

Report

Institution and Context Analysis to inform the PGA for REDD+ in Viet Nam

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Acknowledgements

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Table of contents

Acknowledgements	2
List of acronyms	5
1. Introduction	6
2. Methodology of the research	6
2.1 Research Approaches	6
2.2 ICA Methods	6
a) Literature review	7
b) Provincial multi-stakeholder consultation workshop	7
c) Focus group discussion at districts and communes	7
d) Semi-structure interview of (provincial) key informants	8
3. An overview on forestry sector and forest management in Lam Dong	9
4. Analysis on institutional structure for forest management in Lam Dong	9
4.1 Institutional at a glance on institutional set-up	11
4.2 Institutional and their roles	14
a) Lam Dong Provincial People's Committee	14
b) Lam Dong DARD, including FPD, Department of Forestry, PFPD	15
c) Lam Dong DONRE	17
d) State-owned forest management organisation and private companies	18
e) Provincial Police and Military and other justice agencies	19
f) Other departments, including DPI, DOIT, DOST, DOLISA, DOCST	20
g) National and provincial media (newspapers, TV agencies, including social media)	20
h) Consulting firms and services, including Da Lat University, INGOs	20
i) Provincial mass-organization, including Women Union, Youth Union, Farmer associatio Lam Dong LUSTA	on, 21
j) Districts authorities, including DPC, district FPDs, and other divisions	22
k) Communal authorities, including CPC and village communities	22
4.3 Stakeholder mapping and implications of institutional analysis to REDD+ and PGA in Lam I	Dong 23
4.3.1. Relationship of Influence and power of decision-making in REDD analysis	23
4.3.2 Relationship of Interest and power of decision-making in REDD+	25
5. Analysis of key governance issues in forestry in Lam Dong	25
5.1 Governance issues identified after consultation in Lam Dong	26
Issue 1: Existing management mechanism of forestland is not ensuring opportunities for improving or maintaining local people's livelihood / wellbeing	27
Issue 2: Governance agencies' management over the private companies' performance, especially on using of the rented forestland has not comply properly with the law / polic contract	ies / 28
Issue 3: Law enforcement to prevent illegal forest degradation and deforestation is not v effective	very 29
Issue 4: Commune authorities, local people almost marginalized from the forest / forestl use and management in their locality	land 30
Issue 5: Inter-sectoral coordination in management of forestland is not effective	31

5.1.1 Summary of prevalent issues in the forestry in Lam Dong	31
5.2 Broad governance principals to be considered in the PGA	32
5.3 PGA Advisory Group	33
6. Conclusion	35
6.1 Actors in the forestry sector	35
6.2 The main issues in forest governance in Lam Dong	35
ANNEXES	36
Annex 1: List of documents reviewed	36
Annex 2: Interview questionaires	37
Annex 3: Stakeholder Mapping and Analysis	39
Annex 4: List of interviewee	53
Annex 5: List of participants at the Provincial Consultation workshop	60

List of Acronyms

BDS	Benefit Distribution System
CERDA	Centre of Research & Development in Upland Areas
CFM	Community Forest Management
СОР	Conference of Parties
CPC	Commune People's Committee
CSDM	Centre for Sustainable Development in Mountainous Areas
CSO	Civil Society Organizations
DARD	Department of Agriculture and Rural Development
DOF	Department of Finance
DONRE	Department of Natural Resources and the Environment
DPI	Department of Planning and Investment
DPC	District People's Committee
FPD	Forest Protection Department
FPDF	(Provincial) Forest Protection and Development Fund
FPDP	Forest Protection and Development Master Plan
FPIC	Free, prior and informed consent
ICA	Institution and Context Analysis
MARD	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
MRV	Measurement, Reporting and Verification
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
PanNature	Center for People and Nature Reconciliation
PFES	Payment for Forest Ecosystem Services
PFMB	Management Board for Protection Forest
PGA	Participatory Governance Assessment
PFES	Payment for Forest Ecosystem Services
PPC	Provincial People's Committee
REDD	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
REDD+	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, Sustainable Forest Management, Forest Conservation, and Enhancement of Carbon stocks
SEDP	Socio-Economic Development Plan
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework on Climate Change
UN-REDD	United Nations Programme to Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
VFF	Viet Nam Fatherland Front
VNFOREST	Viet Nam Administration of Forestry

1. Introduction

This report documents the first step in implementing a Participatory Governance Assessment (PGA) for REDD+ in Lam Dong Province, Viet Nam. The step integrates an Institutional and Context Analysis (ICA) into this process. Firstly, this is done to provide an analysis of the key stakeholders and how to engage with them to make REDD+ successful in the province. Secondly, the ICA is a suitable methodology to identify major governance issues in the forestry sector and as a framework for developing governance indicators in the next steps of the PGA.

The PGA is an approach that aims to produce robust and credible governance data relevant to REDD+, through an inclusive process of consultations with and contributions from both government and civil society as joint developers and owners of the process. According to the national PGA National Kick-Off Workshop report¹ from March 2012, the PGA pilot in Viet Nam should be test-cased in one province. Based on a set of criteria² for selecting a pilot province, it was agreed by the national stakeholders that Lam Dong should become the pilot province. The proposal was approved by the Provincial People's Committee (PPC) of Lam Dong later in 2012. In order to develop a PGA, fundamental understanding of the province's forestry sector is required to identify the existing forest governance structure and issues as well as potential actors and decision-making processes that might significantly affect future implementation of REDD+. An Institution and Context Analysis (ICA) was applied to investigate and gain such understanding based on UNDP's ICA Guidance Note³.

The ICA will help the PGA to understand how different actors in society have different incentives to enable or block development interventions for REDD+. The purpose of the ICA is to examine the formal and informal rules, regulations, incentives and constraints that will impact the achievement of the PGA. The ICA focuses on political and institutional factors as well as the roles, responsibilities and interactions of stakeholders potentially involved in REDD+, and how these have an impact on the implementation of REDD+ in the near future. This research assesses who possesses power in forest management and who is excluded from this process at the provincial, district, commune and grassroots levels. The analysis is also aimed at identifying drivers of deforestation and institutional and political factors that promote or block forest conservation.

2. Methodology of the research

2.1 Research Approach

The team of consultants used political, institutional and social assessments in forestland planning and allocation; forest protection and development, and deforestation and forest degradation, to examine the formal and informal rules, regulations, incentives and constraints to REDD+. This process supports the development of relevant and measurable governance indicators for the PGA of REDD+ in Lam Dong. The examination follows a process as guided by common governance conceptual frameworks reflected through three pillars: 1) policy, legal, institutional and regulatory frameworks; 2) planning and decision-making processes; and 3) implementation enforcement and

http://vietnam-redd.org/Upload/Download/File/PGA kick off workshop report 1824.pdf

http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/democraticgovernance/oslo_governance_centre/Institutional_and_Context_Analysis_Guidance_Note/

¹ PGA National Kick-Off Report, Ha Noi 6 March 2012,

² Commitment and interest from local stakeholders, especially local government; REDD+ activities or similar content already undertaken; Large forest area in which parts are exposed to high risk of being deforested; Presence of ethnic communities and vulnerable groups; Easily accessible given the pilot phase's short period. ³ Institutional and Context Analysis Guidance Note:

compliance. Based on this framework, the team of consultants made an institutional analysis to identify the functions of and institutional relations between different institutions and actors in Lam Dong. The analysis also includes power of decision-making and influence of different stakeholders in the forestry sector at different levels (both state and non-state, formal and informal ones at province, district and commune). This helped the team of consultants determining and mapping out main governance issues and key actors, whose interests, incentives or constraints would affect the future implementation of REDD+ in Lam Dong in important ways, as well as identifying entry-points and bottlenecks for initiating a PGA in the province.

2.2 ICA Methods

Collection of data and analysis for this ICA was mainly based on the following methods (i) literature review of provincial policies in the forestry sector as well as reports and other studies done in Lam Dong; (ii) Multi-stakeholder consultation workshops and focus-group discussions at province, district and commune level; and (iii) selected key informant interviews at the provincial level.

a) Literature review

The team of consultants focused on reviewing local policies related to forestland planning and allocation, forest protection and management as well as compliance to national policies related to forests and REDD+. A number of legal documents and technical reports related to the Lam Dong Forest Protection and Development Master Plan (FPDP) for 2011-2020, rubber plantation strategy, and the implementation of the UN-REDD Programme and Payment for Forest Ecosystem Services (PFES) policies were reviewed. Official databases and information addressing quality of forest protection and management in Lam Dong issued by MARD were also utilized for this report.

b) Provincial multi-stakeholder consultation workshop

With support from UNDP, the team of consultants worked in cooperation with Lam Dong DARD to organize and facilitate an introduction and consultation workshop in Da Lat on 18 December 2012. This workshop aimed at introducing the PGA initiative, implications for REDD+ development and implementation, and discussing with provincial stakeholders to identify potential key governance issues on REDD+ implementation and sustainable forest protection and management. 31 participants representing provincial departments (DARD, DONRE, DPI, DOF, FPDF, and Newspaper agency), Provincial Farmers Association and private sector (hydropower and rubber plantation companies) attended. The participants were introduced to the concepts of the PGA and the Prime Minister's Decision 799/QD-TTg on establishing the REDD+ National Action Programme. Thereafter the team of consultants introduced the ICA, followed by group discussions to brainstorm and identify key governance issues related to forest protection, management and development. The team of consultants facilitated this group work by dividing into three separate themes (i) Forestland planning; investment and finance for forest sector (Group 1); (ii) Forest protection and law enforcement; Communication, awareness and capacity building; Information and reporting (Group 2); and (iii) Forestland allocation and forest development; People's rights to land and forests; and Establishment and operation of provincial REDD+ Steering Committee (Group 3).

c) Focus group discussion at district and commune

Two consultation workshops were held at district level in Di Linh (a pilot site of the UN-REDD Programme) and Lac Duong (no former REDD+ piloting activities) on 20 and 21 December 2012,

respectively. These workshops gathered a wide range of stakeholders⁴. At each workshop, participants were randomly divided into two groups to brainstorm and map out stakeholders and their functions, power of decision-making, institutional relations among district agencies and respective provincial and communal agencies. These group discussions described how each actor had been involved in the processes of forest law enforcement and compliance at district level, and the constraints they were facing to handle their functions. 25 officials in Di Linh and 20 officials in Lac Duong attended these discussions.

Following this, four group-discussions were separately organized in Da Sar and Da Chay communes in Lac Duong district, and Bao Thuan and Gung Re in Di Linh district. Participants in these meetings were mainly leaders and staff of Communal People's Committee (CPC), including Women's Union, Youth Union, Farmer's Union and village chiefs. At the meeting, they were first introduced to REDD+ and its perspectives. They were encouraged to speak out about the situation of forestland allocation and their rights to forests in their communes as well as resource conflicts between local villagers, local authorities, private sector and state-owned forest organizations⁵. These discussions gave a good insight into the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation and roles of local villagers and authority in the processes of decision-making and law enforcement, including PFES compliance. Based on such findings, all stakeholders related to forests at grassroots level were identified and mapped out.

Commune	Participants	No. of	Women
Commune		Attendants	Attendant
Da Sar	Commune staff, village chiefs, local peoples	14	3
Da Chay	Commune staff, village chiefs	16	4
Bao Thuan	Commune staff, village chiefs, local peoples	28	2
Gung Re	Commune staff, village chiefs	11	0

Table 1. Commune participants of consultation workshop in Lam Dong

d) Semi-structure interview of (provincial) key informants

Not all expected interviews were made, particularly with those from social mass-organizations of the province such as Farmer's Union, Union of Science and Technology Association and the Ethnic Minority Committee, but the team of consultants did interview 12 key informants⁶. Each interview took about two hours and focused on reflections and analysis on institutional relations and decision-making related to forestland allocation and forest management. By addressing sensitive issues, particularly related to illegal logging, forest lease and allocation and forest conversion for agrobusiness, the informants provided a wide range of thoughtful analysis on political, legal and economic factors they believed influenced provincial leaders' decision-making. Private sector had become increasingly engaged with forestland possession, resulting in various conflicts with local

⁴ District People's Committee and divisions of forest protection, agriculture and rural development, natural resources and environment, police, military, culture and information, justice, industry and infrastructure, TV and radio, and representatives from mass organizations (women union, farmer association, youth union) and state-owned forest management organizations (such as Di Linh forestry company; Hoa Bac, Hoa Nam, Tan Thuong and Da Nhim PFMBs).

⁵ Bidoup Nui Ba National Park (special use forest), Da Nhim PFMB and Di Linh state-owned forest management organization

⁶ Leaders and senior officials from DARD, Department of Forestry, FPDF, DONRE, Bidoup Nui Ba National Park, Don Duong State-owned Forestry Company, FLITCH project management board, Da Lat University, Women Union, Dran Protection Forest Management Board, Dai Ninh Hydropower Company and Da Teh Rubber Plantation Private Company.

communities that in some cases had ruined their livelihoods. These interviews also helped obtain comments on policy interventions in Lam Dong such as PFES, FPIC for REDD+ or conversion of poor natural forests to other purposes. A questionnaire used for this semi-structure interview is annexed to this report.

3. An overview on the forestry sector and forest management in Lam Dong

Lam Dong's PPC approved its FPDP for the period 2011-2020 in December 2012, committing to maintaining the forest coverage by 61%. This would ensure a significant conservation of forest resources in the Socio-Economic Development Plan (SEDP), with agreed proportions of special use forest, protection forest and production forest. This highlighted that Lam Dong would continue its efforts to socialize its forestry sector by improving forest and forestland allocation, contracting local communities, ensuring benefits from forests, explore potential revenues from forest services and implement PFES. Measures to realize the FPDP included improving forest management systems at all levels, and attracting investments to forestry development, production and business.

The FPDP likely created new opportunities for local villagers and communities in the province, particularly for the 300,000 ethnic minority people (estimated to 25% of the provincial population), who traditionally have been fully dependent on the forest, but not yet been prioritized for forestland allocation. A statistical record provided by DARD showed that by 2010 less than 2000 households, of which 400 belonging to ethnic minorities, and 10 village communities had been granted Land-use Certificated. The 12,000 ha allocated were located in Cat Tien, Da Teh, Bao Lam and Dam Rong districts. In comparison, 18,000 households have been awarded forest protection contracts since 2000, receiving annual payments for protecting about 340,000 ha. As shown in Figure 3.1 about 85 % of the forestland in Lam Dong is managed by state-owned forest organizations, and less than 2 % by households. This is far less than the nearly 12% allocated to hundreds of private companies and local authorities.




Figure 3.1. Status of Forest allocation in Lam Dong

Inequality and disparity in access to forest resources, and weak law enforcement have caused various conflicts at the grassroots level. Results have been in illegal logging, forest encroachment, deforestation and forest degradation. According to statistics reported by MARD's Forest Protection Department (on FPD website)⁷, over 2000 violations on average of forest misuse had been recorded and processed over the last 5 years (2008-2012) in Lam Dong. The violations mainly related to illegal

⁷ http://www.kiemlam.org.vn/Desktop.aspx/List/Hanh-vi-vi-pham-Luat-BV-va-PT-rung/

logging, forest clearance for cultivation, forest exploitation, transportation and trade of forest products. This caused a significant natural forest loss from 2002-2009 (Figures 3.2 and 3.3), although the loss had a decreasing trend.




Figure 3.2: Number of violations to forests in Lam Dong, 2008-2012 (FPD, 2013)




Figure 3.3. Loss in natural forests in Lam Dong 2002-2009 reported by FPD (2013)⁸

As one of five richest provinces in forest resources, Lam Dong has been greatly challenged by illegal logging and to promote forest conservation and sustainable utilization. The issuance of provincial policies to facilitate a better investment climate and spur economic growth, has converted thousands of hectares of natural forests into coffee, rubber, export flower and vegetable plantations. For instance, according to Mr. Tran Thanh Binh, Director of Lam Dong Provincial FPD, Lam Dong will have to convert more natural forests into rubber plantations to reach the goal of 150,000 ha by 2020⁹. For example, in 2005 almost 25,000 ha of forests were cleared to build hydropower plants.

⁸ Blue line: Loss in natural forest in Lam Dong 2002 – 2009

Grey line: trend of loss in natural forest in Lam Dong 2002 - 2009

⁹ Decision No. 750/2009/QD-TTg dated June 3, 2009 of the Prime Minister approving the planning on development of rubber tree up to 2015, with a vision toward 2020 stated "the Central Highlands: to continue planting new rubber trees on around 95,000 – 100,000 hectares of land areas under inefficient agricultural

However, since 2010 Lam Dong has been a leading province to pilot and implement PFES, generating substantive financing for forest protection. By the end of 2012, 12-14 hydropower plants (as Da Nhim, Dai Ninh, Ham Thuan) and 4 clean water-supply companies (as Dong Nai Sawaco) had been contracted and transferred 154 billion¹⁰ VND to Lam Dong FPDF (2011: 56 billion VND). Over 16,000 households that had been contracted to protect more than 330,000 ha of watershed forests, benefitted. The revenue has helped participating households to increase their income with 300,000-400,000 VND¹¹ per ha per year, a significant average increase of 10.5 to 12 million VND to annual income. That gives an annual income that is 3 to 4 times higher than before the PFES was introduced. According to DARD, the PFES has initially proved a good instrument to enhance the effectiveness of forest protection in Lam Dong. They want to see other forest ecosystem services such as biodiversity and carbon resources added in the future.

4. Analysis on the institutional structure for forest management in Lam Dong

4.1 Institutions at a Glance

Figure 4.1 presents the institutional structure for forestry management in Lam Dong, which is set up in accordance to the Forest Protection and Development Law from 2004 and other regulations¹². The figure explains the relationships among and between decision-making bodies and professional institutions. The institutions included in the figure are (i) Government decision-making bodies, such as People's Committees; (ii) Planning and implementing agencies, such as DARD and sub-DARD, which are responsible for overseeing policy compliance and law enforcement, and for advising People's Committees; and (iii) Cooperatives, boards, companies and joint task forces, dealing with regular or ad-hoc demands for forest management and protection, such as management boards. Vertical relationships in the figure visualize the hierarchy between decision-making bodies from national to communal level, such as between PPC, DPC and CPC. Horizontally, from left to right, the figure shows the lines of authority between professional institutions, whose responsibilities are provided by national and provincial legal regulations.

production, left unused or under poor natural forests suitable to rubber trees, in order to stabilize the total area under rubber tree in this region at 280,000 hectares."

¹⁰ <u>http://baolamdong.vn/kinhte/201210/Hon-16-ngan-ho-dan-duoc-huong-loi-tu-chuong-trinh-chi-tra-dich-vu-moi-truong-rung-2197756/</u>

¹¹ http://baolamdong.vn/kinhte/201207/Qua-hai-nam-thuc-hien-chi-tra-dich-vu-moi-truong-rung-2176932/

¹² Decree 119/2006/ND-CP and 117/2010/ND-CP




Figure 4.1 Institutional structure of forestry management in Lam Dong¹³

¹³ Based on the official regulations but with research from the consultant to develop this detail institutional structure of forestry management in Lam Dong

Provincial level

Following Figure 4.1, the PPC is the most powerful provincial decision-maker in the forestry sector, directly administrating DARD, DONRE, DPCs, Bidoup Nui Ba National Park and 13 State-owned Forest Companies. DARD is the focal point for all forestry planning and activities in the province. FPD, DoF and the FPDF assist DARD to perform these tasks. All state-owned forest organizations and private forest companies have to operate under the professional guidance and management of DARD. The PPC has established a multi-stakeholder institution known as the Provincial Steering Committee to implement the FPDP for 2011-2020. The Steering Committee is headed by the PPC's Vice-chairman and includes members from a wide range of agencies under the control of the PPC¹⁴. The Steering Committee does not include representatives from any mass-organization or from civil society. DARD has also developed an inter-agency body with the provincial police and military particularly for forest patrolling to fight illegal logging, forest fire and encroachment. The body reports to the PPC, MARD and the Steering Committee.

District level

At district level, the district FPD acts as focal point to advice the DPC in planning, operation and enforcement of forest protection and forestland allocation. This is different from other provinces where these tasks belong to sub-DARDs. District FPDs have the authority to manage, check and monitor laws related to forest holders, including households, communities, state-owned forest organizations and private companies. Each district has an inter-sectoral cooperation institution set up by the DPC focusing on forest patrolling and prevention of illegal logging, forest fire and encroachment. This body includes district FPD, the police and the military, and forest management boards of special use forest and protection forest in the district area. Representatives of mass-organizations, broadcasting and TV are also invited to join the platform.

Commune level

The Commune's People Committee (CPC) is the heart of formal power at lower level as they are legally authorized and responsible for natural forest management within their communal territory. They are, however, not able to interfere and have no real power to influence forest land-use planning and forest use in those areas that are being managed by national parks, state-owned forestry companies or private companies. In order to support those forest holders in contracting and allocating forest to local households, the CPC has set up a joint communal forestry board, chaired by a CPC leader.¹⁵ This multi-stakeholder body focuses on regular exchange of information, dialogue and ad-hoc cooperation (to deal with specific cases) rather than acting as a decision-making body. Groups of local households that have been contracted by State-owned Forestry Companies, PFMBs or national parks for forest protection, contribute to forest management at village level, like in Di Linh and Lac Duong districts. This kind of informal community institution (15-20 households per group on average) and has recently been replicated to villages engaged with PFES.

The mandates of the three above-mentioned layers are influenced by other stakeholders, both formal and informal. The team of consultants found that state-owned enterprises and private investors are the most influential, whereas the mass-organizations are the least:

¹⁴ DARD, FPD, DoF, Lam Dong Broadcasting and TV agency, Police Department, Military, DOF, DPI, People's Procuracy, Department of Health, Ethnic Minority Committee, Department of Culture, Sport and Tourism, DOIT, DONRE, Fatherland Front, and Inspection Agency.

¹⁵ Members of this board include communal forestry staff, police, military staff, village chiefs, field ranger(s) of the district FPD in charge of that commune, and representatives of related forest management organisations situated in the commune.

- In recent years state-owned and private hydropower companies and rubber plantations have emerged as key drivers of deforestation of natural forests in Lam Dong, overtaking coffee, flower and vegetable plantations, timber processing, mining and tourism;
- News and critics related to violations in forest protection and management in Lam Dong province are usually disclosed to public on national newspapers like Lao Dong (Labour), Thanh Nien (The Youth), Tien Phong (The Pioneer) or Tuoi Tre, but not on local newspapers;
- Da Lat University and international NGOs have facilitated and provided technical inputs into the provincial policy-making process, conducted capacity building and provided other consultancy services for provincial, district and communal authorities in community forestry, PFES and REDD+.
- Hundreds of small-scale timber processing (household-based) companies with operational permission legally granted by district authorities are considered as threats to natural forests due to their potential engagement with illegal timber logged and traded by local villagers.;
- The team of consultants found no clear evidence that local mass-organizations have made real contributions to good protection and management of forests at grassroots level, even though they claim to play a key role in raising awareness of and mobilizing local communities.

4.2 Institutions and their roles

a) Lam Dong PPC

As regulated by the Forest Law (2004), Lam Dong PPC is responsible for management of all forests and forestry operations in the province under the supervision of Lam Dong Provincial Communist Party and the People's Council. The PPC has to ensure that all objectives of provincial forestry development will be performed and achieved as stated by political resolutions and commitments. They have the right and responsibility for developing provincial forest management, investment and development policies and strategies, forest land-use plans and allocation plans. Other tasks include institutionalizing national forestry policies and programmes issued by MARD and other lineministries, setting up provincial institutional structures for forestry operation, and ensuring forest law enforcement.

To implement Decision No. 57/QD-TTg¹⁶ issued by the Prime Minister, the PPC developed the provincial FPDP for 2011-2020, which was approved by the Provincial People's Council in December 2012. The FPDP acknowledges the application of forest carbon finance mechanisms like REDD+ in the province. The approval of the National REDD+ Action Programme by Decision No.799/QD-TTg (2012) also requires the PPC to develop a REDD+ action plan for Lam Dong up to 2020.

The PPC's responsibilities in state management of forests and forestland are implemented through DARD and DONRE in cooperation with DPCs and other provincial departments such as DPI, DoF, the military and the police. The PPC has the authority to make decisions on annual operational budgets and plans for land-use changes prepared by these forest management organizations. The decisions are often signed by either the PPC chairman or the vice-chairman in charge of agriculture and rural development sector.

The PPC established the Lam Dong Forest Protection and Development Fund (FPDF) in 2009. The fund is derived from a participating multi-stakeholder financial institution belonging to DARD, controlling annual revenues of several hundred billion VND. The fund has been suggested, as one of

¹⁶ Decision No. 57/2012/QD-TTg dated January 09, 2012 of the Prime Minister approving the forest protection and development plan during 2011 – 2020.

the options, to manage and channel revenues from REDD+ payment to forest holders, but a decision has not been made.

Recent policies and decisions by the PPC have posed some problems, such as prioritizing forest allocation to private sector instead of local households and communities, or supporting forestland conversion for coffee, rubber and export flowers plantation, mining and hydropower development. These decisions allow deforestation and forest degradation in the province to be tolerated. Furthermore, these decisions will slow down efforts to fight poverty as local villagers become prohibited from participating in and benefiting from the forest sector in a sustainable manner, creating conflicts over forest and land-use between local villagers, companies and local authorities.

Local villagers in Da Chay, Da Sar, Gung Re and Bao Thuan stated that they had not been informed or consulted when the PPC had made decisions to allocate forests in their communes to companies, which prevented them from accessing traditionally used areas. This reality has raised a significant problem as local villagers or even district and communal authority officials do not trust PPC's decision-making process because of its non-transparent, non-participatory and non-inclusive nature, especially regarding the lack of attention paid to local communities' voice.

b) DARD, including FPD, Department of Forestry (DoF) and FPDF

DARD, through its supporting offices such as the FPD, DoF and FPDF, are considered key bodies for managing, protecting and developing forest resources in the province, including recently implemented REDD+ initiatives and the PFES policy. DARD is also a key adviser to the PPC. Annual plans and proposals for forestland allocation, as well as forest contracting, must be either prepared or reviewed by DARD before submission to the PPC for approval. However, in the past ten years, forestland allocation to households and local communities has not been prioritized. As a consequence, cooperation between DARD and DONRE for forestland allocation has not been optimal. No specific collaborative mechanisms have been officially formulated, relying instead on personal relations between officials.

In 2011, DoF in cooperation with FPD were assigned to work with 17 local state-owned forest organisations to draft the FPDP for 2011-2020. An informant from DoF claimed this plan was solely developed by DARD and its allies, without broader consultation with other departments and district agencies, including DONRE. Lessons from a participatory and bottom-up planning approach for forest management and development, effectively tested by a DARD-coordinated FLITCH project in Lam Dong, were not taken into consideration by DARD. The FPDP was considered to meet MARD's requirement of institutionalizing the prime minister's decision No.57/QD-TTg, but not to be a practical policy instrument of the province. This was explained by referring to the fact that the province would not be able to adequately finance the implementation of the FPDP and to achieve its results.

The FPD is in charge of state management and enforcement of forest protection, prevention of illegal logging and forest encroachment, and in control of forest products originating from protection and special use forests. Besides its headquarter office in Da Lat, the FPD manages 13 district FPDs in charge of forest management and protection at district level, including one branch belonging to Bidoup Nui Ba National Park. Local forest rangers are located in the province, district and in every commune (also called field rangers), enabling them to access and oversee forest activities by local forest management entities (individuals, households, communities, and organizations).

Cooperation between FPD, the military and the police has been set up at district level through joint forest patrolling to prevent illegal logging and forestland encroachment at identified hot-spots. The

hot-spots are usually under the management of management boards of special-use forests and protection forest, and forest companies, especially in remote border areas between Lam Dong, Ninh Thuan and Khanh Hoa. To encourage such cooperation, the military and police are contracted and get paid to protect thousands hectares of forests. However, this kind of contracting has raised questions on the political and financial legality of the institutional relations between local rangers, the military and the police. The contracts were not publically disclosed, and informally considered by the local FPD as an internal and locally adopted affair to generate income or pay for patrolling expenses. But, no evidence was provided to reflect how well the forest protection was handled by the local military and police agencies.

Informants from districts and communes were suspicious that district FPDs and local rangers sometimes engaged in illegal logging, transport and trade with local private companies, timber traders and even with some local leaders. On the other hand, one local ranger unofficially said that they did not always have the power and right to properly and effectively enforce the law. For instance, they have had to release confiscated timber and captured illegal loggers after having received informal phone calls from district and provincial leaders. Moreover, the rangers have little power to process prosecution over arrested illegal loggers and traders, which is the role of the police agencies. With many stakeholders and agencies involved in forest protection tasks, local FPDs try to shift the blame of deforestation and forest degradation directly on forest holders, especially on local villagers.

The DoF is in charge of supporting DARD in forestland planning and allocation, forest planting and silviculture techniques, focusing on production forests and enrichment of protection forest. They usually work with DONRE, district PCs, state-owned forestry companies and protected areas management boards. With a total of only 14 working staff, the DoF is challenged to handle these tasks well. Unlike the FPD, the DOF does not have branches at district and commune level. They usually have to conduct their tasks through district FPDs, whose expertise is more with forest protection and forestry product management than forest plantation and afforestation. According to a staff from the DoF, the province does not want to allocate land-use certificates ("Red Books") to households and village communities, as they fear the forests will be cleared off similarly to in Dak Lak Province. Therefore, through the 661 and 30A Programmes, Lam Dong has since 2000 mainly concentrated on contracting households for forest protection, with an estimated 18,000 households contracted. Avoiding forestland allocation to households could become a challenge later when forest owners, carbon rights and benefit sharing systems must be determined in preparation for international trade on carbon.

Informants from DARD, FPD and DoF saw REDD+ as a future opportunity to generate additional financial sources for forest protection in Lam Dong. But, they also expressed their concerns with regards to the certainty and feasibility of REDD+ performance and payments, since national legal frameworks and guidelines are not yet available. They questioned if the province would lose their authority of managing and utilizing the local forests once the forests are included in long-term carbon trading contracts with foreign investors bound by international regulations. It is clear that as long local stakeholders are not well informed about REDD+, it might affect their attitude and interest in REDD+.

Past experience with piloting UN-REDD activities in Lam Dong also raised arguments as to which local agency would be selected as focal point for REDD+. DARD's Planning Division was eventually assigned the task in 2009, leaving the DoF mainly on the outside. The consensus is that DARD, under the administration of the PPC, should be acting as focal institution for REDD+ in the province, with

FPD and DoF as implementing agencies. FPD would be in charge of first two objectives of REDD+ (mitigating deforestation and forest degradation), and Department of Forestry in charge of the reaming three duties (sustainable forest management, carbon storage and carbon enhancement).

The FPDF, established by the PPC and directly administered by DARD, is a fund responsible for mobilizing financial resources for forest protection and management. Currently, the majority of the FPDF revenues in Lam Dong come from hydropower and water supply companies through the PFES regulations. In close collaboration with state-owned forestry companies, district FPDs and communal authorities, the FPDF delivers direct cash payment to forest holders on a quarterly basis. The recipients are mainly households, who have been contracted by state-owned forest organizations for forest protection. Local officials are proud that Lam Dong is the leading province in Viet Nam on PFES, and believe the FPDF could be used for administrating and distributing future REDD+ payments to local forest holders. However, some of the state-owned forest organizations, such as Bidoup Nui Ba National Park, forestry companies and protection forest management boards, want the PPC to reconsider FPDF's decision-making power over payments. They argue they need to play a stronger role themselves as service providers and managers. Though these state-owned forest organizations manage almost all natural forests in Lam Dong, none of them serve in the FPDF Management Council¹⁷.

c) DONRE

Similar to DARD, DONRE is regarded as an advisory body to the PPC on state management of environmental and natural resources. In the forestry sector, DONRE is a key actor, responsible for decision-making processes related to the province's land-use planning, forestland allocation to forest companies, PFMBs, national parks and private companies through forest lease. DONRE does not directly involve itself in forestland allocation to local households and communities, because this is mainly handled by DPCs. As regulated by the law, DONRE is responsible for state-management of biodiversity and other natural resources, including water, soil and minerals. Protection of biodiversity is also under the responsibility of Bidoup Nui Ba national park, Cat Tien national park and PFMBs, though these state-owned forest organizations are managed by DARD. According to the Biodiversity Law (2008), DONRE has to be updated by local conservation bodies annually on the status of biodiversity in the province. In addition, as a key institution in charge of managing, screening and guarding the quality of environmental impact assessment, DONRE is in a position to help mitigate and control impacts of deforestation and forest degradation from hydropower development, mining, road construction and industrial plantation.

There are different implementing agencies within DONRE to assist its leaders to execute its responsibilities¹⁸. At the district level, each DPC has a Division of Natural Resources and Environment, which professionally works under the supervision of DONRE.

Cooperation between DONRE and DARD in Lam Dong is said to be less effective because of the lack of a locally decided guiding regulation. It is proved by the fact that local statistics on forestland held by DONRE and DARD are often different, thus raising differences of opinion during local socioeconomic development planning. There is no proof that this has been improved since a new

¹⁷ Members include DARD (chair), DOF, DONRE, DPI, DOIT, DOST, Department of Taxation and Provincial Treasury.

¹⁸ Department of Environmental Protection, the Department of Land-Use Management, the Center for Information on Land Use Registration, and the Center for Natural Resources and Environment Monitoring.

guideline on cooperation between DONRE and FPD in forestland allocation, was jointly issued by MARD and MONRE in early 2011¹⁹.

DONRE is member of the provincial FPDF Steering Committee, and also of the Provincial Steering Committee for FPDP. In December 2012, DONRE completed drafting the Provincial Action Plan in Response to Climate Changes, in which initial contents of REDD+ is included.

d) State-owned forest organizations and private companies

Over 85% of Lam Dong's forestland is managed by state-owned forest organizations, including Bidoup Nui Ba and Cat Tien (Cat Loc area) national parks, 15 PFMBs and 8 one-member forestry companies. This excludes some other forest areas, such as production forests, which is managed by DPCs and CPCs. Most of the forest allocated to the state-owned forest organizations are classified as natural and rich, which contains an estimated 80 %²⁰ of the province's timber and bamboo volumes. This highlights the significant potential economic value in local forests, and might help to explain why Lam Dong is restrictive to allocate forestland to local households and communities.

State-owned forest organizations are under the control of DARD, and have to submit annual action plans to them. However, it is the PPC that actually administers the national parks and the forestry companies, and the DPCs that administers the PFMBs. This means that the power to make decisions on the management of the forest is limited, as any change would need to be reviewed by DARD and approved by the PPC.

As stated by the law, PFMB and national parks are not considered forest owners, although the PPC legally granted a land-use decision upon their establishment. Ownership rights to special-use and protection forests still belong to the PPC, and they annually provide state funding for PFMBs and national parks to carry out planned forest protection, management and development activities. This means that PFMBs and national parks are not real owners over forest-related properties in the areas they are assigned to manage. This has made them reluctant to and affected their ability towards enforcing laws and to adopt alternative solutions to strengthen effectiveness in forest protection and management. On another aspect, by recognizing themselves as primary providers and managers of forest ecosystem services, both PFMBs and national parks are requiring a stronger role and more decision-making power to manage and distribute PFES revenues in Lam Dong. Today the PFES revenues are directly managed by the provincial FPDF.

Similar to Bidoup Nui Ba national park and PFMBs, forestry companies do neither have much power over the forests and the forestland they are assigned to manage, even though granted land-use entitlement. All decisions to allocate forests or forestland to private companies for rubber plantations were made by the PPC. After natural forests became provisionally closed for harvesting, most forestry companies in Lam Dong are focusing on planted forest. They usually focus on small-scale and simple processing. Similarly to national parks and PFMBs, these forestry companies also receive funding from the PPC for managing the natural forests, for instance for contracting local households for forest protection. Little decision-making power on forest management and limited financial resources, affect their ability to protect the forest. They end up in conflicts with local villagers in their efforts to prevent illegal logging and forest encroachment.

¹⁹ Circular 07/2011/TTLN-BNNPTNT-BTNMT dated on 29 January 2011 jointly issued by MARD and MONRE on instructions for forest allocation and lease together with forestry-land allocation and lease.

²⁰ PFMBs have the biggest stock with 42.3%, followed by forestry companies with 21.3% and NPs with 16.4%.

Supported by provincial policies to promote public-private partnership in forest management and development, the PPC have approached private companies with offers of forest leases, encouraging them to invest in activities to convert poor forests into coffee and rubber plantations, or tourism services. Many informants from losing forestry companies felt they had been ignored by the PPC or pressured by private companies in Lam Dong, HCMC or Hanoi. At the moment, forestry companies in Lam Dong are waiting for a national reform to restructure forest companies, by which they hope logging permissions would be continued.

In the past decade, private companies have become a key driver of significant change in forests. Based on national policies on forest lease and provincial incentives for private investment into the forestry sector, more than 15% of the provincial forestland has been allocated to private companies.

Many informants from provincial and district agencies asserted that private companies investing in small hydropower constructions, rubber plantations and other services in Lam Dong, had strongly influenced provincial leaders and the PPC. As a consequence, decisions related to forestland allocation, forest lease and forest conversion had come to their benefit. District, communal authorities and local communities had not been taken much into account.

According to informants from Da Chay and Da Sar Communes, a lack of transparency and participation in decision-making processes have raised a lot of concerns among local authorities. This has caused various conflicts between private companies and local villagers due to shortage of cultivation land, access to forests, compensation and employment. On the other side, about 100 forest lease contracts with private companies have recently been terminated by the PPC because of their failure to comply with investment agreements.

e) Provincial police, military and other law enforcement agencies

The Government has issued a Circular²¹ that guides the set-up of inter-agency cooperation between rangers, police and military forces on forest protection, prevention of forest fire and illegal activities, has been issued. That said and unlike other provinces in Viet Nam, Lam Dong has not prepared any legal instrument to institutionalize the circular for long-term compliance.

Instead, the PPC usually issues and delivers urgent messages²² and instructions²³ to request involved agencies²⁴ to respond immediately to prevent forest fires in hot seasons, illegal logging and forest invasion at hot spots. In Di Linh district, close cooperation between district FPD, forestry companies, local police and military has been formed through a joint task force, which mainly focuses on keeping local villagers from expanding their coffee plantation onto new land.

In Lac Duong district, collaboration between forest holders, such as Bidoup Nui Ba national park and Da Nhim PFMB, and the police and military, is struggling to prevent illegal logging in border areas to Khanh Hoa or Ninh Thuan. The team of consultants, however, found no evidence of the effectiveness of this joint task force. Put another way, its contribution to forest protection is questionable since illegal logging and forest encroachment continue. District FPDs blame limited resource and budgets for this. Same reason was also provided to explained the allocation of thousands of hectares of

²¹ No.144/2002/TTLT-BNNPTNT-BCA-BQP dated on 13 December 2002

²² For example, an instant message No.777/CD-UBND dated 21 February 2013 issued by Lam Dong PPC Chairman on requests of strengthening actions toward preventing and stopping forest fire in Lam Dong province.

²³ For example, an instruction No.01/CT-UBND dated on 08 January 2013 signed by Lam Dong PPC Chairman on strengthening forest fire prevention in dry season 2012-2013.

²⁴ Such as DARD, FPD, state-owned forest management boards, DPCs or provincial Police and Military

income generating forests e.g. in Di Linh to district police and military. DARD, however, stated that this allocation was purely for security purposes. Many district informants felt the joint task force focused more on fighting local villagers than illegal loggers, timber traders and violating wood processing workshops. This was proven by the fact that only a few forest violations were prosecuted in Lam Dong in the past decade even though thousands of forest crimes, including attacks on local rangers, were officially recorded annually.

f) Other departments, including DPI, DOF, DOIT, DOST, DOLISA and DOCST

The Department of Planning and Investment (DPI) has the potential to make significant influence to the remaining forests in Lam Dong. They are responsible for developing the SEDP, and reviewing sectoral development plans for forestry and agriculture, including land-use plans, to ensure that they are consistently integrated into the SEDP. DPI advices the PPC on objectives related to economic development, which sometimes are in conflict with forest preservation. Recent years' increased investments in hydropower development, mining and rubber plantations have partly contributed to the loss of thousands hectares of natural forests. In that sense, forest conservation has actually been undermined in Lam Dong. And, more forests will need to be sacrificed to meet the objective of 150,000 ha of rubber plantations by 2020. DPI is also responsible to guide and grant investment permissions for private actors in Lam Dong prior to final approval by the PPC.

The Department of Finance (DOF) has a critical influence on the decision of PPC's budget allocation for forest protection and development activities. According to DARD, DOF usually makes a large cut-off from their fiscal proposal. Some informants also wondered if DOF would cut off local budget for management of special use and protection forests once REDD+ revenues were generated from these areas.

Conflicting interests of other sectors under the control of DOIT (hydropower, mining, timber processing, export coffee, flower), DOLISA (demanding more forestry-land for the poor and ethnic minorities) or DOCST (mobilizing private investment for tourism infrastructure development) also influence forest protection in Lam Dong. Although consultations between different departments happen, no mechanism for negotiation exists. Thus, final decisions are normally sent to the PPC.

g) National and provincial media (newspapers, TV agencies, including social media)

Newspapers, radio and television in Lam Dong are not encouraged to frequently report "bad" news on deforestation and forest degradation in the province, due to "political obligations". Published reports and news are always strictly monitored by the provincial communist party's propaganda apparatus and education division in order to avoid public criticism. Local media in Lam Dong broadcast radio and television in ethnic languages that can help to disseminate information on forestry policies and laws to local villagers, and subsequently raise their awareness.

However, forest crimes in Lam Dong are usually reported by many national newspapers, such as Lao Dong, Tien Phong, Tuoi Tre and Thanh Nien and many online newspapers and websites. Illegal logging, timber trade, poor law enforcement and forestland conflicts get a lot of coverage. Journalists challenge local authorities on their responsibilities and performance on forest protection. Media coverage has lately resulted in PPC, the Government Office or MARD demanding responsible agencies to take appropriate action to handle disclosed violations in the province.

h) Consulting firms, service providers and bi- and multi-lateral organizations, including Da Lat University and INGOs

Representatives from Da Lat University²⁵, are usually invited as members of scientific committees coordinated by DOST, or to attend scientific consultations. The engagement is based on administrative agreements or service contracts, in which they agree to share knowledge and give advice on environmental impacts assessments, land use planning, community awareness, grassroots development planning, PFES, FPIC/REDD+, training and capacity building for local audiences.

While being recognized as important institutions, particularly in term of providing scientific information and educating students, they admit that the power of decision-making ultimately lies in the hands of the provincial authorities, especially the party committee and the PPC. The position of the university in the provincial institutional structure, particularly on natural resources and forestry, is influenced more by individual experts than the organization as a whole. Their role and participation in provincial policy development is quite limited. The strengths of the university are the trainings, awareness raising and baseline studies they can conduct on forest management and development. However, further assessment of their inter-disciplinary study capacity, availability and readiness of experts might be necessary.

International development agencies, international consulting firms, INGOs, and Vietnamese NGOs, can influence decision-making through ODA projects and partnerships with the province. For example, Lam Dong was chosen by the Government to pilot PFES in 2008²⁶. With technical support from Winrock International and MARD through a three year USAID funded project, a national PFES policy was eventually adopted. Lam Dong has become a leading province in institutionalizing and implementing PFES, which also has led to the set-up and operation of a FPDF²⁷.

Such agencies can facilitate local authorities and other stakeholders to work together to demonstrate new practices, and promote new policies such as PFES, REDD+ (FPIC, BDS), forest co-management, community forestry/household forest allocation, or grassroots participation etc. Facilitation by international agencies could be limited due to administrative and political barriers, as reflected by Toward Transparency, for example when local authorities impose barriers to foreign experts working on governance issues related to rights of indigenous people, community institution, grassroots monitoring/democracy, transparency, etc.

Consulting firms are also identified as important actors in the policy-making and stakeholder facilitation in Lam Dong. A FLITCH project manager mentioned he highly appreciated the Lam Dong Agro-forestry Consulting Center for helping his project facilitate DARD and DONRE to work together in participatory forest land-use planning and forestland allocation at their project sites. The consulting firm had helped to conduct the assignment quicker than usual. From another point of view, similar to other provinces, provincial planning for hydropower development and mining had been strongly influenced by external consulting firms. As a consequence, forest resources in Lam Dong experienced significant disturbance once the plans were approved for implementation. Forest conservation and environmental protection had been considered less important in these plans. In addition, some informants from Lac Duong District also pointed out that some consulting firms in Lam Dong had utilized their own working relations (with provincial authorities) to facilitate and help private companies to quickly "occupy" forests and forestland for business purposes in accordance with forest lease policies.

²⁵ Particularly from the Faculties of Environmental Sciences, Agroforestry, Law, Sociology or Social Work

²⁶ Decision 380/QD-TTg dated 10 April 2008 by Prime Minister on piloting policy on PFES

²⁷ Decision 333/QD-UBND dated 17 February 2009 issued by Lam Dong PPC on establishment of Lam Dong Forest Protection and Development Fund and its organisational and operational regulations.

i) Provincial mass-organizations, including Women's Union, Youth Union and Farmer's Union

In 2008 the Provincial Communist Party's Standing Committee in Lam Dong promulgated an instruction²⁸ to strengthen the party's leadership in forest management, protection and development. Following this, the PPC issued a decision in 2009 on rules of collaboration between forest rangers and departments, agencies and political-social mass organizations. According to this decision, the military, state-owned forest organizations, and mass-organizations should partner with local FPDs in promoting public awareness, conducting forest patrolling, preventing illegal logging and forest fires, forestry-land allocation, household contracting for forest protection, and forest plantation.

A report by DARD²⁹ states that in compliance to the instructions and decisions, DARD organized 4,756 propaganda meetings to raise awareness for almost 107,000 people, delivering more than 118,000 leaflets, signing nearly 25,500 forest protection contracts, and sensitizing 329 villages to develop their own forest protection regulations.

Mass organizations usually mention their "awareness raising" (as one-way information dissemination, *tuyên truyền*) and "mobilizing people" (*vận động nhân dân*) to protect forests and stop illegal logging. Each of these organizations has a wide and well-organized network ranging from province to village, thus they can easily target villagers. However, the team of consultants found no clear evidence of any collaboration with local FPDs after the decision went into effect. Informants said the collaboration did not work well because there were no funds to mobilize campaigns, which meant messages had to be integrated into regular meetings. Observations from meetings with communal officials point out that these organizations were not trained, motivated or prepared to realize the collaboration.

j) District authorities, including DPC, district FPDs and other divisions

The formal authority over forest management and protection at district level belongs to the DPC. Despite of this, DPC's decision-making power in forest land-use planning and forest lease is weak as they have to comply to and follow decisions made by PPC. This explains why private companies usually ignore the DPC when they lobby for forest lease agreements or hydropower projects in the district. The responsibility of the DPC is more related to monitoring compliance to PPC decisions. Its power to enforce laws and process violations is also limited. Therefore they usually act as an intermediate in addressing conflicts on access to forests or land-use between local villagers and private companies.

It's the responsibility of DPCs to ensure prevention of forest fire, illegal logging and forest encroachment, manage forestry products, forestland allocation to households, and management of unallocated production forests. They delegate these tasks to district FPDs and a task force consisting of local ranger, police, military and forest holders. DPC does not have power to make decision on land allocation to state-owned forest organization and the private sector or PFES for local villagers. DPC only implement the decisions made by provincial leaders. The team of consultants found that Di Linh and Lac Duong district leaders were not much involved in PFES and the restructuring of stateowned forestry companies led by the Central Government. It will be hard for them to challenge the lack of cultivation land, livelihoods for forest dependents people and poverty reduction if the Central

²⁸ No.41-CT/TU

²⁹ News on Lam Dong online-newspaper: <u>http://baolamdong.vn/chinhtri/201108/So-ket-3-nam-tang-cuong-su-lanh-dao-cua-dang-trong-quan-ly-bao-ve-phat-trien-rung-2067518/</u>

Government maintains the current procedures of forest management, and the PPC does not support allocating forestland to local households.

k) Communal authorities, including Commune People's Committee and village communities

CPC's decision-making power over forest resources is not clearly defined, and usually conflicts with forest management boards. In practice it is very weak. Their responsibility is more associated with awareness raising, prevention of forest fire, illegal logging and forest invasion, assistance to forestland allocation, and mobilization participation in forestry activities in communes. The CPC usually sets up a communal forestry board (CFB), a multi-stakeholder institution³⁰, to implement these tasks. Although DARD stressed that the CFB institution is funded by the state and only found in Lam Dong, the team of consultants found that this body is mainly used for periodical information exchange rather than for decision-making. In that sense, it is not a forest co-management body where local villagers are represented, treated equally and able to negotiate and collaborate with local authorities and management boards of forest organizations.

An informal forest co-management model does however exist at local level. It happens that groups of villagers and households sign annual contracts of forest protection with PFMBs or forestry companies. The size of each group in Di Linh ranges from 15-25 households, and they establish forest patrolling work plans with field staff of forest holders. This model has been extended to many communes in Lam Dong benefiting from PFES.

4.3 Stakeholder mapping and implications of institutional analysis to REDD+ and PGA in Lam Dong

The stakeholder mapping and analysis is presented in Figure 4.3.1 and 4.3.2: Power of decision-making³¹ and their interest and influence³² on REDD+.

4.3.1 Relationship of Influence and power of decision-making in REDD+ analysis

Not surprisingly, the PPC is the most powerful decision-making body for REDD+ in Lam Dong. PPC has the power to decide whether REDD+ should be developed in the province, and also on land-use planning. PPC also makes decision on policies, financial mechanisms, human resources and coordination among institutions to implement REDD+.

Among the PPC's provincial departments, DARD is the highest consultancy body in forest protection and development. Hence, it comes second to the PPC. DARD should be acting as focal point institution for REDD+ in the province, with FPD and DoF as implementing agencies, of which FPD is in charge of the first two objectives of REDD+ (reducing deforestation and forest degradation), and the remaining three objectives with the Department of Forestry (sustainable forest management, carbon storage and carbon enhancement).

DONRE's recommendation on forest owners and use of forestland will influence REDD+. DPI and DOF have some influence as professional advisory bodies for PPC. DIC also has certain influence on land planning for production, construction and hydropower projects.

Although DPCs and their functional departments have decision-making power in forestland allocation to local people and small enterprises, observations from Lac Duong and Di Linh confirm

³⁰ Consist of communal leaders, forestry police, military staff, village chiefs, field rangers assigned by district FPD, and representatives of forest management organizations.

³¹Power here is the right and responsibility of the organization and its leader as defined by law. Power is limited by the law and regulations for official and public servants of the Communist Party, and other relevant legislations.

³²Influence happens vertically. It is defined hierarchical relationship within the organization.

that the policy restricting or banning forest allocation to ethnic minorities prohibits them from doing their task. However, they still have a responsibility for implementation future REDD+ activities at district level. Although the police and military have little power and do not participate directly in implementation of forest plans, they provide valuable support in protecting border-area forests and when forest fire occurs. State forest organizations own most of the forest in Lam Dong. They are the main players in implementing PFES, and responsible for forest protection and development and contracting local people for forest protection. According to the current mechanism of task assignment, they just perform the duty assigned by PPC and under the control of other functional departments, and this explains why they have so weak influence and decision-making power in REDD+ process.

CPC, in spite of their responsibilities in the commune territory, has the weakest voice and influence on forest protection and development in general. However, communal forestry official, who are directly in charge of forest protection and development, hold key information on forest status.

Informal institutions such as mass-organizations, NGOs and Da Lat University have no decisionmaking power in REDD+, however, they are able to influence REDD+ at certain level. If they are assigned specific tasks, such as research and pilots on community participatory activities, they will become effective advocates for forest protection and REDD+ implementation. Private firms do not have decision-making power, but strong informal influence on decision makers in REDD+.

Some private companies, especially within eco-tourism, are the least effective companies in Lam Dong, because they do not invest in REDD+. After receiving forestland they make use of it as quickly as possible for their own purpose and revenue. The last informal institution, which is an extremely important one to REDD+, is the local community. Their livelihood is based on forest, especially for ethnic minorities. In Da Sar commune most households can join REDD+ in the role of contract worker for forest protection the forest may be better protected. Whilst in Bao Thuan and Gung Re a few households (215 among 1,323 households) are contracted for forest protection. As their income from coffee is low, there is a risk they turn to deforestation activities unless their incomes from forest protection are high enough.




Figure 4.3.1: Influence and Power of decision making on REDD+

4.3.2 Relationship of Interest and power of decision-making in REDD+

Based on the relationship between *Interest* and *Power of decision-making*, potential REDD+ partners can be divided into 4 categories. See figure 4.3.2. The main partner in forestry/ REDD+ management at provincial level is the PPC, closely followed by DONRE and DARD. At district level, DPC and its two functional departments (Natural Resources and Environment Department and Forest Protection Department) directly monitor the forestry/REDD+ process in the district. Mass-organizations, state forest organization will participate directly in REDD+ locally. Close engagement with these bodies is important.

Groups that need to be mobilized to participate in REDD+ are ones with medium to low interest to REDD+ (level 0-2), including: Provincial People Council, Department of Planning and Investment, Department of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs, Department of Tourist and Communications, Police and Military, NGOs, Da Lat University, Center of Consultancy and Investment. Although they have little interest in forestry/REDD+, these agencies have strong influence on the success of REDD+.

The Commune's People's Committee needs to be trained and strengthened, as it has high interest in REDD+ (level 3-4), but little decision-making power.

Lastly, the groups that need more awareness raising on REDD+, forest protection and management (level 0-1 in interest), include private companies and especially communication agencies at provincial and district level. It should be noted that institutions such as state forest organizations, community and mass-organizations with level of interest on REDD+ around 1-3 need strengthened capacity to participate in REDD+ and also to be authorized more power in REDD+ implementation.




Figure 4.3.2: Interest – Power of decision making of Stakeholder in REDD+

5. Analysis of key governance issues in forestry in Lam Dong

The depth of consultation and broad-based representation of an ICA is extremely conducive to identifying broad areas of governance and associated challenges that are prevalent in a specific area. This analysis has therefore taken the approach to conduct an ICA as the first step of the larger PGA process. On the one hand the findings from the ICA inform possible institutional arrangements for the second phase of REDD+ in Lam Dong province and - if suitable to replicate - in the other five pilot provinces for UN-REDD Phase 2. On the other hand these findings outline a broad base for developing participatory governance indicators by outlining a broad set of governance issues. This section analyses a number of clearly prevalent specific issues in the forestry sector that were mentioned during the research for the ICA and identifies the areas of governance that these issues fall into.

There are five distinct issues that can be identified through the ICA:

- Existing mechanisms for forestland management do not ensure opportunities for improving or maintaining local communities' livelihoods and well-being
- The government's management of private companies does not comply properly with the law, policies and contracts, especially with respect to rented forestland
- \circ $\;$ Law enforcement to prevent illegal logging is not very effective
- Commune authorities and local communities are practically marginalized from the management of forests and forestland use in their areas

 Inter-sectoral and inter-agency coordination for the management of forests and forestland is not effective

5.1 Governance issues identified after consultation in Lam Dong

<u>Issue 1:</u> The existing mechanisms for forestland management do not ensure opportunities for improving or maintaining local communities' livelihoods and well-being.

Access to land is a major issue for all stakeholders in Lam Dong province. The primary and secondary data show that Lam Dong province differs from other provinces in implementing land use policies. The province limits allocation of forestland to households and prioritizes private companies, some of which are based in Ho Chi Minh City, for the objective of economic growth. There are opposing viewpoints on who should be allocated land between the provincial DARD and other actors. The Table below provides a summary of major issues and the opposing viewpoints.

Table 5.1	
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Issue	DARD officials' point of view	Non-DARD actors' point of view
Land allocation to households or communities	Opposed	In support
Forest protection	People with low levels of education would not cooperate with authorities and would not be able to protect the forest	The people in the communes can protect the forest, if there are clear boundaries and if they are fully informed about the laws and responsibilities by government officials
Forestland sale	Households would sell the forest land, if it were allocated to them	Households would not sell the forest land, if it were allocated to them
Economic growth objectives	The current mechanisms applied to the existing forest users can meet the goal of economic growth and work well	The current mechanisms are fostering inequality and are unfair for the local communities and households
Forest management structures	The current structure of forest management by government agencies of forest land is the best	The current structure of forest management by government agencies of forest land (incl. program 661, PES, Forest rangers) is ineffective

Because of the lack of secure land tenure and access to forest land to ensure sustainable livelihoods for rural communities, local people encroach illegally on the forest, which is difficult to prevent. Moreover, although these people are in a suitable position to protect the forest, they are damaging or destroying the forest, because they are working for illegal loggers to earn a meager wage. A number of households are faced with a shortage of agricultural land to maintain their livelihoods, especially young couples from poor families

The field work in Lam Dong confirmed that there are groups of people living around the forest without opportunities to access forest resources, not even through the 12-month forest protection contract or through state programmes like programme 661 or PFES. Even these programmes provide only limited opportunities for poor households and ethnic minority groups, who have the sufficient human resources to maintain the forest. Figure 4 shows the distribution access to forestland by type of users. Opportunities to access forestland are uneven, with households and individuals accounting for only 1.6 % of forestland allocation.




Figure 5.1. Forest user groups in Lam Dong Province

Although allocation of land to households is currently low, the province is piloting a community based forest management model in 10 communities. However, there are strong concerns that the chances to access land are considerably lower for communities and households as supposed to private companies and state-owned forestry organizations.

Generally, rural households wished to be allocated forestland and stated that they would protect the forest, if they had secure tenure with clear boundaries and full access to information on laws and regulations. However, some households in Bao Thuan commune reported that they requested the allocation of forestland that they had taken care of under the 337 Programme since the 1990s, but were unsuccessful with their request. The land was allocated to individual staff of a state forest enterprise.

Given the difficult situation that the people are in now, they are driven to illegal encroachments on the land. Stakeholders reported that such activity is taking place during nighttime and only few people have been trialed and fined. Moreover, some farmers had sold their land to non-local people and subsequently had to work on the land for low wages.

The lack of secure tenure is a serious problem for local communities and causes a lack of long-term commitment to forest protection. Even a forest protection contract, under which people receive payments³³, provides only a short term planning base and low wages paid by other forest owners are an additional concern for many people. In addition, the authorities stressed that they do not have the resources to protect forestland and prevent illegal logging. Pressure on land is also high from hydropower, agro business and mining. Rural communities expressed concern that current mechanism designed to foster economic growth are highly unequal and provide only limited opportunities for them.

There are two general governance principles in the forestry sector in Lam Dong province that emerge from this specific issue. First, the current practice on the ground is considered by many stakeholders not inclusive and lacks opportunities for participating in decision-making processes. Secondly, there is inequality with respect to access to land.

<u>Issue 2:</u> The government's management of private companies does not comply properly with the law, policies and contracts, especially with respect to rented forestland

The ineffective use of forestland allocated to private companies was a major concern for stakeholders at all levels of government from the commune to the provincial level. According to the provincial policy private companies are given priority for accessing land with the goal of fostering economic growth.

³³ Under the PFES scheme.

There is a common perception that the number of the successful private companies is small. The reasons for this lack of success amongst private companies vary. Some companies are unable to raise substantial investments required to fulfill a forest lease contract. Others simply do not fulfill their contractual obligations, especially with respect to social and environmental responsibilities. In other cases the companies engage exclusively in timber harvesting or leave the land unused. However, policies and laws have not been applied properly in many of these cases. If private companies are not fulfilling their contracts within the first two years, for example by leaving the land unused or it is not used within the stipulated rules in the contract, they would legally be required to return the land to the province, but this is not applied in practice. Stakeholders at the commune level expressed their discontent regarding this practice and considered this phenomenon an "elite capture" of forestland by private companies.

Currently, there is no proper monitoring system in place, which means such issues are not identified properly at the provincial level. Private companies will be checked more regularly in the future, according to a DARD official. There is also a high rate of turnover amongst the companies. Up to now, more than 100 private companies were unsuccessful and dissolved. Moreover, the contribution to economic growth by these companies is questionable.

The current situation raises three issues in terms of governance. First of all, the rule of law is inconsistent or applied somewhat arbitrarily regarding the allocation of land to private companies. Moreover, there is a lack of both transparency and accountability. Stakeholders, especially those at the commune level, are not informed about the land allocation process, which is not conducted transparently. In addition, there is no complaint mechanism and thus there is a lack of accountability by government officials.

Issue 3: Law enforcement to prevent illegal logging is not very effective

All stakeholders have confirmed regular occurrences of illegal logging. Poor law enforcement mechanisms are usually considered the main reason for this. The issue was a major concern to all stakeholders. Generally spoken, illegal timber logging is a lucrative business and stakeholders identified a variety of factors that drive illegal logging, however, the proceeds of it are concentrated in the hands of a few.

Engaging in illegal timber logging is a matter of sustaining a livelihood for most people, either by using the forest for agriculture and other unsustainable activities or by working directly for organized illegal loggers. The compensation for this work is very low, however, and will sustain people's livelihoods in the long run. Some stakeholders have stated that people in rural communities lack understanding of the law. However, some people have full knowledge of the law, but break it regularly for logging and work through large illegal logging rings. Similarly, reporting of illegal logging by the population is rarely occurring, although reporting illegal loggers could in theory carry a reward for the reporting person. However, most people do not consider reporting of illegal logging to forest rangers an effective way to prevent this activity.

Law enforcement is further weakened by reluctance by authorities to report people from their own communities or fears of revenge. Some illegal loggers have also resisted law enforcement agencies violently, including using sticks, hammers and knifes as weapons. Forest rangers also received "legal but illegal orders" from powerful officials, when arresting illegal loggers and were forced to release them shortly after arrest. Moreover, forest rangers complained that they lack human resources and have a shortage of vehicles for effectively enforcing the law. Their salaries are also low, they reported.

Commune authorities and the heads of villages reported that those arrested by forest rangers are relatively small cases, such as local people on motorbikes, while large trucks of illegal timber have practically free passage. During field research timber trucks were observed in the natural forests of Bao Thuan and Gung Re and when the team of consultants took pictures of the trucks, the drivers were visibly angry. The people in the commune do not know where the timber comes from.

A major pressing issue for the rural population, especially poor people, is the uneven enforcement of the law. In Da Sar and Da Chay illegal forestland encroachment has occurred continuously for coffee cultivation by the local people. The commune and village leaders reported that a young couple without land was recently on trial for four "sào"³⁴ of illegal forestland encroachment. They received a penalty of 35 million VND and 5 years of probation, while large illegal logging rings are hardly prosecuted.

The major governance theme that can be identified through this specific issue is rule of law as shown through both the lack of enforcement and the uneven enforcement of the law.

<u>Issue 4:</u> Commune authorities and local communities are practically marginalized from the management of forests and forest and use in their areas

Decision-making power regarding forestland use planning is highly centralised in the Provincial People's Committee. Provincial departments such as the DPI, DONRE, DARD and DOF have primarily advisory functions. The district authorities manage only small tracks of land, which are rented to private companies, but they expressed their concern that they are not powerful enough to manage the land in their areas effectively. Contrary to the Grassroots Democracy Ordinance³⁵, commune authorities are unable to participate in the decision-making process and are usually not in a strong enough position to protect the local populations' legal interests regarding forest land-use planning. They generally obey orders from higher levels of government. All the district and commune authorities suggest that they need more power to fulfill their duties as forest managers in their areas.

In almost all consulted communes, the commune authorities do not have the power to monitor the fulfillment of contracts by private companies. For example, they are unable to enter the land rented by private companies and cannot check between renewals of contracts. Often they are unaware of land leases and only get to know about new leases, when the new lessors appear in the commune. In addition, the local authorities and people seriously do not have access to relevant information, such as policies and laws, meaning they do not know their rights and responsibilities regarding forest land use and monitoring of land leased to private companies.

Many village leaders and leaders of contracted forest protection groups explained that there is no functional complaint mechanism and that their complaints to the forest agencies receive no response. They also complained that PFES payments are late and that at the time of consultation in December 2012, they had not received the PFES money for the second half of 2012. The contract for forest protection is transparent and contains relevant information on paper, including plot numbers and boundaries, but in practice this information is meaningless.

The governance themes that can be identified through this specific issue are transparency, participation as well as accountability as a related matter. Allocation of land is done at the provincial

 $^{^{34}}$ 1 sào = 360m² in Northern Vietnam, 1 sào = 500m² in Southern Vietnam

³⁵ The first new policy was Party directive 30/CT-TW, dated 18 Feb.1998. This was later issued as Decree 29 in 1998, superseded in 2003 by Decree 79. Both decrees were officially titled 'Decree on the issuance of regulation on implementing democracy in communes', however they have become popularly known as the 'grassroots democracy decree'. Thus, for the sake of simplicity, this paper refers to GDD, meaning both the Decree 79 and similar decrees providing for increased democracy in other fields. These include state owned enterprises (Government Decree no. 7/1999/ND-CP of 13 Feb. 1999 on implementing grassroots democracy in state enterprises) and administrative offices (Decree 71/1998/ND-CP of 8 Sept. 1998 on the promulgation of the regulations to realise grassroots democracy in government agencies).

level without local authorities and communities receiving information about the process, which means there is a lack of transparency and by extension authorities are not accountable to their people. In addition, the unilateral decision making process at the provincial level of government points to a lack of participation by the people most affected by these decisions.

<u>Issue 5:</u> Inter-sectoral and inter-agency coordination for the management of forests and forestland is not effective

There are two main ad-hoc coordination regimes at the provincial and lower levels for the management of forestland. The first one concerns coordination amongst relevant departments at the provincial level, the second concerns the coordination of law enforcement agencies, including forest rangers, police, military and state-owned forestry organizations.

At provincial level almost all stakeholders agreed that the co-ordination between relevant departments, including the DPI, DONRE DARD and DOF, is weak and needs the significant improvements. For instance, the official data managed by different departments on forestland differ from department to department. These and similar coordination issues cause gaps or overlaps in the administrative structure.

Reasons for the lack of coordination are: 1) Each department focuses on its own work and goals; 2) Senior management is not regularly attending coordination meetings and the attending staff cannot make decisions so that the meetings end inconclusive; 3) Issues are not or only poorly followed-up. All stakeholders have recognized these weaknesses for a long time, but little improvement has taken place.

At the district level, the inter-agency coordination between forest rangers, the police, the military and state forest owners is not effective in preventing illegal forest land encroachment and logging. Almost all stakeholders agreed that the control mechanisms between these four agencies are not very effective. Some interviewees even expressed that this practice is waste of public money and leads to increased infringement of the law by the local population.

This issue points to a lack of accountability by the various departments and agencies as well as a generally inefficient public administration.

5.1.1 Summary of prevalent issues in the forestry sector in Lam Dong

The five issues described above show considerable commonalities along some principles of good governance. All issues are directly or indirectly linked to land use and land allocation. There are opposed views on land-use regimes between the provincial DARD on one-side and district and commune representatives on the other. The allocation of land to private companies under an economic growth paradigm is highly contested by local communities. Some of the more direct complaints by these communities include late payments under the PFES scheme, a lack of supervision or control over private companies' performance and the absence of a complaint mechanism. Moreover, poor law enforcement with respect to illegal logging as well as poor intersectoral and inter-agency coordination and the unequal application of the law was a major issue amongst stakeholders. The ability by commune authorities and rural communities to participate in the decision making process was further a cause of discontent.

5.2 Broad governance principals to be considered in the PGA

Based on the five major issues identified during the consultations at the provincial, district and commune level, five broad areas of governance can be identified that should be further investigated during the PGA and provide the framework for developing participatory governance indicators through the process of the PGA. These broad areas of governance or governance principles are:

- o Transparency
- o Accountability
- o Rule of Law

- Equity and Inclusiveness
- Participation

In March 2013 the findings were consulate in a validation workshop with relevant stakeholders (see Annex 5). At this workshop, stakeholders asked to rank the five issues described in the previous section by order of importance through pair wise ranking³⁶ (see Box 5.1). However, this ranking cannot be directly translated into a ranking of the five governance principles that should provide the framework for the development indicators within the PGA. Rather the ranking provides an order of importance of the specific issues. Table 5.2 below summarizes the evidence collected from the consultations that supports each of the five governance principles.

Table 5.2

Governance Principle (Broad area of governance)	Supporting evidence (examples from consultation)
Transparency	 Decision-making for land allocation is not <i>transparent</i>. In some cases communities only learn about land allocation in their areas, when a new owner or lessor arrives
Accountability	 Contracts with private companies are not enforced by the authorities Transfer payments for PES arrive late without consequences There is no functional existing complaint mechanism There is undue interference ("legal, but illegal orders") by authorities in the work of law enforcement agencies
Rule of Law	 Illegal logging cannot be prevented Law enforcement agencies are poorly coordinated and equipped The law is applied unevenly Contracts with private companies are not enforced by the authorities
Equity and Inclusiveness	 Land is allocated disproportionately to private companies There is practically no opportunity for participation by commune leaders in the land allocation process Only a small proportion of land is allocated to households, while large areas are allocated to companies with the goal of economic growth
Participation	- There is practically no opportunity for participation by commune leaders in the land allocation process

³⁶ Rapid and simple way of selecting the most important issues or problems facing a community. Brainstorming generates a preliminary list. A group of people then vote on the significance of every item against each other item using a matrix. <u>http://web2.concordia.ca/Quality/tools/18pairwise.pdf</u>

Box 5.1: Pair wise ranking of issues and disagreements during validation workshop

During a validation workshop for the findings of this report, held on March 6th, 2013 in Lam Dong Province, participants expressed opposing viewpoints weather land should be allocated to households (local people) or not. While provincial authorities, mainly representatives from DARD, claimed that rural communities would not be able to look after the land and would eventually sell it, the communities themselves strongly asserted that they are very well able to look after the land, but need secure tenure and long term planning horizons. No consensus could be reached on the issue.

Participants also engaged in a pair wise ranking exercise of specific issues, providing an order of importance of the specific issues, which provides a general guidance, which areas of governance are important to the participants.

Ranking of issues (in order of importance):

- 1. Inter-sect oral coordination in management of forest land is not effective
- 2. Law enforcement to prevent illegal forest degradation and deforestation is not effective
- 3. Existing management system of forest land management is not ensuring opportunities for improving or maintaining local people's livelihood/well being
- 4. Commune authorities, local people almost marginalized from the forest/forest land use and management in their locality
- 5. Government agencies' management over the private companies' performance, especially on using of the rented forest land has not comply properly with the law/policies/contract

5.3 PGA Advisory Group

In the next phase of the PGA it will be crucial to develop specific indicators in the five broad areas identified above to measure governance performance. In order to develop these indicators an Advisory Group should be set up that can inform the process and provide inputs regarding the types of indicators to be applied, data availability and how to avoid manipulation of the indicators. The ICA described above should inform the selection of advisory group members.

In the context of a PGA for REDD+, the Advisory Group should broadly represent the interests and concerns of the various stakeholders in REDD+ and consist of individuals to be selected from provincial authorities and departments, political and social mass-organizations, civil society organizations, academic and research institutes, and indigenous community institutions. This group could also be extended to engage representatives of key national government counterpart such as MARD, MONRE, legal institutions, and international and national NGOs familiar with REDD+ and forest governance.

With facilitation by UNDP, FAO and VNForest, the Advisory Group would be responsible for contributing to the development of governance indicators based on the five governance principles transparency, accountability, rule of law, equity and inclusiveness as well as participation.

A list of selection criteria of Advisory Group members has been discussed and agreed during the validation workshop in Lam Dong, including (i) willing to follow from the beginning to end; (ii) have relevant forestry experiences; and (iii) willing to share local people's opinions and requests.

Based on these criteria, the following list of potential members for the Advisory Group is recommended:

- 1. Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (DARD)
- 2. Department of Natural Resources and Environment (DONRE)
- 3. Provincial Board of Ethnicities
- 4. Provincial Forest Protection Department (provincial FPD)
- 5. Provincial Farmers Association
- 6. Provincial Women Union
- 7. District Forest Protection Division (district FPD)
- 8. District Natural Resources and Environment Division (district DONRE)
- 9. Communal Forestry Board
- 10. Private companies

Considering the findings from the ICA, this list could be extended by other crucial actors, including the Provincial People's Council (as a local law-making institution), Da Lat University (as academic and consulting institution), local communities or key state-owned forest organizations such as national parks, PFMBs or forestry companies. Additional training on the PGA process should be considered for all advisory group members, as this is a new process.

6. Conclusion

This report has provided a detailed analysis of the stakeholders in the REDD+ Readiness process in Lam Dong province. The team of consultants has investigated the roles and responsibilities of various stakeholders and specific actors, their working relationships and position in the administrative structure of the province as well as informal arrangements and practices. The interviews and focus group discussions during the consultation process in December 2012 provided a wealth of information that is documented in this report. The numerous reports, experiences and explanations provided by the people of Lam Dong from government officials to ordinary members of rural communities were invaluable for this work. While many individuals gave detailed accounts of their experience in the forestry sector, a number of issues emerged as dominant and need to be addressed during the second phase of the REDD+ Readiness process. This section will first very briefly summaries the findings and conclusions from this work and then provide specific recommendations for the implementation of the Phase II of the UN-REDD Programme as well as completing the Participatory Governance Assessment (PGA) pilot.

6.1 Actors in the forestry sector

The networks, hierarchies and interactions of actors potentially involved in REDD+ in Lam Dong are complex. While mandates are usually very clearly defined in the Vietnamese administrative structures at all levels, some actors have considerable influence extended outside their formal mandates. The PPC clearly emerged as the central agency for decision making in the forestry sector in Lam Dong province, while specific departments, namely DARD and DONRE, are highly influential in the forestry sector and land allocation. It will of course be crucial to closely engage these actors to successfully implement REDD+ in Lam Dong (see also the top right quadrant of Figure 4.3.2 for other actors to be closely involved).

While the PPC, DARD and DONRE are generally supportive and powerful actors, there are some actors, who are not currently directly involved in REDD+ and whose support needs to build during the REDD+ Readiness process. These actors, such as the DPI or the DOF, can be found in the top left quadrant of the matrix in Figure 4.3.2. Similarly, awareness raising is needed for those actors that are placed in the bottom left quadrant of the matrix and empowerment should be provided for those in the bottom right. Some actors, who are outside the formal decision making structure in the forestry sector, such as Da Lat University, international organizations and consultants will be important advocates and potential mediators in the implementation of Phase II of the UN-REDD Programme and should be engaged as important advising agencies.

6.2 The main issues in forest governance in Lam Dong

A number of major issues in the forestry sector emerged from the consultations with stakeholders in the province. These include issues around equity and participation of rural communities, the mechanism for land management, compliance by and control of private companies with respect to contractual obligations and the effectiveness of law enforcement and inter agency coordinating mechanisms. Perhaps most importantly, however, there are opposed viewpoints between some provincial government officials and local communities on land allocation, the most appropriate way to allocate land and the fairness of the system. While representatives from the commune level consider the current system as unfair and inadequate for providing them with sustainable livelihoods, provincial government officials argue that people in the communes are poorly educated and are unable to take care of the land, if land-use certificates (Red Books) are issued to them. Currently only 1.6 % of forestland is allocated to households.

Annex 1: List of document reviewed

- 1) Provincial Council Decision No: 25/2001/NQ-HĐND date 24 July 2001 on Land use Planning for the period from 2001- 2011
- 2) Provincial People's Committee decision N0: 96/2001/QĐ-UB date 18 October 2001 on Approval of Agriculture and Rural development Plan towards 2010.
- 3) Provincial Council Decision No: 47/ 2006/ NQ-HĐND. Da Lat, date 07 July 2006 on Review of Land Use Planning for five years 2006-2010.
- 4) Quyết định số 168/2001/QĐ-TTg
- 5) The Prospects for Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) in Vietnam: A Look at Three Payment Schemes Phuc Xuan To & Wolfram H. Dressler & Sango Mahanty & Thu Thuy Pham & Claudia Zingerli
- 6) Payment for Forest Environmental Services: A Case Study on Pilot Implementation in Lam Dong Province Vietnam from 2006 2010, Winrock International, 2011
- 7) Payment for Environmental Services in Vietnam: An Analysis of the Pilot Project in Lam Dong Province, The Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES), RECOFTC - The Center for People and Forests; Author: Nguyen Quang Tan
- 8) The Payment for Forest Environmental Services Pilot Policy in Da Nhim Commune, Lam Dong Province, Vietnam, by Nguyen Thi Hanh
- Consultations in Support of the Development of a Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) and Compliant Benefit Distribution System (BDS) for Viet Nam; CERDA, SNV. Hanoi, October, 2012
- 10) Research report Situation of management and use of Land in EM mountainous Areas 2012
 Research Consultant Group for UNDP
- 11) Information of oversight visit results on resident and production land of EM by Standing Committee of National Assembly in 2012
- 12) Research Report on Land Oxfam Hong Kong
- 13) Access to Natural and Financial Capital, and its Effects on Livelihood Strategies.

Annex 2: Interview questionnaires

Focus Group questions - government officials and provincial actors

1) Where do you see your own involvement in REDD and that of your organization?

- What were your previous involvement in REDD activities?
- What is your future involvement in REDD program?
- What responsibility will you or your organization have within REDD?
- What are potential conflicts e.g. land use, economic growth vs. forest protection?
- 2) What are your hopes and concerns for REDD?
 - What barriers do you see for successful implementation?
 - Do you think your organization has the capacity to fulfill its responsibility?
 - What are your needs to fulfill the responsibility?
 - How can you coordinate with other organizations?
 - Do you have the mandate to fulfill your responsibilities?
 - Do you know about the Provincial Forest Protection and Development Fund? Is there a need for an alternative mechanism? What kind of mechanism could this be?

3) What are the difficulties and challenges in land allocation?

- How much complete (and for whom)?
- What are the priorities for land allocation and in which areas?
- Is there community land allocation for ethnic minorities (or others)?
- How do you think co-management or community management of protection forests could work?

Focus Group questions- community/grassroots level:

- 1) Provide an overview of the village / community?
 - Maybe ask a community leader to provide information on farming, forest use, land use, size of the community, ethnic composition, road access / infrastructure?
 - Do you know about REDD? If yes, was there any training or information session?
 - Do they know the market prices for coffee, timber, rice?
 - Are there any development or livelihood project? How do you participate in it?
- 2) What challenges does the community face?

(Was the community part of FPIC)?

- How did you get land allocated, if any, e.g. what kind of paper was necessary? Was it easy to get land allocated? Did you need to make any payments?
- Do you know about support programmers? If yes, were you consulted about them? What type of support was there?
- If they know about REDD, how much detail are they aware of? What do you hope REDD could help you with? Is there another choice to improve your livelihoods?
- 3) Who does the forest belong to? Do you know about the organizations taking care of the forest?

(This question is asked as an entry point into establishing the community's relationship to other actors)

- How are land use decisions made in your community, e.g. is a communal process or is this a decision made by one gender only?
- Do you benefit from your land allocation? If no, why not?
- Is the forest land formally (red book) or otherwise allocated to you?
- If there is a conflict, do you know about complaint or conflict resolution mechanisms (ask indirectly)?
- Ask to draw institution paragramme to show who directly affects their village (on flip chart
- 4) Are you involved coffee / tea / (rubber) growing?
 - Is that an important source of income?
 - Who do you sell your products to?

Semi-structured interviews

- 1) What do you know about REDD?
- 2) Have you received or know about the Decision 799 regarding REDD?
- 3) How were you involved in REDD Phase I?
- 4) Do you think, REDD will be of benefit to Lam Dong province / district?
- 5) How do you think, REDD will impact your work and your organization?
- 6) How are you involved in REDD? Is your organization represented at the Steering Committee?
- 7) Do you work directly with local communities? How do you think, communities should be involved in REDD and what would make their involvement successful? What barriers may there be to successful participation?
- 8) Which organization should be involved in REDD? Why? Which ones would be most important?
- 9) Is your organization involved in land use planning? Who do you need to cooperate with and how?
- 10) Is your organization involved in forest protection? Who do you need to cooperate with and how?
- 11) Explain about REDD, then ask: what potential negative impact would it have?
- 12) How important is the coffee / tea / rubber industry for Lam Dong's economic growth and poverty reduction?
- 13) Do you think coffee / tea / rubber plantation area needs to be expanded?
- 14) What are the main markets for coffee / tea / rubber? Leading question to identifying main trading companies...

Drivers of deforestation

- Perception and knowledge of REDD and sustainable forest management
- Relationship between communities and (government) decision makers
- Identify actors involved in land use and deforestation (also indirect ones, e.g. banks)
- Identify actor coalitions (refer to partnerships or cooperation).

Annex 3. Stakeholder Mapping and analysis

	Mapping of Formal and informal institutions
Province	Formal Institutions
	Provincial Party + Provincial People's Council + Provincial People's Committee
	Provincial Department of Agriculture and Rural Development
	- Forest Protection Department
	- Department of Forestry
	Management Board of protection forests (03)
	Bidoup Nui Ba National Forest
	Forestry One Member Limited Company (14)
	The Forest Protection and Development Fund
	The Management Board of Protection Forest and Special Use
	Department of Natural Resources and Environment
	Department of Finance
	Provincial Department of Planning and Investment
	Provincial Department of Police and Provincial Army
	Press (National level + Lam Dong press+ Post cast and Television)
	Mass socio-political organizations, unions
	Informal Institutions
	Private/ state owned enterprises (hydropower station, rubber, coffee, vegetable, flower,
	livestock, mining, processing and trading of wood)
	Environmental Sciences Faculty / Da Lat University
	Agriculture and forestry consulting company
	Association/ illegal timber trafficking groups.
District	District People's Committee
	Forest Protection Department
	Department of Agriculture and Rural Development
	Department of Natural Resources and Environment
	District Police + District Army (inter-unit)
	Supervisory Board of Forest Protection and Development Fund (interdisciplinary, including
	the Vietnam Front Fatherland and unions)
	Businesses / forest product processing factories
Commune	Communal People's Committee
	Communal Forestry Committee
	CommunealPolice + Army + Militia
	Village leaders
	Local forest ranger / forest protection station
	"The middlemen / intermediaries" (land, wood, credit) + forestry products based enterprises
	Private enterprises (renting forest)
	Local ccommunity (group/forest protection-contracted -households, village communities)

• Stakeholder Mapping of key stakeholders in Lam Dong province

1. Stakeholder Analysis at Provincial level

1.1 Formal Institutions

Strength/Incentive for	Weaknesses/Constraints	Potential influence to REDD+
REDD	for REDD	
 Forest Protection Management Planning 2011-2020 Pilot on UN-REDD, SNV, RECOFTC (FPIC, BDS,) PFES / Forest Protection and Development Fund Policy of creating production land fund for Ethnic minorities Policy of conversion of forest land / forestry company Annual Forest Protection Management Planning 	 Policy and the decision on withdrawing leased forest from private firms (forest will be withdrawn if not invested after 2 year) The forestry sector is not the priority in the allocated annual budget Development Plan of coffee, rubber, flower, vegetable, mineral, hydropower is given priority Policy on not-allocating forest to household/ community Conversion of poor forest to production land Law enforcement on forest management and protection is weak 	 Pioneering / experienceing in piloting REDD+, Restricted rights and opportunities on access to forest and forest land of community/ households, especially ethnic minorities; Relationship/ alliance between governmentand enterprises (for power and interests) do not promote people's participation in forest management process; Trust, legitimacy and law enforcement have been declined or not recognized/complied by the community Local people/community envyingly thinks that there is no equity in benefits sharing from forest management and protection and this leading to deforestation and forest degradation. FPIC can not be applied because households are not legal forest owners they just hired labor for forest protection Poverty rreduction objective in REDD+ is difficult to be implemented; Policy of socio-environmental protection is difficult to be met if forest is merely allocated to private businesses.

1.1.1 Provincial Communist Party + People's Council + People's Committee

1.1.2 Provincial Department of Agriculture and Rural Development and Rural Development, Forest Protection Department; Department of Forestry

Strength/Incentive for	Weaknesses/Constraints for REDD	Potential influence to
REDD		REDD+
- Take primary	- It is merely advisory body having no right to	- Rangers can monitor and
responsibility for	make decision; has limited law enforcement	support the process of
State management of	authority and asynchronous and overlapping	REDD+ implementation
Forestry and	functions with poor accountability;	(fire control, prevent
implementation of	- Coordination between the Department of	illegal activity, payment
Forest Protection and	Agriculture and Department of Natural	for forest service, mining,
Development	Resources and Environment is not effective	leakage)
Planning 2011-2020;	- Not well-defined division of responsibilities of	 No support for forestry/
- Considered as the	the agencies who (should) implement REDD+ ,	land allocation to
focal agency for	Competition of authorities	households and
implementation of	- Forest rangers are "employees" for private	communities;
REDD+, PFES;	enterprises to protect forests (rubber tree)	- Natural forest planning
- To advise, plan,	- The cost of protection of forestry land and	(suitable for REDD+) is

	r	
design and verify	forests is low; state budget is not enough for	assigned to enterprises;
forest allocation for	forest protection, therefore illegal logging can	 Conflict of land use
households/	not be banned ; price and market demand of	planning for REDD +
communities/	forest products – timber is high;	and/or other agriculture /
businesses, pay for	- Lack of updated information on the status of	forestry production;
forest services; forest	forests and forestry land;	- Improve forest
co-management,	- Rangers ignore, "shaking hands with the illegal	encroachment, invasive
community forestry,	loggers", legalized illegal forest products;	cultivation thus increasing
forest inventory,	dare not to against or not to obey oral order	the risk of deforestation
forest development	via phone when handling violations, land	- DD risks are high in forest
and protection;	allocation, tax retrieve; - insensitivity	areas managed by the
- Enforce Forest Law,	syndrome, idiopathic;	state forest owners (legal
monitor forest	- Low effectiveness of communication and	and illegal)
owners, control	awareness raising on forest management and	
forest product usage	protection	
and sanctioning	- Difficulties in the management of forests	
- Conduct Forest	interspersed with agricultural land since it is	
Protection and	acceptable to be encroached and invaded for	
Development plan	cultivation of coffee	
and regulation in	- Contribution of the forestry sector to the local	
interdisciplinaryy	budget is low compared to other economic	
coordination	fields, hence, it is difficult to compete with	
between Police, Army	other development options;	
and mass	- Unable to quantify the economic value of	
organization on	forest environmental services, proved to trade	
Implementation of	and perceived as a burden, and leading to	
the plan	small investment.	
- Their expectation on	- The principle "the participation of a whole	
REDD+ to generate	political system" in forest management and	
financial resources	protection makes rangers possible to dodge	
for forest protection	accountability ;	

1.1.3 Provincial Department of Natural Resources and Environment

Strength/Incentive for REDD	Weaknesses/Constraints for REDD	Potential influence to REDD+
- Being the focal body	- Does not directly control/manage	- There is doubt that the
responsible for	DD, forest resources; reduction of	policies on Environment and
implementation of	emission;	Society safeguard in REDD+
National Target Program on	- Statistic data sources on the land	composed by DONRE/MONRE
REDD; action plan on	and forests is inconsistent	will be connected to the use of
climate change adaptation;	between the Department of	forest/forest land and thus do
annual report of	Natural Resources and	not meet the co-benefit
greenhouse gas	Environment and the Department	principle and there is not yet
inventories;	of Agriculture and Rural	plan for biodiversity
- Supports REDD+ initiatives;	Development (forest inventory,	conservation integrated with

P		
is member of the	land, biodiversity); lack of effective	REDD+
Management Board of the	coordination mechanism in the	- There should be Plan for
UN-REDD and Forest	management of forest data	control of emission reduction
Protection and	sources;	actions in the province,
Development Fund	- Land use planning is inadequate,	including forest planning for
- Advise and guide process of	yet unclear and unsustainable, not	REDD+;
allocation of forest land to	totally realistic and the lack of	- Lack of agricultural land
households and	consistency between sources of	leading to increases of DD and
communities (red book,	departments	leakage
contracting, leasing), the	- Capacity in monitoring land	- DONRE may be able to impact,
conversion of land use	allocation, managing natural	advise for Province to allocate
purpose (converting forest	resource, handling conflicts of land	forest/ land to community;
land to agriculture,	use (state forest owners and	- It has function of advice and
construction)	community) is still low;	verify but authority to allocate
- Posses statistic data on the	- Forest land allocation for ethnic	land/forest to households
current status of land use	minority communities is hampered	- May have impact on forest
(but lack of updated data	by the political and historical point	planning for REDD+ and
on shifted forest land)	of view, the concern of	biodiversity;
- Responsible for	autonomous region establishment	- If there are multiple
management of	by the local people; concern of	stakeholders participating in
biodiversity, minerals,	selling land (agriculture),	REDD+ Steering Committee,
water resources;	transferring forest land use right;	there would be increase in
- Evaluate/ verify EIA of	and land consolidation;	indirect costs and
development projects		accountability would be low.

1.1.4 State forest owners (Bidoup Nui Ba National Park, Protection Forest. Management Board, One member Forestry LTD company)

Support/Incentive for REDD	Constrain /opposition for REDD	Influence to REDD+
1.Lessons from PES	- Have few opportunities to participate in other policy	1) Identificati
payments to households	making process.	on of real forest
(protection contracts)	- Forest owners do not have long-term forest	owners to
2.There have been inter-	protection and development strategies/ investment	protect and
sectoral coordination	plans; or business plans (National forest, Protection	development
mechanisms for forest	Forest Management Board). There is no clear	forests is unclear.
management and	division between enterprises and governmental	Local people's
protection.	organizations who both are in charge of forest	access to forest
3. Willing to participate in	protection	land is restricted
REDD+ because it has	- Managed forest areas reduced by process of	(due to land
money	allocating forest land to private companies (inside	recovery,
4.Staff are paid by state	and outside the province)	contrary to
budget. Budget for forest	- They allocate forest for their staff and do not give	customary law)
protection and	back forest to local people whose livelihoods	2) People's
development is granted by	depend on forests and who are traditional owners	tenure in REDD+
government.	- Not satisfied to take mediating role of PES activities	is passive since
5.REDD+ is met with their	- Have big conflict in land and forest with local people	they are not legal

objectives and functions in	and private enterprise. Do not get the support from	forest
forest protection and	people because local people think that they invaded	user/owner.
development.	their land	- Benefits from
6.Annual plan for forest	- Do not know the boundaries of their allocated	REDD+ are
protection and	/managed forests in the field.	shared by many
development is approved	- Being the forest owners but possess no real right as	stakeholders and
and financially granted by	"master and owner" because dominated by many	thus leading to
province.	other agencies and real master.	deeper conflict
7.Have the right to	- Incapable and not competent enough to prevent and	over forest.
participate in the decision-	handle illegal logging and encroachment.	3) May be an
making process and to	- Deadlock in stopping deforestation, encroachment	opportunity for
supervise the	and illegal logging	forest co-
implementation of forest	- The pressure of poverty	management
land allocation to other	- Unsustainable and lack of finance source; income	between the
stakeholders.	mainly depends on the state budget. Low income	state and
8.National Park, Protection	from forestry business.	community and
Forest Management Board	- Signed forest protection contract with police and	giving back forest
are actively cooperate	army (district)	land from forest
with NGOs to implement	- The forestry companies have no authority or	owners to
the project /study on	opportunity to access the ODA fund for forestry.	households;
REDD +, climate change.		

1.1.5 Forest Protection and Development Fund – FPDF

Support/Incentive for	Constraint/opposition for REDD	Influences to REDD+
REDD		,
 Forest Protection 	1) Administrative costs for operating funds	8) Can apply the
and Development	(provincial level) is very high.	PFES payment system /
Fund is operating at	2) Transparent and information system is not	regulations for REDD+
both central and	strong enough (people do not know how the fund	9) Number of forest
local level	functioning, information is fuzzy)	protection - contracted
• There is internal	3) There is no complaint/ grievance system; no	households accounts
monitoring system	independent and effective monitoring system, and	for low percentage.
for payment	payment may be garbled and/or constituted by the	Poor households or
(province, forest	team leader or the forest owner /company.	household without
owners, local	Payment is not based on the results	labor force can be
people)	5) Disputes of entitlements and income	excluded from REDD+
 Propose REDD+ 	management between the forest owner and fund	leading to poverty
Fund to be under	manager.	reduction targets can
PDF	6) PES fee payment could not be collected from	not be achieved;
 Support REDD+ 	hydropower because the Decree No.99 did not defin	ne 10) Postpones in
implementation	a clear roadmap.	payment, intermittent
 Many stakeholders 	7) Allocation-payment contracts have been	contracts can lead to
participate in Fund	violated by forest owner (for example: the contracte	ed deforestation;
Steering	households do not know the forest position in the	11) The risk of
Committee	field, they only patrol on demanded route)	corruption leading to

	deforestation while
	money is still be spent

1.1.6 Department of Finance + Department of Planning and Investment (DPI)

Support/Incentive	Constrain/opposition for REDD	Influence to REDD+
for REDD		,
- DPI is the focal	- Main problem is data inconsistency among	- DPI can provide an
management body	departments/agencies in the planning; lack of	opportunity to integrate
using ODA and other	standards (because the statistics standard is different	REDD+ in the socio-
financial aid (current	among different sectors)	economic development
project) such as	DPI is the focal body in advising and leasing license for	plan of the province
REDD +;	private enterprises to invest in development projects	- Investors may lobby
	which can affect forests such as hydropower, minerals,	these Provincial
- Department of	rubber, coffee and others;	Department, leading to
Finance (and DPI),	- DPI often ranked capacity of private enterprise	changes in forest
members of the	higher than it is, seldom evaluate impact of private	protection and
Provincial Forest	enterprise to the community, resources and this	development planning,
Protection and	resulted in massive private enterprise hire local	breaking commitments
Management Board,	forests, occupy land of people; and do not fulfill their	for REDD +;
are experienced in	committed obligation;	- To advise for balancing
managing trust	- Asynchronous Planning overlapped Forest protection	between development
forestry payment	and development plan.	and conservation,
fund;		reducing opportunity
	- Responsibility of provincial level in managing revenue	cost, focusing on
- Support and	and expenditure from REDD+ source is not well-	protecting environmental
allocate investment	defined. If there is revenue from REDD+, planning and	services;
funds, reciprocal,	approval of local budgets for forest protection and	
payments to	development will be seriously affected by lobby	
promote land	(leading to reduction of revenue from the state	
allocation to	budget).	
households in Lam	- It is difficult to mobilize social resources, private	
Dong	investment in forest protection due to low-profit;	
	financial management in forest protection and	
	development is not transparency, lacking of	
	information including the Forest Protection and	
	Development Fund	

1.1.7 Police/ Environment Police, Army, Market management department

Support/Incentive for REDD	Constrain/opposition for REDD	Influence to REDD+
- Regulation in coordination	- There is the fact that the state	- Help in control of the legality of
among ranger-police-army-	forest owners sign forest protection	forest products, limit DD, handle
militia in forest protection and	contacts with police and military (at	recruiters, transportation
forest protection associated	district level) and this is reasonable	intermediaries, smuggling,
with social security.	for controlling the remote border	- To detect, prevent and handle
	areas.	disputes, encroachment of

- Provincial interdisciplinary	- Lack of funds, facilities, human	forest land among households,
working group carry out forest	power for interdisciplinary	businesses and forest owners,
protection and development	collaboration in forest law	- Compete benefits from REDD+
plan, control illegal logging	enforcement and DD prevent.	with the community by joining
and deforestation;	- Do not control the legal origin of	forest protection as
	forest products (FLEGT) effectively	beneficiaries; local people and
- Support forest law	- Low trust of people to the police in	commune authority do not
enforcement, handle dispute	handling cases related to forest land	support this kind of benefit
and conflict on land, forests.	dispute (unfair, non-transparent)	sharing

1.1.8 Press/ public communications

Support/Incentive for REDD	Constraint/opposition for REDD	Influence to REDD+
- Provide information and communication	- Local press promotes /	- National Press can make
on REDD+ to the government, community,	encourages / advocates political	issues related to local
people including ethnic minorities (via TV,	tasks, local development	forest more, benefit
radio in ethnic language)	policies, especially economic	sharing transparency,
- Investigate and bring the acts violating	investment for hydropower,	and people's perspective
forest law (DD) – (see reference in Labour	rubber, coffee, etc. which may	to be heard by public
Newspaper on 12/17/2012)	cause DD;	- Help to raise awareness
- Create the channel for local people to give	- Support the competitiveness of	on REDD+, project
feedback, complaints related to land and	forest land resources with the	information, FPIC
forest to government	community;	- Impact on provincial,
-There are officials in charge of culture and	- Less reflect the thoughts,	national REDD+ policy
information at communal level	aspirations and concerns of the	- REDD+ is a new issue
- Mass Organizations such as VFF, youth	people related to forest,	for the media, therefore
union, women union, farmer association	especially the poor or	it can be misunderstood
also participate in advocacy, communication	community affected by	or used incorrectly,
and mobilization	development program (because	incompletely, hence it
- Available channels / tools / means of	private enterprises rent forest)	cannot protect the
communication (newspapers, television,	- The quality of information is	people's interests;
radio, internet, visual tool, etc.)	not good enough.	

1.1.9 Steering Committee and Interdisciplinary board

Support/Incentive for REDD	Constrain/opposition for REDD	Influence to REDD+
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- Province is experienced in	- PSC's chairman does not	- Policies on REDD+ attract
establishing Steering	participate or not fully engage into	participation of many stakeholders;
Committee, interdisciplinary	activities, hence, decision making	- Quality of REDD+ management
institutions related to	ability is weak, or the decision is not	depends on the capacity and
forestry such as CT661, UN-	feasible.	commitment of the Steering
REDD, Steering Committee	- Accountability of PSC's members is	Committee;
on Forest Protection and	not clear due to weak	- REDD + can be integrated into
Development Planning 2020;	decentralization, assignment	socio-economic development
- Support for multi-	distribution, shortage of action	strategies, policies and plans,
stakeholders' participation in	plans, regulations and specific	contributing to the poverty
steering, operating, inter-	resources;	reduction goals of the locality;
sectoral coordinating in	- Civil society and private sector is	- REDD+ is a voluntarily mechanism
REDD+ implementation.	not allowed to participate in the	which is being piloted and
- Have the opportunity to	PSC;	developed, therefore, it may reduce
influence on local REDD+	- Members of the Steering	commitment of the province in
policy;	Committee just try to protect their	pursuing the locality model affecting
	department's interests, lacking close	other plans of the locality.
	cooperation for the common	
	purpose on REDD +;	

1.1.10 Interdisciplinary anti-illegal logging (DPC, Police, Forest Ranger, Forest owners)

Support/Incentive for REDD	Constrain/opposition for REDD	Influence to REDD+
Periodically organized with	Formalistic	Low effectiveness in
the participation of many	The illegal loggers know the schedule and avoid	preventing illegal
stakeholders as planned	Waste money and time-consuming	exploitation of forest
	Ineffective law enforcement	resources.

2. Informal institutions

2.1 The private sector (enterprises in hydropower, rubber, coffee, flower, vegetable, mining, tourism, agro-forestry, fisheries, etc.)

Support/Incentive	Constraint/opposition for REDD	Influences to REDD+
for REDD		
- Through PES,	- Not interested in REDD+ due to pursuing short-term	- They are the
private sector	income (rent forest in 50 years); they hire outside human	cause/driver/factors of DD
contributes	resource to protect forest with high cost;	- They are barriers in
finance to forest	- Conflict of land, forest between private enterprises and the	REDD+ implementation
protection in the	community is increasing; enterprises take advantage to	because of restricting local
basin (DD target);	promote the conversion of natural forests to other purposes	people/community to
- Can participate	and seek to legalize forest productions (take out timber,	access to forest land.
in REDD+ as a	plant, rubber, coffee, vegetables, flowers, etc.)	- Conflict between
forest owner	- Enterprises have to invest big initial costs, therefore they	enterprises and local
(directly /	need to make revenue quickly; opportunity cost of land use	community – the fact that
secondary);	conversion from forest to REDD+ is high.	people feel unfair in forest
	- Can lobby decisions or policies related to land/ forest	land use and benef

- Support the	planning of the province;	sharing would cause risks
implementation of	- Do not comply with its commitment to the community and	for forests, REDD+ such as
REDD+ regarding	local government when hiring forest; abuse/drive local	leakage, emissions
poverty alleviation	policies on forest land; make changes/ adjustments on initial	increase, benefit
for the	planning	competition, actions
community;	- Hanging project, collect, accumulate, convert/transfer	against forest protection
	land/ forest use rights; they do not get red book because	policies
	they do not want to pay for land use fee (they just want to	- The opportunity cost is
	exploit timber); state does not have expenses for forest	high, trade / short-term
	inventory before revoking the forest	investment/ neo
	- Weak monitoring and enforcing enterprises which	friendship/ power
	ineffectively/not complying with commitment of land use	corruptioin /policy
	(land will be recovered after 2 years of ineffective use of	dominance.
	land)	
	- Information / report is not true;	

2.2 Da Lat University/ Faculty of Environment

Support/Incentive for REDD	Constraint/opposition	Influences to REDD+
	for REDD	
- Provide skillful manpower and technical consulting	- Not highly	- Contributions,
services on the environment, climate change,	appreciated the	cooperation with the
socialization, environment, agriculture, forestry, biology,	participation of Lam	focal point for
culture-ethnic, law school, etc. for Lam Dong;	Dong Radio and	implementation of REDD
- Works closely with the Department of Agriculture,	Television in REDD +	+
Department of Natural Resources and Environment,	Steering Committee of	- Provide skillful human
Department of Science and Technology of REDD +	the province	resources, including
activities as FPIC / UN-REDD, training / LEAF / SNV,	- No decision making	teachers and students;
training local / RECOFTC; participate in the Council of	power / direct	- Introduction
Science on strategy for environmental protection,	involvement in land	understanding of the
environmental impact assessment, land use planning in	use planning in the	REDD + in accordance
the province;	province;	with the Vietnamese
- Recognizing the planning of land use are important	- Join FPIC as experts,	context of land
issues for the implementation of REDD + but in LD this	consultants, noting the	ownership; consider
process is dominated by interest groups (business) vs	response of the people,	carbon ownership
pressure to protect forest resources; and DD in Lam	not competent to	independent from land
Dong is " deliberate process" "fuzzy points for money ";	answer the questions,	ownership;
FPIC must be performed by a third-party to reduce land	building consent or	
conflicts; opportunity cost for short term;	intervene when people	
- They promote the participation of many stakeholders	do not support REDD +;	
to ensure transparency, fairness	- Just consider REDD +	
- Join (sub) Technical Advisory Committee for the	as an opportunity	
provincial REDD +	(uncertainty)	
 Involved in REDD + propaganda and FPIC pilot; 		
- Trusts that local people will participate in REDD + if		
they benefit from it (Red Book for forests, forest		
protection fee)		

2.3 Forest Consulting company and Centre for Land Resource Development

Support/Incentive for REDD	Constraint/opposition for REDD	Influences to
		REDD+
- According to officers of FLITCH project the Forest	- Consultants often enchant Private	- Consultation
Consultation Company is able to set up	sector and so underestimate EIA of	should use
coordination and facilitate both the Department of	the impact of development projects	community
Agriculture and Department of Natural Resources	on the environment, forests,	participatory
and Environment for stakeholder consultations,	biodiversity, livelihoods and society;	approach for
dialogue, allocation, assessment, active	- Consulting on forest land use	planning as
- It can help to assess the impact of the social	planning can narrow forest by reason	FLITCH did;
environment, raise awareness of stakeholders on	of planning hydropower, mining,	- Supports to
REDD+;	encroach many forests and forest	connect
- Centre for Land Resource Development can help	land; hasty interdisciplinary impact	stakeholders
local people and private sector to negotiate with	and overlap with other plans;	together
each other on land compensation and price		

2.4 Illegal logger /middleman/ transportation/ timber processing

Support/Incentive	Constraint/opposition for REDD	Influences to REDD+
for REDD		
	- illegal deforestation	- DD drivers hinder local people from
	- The law enforcement agencies are not	getting contact on forest protection
	capable to control, they avoiding because	because they are afraid of illegal
	loggers are aggressive, dangerous, ready to	loggers;
	attack the officer;	Causing leaks, emissions growth, harm
	- "Coalition Under table" middlemen-ranger-	the interests of PES / REDD+ forest
	police-government-business to take advantage	owners and local people;
	of deforestation or change / distort forest	- Pressure on authority to promote
	management policies;	better law enforcement

2.5 Local People/community

Strength/Incentive for REDD	Weaknesses/Constraints for REDD	Potential influence to REDD+
They consider REDD+ as a	- Have no forest land/forest	- REDD + cannot be successful if
financial opportunity; Forest	- Lack of productive land; illegal	local people do not participate
Ranger Department is the focal	encroachment on forest lands of the	with the role of forest owners
agency responsible for advising	state forest; livelihood still dependent	and enjoy fair and adequate
all forestry-related activities in	on forests;	benefit share from forest
the area, including forest	- Not familiar with the mechanism of	management and protection;
protection and development, is	the forest coo-management with state	- Shift local people from position
the professional representative	forest owners;	of employee (contract) to
body for both FPD and the	- No information, knowledge, and	master (red / green book) of the
Department of Forestry as well.	capacity to enter into the new	forest;
They are conducting PES with	mechanism of REDD +, forest	- To address poverty and forest-
supervisory activities. Being the	management, etc.	based livelihoods to forest
REDD+ pilot province, many	- Poor knowledge of law and policy;	products markets;
leaders and district officials have	affected by the recruiter; always faced	- Community, consensus v.s. DD
been trained and attended	with attempt to accumulate land,	and need a new approach

workshop on REDD+, hence, they	forced to lease land from individuals	matched to local circumstance
have REDD+ basic understanding.	and businesses;	- Adequate information for full
Interdisciplinary coordination	- Loss of trust in the government	and effective participation and
activities among ranger-police-	officials, the complain has not been	self-determination for
army-forest owners are	replied/ resolved, do not know where	development;
organized annually to scan	to address and unfair handle violations	- Who do FPIC? State or
deforestation, forest land and	of forest law / Land r; doubt in the	intermediaries? FPIC cannot be
adjacent areas encroachment;	legitimacy of the state; too submissive	applied in Lam Dong because
District Radio and Television Post	to endure; unaware of human right and	people are not real forest
cast in ethnic minority languages	have not the opportunity / not daring	user/owner
and district mobile information	to speak out, they are disadvantaged.	
team can help raise awareness of	- The Mass organizations and unions is	
people to the village;	not a cushion to protect the rights of	
	people and the implementation of their	
	rights;	
	- Doubts about the implementation	
	PFES	
	- Community is not recognized s legal	
	entity;	

3. Stakeholder Analysis at District level

DPC – District People's Committee
FPD – District Forest Protection Department
Department of Natural Resources and Environment
Department of Agriculture and Rural Development
District Police + Army
Forest Protection and Development Fund Supervisory Board (interdisciplinary, including the Vietnam
Fatherland Front and mass organization)
Business / forest product processing facilities

4. Formal state institutions

Strength/Incentive for REDD	Weaknesses/Constraints for REDD	Potential
		influence to
		REDD+
- Support REDD +, it is	- Unclear boundary between forest and agricultural land in	
considered as opportunity to	Land use planning makes local people confused and to	
get more finance	encroach to forest area	
- Ongoing PES; engaged in	- Weak division of task and responsibilities in forest	
supervision on the PES	management:	
- District Forest Protection	- The district does not have the right to decide on large-	
Department is the main	scale land lease to private sector and has no right to	
agency responsible for	manage this big project.	
advising all forestry-related	- However it is administratively responsible for protecting	
activities in the district	the forest area located in the area of district administrative	

including forest protection	- Decision making on the land lease to private sector	
and forest development,	focused in PPC. The other bodies give advice and	
professional representative	verification (Department of Natural Resources and	
body for both PFPD and	Environment and the Department of Agriculture and Rural	
Provincial Department of	Development staff; DPI, the Department of Finance and	
Forestry;	evaluation)	
- Many leaders and district	4. The procedure of the land lease to private sectors is not	
staff (Di Linh) have been	comply with forest planning process by Grassroots	
trained and participated in	Democracy Ordinance (people suspected in collusion	
numbers of workshop on	between the provincial government and private forest	
REDD + and have a basic	owners)	
understanding on REDD+	5.Inefficient forest law enforcement,	
- Coordinated activity	failed to prevent:	
managed by interdisciplinary	- Illegal logging. Reason: corruption, the recruiter cannot be	
forest-police-army- forest	handle, illegal logging ban is aggressive using knife, hammer	
owners is organized annually	to fight with forest rangers, hire buy cheap labor from local	
to monitor deforestation,	people for cutting timber.	
encroachment of forest land;	- Local people cutting forest for coffee production. Reason:	
- District Radio and Television	they are depend on forests, small number of household are	
broadcast in ethnic minority	hired for forest protection by every 12-month contract;	
languages and the district	They think the allocation forest land is not equal/fair, they	
propaganda team by	have envied other forest owners; They think they have not	
delivering background	been reasonably rewarded.	
information on REDD helped	- People do not cooperate with forest rangers in forest law	
to raise awareness to the	enforcement	
community;	- The ranger staff, interdisciplinary team supervises and	
	monitors implementation of forestry laws but effectiveness	
	of their work is low	
	- Monitoring mechanisms for anti-corruption in the forestry	
	sector is not effective.	

5. Informal institution

Strength/Incentive	Weaknesses/Constraints for REDD	Potential influence to
for REDD		REDD+
	-The private sectors influence strongly both policy formulation and	
	policy implementation process.	
	-The process of leasing forest land to private companies does not	
	comply with Grassroots Democracy Ordinance which makes the	
	local people and commune authorities negatively suspect the	
	collusion between the state agencies and private firms.	
	-The illegal logging cruel gang controlled by illegal logging	
	ringleader attack against the Forest Ranger aggressively by small	
	arms like stick, sharp knife, hammer to protect illegal timber	
	-The powerful illegal logging ringleader operates at the hidden	
	level which is difficult to reveal.	

- A "legal but illegal" call that is powerful to release the illegal	
timber arrested by the forest ranger influences negatively the	
effectiveness of rules of laws.	

6. Stakeholder Analysis at Commune level

Commune People's Committee

Commune Forestry Committee: Vice Chairman of the CPC (Chairman), Commune forest official; commune forest officers, forest rangers, Mass organization, forest owners

Commune police , commune Militia

Village leaders

Local forest ranger / forest protection station

Support/Incentive for REDD	Constraint/opposition for REDD	Influences to REDD+
- CPC is the administrative	-CPC manage personnel's while companies	-The local people are
management agency,	manage forest and forestland and companies	hired by the gang to
- CPC is responsible for the forest	are under province's control.	cut tree illegally with
located within the commune	-The commune as the outsider do not know	low-paid and burn
administrative area	anything about logging in forest that belongs	forest at night for
- CPC has right on sanctions for breach	to Bao Thuan forest owner, do not get any	timber.
of forest law and regulation.	information about the activities of the forest	-The local people
- Is the administrative body has	company in the commune area, do not know	who lack of land
responsibility for forestry company -	anything about the logging in the forest	destroys forest at
Don Duong. It also responsible for fire	-CPC cannot control the illegal logging in	night for coffee land.
control, mobilizes local people for fire-	commune area.	According to the
protective.	-CPC does not know how PFES paying. CPC just	local authorities and
- Commune know very well its	confirms contracts between households and	village leaders, this is
population/household in the	state forest owners. The forest owners	because the local
commune; current land use and land	transfer the PES money to households, the	people's livelihoods
allocation; bare land needed	group leader makes a list of people who	depend on forests.
afforestation, forest protection,	receive allotment and submit it to the state	More important is
agricultural production	forest owner without submission to CPC.	that they think that
- CPC has great responsibility for	-CPC take no role /power in the process of	the access to forest
deforestation in the commune	leasing forestland to private companies.	use rights is unfair,
- CPC directly involves in at least 04	Companies just works with the province	their envy with state
activities: 1) Confirm the allotment	authority, commune authority and village	forest owners. They
contract for households to protect the	leaders do not know anything about this	think they have not
forest after village leader confirms; 2)	process	been rewarded
Coordinate with ranger to implement	-Commune does not benefit anything from	equally to what they
the annual forest fire prevention	companies. Companies contribute nothing to	have done as the
activities along with other forest	commune in terms of finance as well as labor	forest protector
owners; organize the forest fire	(Da Chay). If yes, the amount is very little in	while they are seeing
prevention propaganda at locality;	informal way (Di Linh).	by their own eyes the
every three months, participate in	-Currently, the commune authority does not	timber harvested by
meeting on forest protection and	have power to manage the forest in the	the state forest
development at district level; 3)	private company land, does not get involved in	owners. Now, a small

Organize monthly meetings to capture	the process of transferring land between	number of
the current status of forest protection	companies.	households who can
and development in the commune	-Commune authority's voice is weak and not	get some benefit
area; collaborate with forest owners to	respected. In Gung Re and Da Chay, since	from forest through
against the encroachment of forest	2009, CPC has submitted to the District and	the short-term 12
land to grow coffee ; 4) Commune	the province to invest in reclamation,	months contract to
Forestry Board monitors forest	conversion from poor forest land to	protect forest as a
protection groups in village areas;	agricultural land (mainly for coffee plantation),	hired labor for the
- Commune mass organization	but so far this proposal has not yet resolved	state entities.
motivate people to perform a task -	-Commune officials know nothing about the	
especially women union	prospects as well as plans to implement	
- There is commune officer who is in	REDD+ in the area.	
charge of culture and communication	-Commune leaders in communes where many	
at commune level	REDD activities have been conducted do not	
- Some are familiar with REDD+, for	express any expectations or objectives when	
example in Di Linh district, a number	mentioning about REDD+. They think that the	
of CPC staffs participated in training	most important thing is to allocate the forest	
courses and workshops on REDD+	land for farmers.	
organized by Provincial UN-REDD	-There are solution by the local authority	
Programmed.	which do not comply regulations, they illegally	
- They support REDD+ because	allows people to sawn pine to make houses	
considering REDD+ as a manner to	-For the sake of the people: The commune	
make people protect forest better	authority underhandedly allows people to cut	
-They believe that the forest will be	pine; they though that the local people clears	
managed better if local people can be	the forests for coffee growth is not worthy to	
forest owners.	be sanctioned because 0.5 ha of coffee land is	
	not enough to feed 10 people in one	
	household, ; it should give priority to allocate	
	forest land to poor households.	

Annex 4: List of interviewee

PGA Consultation Workshops Lam Dong province from 18 – 23 December 2012

1. Lam Dong Province

Venue: Lam Dong Province Department of Agricultural and Rural Development Time: 18th December, 2012

No	Full name	Address/Position	Gender
1	Tran Thanh Binh	Director of Provincial FPD, DARD Lam Dong	Male
2	Hoang Cong Hoai Nam	Head of office, Nature Conservation Office, Provincial FPD	Female
3	Pham Trung Thong	Officer	Male
4	Nguyen Dinh Truong	Don Duong Forestry Company	Male
5	Tran Quoc Viet	Dai Ninh Hydropower Company	Male
6	Nguyen Van Bang	Department of Forestry	Male
7	Dang Phi Hanh	Deputy director of Forestry Development Project Management	Male
8	Cao Duc Anh Trung	Dran Protection Forest Management Board	Male
9	Nguyen Truc Bong Son	Director of Centre of agricultural extension station	Male
10	Vo Thuan	Vice Chef, Board of Ethnicities	Male
11	Duy Danh	Lam Dong newspaper	Male
12	Bui Tran Thao Ly	Provincial Farmers Association	Female
13	Vo Minh Tham	Deputy director of forest protection and development fund	Male
14	Tran Thi Thuy Duong	Department of natural resources and environment	Female
15	Dinh Thi Tieu Phuong	Chairman of the Board - Da Teh rubber joint stock company	Female
16	Pham Hung	Deputy chief of Office of Department of Agriculture and Rural Development	Male
17	Nguyen Thi Phuong Hoa	Department of Agriculture and Rural development	Female
18	Nguyen Thi Hoa	Department of Agriculture and Rural development	Female
19	Le Trong Thuong	Department of Planning and Investment	Male
20	Cao Le Dac	Department of Agriculture and Rural development	Male
21	Nguyen Thi Thu Thuy	Department of Agriculture and Rural development	Female
22	Luong Thanh Son	Department of Agriculture and Rural development	Male
23	Pham Nhu Ngoc	Specialist	Female
24	Lam Ngoc Tuan	Dean of Environment Department, Da Lat University	Male
25	Le Van Huong	Director of Bidoup Nui Ba National Park	Male

2. Di Linh disctrict

Venue: People Committee of Di Linh district, Lam Dong province Time: 20th, December, 2012

No	Full name	Address/Position	Gender
1	Le Viet Phu	Vice Chairman of Di Linh District Committees	Male
2	Dao Duy Tram	District Fatherland Front	Male
3	Ha Van Tuynh	Tam Hiep forestry company	Male
4	Nguyen Thi Ngoc Ha	Department of Finance and planning	Female
5	Dinh Thi Thu Thuy	Di Linh District Women's Union	Female
6	Nguyen Tan Dich	Bao Thuan forestry company	Male
7	Pham Minh Chien	Juridical department	Male
8	Hang Dong K'Chien	Head of district ethnic minority committee	Male
9	Ndong Bnum	Television station	Male
10	Nguyen Thi Tinh	Officer	Female
11	Nguyen Sy Hong Thuyen	Officer	Male
12	Tran Van Nam	Vice chairman of famer's Union	Male
13	Dinh Di Truyen	District department of Cultural and sport	Male
14	Tran The Vinh	Chief of district police department	Male
15	Vu Dinh Vinh	Deputy forestry technical management and conservation of forestry company	Male
16	Nguyen The Tien	Agriculture deputy	Male
17	Nguyen Van Thoi	Deputy Director of District FPD	Male
18	Vu Hong Long	People's council office and People's Committees	Male
19	Nguyen Phuong Uyen	Deputy head of resource and environment department	Female
20	Le Ngoc Minh	Hoa Bac Hoa Nam Forest management Board	Male
21	Nguyen Van Thanh	Tan Thuong Forest management department	Male
22	Nguyen Huu Hung	Inspector of District People's Committees	Male
23	Nguyen Tien Gam	Chief of the Secretariat	Male
24	Nguyen Canh	Chairman of People's council	Male
25	Pham Thi Huong	Office of People's council office and People's Committees	Female

3. Lac Duong district

Venue: People Committee of Lac Duong district, Lam Dong province Time: 21th, December, 2012

No	Full name	Address/Position	Gender
1	Nguyen Duy Hai	Chairman of Lac Duong District Committees	Male
2	Su Thanh Hoai	Chief of staff	Male
3	Than Trong Toan	Head of ethnic deputy	Male
4	Trinh Dinh Thuy	Deputy Head of Agriculture and Rural Development Department	Male
5	Tran Truong San	Deputy Head	Male
6	Vu Thi Hanh	District Propaganda Committee	Female
7	Dinh Ngoc Ly	Department of Natural Resources and Environment	Male
8	Vu The Hoa	District Inspector	Male
9	Nguyen Huy Mai	Radio and television	Male
10	Duong Duc Sam	Radio and television	Male
11	Nguyen Thu Binh	People's council office and People's Committees	Female
12	Ho Quynh Dung	Deputy Director of Da Nhim Protection Forest Management Board	Female
13	Nguyen Xuan Quang	Deputy Head of Economic Infrastructure	Male
14	Ha Van Linh	Officer	Male
15	Ro Ong Sara	Radio and television	Male
16	Trinh Van Tien	Forest protection unit	Male
17	Mai ThiHiep	People's council office and People's Committees	Female
18	Le ThiKhuyen	Staff of Lac Duong people committee	Female
19	Nguyen HuuHoa	Deputy Office	Male
20	Le Duc Long	Deputy of Department Juridical	Male

4. Da Sar Commune

Venue: Da Sar commune, Lac Duong district, Lam Dong province Time: 22th December, 2012

No	Full name	Address/Position	Gender
1	Ya Tiong	Chairman of Da Sar People's Committee	Male
2	Lieng Trang Roky	Commune Officer	Male
3	Kra Jan Ha tem	Vice chairman of Commune Fatherland Front	Male
4	Kon So Ha Sep	Chairman of Famer Associations	Male
5	Klong Ha Jack	Leader of village 6	Male
6	Lơ Mu Ha Bock	Leader of village 5	Male
7	Lieng Trang Habe	Leader of village 1	Male
8	Ko Sa Jmi	Deputy secretary of Commune Youth	Male
9	Trinh Thi Phuong	Commune officer	Female
10	Kon So Ha Thi	Vice chairman of Commune people's Committee	Female
11	Lieng Trang Di Gan	Commune Youth leader	Male
12	Lieng Trang K'Đom	Chairwoman of women associations	Female
13	Kra Jan Ha Vien	Leader of village 4	Male
14	C.L Ha Mac	Vice chairman of Famer associations	Male

5. Da Chay commune

Venue: Da Chay commune Lac Duong district, Lam Dong province Time: 22th December, 2012

No	Full Name	Address/Position	Gender
1	Vu Huu Tien	Commune Communist Party Secretary	Male
2	Bon To Ha Dieng	Chairman of Da Chay people's committee	Male
3	Ko Sa Ha Binh	Chairman of Commune fatherland front	Male
4	K'Dong Thu	Chairwoman of women associations	Female
5	Cil Ha Sa	vice Forestry Committee, the military commander	Female
6	Lieng Fang Ha Thuyen	Staff for Land issue	Male
7	Bon To Sa Nga	Leader of Dung K'si village	Female
8	Doan Thanh Cong	Commune officer	Male
9	CilK'Dop	Leader of Long Lanh village	Male
10	Ko Sa ha Thuong	Leader of Tupoh village	Female
11	Vu Trong Tan	Chairman of Veteran Association	Male
12	Ko Sa ha Lach	Chairman of famer associations	Male
13	Bon Yo Bay	Farmer of Dung K'si village	Male
14	K'Dieng	Farmer of Tupoh village	Male
15	Ka Thu	Farmer of Long Lanh village	Male
16	K'Dop	Farmer of Dung K'si village	Male

6. Bao Thuan commune

Venue: Bao Thuan commune, Di Linh district, Lam Dong province Time: 23th December, 2012

No	Full name	Address/Position	Gender
1	K'BrổiH	Chairman of Bao Thuan People's Committee	Male
2	Nguyễn Văn Lưu	Leader of Bao Thuan village	Male
3	K'Broi	Bao Thuan Commune detachment	Male
4	K'Broh	Vice chairman of committee	Male
5	K'Brep	Leader of Bo Sut village	Male
6	K'Brom	Leader of Ko Net village	Male
7	K' Brop	Leader of Knot sok village	Male
8	K'Brop	Chairman of veteran committee	Male
9	K'Bres	Chairman of Veteran Kala tokrieng village	Male
10	K' B ren	Chairman of Veteran Kala tongu village	Male
11	K' B reu	Chairman of Veteran of Hang Ung village	Male
12	K' B ril	Vice chairman of Commune People's committee	Male
13	Ka Nhoih	Deputy secretary crops of commune	Male
14	K' Nhuan	Commune staff	Male
15	K' B riil	Bao Thuan Commune detachment	Male
16	Ka' Brai	Commune officer	Male
17	K' B roi	Leader of Krot Dong village	Female
18	K' Ban	Bao Thuan Commune detachment	Male
19	K' B ren	Chairman of Famer Associations	Male
20	К' Воі	Forestry department of commune	Male
21	K' Breoh	Leader of Ta ly village	Male
22	Dinh Viet Hung	Police of commune	Male
23	KaDok	Chairwoman of women association	Female
24	K' Brol	Vice chairman of Commune People's Committee	Male
25	K' Broih	Commune Police	Male
26	K' Huu	Commune Police	Male
27	K' B reo	Commune Police	Male
28	Hoang Quoc Cuong	Secretary of Commune People's Committee	Male

7. Gung Re commune

Venue: Gung Re commune, Di Linh district, Lam Dong province Time: 23th December, 2012

No	Full Name	Address/Position	Gender
1	Nguyen Xuan Huong	Leader of KLT2 Village	Male
2	Moul Brim	Leader of Do Linh Thuong 1 village	Male
3	Bui Van Bay	Leader of Eangva village	Male
4	K'Brol	Leader of Hoang Lang Gung re	Male
5	Mo OckBrai	Leader Di Linh Thuong 2 village	Male
6	Tran Minh Luong	Leader Dang Rach village	Male
7	K'Gol	Leader KaMiong village	Male
8	К'Кео	Commune People's Committee	Male
9	Nguyen Xuan Tu	Chairman of the Elderly Association	Male
10	Ka Lem	Youth	Male
11	Nguyen Hong Son	Chairman of Veteran Association	Male

Annex 5: List of participants

PGA Provincial Validation Workshop

Venue: Meeting room 2, Department of Agriculture and Rural Development Lam Dong Date: March 6, 2013

#	Name	Position	Organization
1.	Mr. Trần Thanh Bình	Director	Provincial FPD, DARD Lam Dong
2.	Mr. Nguyễn Khang Thiên	Vice Director	Provincial FPD, DARD Lam Dong
3.	Mr. PhạmThànhCông	Vice Director	DONRE Lam Dong
4.	Mr. Võ Thuận	Vice Chef	Board of Ethnicities
5.	Mr. Võ Minh Thâm	Vice Director	Lam Dong Forest Protection and Development Funds
6.	Mr. Lê Văn Hương	Director	Bi Doup – Núi Bà National Park
7.	Mr. Lê Trọng Thường		DPI Lam Dong
8.	Mr. Lâm Ngọc Tuấn	Dean	Environment Department, Đà Lạt University
9.	Ms. Hoàng Công Hoài Nam		Provincial FPD, DARD Lam Dong
10.	Ms. Hồ Thị Bích Linh		Provincial Farmers Union
11.	Ms. Đàm Diệu Thuần		ProvincialWomen Union
12.	Mr. PhạmTriều	Vice Chairman	Lac Duong District People'sCommittee
13.	Mr. Thân Trọng Toàn	Head	Ethnicities office, Lạc Dương district
14.	Mr. K'Boi		Bao Thuan Commune'sForestry Board, Di Linh district
15.	Chairman	Chairman	Gung Ré Communue People's Committee, Di Linh district
16.	Mo Lom Sứ		Gung Ré Commune's Forestry Board, Di Linh district
17.	K'Brợt		Gung Ré Commune's Farmer Union, Di Linh district

18.	Ms. Trần Thị Lệ		Gung Ré Commune's Women Union, Di Linh district
19.	Ms. Liêng Trang K'Đom	Chairman	Đạ Sar Commune's Women Union, Lạc Dương district
20.	Representative		Đạ Sar Commune's Farmers Union, Lạc Dương district
21.	Bôn Tô Ha Diêng	Chairman	Đạ Cháy Commune People's Committee, Lạc Dương district
22.	Ms. K'DongThu	Chairman	Đạ Cháy Commune's Women Union, Lạc Dương district
23.	Mr. Trần Quốc Việt		Đại Ninh Hydro Electric Company
24.	Mr. Cao Đức AnhTrung		Ðran Protection Forest Management Board
25.	Mr. Hồ Huỳnh Dũng	Vice Director	Đa Nhim Protection Forest Management Board
26.	Mr. Cao Hải Thanh		Toward Transparency
27.	Tina Hageberg	Programme Officer	Oslo Governane Center, UNDP – UN REDD
28.	AkikoInoguchi	Forestry Officer	FAO Viet Nam
29.	ToreLanghelle	Programme Officer	UNDP Viet Nam
30.	BjoernSurborg	Consultant	UNDP Regional
31.	Hoang Vu Lan Phuong	PGA Coordinator	UNDP Viet Nam
32.	Mdm. Luong Thi Truong	Director	CSDM (PGA's research team member)
33.	Mdm. Vu Thi Hien	Director	CERDA (PGA's research team member)
34.	Mr. Nguyen Viet Dung	Director	PanNature (PGA's research team member)