each Participating UN Organization, and shall provide those consolidated reports to the respective Resident Coordinators and subsequently to the MDG-F Steering Committee. Decisions by the Steering Committee will be shared with all stakeholders in order to ensure the full coordination and coherence of MDG-F efforts."(MDG-F Framework document, August 2007)	The President of the Committee of Consponsors, i.e. UNAIDS director, presents to the PCB the consolidated report from the cosponsors (UN agencies) NGOs also report progress accordingly. The PCB does not enter into the details of each project/country progress and avoids micro-supervision, which is left to the Secretariat and its regional and national teams	"No later than fourteen (14) days prior to each Annual Meeting of the Participants Assembly, the Facility Management Team provides annual progress reports to Participants regarding the activities of the Facility for the previous Fiscal Year". (FCPF Charter, 2011) No information on reporting requirements at national level

Fiduciary risk management: are audits conducted ?	See above. "Activities carried out by the UN Agencies shall be subject to internal and external audit as articulated in their applicable Financial Regulations and Rules. In addition, the Steering Committee will consult with the UN Agencies on any additional specific audits or reviews that may be required, subject to the respective Financial Regulations and Rules of the UN Agencies. Participating Organizations will provide a summary of their internal audit key findings and recommendations for consolidation by the Administrative Agent and submission to the Steering Committee". (MDG-F Framework document, August 2007)	Audits are conducted at the Secretariat level and at the UN Agency level, according to their own procedures. Audit reports are presented to the PCB.	No information collected
Procedures for approval of budgets Clarity of processes for funding allocation and/or approval	Approval of the proposed budgets for activities are proposed by the Secretariat to the Steering Committee.	Joint budget repartition between all participating agencies is done every two years by the PCB, by consensus.	No information collected

Annex C: Review Matrix

Questions	Sub-cluster	Indicators	Data Collection Method	Data Source
ROLE and RELEVANCE				
Is the organization and management of the PB's functions, composition, and structure conducive to fulfilling programme objectives?				
What are the functions of the PB and how are they aligned with the present environment?	PB Current Functions	Key tasks and responsibilities of the PB, and in governing bodies of other REDD+ global programmes/IFIs	Desk review Comparative analysis with other global REDD+/IFI Sample of Interviews	PB ToRs GEF, FCPF, Spanish MDG Fund documents and staff Current PB members and observers and UN-REDD Secretariat
		Number and type of strategic vs. administrative tasks and responsibilities of the PB and in governing bodies of other REDD+ global programmes/IFIs		
		Number and type of short, medium and long-term tasks and responsibilities of the PB and in governing bodies of other REDD+ global programmes/IFIs		
	ToRs	Type of potentially required changes, and reasons for changes to PB ToRs as a result of internal changes in the UN-REDD programme (e.g. the composition of the PB)		
		Type of changes required, and reasons for changes to PB ToRs as a result of changes in surrounding context (e.g. number of countries with demand for REDD+ support)		
		Mechanisms in place in ToRs to support transparency and accountability of the PB (e.g. who reports to whom, on what, and how often)	Desk review Sample Interviews	PB ToRs Current members and observers and UN-REDD Secretariat
What is the structure and composition of the PB and potential areas for adjustments in light of the current programme objectives?	PB Structure and Composition	Size, profile, representative groups and tenure of PB members	Desk review	PB ToRs
		Level of PB expertise in thematic oversight and in governing board of	Comparative analysis with other global	GEF, FCPF, Spanish MDG Fund documents

		comparable global funds/programmes	REDD+/IFI	and staff
		Level of PB expertise in financial oversight and in governing board of comparable global funds/programmes	Sample of Interviews	Current members and observers and UN-REDD Secretariat
		Level of PB expertise in institutional governance and in governing board of comparable global funds/programmes	On-line Survey	Past and present members and observers
		Changes in PB composition made or potentially required as a result of changes in the programme and in governing board of comparable global funds/programmes		
		Level and type of engagement of CSOs in the PB and in governing board of comparable global funds/programmes		
		Level and type of engagement of private sector in the PB and in governing board of comparable global funds/programmes		
EFFECTIVENESS				
Does the PB conduct business effectively and responsively, with appropriate guidance and oversight in order to reach programme objectives?				
Does the PB conduct business in a manner that is appropriate in light of the challenges surrounding the evolution of REDD+ and the UN-REDD Programme's response to those challenges?	PB Conduct of Business for Meetings	Procedure for determining members of PB	Desk review	UN-REDD Programme Rules of Procedure and Guidelines
			Key Informant Interviews	UN-REDD Sec and UNDG MPTF
		Rules or criteria in place for determining which matters are handled inter-sessionally vs. during PB meetings	Desk review	UN-REDD Programme Rules of Procedure and Guidelines
		Procedure for adoption of agenda (before/during PB meetings)		PB Meetings Minutes
		Procedure for the adoption of minutes		
		Procedure for establishing Working Groups	Sample of Interviews	Current members and observers and UN-REDD Secretariat
		Procedure for nominating national focal points		
		Procedure for designating alternates when focal points cannot attend PB meetings	On-line Survey	Past and present PB members and observers
		Procedure for agreeing on key decision		

		points		
		Procedure for PB follow up to decisions (or action items)		
		Procedure(s) for determining Chairs for the PB		
		Procedures/rules for the appointment of IA and/or UN-staff within the UN-REDD programme		
		Mechanisms in place for time management during PB meetings		
		Languages in which PB meetings are conducted		
		Languages in which PB materials/minutes are published, and timeframe for posting both original documents and their translations		
		Time allotted to specific agenda items/types of tasks during PB meetings		
		Time allotted to input from key actors at the PB meetings (Individual members, REDD Secretariat, IAs, etc)		
	Funding Approval	Type of PB involvement in approval of financial matters		
		Balance of allocations to National Programmes and SNA from UN-REDD Programme Fund, respectively		
		Procedures and rules for reporting on expenditures, to whom, and on what level of reporting (by outputs, outcomes etc)		
		Procedures for approval of budgets		
Is the PB responsive to partners and stakeholder needs?	PB Responsiveness	Utility of knowledge generated/materials produced as requested by the PB for different categories of stakeholders (countries, donors, IAs, etc)	Desk review	UN-REDD Programme Annual Progress Reports
				PB Meeting Minutes
			Sample of Interviews	Current members and observers and UN-REDD

		Level of coherence between UNFCCC guidance and other external sources of guidance and input on REDD and PB decision-making		Secretariat
			On-line Survey	Past and present PB members and observers
			Key Informants	UN-REDD Sec and UNDG MPTF
		Level of responsiveness of PB compared to other REDD funds/IFIs	Comparative analysis with other global REDD+/IFI	GEF, FCPF, Spanish MDG Fund documents and staff
			Sample of Interviews	Current members and observers and UN-REDD Secretariat
			On-line Survey	Past and present PB members and observers
Does the PB provide adequate guidance and oversight for delivering programme objectives, and up to international standards?	PB Guidance	Quality and volume of materials requested by the PB (e.g. through partners, working groups, IAs, etc)	Desk review	UN-REDD Programme Annual Progress Reports
		Overall perceptions of PB governance and oversight		PB Meeting Minutes
		Strategic guidance/input by PB with regards to reviewing and assessing programme progress	Sample of Interviews	Current members and observers and UN-REDD Secretariat
			On-line Survey	Past and present PB members and observers
			Key Informants	UN-REDD Sec and UNDG MPTF
		Types of guidance and oversight provided by other REDD funds/IFIs	Comparative analysis with other global REDD+/IFI	GEF, FCPF, Spanish MDG Fund documents
			Key Informant	GEF, FCPF, Spanish

			Interviews	MDG Fund staff
EFFICIENCY				
Does the PB have a clear functional role to conduct business in a timely fashion, and in a way that reduces duplicate efforts?				
What is the functional role of the PB relative to other UN-REDD Programme key actors?	Functional role of PB among other Actors	Delineation of tasks and responsibilities of the PB in relation to the UN-REDD Secretariat	Desk review	UN-REDD Programme Rules of Procedure and Guidelines
		Delineation of tasks and responsibilities of the PB in relation to the UN-Management Group		PB Meetings Minutes
		Delineation of tasks and responsibilities of the PB in relation to the MPTF Office/AA	Sample of Interviews	PB, MG and Secretariat ToRs
		Delineation of tasks and responsibilities of the PB in relation to the IAs (FAO, UNDP, UNEP)		Current members and observers and UN-REDD Secretariat
		Delineation of tasks and responsibilities of the PB in relation to the UN Strategy Group	On-line Survey	Past and present PB members and observers
		Delineation of tasks and responsibilities of the PB in relation to the WGs	Key Informant Interviews	UN-REDD Sec and UNDG MPTF
		Delineation of tasks and responsibilities of the PB in relation to the IA Focal Points		
		Extent of overlap/redundancies and/or gaps between main tasks and responsibilities expected of the PB and other internal key actors		
Is there clarity of roles and responsibilities between key programme partners?	Clarity of roles/ responsibilities	PB level of awareness of the respective roles and responsibilities of the PB vs. IAs (UNDP, UNEP, FAO)	Sample of interviewee E-survey	Present members Past and present members & observers
		IA (UNDP, UNEP, FAO) awareness of respective roles and responsibilities of the PB vs IAs	Sample of interview	Present IA members
		Number of PB meetings (per annum)	Desk review	PB documents
		Level of adequacy of frequency and	Desk review	PB documents

		timing of PB meetings		
			Comparative desk analysis	GEF, FCPF, Spanish MDG Fund documents and staff
			Sample of Interviews	Current members and observers
			E-survey	Past and present members & observers
		Level of procedural clarity among various actors during PB meetings	Desk review	PB documents
			Comparative desk analysis	GEF, FCPF, Spanish MDG Fund documents and staff
			Sample of Interviews	Current members and observers
			E-survey	Past and present members & observers
		Level of clarity of PB Board minutes with respect to meeting follow-up activities	Desk review	PB documents
			Comparative desk analysis	GEF, FCPF, Spanish MDG Fund documents and staff
			Sample of Interviews	Current members and observers
			E-survey	Past and present members & observers
		Instances of a lack of clarity in roles or responsibilities between various actors (UNDG MPTF Office as Trustee, REDD Secretariat, PB etc)	Desk review	PB documents
			Sample of Interviews	Current members and observers

			E-survey	Past and present members & observers
		Level of clarity of processes for funding allocation and/or approval	Desk review	PB documents
			Comparative desk analysis	GEF, FCPF, Spanish MDG Fund documents and staff
			Sample of Interviews	Current members and observers
			E-survey	Past and present members & observers
SUSTAINABILITY/LEVERAGE				
Is the UN-REDD Programme Policy Board positioned to enable fulfillment of the Programme Strategies?				
Is the relationship between the PB and participating agencies (FAO, UNEP, UNDP) conducive to meeting programme objectives?	UN Delivery structure	Perceived effectiveness of UN Joint programming	Desk review	PB documents
			Sample of Interviews	Current members and observers
			E-survey	Past and present members & observers
		Delivery structures with other UN 'Delivering as ONE' funds	Comparative desk analysis	Spanish MDG Fund documents and staff
			Key informant interviews	
		Delivery structure of other non-UN MPTFs, including REDD and other global IFIs	Comparative desk analysis	GEF, FCPF documents and staff
			Key informant interviews	
		Processes and/or mechanisms in place for PB to manage governance challenges associated with global changes in REDD+ (e.g. growth in scope and size)	Desk review	PB documents
			Comparative desk analysis	GEF, FCPF, Spanish MDG Fund documents and staff
			Sample of Interviews	Current members and observers

			E-survey	Past and present members & observers
		Degree of flexibility in place between MPTF and PB to manage changes in REDD+ implementation	Desk review	PB & UNDG MPTF documents
			Sample of Interview	Current members and observers and with UNDG MPTF
Is the relationship between the PB and Tier 2 contributors conducive to meeting programme objectives?	Tier 2 funding	Process used to set up Tier 2 funding	Desk review	PB documents
			Sample of Interview	Current members and observers
		Nature of relationship between PB and Tier 2 funders	Desk review	PB documents
			Sample of Interview	Current members and observers
		Level and nature of involvement of Tier 2 donors on programme strategy/direction	Desk review	PB documents
			Sample of Interview	Current members and observers & UN-REDD Secretariat
		Level of Tier 2 funding expected	Desk review	PB documents
			Sample of Interview	Current members and observers & UN-REDD Secretariat
		Expected relationship between Tier 2 funding and MPTFs according to UN guidelines	Desk review	PB & UNDG MPTF documents
			Key Informant Interview	UN-REDD Secretariat & UNDG MPTF
		Changes in rules and procedures, as a result of Tier 2 funding	Desk review	PB documents
			Sample of Interview	Current members and observers & UN-REDD Secretariat

		Processes and/or mechanisms in place by PB to manage (perceived and expected) opportunities and/or challenges presented by Tier 2 funding	Desk review Sample of Interview	PB documents Current members and observers & UN-REDD Secretariat
		Processes and/or mechanisms in place to ensure transparency and/or accountability for Tier 2 funding	Desk review Sample of Interview	PB documents Current members and observers & UN-REDD Secretariat
		Relative advantages and/or disadvantages of the parallel Tier 2 funding window	Desk review Sample of Interview	PB documents Current members and observers, UN-REDD Secretariat, and UNDG MPTF
		Level of responsiveness and flexibility of the PB in relation to Tier 2 funding	Desk review Sample of Interview	PB documents Current members and observers & UN-REDD Secretariat
		Relationship between Tier 2 funding and the achievement of programme objectives	Desk review Sample of Interview	PB documents Current members and observers & UN-REDD Secretariat
		Decision-making powers of Tier 2 donors, its effect on the PB, its membership, and/or rules and procedures	Desk review Sample of Interview	PB documents Current members and observers & UN-REDD Secretariat
In light of the challenges surrounding the evolution of REDD+ and the UN-REDD Programme's response to those challenges, what is an appropriate structure and composition of the PB?	Structure and Composition going Forward	Potential avenues regarding the size, profile, representative groups and tenure of PB members with respect to current tasks and responsibilities (and/or perceived gaps or mismatches)	Desk review Comparative desk analysis	PB documents GEF, FCPF, Spanish MDG Fund documents and staff

			Sample of Interviews	Current members and observers
			E-survey	Past and present members & observers
		Perception on the level of the thematic, financial, and/or institutional governance expertise on the PB (and/or perceived gaps or mismatches)	Desk review	PB documents
			Comparative desk analysis	GEF, FCPF, Spanish MDG Fund documents and staff
			Sample of Interviews	Current members and observers
			E-survey	Past and present members & observers
		Size, profile, representative groups and tenure among other REDD+ global funds/IFIs	Desk review - Comparison Matrix	Rules of procedure and guidance of other REDD+ global funds/IFIs
			On-line Survey	Past and present members & observers
			Sample of Interviews	Current members and observers
				GEF, FCPF, Spanish MDG Fund documents and staff
		Relative advantages or disadvantages of different governing structures/ composition of governing bodies among other REDD+ global funds/IFIs	Comparative desk analysis	GEF, FCPF, Spanish MDG Fund documents and staff
			Key informant interviews	
In light of the challenges surrounding the evolution of REDD+ and the UN-REDD Programme's response to those challenges, where does the PB stand relative to other actors in the REDD arena?	Relationship with UNFCCC	Extent to which the PB encourages or supports the uptake of guidance and decisions from the UNFCCC into UN-REDD-Programme planning and/or strategy	Desk review	PB documents
			Sample of Interviews	Current members and observers and UN-REDD Secretariat
			E-survey	Past and present members

					& observers
		Extent to which the UNFCCC encourages or supports the uptake of lessons learned and input from the PB and/or other key actors in the UN-REDD Programme into the negotiations processes	Desk review	PB documents	
			Sample of Interviews	Current members and observers	
			E-survey	Past and present members & observers	
			Key Informant Interviews	UN-REDD Secretariat and UNFCCC Sec.	
	Direct Access	PB discussion on and/or approach to support for direct access modalities	Desk review	PB documents	
			Sample of Interviews	Current members and observers & UN-REDD Secretariat	
			E-survey	Past and present members & observers	
	Safeguards	PB approach and risk-tolerance in terms of proposed programme fiduciary standards for member countries	Desk review	PB documents	
			Sample of Interviews	Current members and observers & UN-REDD Secretariat	
			E-survey	Past and present members & observers	
		PB approach to and support for proposed environmental and social safeguards for member countries	Desk review	PB documents	
			Sample of Interviews	Current members and observers & UN-REDD Secretariat	
			E-survey	Past and present members & observers	
	Entry points	Mechanisms and/or processes encouraged or supported by PB for effectively identifying and utilizing entry point in countries to address the drivers	Desk review	PB documents	
			Sample of Interviews	Current members and observers & UN-REDD	

		of deforestation and forest degradation		Secretariat
			E-survey	
				Past and present members & observers
		PB contribution to, and types of support for, countries to assist them in meeting the requirements for REDD readiness	Desk review	PB documents
			Sample of Interviews	Current members and observers & UN-REDD Secretariat
			E-survey	Past and present members & observers
	Relationship with FCPF	Areas of collaboration with FCPF in the delivery of global and national programs	Desk review	PB documents
			Sample of Interviews	Current members and observers & UN-REDD Secretariat

Annex D: List of Documents for Review

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FCPF, First Program Evaluation of the FCPF, 2011

FCPF, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Charter Establishing The Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, May 11, 2011

Global Environment Facility, Rules of Procedure for the GEF Council, October 2007

Green Climate Fund, Additional rules of procedure of the Board, GCF/B.01☐12/02, 3 August 2012

Green Climate Fund, Roles and Responsibilities of the Board, Information Document GCF/B.01-12/Inf.02, 3 August 2012

Hardcastle P. et al., Discussion of Effectiveness of Multilateral REDD+ Initiatives, theIDLgroup, 24 October 2011 (report and PowerPoint presentation).

Independent report on the effectiveness of multilateral REDD+ initiatives, commissioned by the REDD+ Partnership, 2011

Management Note for Improved Delivery of the UN-REDD Programme, 2012 (including revised ToR for the Secretariat, MG & SG)

MDG-F Framework document, 2007

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MDGF, Secretariat Report to the Steering Committee Members, June 2011

MDGF, Seeds of Knowledge, Contributing to Climate Change Solutions, UNEP, 2012

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Müller, B. A Delhi Vision for the Green Climate Fund Business Model Framework – Some thoughts on Access and Disbursement

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Report of the Secretary-General's High-level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing, November 2010. http://www.un.org/wcm/webdav/site/climatechange/shared/Documents/AGF_reports/AGF%20 Report.pdf

Sukhdev, Pavan, et. al. UN-REDD Programme Policy Brief no. 1: *REDD+ and a Green Economy: Opportunities for a mutually supportive relationship.* 2012.

UN Economic and Social Council, Resolution 1994/24 establishing UNAIDS

UNAIDS 2011-2015 Strategy, Getting to Zero, 2010

UNAIDS division of Labour, Consolidated note, 2010

UNAIDS, Composition of the Programme Coordinating Board (PCB), 1 January 2013

UNAIDS, 30th Meeting of the UNAIDS Programme Coordinating Board, Geneva, Switzerland, 5-7 June 2012, Decisions, Recommendations and Conclusions, 7 June 2012

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UNAIDS, Modus Operandi of the Programme Coordinating board, 2011

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UN-REDD Programme Africa Lessons Learned, 2012

UN-REDD Programme and FCPF Guidelines on Stakeholder Engagement in REDD+ Readiness: With a Focus on the Participation of Indigenous Peoples and Other Forest-Dependent Communities, April 20, 2012 (revision of March 25th version)

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UN-REDD Programme Country Needs Assessment: A Report on REDD+ Readiness among UN-REDD Programme an FCPF member countries, October 2012

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UN-REDD Programme Framework Document - FAO, UNDP, UNEP - June 2008

UN-REDD Programme Funding Framework (as of 15 September 2012), UN-REDD Programme Ninth Policy Board Meeting, October 2012

UN-REDD Programme Funding Framework (as of 15 September 2012), UN-REDD Programme Ninth Policy Board Meeting, October 2012

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UN-REDD Programme Management Note for Improved Delivery of the UN-REDD Programme, 2012

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UN-REDD Programme Policy Board Member Disclosure of Interests Form, undated

UN-REDD Programme Policy Board Terms of Reference, March 2009

UN-REDD Programme Report of the Eight Policy Board Meeting, March 2012

UN-REDD Programme Report of the Ninth Policy Board Meeting, October 2012 (including approved revised ToR for the UN-REDD Programme and all documentation disseminated for the Ninth PB meeting)

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    http://blog.cifor.org/13152
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    http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/CCF00
    http://rconline.undg.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/UNAIDS_InfoBrief2012.pdf
    http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/doha_nov_2012/decisions/application/pdf/cop18_standing_committee.pdf
    http://unfccc.int/methods_and_science/lulucf/items/4123.php
    http://www.amazonfund.org/

http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/node/12
http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/node/12;
http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/node/23
http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/node/304
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http://www.mdgfund.org/content/governancestructure
http://www.theredddesk.org/conference/unfccc_cop18_doha_qatar
http://www.unaids.org
http://www.un-redd.org/AboutREDD/tabid/102614/Default.aspx
http://www.un-redd.org/PolicyBoard/tabid/102628/Default.aspx
http://www.un-redd.org/UNREDD_Japan_Partnership_Project/tabid/6379/Default.aspx

Annex E: Sampling Rationale for Survey and Interviews

The sampling rationale for the review of the UN-REDD Programme Policy Board will be based on ensuring a representative cohort of information and experiential input from key informants and stakeholder groups. The following outlines the proposed sampling cohort for the survey and semi-structured interviews, respectively, followed by Table 5. that illustrates the specific sample groups and sizes.

Survey
The electronic survey will be launched to collect input from a broad variety of stakeholders across a clear and finite set of key questions. The sample for the survey will reach a minimum of 58 potential respondents, including, insofar as possible:

- All former country members and alternates of the Policy Board, as well as all current country observers (with the exception of the 3 country observers to be interviewed – see below)
- All previous members and observers among the Indigenous Peoples and CSO cohorts
- All previous Implementing Agency representatives, as relevant
- All individuals who were previous ex-officio, permanent observers, other observers
- Three staff from the UN-REDD Secretariat.

Interviews
With the input and guidance of the UN-REDD Secretariat, a cohort of about 40 appropriate and representative interviewees will be chosen for a more in-depth and structured phone interview. The sample of individuals will include:

- All current country members and one country observer per region
- All current donors and one donor observer
- One current member and one current observer each from among the IP and CSO cohorts
- All current Implementing Agency representative members
- All current representatives for the ex-officio MPTF Office, and a selection of key permanent observers and other key observers
- A limited selection of UN-REDD Secretariat staff (two to three),
- Two representatives per IA (one staff and one manager)
- One key informant (staff) from each of the other funds/mechanisms being reviewed as part of the comparative analysis to be performed
- One or two key informants from UNFCCC Secretariat.

Table 12: Sample Selection for Interviews and Surveys

	Countries	Donors	CSOs	IPs	UN Agencies	Other PB	Other Non-PB Key Informants
PB (status as of Nov 2012) & Others	**Latin America and Caribbean: 3** • Paraguay (member) • Panama (alt) • Equador (alt) **Africa: 3** • Zambia (member) • Nigeria (alt) • DRC (alt) **Asia Pacific: 3** • PNG (member) • Cambodia (alt) • Viet Nam (alt)	**Norway** (member) **Spain** (member shared with Denmark) **Denmark** (member shared with Spain) **Japan** (member) **Luxembourg** (observer) **European Commission** (observer)	**Africa:** NGO Coalition for Environment (NGOCE) (observer) **Asia-Pacific:** Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) (observer) **LAC:** Asociación de Forestería Comunitaria de Guatemala Ut'z Che' (AFCG UT'Z CHE') **Industrialized Countries:** Environmental Defense Fund (member)	United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII) (member) **Africa:** Community Research and Development Services (CORDS) (observer) **Asia-Pacific:** Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities (NEFIN) (observer) **LAC:** Coordinadora Andina de las Organizaciones Indigenas (CAOI) (observer)	**Implementing Agencies: 3** • FAO (member) • UNDP (member) • UNEP (member)	**Ex Officio:** 1 MPTF Office (member) **Permanent Observers:** 3 • UNFCCC Secretariat • FCPC Secretariat • GEF Secretariat Independent Advisory Group on Rights, Forests, and Climate Change (IAG): 1 Rights and Resources Initiatives (RRI) (observer)	Staff from GEF, FCPF, Spanish MDG Fund (1 from each) UN-REDD Secretariat (2) UN-REDD Programme Staff: (6) • National Programmes (1 manager per Agency) • SNA (1 managers, 2 staff)
Survey Sample **[266]**	All current observers (except 3 interviewed) and previous members, alternates [105]	[37]	All possible previous members and observers [22]	All possible previous members and observers [10]	All possible previous member reps [32]	All previous ex-officio, permanent observers, other observers (5) [1]	Staff from UN-REDD Sec., GEF, FCPF, UNFCCC, etc.
Interview Sample **[40]**	All current members and alternatives (9); 1 observer per region (3) [12]	4 members; 1 observer (EC) [5]	1 member; 1 observer (NGOCE) [2]	1 member; 1 observer [2]	All current member reps (3) [3]	All ex-officio, permanent observers, other observers (5) [5]	Interview sample (2 members per agency); staff from UN-REDD Sec. [11]

Annex F: On-line Survey

Introductory message:

Alain Lafontaine, from Le Groupe-conseil baastel, has been mandated to conduct an independent comprehensive Review of the UNREDD Policy Board structure, as agreed during the Seventh Policy Board Meeting in October 2011. In the context of this independent Review, several data collection tools will be used to inform the Review process. One of them is in the form of the present online survey of past and current Policy Board members, in order to collect opinions and recommendations so as to respond to the Review three main objectives:

1. Examine the composition and governance structure of the Policy Board, how it conducts its business, and how it assists the Programme in the fulfillment of its mandate compared to other UN-administered Programmes, including MPTFs, and REDD Readiness initiatives;
2. Assess the existing UN-REDD Programme Rules of Procedure and Guidelines and Policy Board Terms of Reference, evaluate fit-to-purpose, consistency with meeting objectives, and identify any gaps that need to be addressed;
3. Propose changes, if necessary, to the existing UN-REDD Programme Rules of Procedure and Guidelines and Policy Board Terms of Reference.

Therefore, the focus of the Review is really on the performance of the Policy Board itself, and not on the results of the UNREDD Programme. A separate evaluation of the results of UNREDD programme is planned for 2013.

Your participation to this on-line survey is important to ensure that we collect reliable and valuable input from PB members. Please be assured that all individual responses to this survey will remain confidential and your frank responses are valuable to the success of this process.

The survey includes 8 questions and takes about 15 to 20 minutes to complete. You will have the opportunity to save your draft answers to the survey and fill in one or more questions at a time. Please use the blank space at the end of each question for additional comments. The survey is available in English, French and Spanish, by choosing your preferred language at the top right corner of your screen. In order to be considered, your completed survey must be submitted no later than February 1st, 2013.

Thank you in advance for your insights and your time !

What type of stakeholder are you?

1. **In order to allow an analysis of the survey per type of UNREDD PB stakeholder, please specify which of the following categories you fall under:**
   - Developing Country Partner
   - Development Partner
   - Civil Society Organization (CSO)
   - Indigenous Peoples (IP) organisation
   - UN Agency
   - Ex-officio member
   - Other (UNFCCC Secretariat, IAG, RRI, FCPF, etc.)

Relevance

The following section pertains to the relevance of the PB in fulfilling its respective roles and functions, and seeks to help answer the question: *Is the organization and management of the PB's functions, composition, and structure conducive to fulfilling programme objectives?*

2. **How does the UN-REDD Policy Board structure and composition compare with other similar global funds (in REDD or otherwise)? Based on your experience, please complete the statement using a 3 point scale, insufficient/not enough, just right, excessive/too much/long (or n/a "Unsure").**

In comparison with other comparable global funds, the Policy Board's:	Insufficient/not enough	Just right	Excessive/too much/long	N/A or Unsure
a. Total size (number of people) in order to fulfill its current tasks and responsibilities is :				
b. Profile of expertise/knowledge is :				
c. Number of types of representative groups is :				
d. Tenure for respective PB members is :				
e. Thematic or technical expertise among its members is :				
f. Financial expertise among its members is :				
g. Institutional governance expertise is :				
h. Engagement of CSOs Engagement is :				
i. Engagement with the private sector is :				

Please use this space to elaborate on any of your answers above:

Effectiveness

The following section pertains to the effectiveness of the PB in fulfilling its respective role and functions, and seeks to help answer the question: *Does the PB conduct business effectively and responsively, with appropriate guidance and oversight in order to reach programme objectives?*

3. **Please rate the following as 'sufficient' or 'insufficient' to the functioning of the UN-REDD Programme governance and operations. Please use the space after to explain further, namely if either exceptional or insufficient.**

Function	Sufficient	Insufficient	Explanation
a. Rules or criteria in place for determining which matters are handled inter-sessionally vs. during PB meetings			
b. Procedure for adoption of agenda (before/during PB meetings)			
c. Procedure for the adoption of minutes			
d. Procedure for establishing Working Groups			

e.	Procedure for nominating national focal points			
f.	Procedure for designating alternates when focal points cannot attend PB meetings			
g.	Procedure for agreeing on key decision points			
h.	Procedure for PB follow up to decisions (or action items)			
i.	Procedure(s) for determining Chairs for the PB			
j.	Procedures/rules for the appointment of Implementing Agencies and/or UN-staff within the UN-REDD programme			
k.	Mechanisms in place for time management during PB meetings			
l.	Languages in which PB meetings are conducted			
m.	Languages in which PB materials/minutes are published, and timeframe for posting both original documents and their translations			
n.	Time allotted to specific agenda items/types of tasks during PB meetings			
o.	Time allotted to input from key actors at the PB meetings (Individual members, UN-REDD Secretariat, IAs, etc)			
p.	Type of PB involvement in approval of financial matters			
q.	Balance of allocations to National Programmes and Global Programme from UN-REDD Programme Fund, respectively			
r.	Procedures and rules for reporting on expenditures, to whom, and on what level of reporting (by outputs, outcomes etc)			
s.	Procedures for approval of budgets			

Please use this space to elaborate on any of your answers above:

4. **How does the PB function as a governing body? Based on your experience, please rate each statement on a 4 point scale, from Strongly disagree, Disagree, Agree, to Strongly agree (or n/a "Unsure"):**

   a. The knowledge generated/materials produced by request of the PB are useful for their targeted stakeholders
   b. There is coherence between UNFCCC guidance and PB decision-making
   c. There is coherence between other external sources of guidance and input on REDD (non-UNFCCC) and PB decision-making
   d. The PB is responsive to stakeholders as compared to other REDD funds and/or comparable international financial institutions
   e. The PB requests from Working Groups and Implementin Agencies a sufficient amount of quality materials to help support programme objectives
   f. The PB provides sufficient oversight to UN-Programme activities
   g. The PB provides sufficient strategic guidance and input in terms of assessing programme progress

Please use this space to elaborate on any of your answers above:

Efficiency

The following section pertains to the relative efficiency of the Policy Board in the execution of its tasks and responsibilities, and seeks to help answer the question: *Does the PB have a clear functional role in order to conduct business in a timely fashion, and in such a way that reduces duplicate efforts?*

5. **Which of the following UN-REDD Programme actor(s) do you think have a clear and distinct function? Which actors have tasks or responsibilities that overlap/repeat or conflict with other actors, or are missing from their mandate? Please check off all that apply:**

Actor	CHECK ONE OR MORE PER ACToR				Please explain overlap or gap
	Distinct roles and responsibilities	Repeats or overlaps	Conflicts or is in opposition	Gaps/ missing tasks or responsibilities	(e.g. What overlaps? With whom? What kind of gap?)
Policy Board Members					
Policy Board Alternates					
Policy Board Observers					
UN-REDD Programme Management Group					
UN-REDD Programme Secretariat					
Implementing Agencies					
MPTF Office					
Working Groups					
UN-REDD Programme Strategy GroupG					
IA Focal Points					
Other (optional)					

Please use this space to elaborate on any of your answers above:

6. **Does the PB have the right tasks and responsibilities? Based on your experience, please rate each statement on a 4 point scale, from Strongly disagree, Disagree, Agree, to Strongly agree (or n/a "Unsure"):**

   a. The roles and responsibilities between the PB and other actors is clear
   b. The PB meetings are well-timed during the fiscal/operational year
   c. The PB meets the right number of times per year (please note below whether you think they are too frequent or infrequent if you disagree)
   d. Procedures undertaken during PB meetings are clear and consistent
   e. Procedures for follow-up to decisions made at the PB meetings are clear and consistent
   f. Procedures for funding approval and allocation are clear and consistent

Please use this space to elaborate on any of your answers above:

Sustainability & Leveraging

The following section pertains to the sustainability and leveraging of the UN-REDD Programme and it's governance structure, and seeks to help answer the question: *Is the UN-REDD Programme Policy Board positioned to enable fulfillment of the Programme Strategy?*

7. **Is the PB prepared to fulfill the programme mandate? Based on your experience, please rate each statement on a 4 point scale, from strongly disagree, disagree, agree, to strongly agree (or n/a "Unsure"):**

    a. UN Joint programming is an effective delivery structure for the UN-REDD Programme.
    b. The PB has adequate processes and mechanisms in place to manage UN-REDD Programme governance challenges associated with global changes in REDD+.
    c. The PB encourages or supports the uptake of guidance and decisions from the UNFCCC into UN-REDD-Programme planning and/or policy.
    d. The UNFCCC encourages the uptake of lessons learned and input from the PB and/or other key actors in the UN-REDD Programme into the negotiations processes.
    e. The PB supports direct access modalities.
    f. The PB has an appropriate level of risk-tolerance in terms of programme fiduciary standards for member countries.
    g. The PB has an appropriate level of risk-tolerance in terms of programme environmental and social safeguards standards for member countries.
    h. The PB helps countries to identify and utilize entry points for REDD and REDD+.
    i. The PB helps countries' to meet requirements for REDD readiness.

Please use this space to elaborate on any of your answers above:

8. **What do you think are the key factors, if any, negatively affecting the performance of the policy board for UN-REDD? What would you suggest as options to address this gap in performance?**

Key factor (s) affecting performance	Options to address gap
1.	
2.	
3.	

Annex G: Interview Protocol

Interviewee codes
OF: Other Funds
UNRS: UN-REDD Secretariat
UNRP: UN-REDD Programme staff/managers
MPTF: Multi-Party Trust Fund Office
PB: Policy Board members and/or observers
UNO: Other key informants from UN organizations (UNDG, UNFCCC Sect)
O: Other non-UN key informants

RELEVANCE

Current Functions of the PB [OF, UNRS, PB]
1. How do the tasks and responsibilities of the PB compare to the governing bodies of other IFIs, REDD funds?
2. What do you think is the balance of PB functions between strategic vs. administrative tasks? What should it be?
3. What do you think is the balance of PB functions between short- medium and long term tasks and responsibilities? What should it be?

PB ToRs [UNRS, PB]
4. Are you aware of any request for changes to the PB ToRs and/or programme Rules and Procedures? What were they? How or why did they come about? Were they a result of internal or external reasons?
5. What mechanisms are in place to support transparency of the PB?
6. What mechanisms are in place to support accountability of the PB?

PB Structure and Composition [OF, PB, UNRS]
7. Do you think the PB size, profile of expertise and knowledge, types of representative groups, and tenure of PB members are conducive to fulfilling its current mandate?
8. What do you think is the relative level of thematic oversight, financial oversight and expertise in governance among the BP members? Are there any overlaps or gaps in these areas under the current ToRs?
9. Do you think the PB sufficiently engages CSOs and/or the private sector? In what ways? Why or why not?

EFFECTIVENESS

Conduct of Business
10. What is the procedure for determining members of the PB? [UNRS, MPTF]
11. How would you rate the following (sufficient or insufficient)? If insufficient, why? [PB, UNRS]

Function	Sufficient	Insufficient	Explanation
Rules or criteria in place for determining which matters are handled inter-sessionally vs. during PB meetings			
Procedure for adoption of agenda (before/during PB meetings)			
Procedure for the adoption of minutes			
Procedure for establishing Working Groups			
Procedure for nominating national focal points			
Procedure for designating alternates when focal points			

cannot attend PB meetings			
Procedure for agreeing on key decision points			
Procedure for PB follow up to decisions (or action items)			
Procedure(s) for determining Chairs for the PB			
Procedures/rules for the appointment of IA and/or UN-staff within the UN-REDD programme			
Mechanisms in place for time management during PB meetings			
Languages in which PB meetings are conducted			
Languages in which PB materials/minutes are published, and timeframe for posting both original documents and their translations			
Time allotted to specific agenda items/types of tasks during PB meetings			
Time allotted to input from key actors at the PB meetings (Individual members, REDD Secretariat, IAs, etc)			
Type of PB involvement in approval of financial matters			
Balance of allocations to National Programmes and Global Programme from UN-REDD Programme Fund, respectively			
Procedures and rules for reporting on expenditures, to whom, and on what level of reporting (by outputs, outcomes etc)			
Procedures for approval of budgets			

12. Is the knowledge generated/materials produced by request of the PB useful for the targeted stakeholders? Why or why not? [PB, UNRS, MPTF]
13. To what degree is there coherence between UNFCCC guidance and negotiations and PB decision-making for the UN-REDD Programme? [PB, UNRS, MPTF]
14. How responsive is the PB as a governing body in comparison with other IFIs/global funds? [PB, UNRS, OF]

PB Guidance
15. What is the quality and volume of material requested by the PB through partners, working groups, implementing agencies? [PB, , UNRS, MPTF]
16. What is your overall impression of PB governance and oversight? [PB, UNRS, MPTF]
17. How would you rate the strategic guidance and input from the PB in terms of assessing programme progress? [PB, UNRS, MPTF]
18. How does the guidance and oversight of the PB compare to other IFIs/global funds? [OF]

EFFICIENCY

Functional Role of PB among other actors [PB, UNRS, MPTF]
19. Do you think there is clear differentiation of tasks and responsibilities of the PB in relation to:
    a. UN REDD Secretariat?
    b. UN-Coordination Group?
    c. MPTF Office?
    d. Implementing Agencies?
    e. UN Strategic Directions Unit?
    f. Working Groups?
    g. Focal Points?
    As needed, please explain your answer(s).

20. Do you perceive any gaps and/or overlaps in tasks and responsibilities among these key actors (and especially between the PB and IAs)? If so, what and to what extent?

Clarity of Roles/Responsibilities [PB, OF]

21. Do you think the PB meetings are well timed during the fiscal/operational year? Are the meetings sufficiently frequent (or too frequently or infrequently)?
22. Are meeting procedures sufficiently clear among the various actors attending the PB meetings?
23. What are the procedures for follow-up activities on PB decisions? Are they sufficiently clear?
24. Are you aware of any cases of a lack of clarity in roles of responsibilities among the various PB actors and or other partners? [PB]
25. How does the clarity of procedures of the UN-REDD PB compare to other IFIs/global funds?
26. Do you think the processes for funding allocation and approval are sufficiently clear? Why or why not?

SUSTAINABILITY/LEVERAGING

UN Delivery Structure

27. How effective is the UN Joint Implementation as a delivery mechanism for the UN-REDD Programme? [PB]
28. How does the UN-REDD delivery structure compare to other UN-ONE funds? [UNO]
29. How does the UN-REDD delivery structure compare to other non-UN PMTFs, including REDD and other global IFIs? [O]
30. Does the PB have sufficient mechanisms and processes in place to manage the (current and potential) governance challenges associated with global changes in REDD+? [PB, OF]
31. Do you believe there is sufficient flexibility in place between the MPTF Office and the PB to manage these changes in REDD+? [PB, MPTF]

Tier 2 Funding

32. What was the process for setting up Tier 2 funding? What is your opinion of that process? [PB]
33. What is the nature of the relationship between the PB and tier 2 funders? What do you think it should be? [PB]
34. What is the nature and level of involvement of tier 2 funders on programme strategy/direction? What do you think it should be? [PB, UNRS]
35. What is the expected level of tier 2 funding through 2015, and beyond? [PB, UNRS]
36. What is the expected relationship between tier 2 funders and the MPTF according to UN guidelines? [UNRS, MPTF]
37. Are there any expected changes in rules of procedure due to the introduction of tier 2 funding? [PB, UNRS]
38. What processes or mechanisms are in place by the PB to manage the (perceived or expected) opportunities and/.or challenges presented by tier 2 funding? [PB, UNRS]
39. What do you think are the relative advantages and disadvantages of the parallel window of tier 2 funding? {PB, UNRS, UNDG, MPTF]
40. How flexible and responsive do you think the PB is in relation to tier 2 funding? [PB, UNRS]
41. What is the relationship (if any) between tier 2 funding and the achievement of programme objectives? {PB, UNRS]
42. What should be the decision-making powers of tier 2 donors and its influence on the PB in terms of membership and rules/procedures? [PB, UNRS]

PB Structure and Composition going Forward

43. Do perceive any gaps or mismatches regarding the size, profile, types of representative groups, and/or tenure of PB members in terms of fulfilling programme strategy through 2015 and/or beyond? [OF, PB]

44. Do you think there is sufficient thematic, financial, and/or institutional governance expertise on the PB to fulfill programme strategy through 2015 and/or beyond? [OF, PB]
45. What is the relative size, size, profile, types of representative groups, and/or tenure of members compared to other IFIs/global funds? [PB, OF]

Relationship with UNFCCC

46. Does the PB encourage or support the uptake of guidance and decisions from the UNFCCC and negotiations process into UN-REDD Programme planning and/or strategy? [PB, UNRS]
47. Does the UNFCCC encourage or support the uptake of lessons learned and input from the PB and other actors in the UN-REDD Programme into the negotiations process? [PB, UNRS, UNFCCC Sect]

Direct Access [PB, UNRS]

48. In what ways (if any) does the PB support or encourage discussions or approaches to direct access modalities?

Safeguards [PB, UNRS]

49. What is the PB's approach to and or/relative level of risk tolerance in terms of proposed fiduciary standards for countries?
50. What is the PB's approach to and level of support for proposed environmental and social safeguards for countries?

Entry Points [PB, UNRS]

51. What mechanisms and/or processes does the PB support or encourage to help countries to identify and utilize entry points for addressing the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation?
52. In what ways has the PB supported countries in meeting requirements for REDD readiness?

Annex H: List of People interviewed

	COUNTRIES	Names
	Latin America and Caribbean	
1	Paraguay (member)	Rodrigo MUSSI
2	Panama (alt)	Carlos Alberto GOMEZ MARTINEZ
3	Equator (alt)	Carola BORJA
4	Colombia (Obs)	Ruben Dario GUERRERO USEDA
	Africa:	
5	Zambia (member)	No answer to invitation emails
6	Nigeria (alt)	Salisu DAHIRU
7	DRC (alt)	Vincent KASULU
8	Benin (Obs)	Fiacre Codjo AHONONGA
	Asia Pacific:	
9	PNG (member)	Federica BIETTA and Kevin CONRAD
10	Cambodia (alt)	Vathana KHUN
11	Viet Nam (alt)	Pham CUONG
12	Bhutan (Obs)	Dhan Bahadur DHITAL

	DONORS	First names
13	Norway (member)	Gry-Asp SOLSTAD
14	Spain (member shared with Denmark)	Monica CORALES
15	Denmark (member shared with Spain)	Mike SPEIRS
16	Japan (member)	Rikiya KONISHI
17	European Commission (observer)	Michael BUCKI

	CSOs	First names
18	CSO Africa - NGOCE	Edwin Eyang USANG
19	Environmental Defense Fund	Christopher W.MEYER

	IPs	First names
20	United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII)	Not available
21	Africa: Community Research and Development Services (CORDS	No answer to invitation emails
22	LAC: Coordinadora Andina de las Organizaciones Indigenas (CAOI)	No answer to invitation emails

	UN Agencies	First names
23	FAO	Eduardo Rojas
24	UNDP	Veerle VANDEWEERD

25	UNEP	Ibrahim THIAW

	Other PB	First names
26	**Ex Officio**: 1 MPTF Office	Bisrat AKLILU
27	**Ex Officio**: 1 MPTF Office	Mari MATSUMOTO
28	**Permanent Observers**: 3 • UNFCCC Secretariat	Wojciech GALINSKI
29	• FCPF Secretariat	Neeta HOODA
30	• GEF Secretariat	Ian GRAY
31	Rights and Resources Initiatives (RRI) : 1	Andy WHITE

	Other Non-PB Key Informants	First names
32	Staff from: UNAIDS	Samia LOUNNAS
33	Spanish MDG Fund	Sophie de CAEN
34	UN-REDD Secretariat (1)	Mario BOCCUCCI
35	UN-REDD Secretariat (2)	Thais LINHARES-JUVENAL
36	UN-REDD Prog Staff: FAO - NP	Maria SANZ
37	UN-REDD Prog Staff: FAO - GP	Tina VAHANEN
38	UN-REDD Prog Staff: UNDP - NP	Clea PAZ
39	UN-REDD Prog Staff: UNDP - GP	Tim CLAIRS
40	UN-REDD Prog Staff: UNEP - NP	Julie GREENWALT
41	UN-REDD Prog Staff: UNEP - GP	Tim CHRISTOPHERSEN

Annex I: Terms of reference of the Review

See Independent Review ToRs in the next pages.

Review of UN-REDD Programme Policy Board Structure: Terms of Reference

UN-REDD PROGRAMME

4 May 2012

The [UN-REDD Programme](#) is a collaborative programme of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). It therefore operates under the governing policies, procedures and rules of the three participating UN agencies. It also follows the governance guidelines developed by the [United Nations Development Group](#) (UNDG) for joint programmes, including with respect to the governance and oversight of [Multi-Donor Trust Funds](#) (MDTFs).

The UN-REDD Programme Policy Board was established to provide overall leadership and strategic direction to the UN-REDD Programme. The Policy Board also approves financial allocations from the UN-REDD MDTF, according to the parameters set out in relevant documentation, including the UN-REDD Programme Strategy for 2011-2015, to ensure overall Programme success. Therefore, the effectiveness and efficiency of the governance of the Policy Board is essential for the UN-REDD Programme's success. A transparent and well-functioning Policy Board gives confidence to stakeholders including contributors to the Programme.

At the seventh Policy Board meeting in Berlin 13-14 October 2011, the Board requested that the Programme establish a process for a comprehensive review of the Policy Board structure. The Board specifically requested that the UN-REDD Programme Secretariat propose a roadmap, including the scope and timeframe for such review, as soon as possible and within the ninth Policy Board meeting. These terms of reference (ToR) have been developed in response to that request.

Purpose and Objectives

The main purpose of the review is to assess and evaluate the current Policy Board mandate, composition, role, responsibilities, governance structure, practices, procedures and accountability, and, considering the evolving landscape, both related to the operations of the Programme, for instance the increasing number of countries, progress in REDD+ implementation, and the fact that the Programme has been operating for three years, along with external developments, including UNFCCC decisions, make recommendations to improve the UN-REDD Programme Policy Board. The review should focus on the period up to 2015 in line with the UN-REDD Programme Strategy 2011-2015 and previous Policy Board decisions.

Accordingly, the review of the Policy Board structure has three main objectives:

1. Examine the composition and governance structure of the Policy Board, how it conducts its business, and how it assists the Programme in the fulfillment of its mandate compared to other UN-administered Programmes, including MDTFs, and REDD Readiness initiatives;

2. Assess the existing UN-REDD Programme Rules of Procedure and Guidelines and Policy Board Terms of Reference, evaluate fit-to-purpose, consistency with meeting objectives, and identify any gaps that need to be addressed;

3. Within the context set out above, the expected future implementation of the UN-REDD Programme based on the 2011-2015 Strategy and relevant Policy Board decisions, and considering best practices of transparency and good governance, propose changes, if necessary, to the existing UN-REDD Programme Rules of Procedure and Guidelines and Policy Board Terms of Reference.

Scope

The final report addressing both the objectives above, and responding to the following aspects of the Policy Board's characteristics and operations, will inform proposals on how to strengthen the work of the UN-REDD Programme Policy Board. The list should be seen as guidance for the reviewers and is not exhaustive:

1. Organization and management of the Policy Board's business, composition and structure

   - UN-REDD Programme Rules of Procedure and Guidelines and Policy Board Terms of Reference
   - Policy Board size and profile, representative groups, and tenure (terms of appointment) of members
   - Whether the current system for determining membership to the Policy Board is adequate in ensuring that the Board has expertise in areas such as thematic oversight, financial oversight and institutional governance
   - Adequacy of the number of Policy Board meetings per annum
   - Conduct of Business (Management of the Board and working group meetings)

- The Policy Board member's understanding of the delineation between the Policy Board and the implementing agencies' responsibilities

2. <u>The Policy Board's engagement in reviewing progress and approving funding</u>

Reviewing Progress

- Reviewing progress of the Programme
- Reviewing demand for support from the Programme and level of response
- Providing strategic guidance

Involvement in approval of funding requests

- Funding allocations to National Programmes and the Global Programme from the UN-REDD Programme Fund
- Implementation of clear policies for allocation of funds

3. <u>Other areas pertinent to understanding how the Policy Board will operate up to 2015, in line with the Programme Strategy</u>

Relationship to the participating agencies (FAO, UNDP and UNEP)

- The nature of UN joint programming (i.e. Delivering as One and other relevant MDTF examples such as the Spanish MDG Achievement Fund)
- Guidance from the UNDG and the Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office
- The partnership architecture (i.e. the MoU) between the participating agencies that underpins the UN-REDD Programme

Relationship between Tier 2 contributors and the Policy Board

- To what extent, if any, may Tier 2 donors through the creation of the Tier 2 mechanism influence the Programme
- What will be the Tier 2 donors relationship, if any, to the Policy Board

Relationship with other initiatives

- What should be the future role, functions and composition of the Policy Board, in the light of: (i) progress in REDD+ implementation and the evolution of the

Programme and other relevant bodies (such as the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility's Participants Committee and Participants Assembly, the FIP Sub-Committee, the REDD+ Partnership and the Global Environment Facility's Governing Council and Assembly); (ii) UNFCCC decisions; and (iii) the evolution of finance to REDD+ including the establishment of the Green Climate Fund

Methodology, Consultant(s) and Working Group

The review shall apply international best-practices to ensure objective, transparent, evidence based and impartial assessment and learning. The review is to rely on examination of relevant documents, review of governance structures of similar initiatives, review of other REDD+ initiatives, use of surveys and questionnaires, interviews of Board members and other applicable data collection instruments.

One or more independent and experienced consultants, with expertise in organisational governance the UN system and fund management, will be recruited to undertake the review. The consultant(s) should produce a single document, responding to each of the three deliverables mentioned below. The consultant(s) must be independent from, and free from any potential conflicts of interest with, the UN-REDD Policy Board. The consultant(s) should demonstrate detailed knowledge of how the UN agencies (FAO, UNDP, and UNEP) function and the nature of joint programming. The consultant(s) should also have previous experience in the evaluation of similar decision making bodies. Some knowledge of REDD+ and the work of the UN-REDD Programme REDD+ would be an additional asset. See Annex 1 for ToR for the appointment of the consultant(s).

A Working Group was established by the eighth Policy Board for the review, composed of two representatives from each Policy Board member group[95]. The consultant(s) will report on progress and their findings to the Working Group. The Secretariat will be responsible for facilitating the review process and the work of the Working Group. The Secretariat will designate a staff member to serve as Secretary to the review and coordinate the logistics of the review process.

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[95] PNG, Viet Nam, Japan, Norway, FAO, UNEP, CAMV, Global Witness, AMAN, UNPFII.

Deliverables

Before going into data collection, the reviewers shall prepare an *inception report*. The *inception report* should detail the reviewers' understanding of what is being reviewed and why, demonstrating how the review questions can be addressed by way of: proposed methods and sources of data, as well as data collection procedures. The *inception report* should also include a proposed schedule of tasks, activities and deliverables, and an annotated outline of the report. This will allow the Working Group to verify that there is a shared understanding of the review and that it will meet the needs of the Programme.

At an interim point, the consultant(s) shall prepare a *draft review report* focussing on the specific issues described in the ToR. This should include proposed changes to the existing UN-REDD Programme Rules of Procedure and Guidelines and Policy Board Terms of Reference.

The final report of the review is expected to be a synthesised report that addresses the overall objectives of the review. The final product of the review will be delivered as one document with a set of recommendations and suggestions for improving the Policy Board, including proposed changes to the existing UN-REDD Programme Rules of Procedure and Guidelines and Policy Board Terms of Reference. The recommendations should be clearly derived from the findings of the review, and are expected to be realistic, time-framed and with a clear identification of human and financial resource implications.

Indicative Timetable and Output

Activity	Timeframe
Establishment of Working Group [Completed]	PB 8 March 2012
Secretariat to work with Working Group intersessionally to finalise ToR	April 2012
Send ToR to Policy Board for information	May 2012
Recruitment of the consultant(s)	May/June 2012
Briefing of the consultant(s) by the Working Group and Secretariat and preparation of an inception report by the consultant(s)	June 2012
Initiation of review activities	July 2012
Submission of draft report to Working Group and the Secretariat and	Late August 2012

comments and feedback provided to consultant(s)	
Draft summary report revised and circulated to the Policy Board	September/October 2012
Presentation of draft findings at PB9 and comments and feedback provided to consultant(s)	October 2012
Revised report shared with Working Group members for comments and feedback submitted to consultant(s)	November 2012
Final Report and a draft response to the report circulated to Policy Board	December 2012
Approval of recommendations and draft response prepared by the Working Group	PB 10

Annex 1. Terms of Reference for the Consultant(s)

The review will be conducted by a consultant, facilitated by the Secretariat and supervised by a Working Group established by the Policy Board. Depending on the available experience and skills, two consultants with complementary skills may be appointed by the Secretariat, who will nominate one as the team leader. The consultant(s) shall produce a single document responding to each of the aforementioned deliverables.

The consultant(s) will be selected through an open and competitive selection process in line with the standards of the administering UN agency.

It is anticipated the review will be carried out within a maximum of 90 working days over a period of seven months from June 2012. Consultancy fees for this assignment will determined by level of experience and the commensurate UN remuneration rate for consultants at this level.

Requirements/competencies of the consultant(s):
- Independence from the UN-REDD Policy Board.
- Detailed knowledge of the UN system, including fund management, UN joint programming and the policies, procedures and rules of the participating UN agencies.

- Demonstrated experience of organisational governance and in evaluation of similar types of decision-making bodies.

- Some knowledge of REDD+ and the work of the UN-REDD Programme would be an additional asset.

- Advanced degree in relevant social science subject

- Minimum 10 years work experience in relevant areas.

- Excellent writing and editing skills.

- Attention to detail and respect for timelines.

Scope and tasks:

- Prepare an inception report comprising an annotated outline of the report, along with a proposed schedule of tasks, activities and deliverables detailing the reviewers' understanding of what is being reviewed and why, and showing how the objectives will be answered by way of proposed methods, sources of data and data collection procedures.

- Conduct a thorough analysis of relevant documents, existing Policy Board procedures, composition of the Board, and review of governance structures of similar initiatives and other REDD+ initiatives.

- Conduct interviews with Policy Board members and use other applicable data collection instruments.

- Produce a draft report with the findings and recommendations focusing on the specific issues outlined in the review Terms of Reference, including proposed changes to the existing UN-REDD Programme Rules of Procedure and Guidelines and Policy Board Terms of Reference.

- Present draft findings/recommendations at the ninth Policy Board

- Produce a consolidated final review report, with a set of recommendations and suggestions for improving the Policy Board, including proposed changes to the existing UN-REDD Programme Rules of Procedure and Guidelines and Policy Board Terms of Reference. The recommendations should be clearly derived from the findings of the review, and are expected to be realistic, time-framed and with a clear identification of human and financial resource implications.

<u>Application</u>

Applicants should send the following to the Secretariat (<u>un-redd@un-redd.org</u>) by 1 June 2012:

a. Cover letter

b. 1-2 page note including a brief indication of understanding of the ToR and the general approach proposed for the consultancy. The note may also raise any questions or suggestions related to the review approach

c. Completed UNEP P11 form