Who gives consent?

- Is the customary leadership enough?
 Is the introduced leadership system accepted?
- Indonesia: customary bodies lack legal personality
- Guyana: colonial village administration now accepted
- Every place will be different: right to choose their own representation

Social structures very varied: some `acephalous', some hierarchical



Divided leadership: Pasaman Barat and PT PHP

- 'Adat' leadership divided
- Some pro and some contra
- Unclear which leaders have authority
- Divided leadership hinders community from strong negotiation with company





Challenges to participation

Capacity
Language
Legal status
Caste, class, status and gender divisions



Rule of thumb

Sound consensus-based decisions emerge best from processes that:


- Are iterative
- And inclusive
- Take time and allow interim offers to be taken back to community for discussion
- Ensure the right and the resources for chosen independent counsel (legal or NGO)
- Allow scope for customary norms to be respected
- Allow people to say `no'.

Free of what?



Prior to what?

Proposal?
Planning?
Permits?
Operations?



Consent by what process?




How long does it take? Customary rights : customary laws






Who provides the information?







Who verifies FPIC was achieved?

Certification bodies in FSC have not made FPIC requirement a 'major' So instead of being failed for noncompliance companies are asked to make 'corrective actions' over coming years Result: Communities lose what little leverage the process gave them



Philippines: NCIP and 2006 FPIC Guidelines

- FPIC has become technical and procedural, very complex, increasingly weakened
- Guidelines do not conform with the definition of FPIC
- It unduly imposes government standards and policies
- Shifts the burden to the Indigenous Peoples to substantiate their rights to ancestral domains

FPIC and REDD

- CCBA, CARE, UNREDD require FPIC
 World Bank FCPF Charter requires respect for countries' international obligations (but OP, which requires only FPICon now being replaced by SESAs)
- UNREDD and FCPF now being combined? Which standards will apply? Who and how accountable?
- Meanwhile numerous requests for simplified guidance
- Risks of making FPIC a 'one stop shop' stand alone with simplified check list instead of iterative and
- Instead of part of wider RBA to development



BHP, Ekati Diamond Mine



Lessons from Indonesia: FPIC works!

Obstacles:

- Lack of legal recognition of customary rights
- replacement of customary institutions by a uniform village administrative system
- unfettered exercise of the States' `controlling power' over natural resources
- Forestry laws which are applied as if the State owned all forests
- Patrimonial and untransparent governance
- Repressive use of security forces by private sector

Achievements:

- Agreements have been (re) negotiated on good faith basis
- oil palm companies have restituted lands to communities (Sambas)
- compensation has been paid for damages (Sambas)
- local governments to recognise community livelihoods in protection forests (Lewolema);
- communities have been able to revitalise their customary institutions (Lusan).

Community land care





FPIC in International Law:

International Human Rights Laws:

- FPIC is recognised explicitly in international laws
- UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
- ILO : 6(2) y 7(1) (aim of securing consent)
- CBD : 8j (indigenous knowledge)
- Jurisprudence:
- FPIC is explicit in legal interpretations
- Committee of Human Rights
- CERD Committee
- InterAmerican Commission and Court of Human Rights
- African Commission of Human and Peoples' Rights

Complex adat structure

- Land is owned by women and by kindreds
- Kindreds (*kaum*) choose leaders
- Leaders hand land to government
- Government hands land to company
- Company gives plasma to KUD
- KUD gives plasma to KUD members
- Lots of room for manipulation

