

UN REDD Programme Evaluation

Response to comments received on the draft report of 12 May 2014

1. Management Group comments

MG Comments	ET Responses
Introduction and general observations	
<p>The Management Group (MG) of the UN REDD Programme welcomes the opportunity to provide feedback on the draft report of the first external evaluation of the Programme (received on 12th May 2014). The report contains many significant insights and observations concerning the Programme and will be an important milestone in the development of the efforts to reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD+) as supported by the three UN agencies that have combined forces through the UN REDD Programme. A full management response will be prepared when the final report of the evaluation is ready. At this stage, the MG has focused on preparing specific comments and proposed corrections (section B, below) and on providing some feedback on the conclusions (section C) and the recommendations (section D).</p>	<p>Noted</p>
<p>By way of introduction, some general observations are in order. In particular, in accordance with the terms of reference for the evaluation, it is noted that the Programme's relevance, effectiveness, likelihood of impact, sustainability and efficiency as well as several cross cutting issues have been assessed. However, there often appears to be confusion between an assessment of the REDD+ agenda and process as it has evolved at global level (notably through the UNFCCC since 2007), and an assessment of the results and likelihood of impact of the Programme as it has been implemented since 2008. Undoubtedly these processes are linked, but there is a need to distinguish clearly between the two to avoid misconceptions and misunderstandings. Despite the report often reading as a sustained critique of the REDD+ process as a whole, it is worth noting that the overall rating of the relevance of the Programme is satisfactory.</p>	<p>The critique of this paragraph is unclear – please explain the assertion regarding the “confusion between REDD+ agenda, UNFCCC process and programme results”....What is the Programme trying to achieve that is different from the UNFCCC process? As the MG notes, these processes are closely linked and the evaluation team thinks we have clearly focused our evaluation on UN-REDD programme activities rather than on the global process</p> <p>The evaluation team sees no contradiction between challenges that REDD+ faces and the Programme's relevance.</p>
<p>In the evaluation there are references to the difficulties arising with respect to REDD+ as a “moving target.” The UNFCCC negotiations on REDD+ have indeed formed a background against which the REDD+ process has advanced through the Programme activities defined in the 2011-15 strategy. However, there is a sense in which the evaluation has not captured and reflected upon the innovative nature of REDD+ and has not given credit for the efforts that are being made to introduce new approaches to the complex problems of reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation. REDD+ is “work in progress”, to which the large body of research literature cited in the evaluation report testifies. The recent approval of the “Warsaw Framework” (at COP 19 of the UNFCCC) is the culmination of the process so far, defining a flexible set of rules for countries intent on the development of</p>	<p>Noted and reflected in Context section and revisions to F17</p>

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REDD+.	
<p>The generally positive assessment of the results and the delivery with respect to the stated objectives of the Programme is to be welcomed. Despite limitations, the evaluation has noted that progress is being made in “moving towards outcomes”, particularly in the countries that have been studied in greater detail. This could perhaps have been expanded to an overall assessment of the trajectory towards readiness, although this might be complex given the “variable duration” of the national programmes.</p>	<p>Point well taken. This was the intent and indeed requirement of points raised with respect to paragraph 18 below. Please see explanation and caveats highlighted below.</p>
<p>The evaluation has identified a number of organizational and management deficiencies. Perhaps it is not surprising that an innovative agenda such as REDD+, taken up by three agencies aiming to work together and “deliver as one”, has encountered obstacles and difficulties. Changing the ways of “doing business” in large organisations is a complicated enterprise. It is important to stress that only a little over 5 years have elapsed since the UN REDD Programme agreements were signed. Needless to say, constructive proposals that are made in the evaluation concerning organizational and management improvements that could be made, will be taken very seriously in the follow up.</p>	<p>Noted</p>
<p>Finally it is necessary to point out that further editing is required. Some phrases are difficult to understand, e.g. the first paragraph of the conclusions (§248), in which the second sentence is too long and unclear! There is also some repetition of a few key arguments. With good editing the report could probably be much shorter.</p>	<p>Corrected / noted</p>
<p><u>B. Specific comments, proposed corrections and some questions</u></p>	
<p><u>Section 1.</u></p>	
<p>§1 In the opening paragraph of the evaluation it would be appropriate to set the tone in terms of lessons learned and “forward looking” assessment, as well as noting the “accountability requirements.”</p>	<p>Amended.</p>
<p>§4 The text is inconsistent with the table of contents as there are 9 sections in the report. Furthermore, the reconstructed theory of change (ToC) is not appended as promised on page 1. Is figure 5.1 what the evaluation team refers to as the reconstructed “ToC”, or is there more (in a missing appendix)?</p>	<p>Yes – it was moved at last minute in response to an EMG request. The table has been updated and reference numbers amended.</p>
<p>§7 refers to 47 partner countries and 17 NPs, §47 refers to 51, etc. Since the evaluation deals with the period to the end 2013, the figure of 51 would be correct. Furthermore, “long term national programme support” might better be referred to as comprehensive REDD+ readiness support, in line with the Programme strategy (2011-15).</p>	<p>Amended. Reference to number of countries has been removed since it was repetitive of other sections in the report and not necessary.</p>
<p>§18 A mission by the evaluation team to Colombia is mentioned, but there are no Colombian informants on the list (appendix II)</p>	<p>Indeed, no specific mission to Colombia was undertaken; it was planned and requested by the UN REDD secretariat,</p>

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<p>and the report doesn't appear to use any information from Colombia; e.g. in section 6.2.2, which assesses readiness comparing eight countries, but not Colombia. It is also important to mention that neither the UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre (WCMS) nor the UNEP Finance Initiative (FI) was consulted during the evaluation, resulting in a somewhat narrow perspective on what UNEP contributes to the Programme. The lack of interaction with senior personnel at the World Bank's FCPF is also a weakness. The country visits were not intended to assess the national programmes (NPs), in order not to duplicate existing or planned evaluations. Rather the intent was to look into how the UN-REDD Programme as a whole has supported countries and for the evaluation team to get a sense of what happens at a country level. This is how the missions were communicated to the countries, but the outcome seems to have been an assessment of NP performance.</p>	<p>but the Colombian government could not host the mission on the planned dates. However, during visits to the regional team (Panama, Paraguay), the progress in Colombia was discussed and this was validated by phone with one informant from Colombia (included in list of informants)</p> <p>With regards to UNEP WCMC and FI, the team spoke to every representative identified by UNEP team. WCMC provided specific support at country level and their products and services were evaluated during country evaluations. FI was mentioned as a potential source of information by the UNEP Economics and Trade Branch - representatives, interviewed in Geneva. However, after these very productive interviews, the evaluation team decided no further follow-up was required, considering time constraints. All UNREDD related UNEP staff, identified by the Secretariat, received the call for the online survey.</p> <p>Lack of interaction with senior Bank officials is recognized and attributable to a number of reasons: refusal to participate; timing constraints; short notice of field mission; and lack of time to follow-up thereafter.</p> <p>The concerns raised in the MG comments have been highlighted in the limitations of the report – see paragraphs 24 and 25. For future reference, it is the responsibility of evaluated entity to provide a full list of the people and organisations to be consulted.</p> <p>The team did not assess individual NP performance, in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, lessons learned etc. The report on NP performance is limited to the achievement of planned outputs, which are key for understanding general UNREDD performance, as requested as such by ToR. After the preliminary report and in reference to a requirement of the ToR (paragraph 31), Norway specifically requested the team to make specific judgments on the current status of readiness in the supported countries.</p>
<p>§ 20 Typo – spelt: Papua New Guinea.</p>	<p>Corrected</p>
<p><u>Section 3.</u></p>	
<p>§23 & §24 do not summarise limitations of the evaluation, but are comments on the assignment. In other words, is the complexity of the Programme to be considered as a limitation of the evaluation? There is a mistake in the second limitation in that the collaboration with the FCPF has been elevated to the same level as the partnership between three UN agencies that “deliver as</p>	<p>Noted by EMG as well and has been amended by incorporating text in a general introduction to Limitations. The text has likewise been modified to suit the intended purpose. Paragraphs 22 to 25 have been revised, including the order in which they appear.</p>

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one.”	
<p>§25 The evaluation team notes that it was not possible “to obtain detailed budgetary information at the global level...” This gives the impression that information was withheld, which is not the case. The SNA work-plans and budgets were given to the ET. The problem appears to be that the evaluation team was seeking a work-plan for the whole Programme at activity level and this is not available due to the nature of the Programme. In addition, the Programme does not include (apart from Paraguay) pilot projects or sites. The whole approach is predicated on national level support, so there are almost no “project sites” as such.</p>	<p>The fact remains that requested annual workplans and budgets for each of the three UN partner agencies were never received – and regardless of how the Programme is delivered, each agency has to necessarily draft and structure its annual work according to available resources and intended results. Moreover, based on the interviews with MG members themselves, this information is not shared within the MG. The text in paragraph 24 and 25 has been nuanced to remove the “impression that information was withheld.”</p> <p>To the best of our knowledge, several NPs include support to pilot projects or initiatives.. E.g. output 3.2 of the NP of Cambodia reads " Implementation of pilot project activities", which liaise directly to pilot projects. Visits to these “sites” were not possible in most cases (save Cambodia and Zambia).</p>
<p>§27 For NPs, annual reports assess progress towards outcomes, which are intended to be reached at the end of the NP life and evaluated at outcome level by final evaluations. The same applies to the SNA, inputs can only be collected at output levels at this stage, as they collectively contribute towards the achievement of outcomes.</p>	<p>Noted. However, linkages to outcomes are not always clear. The text has been amended to better explain argument.</p>
<p>§28 The Programme strategy (2011-15) does include specification of indicators, which have been used in compiling Programme reports. It is not correct to state that there are none. Reducing emissions is not an indicator for the Programme – but for REDD+ as a global process.</p>	<p>Noted. The original intent of this paragraph was to underscore the difficulty in measuring progress towards REDD+ readiness. The text has been amended to recognize the points raised and give greater specificity to the associated challenge.</p>
<p>Section 4</p>	
<p>§35 The evaluation team needs to be consistent in the language used throughout the report regarding REDD+. In this paragraph alone it is referred to as a “mechanism” and an “instrument.” It is also stated that REDD+ was “formally endorsed as a mechanism of the UNFCCC...” This is incorrect. REDD has not been negotiated under the UNFCCC to be a “mechanism”, let alone one that has to be formally endorsed. Furthermore, the evaluation team refers here – and in other sections – to “jurisdictional boundaries” which in the world of REDD+ is associated with specific methodologies and could be misleading readers to think this approach is adopted by the Programme. Alternative wording could be found.</p>	<p>The Programme should help clarify this point to nearly every scholar who has ever written about REDD+, including Programme staff and stakeholders at all levels. E.g. the UN-REDD website responds on the FAQ "What is REDD" with "REDD is a mechanism to..." UN-REDD Programme documents alternatively refer to REDD+ as an instrument (e.g., Framework document) and a mechanism (Strategy 2011-15). For the sake of clarity, the term mechanism (and/or process where applicable) is used throughout the report, recognizing that it is a mechanism under negotiation. The term instrument has been replaced.</p> <p>Sentence regarding UNFCCC amended to read: “adopted as an agenda item of the UNFCCC process.”</p> <p>With regards to “jurisdictional boundaries,” the sentence is sufficiently clear and allusion to “specific</p>

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	methodologies” is unwarranted in this case. The term does not appear anywhere else in the report. The words jurisdiction and jurisdictional appear in several other instances but the intended meaning is likewise clear and unambiguous.
<p>§37 It would be worth highlighting that the Warsaw Framework (2013) finalises the “rulebook” for REDD+. The set of COP19 decisions, together with relevant decisions from earlier COPs, now set out the process by which countries can have their results-based actions recognized and seek to obtain results-based payments. This is the equivalent of a so-called “mechanism”, which in this sense is now complete. It would be best to refer to REDD+ as a “process.”</p>	Text amended to reflect insight.
<p>§38 The meaning and implications of REDD+ do not continue to evolve – at least as established by the UNFCCC, as noted above. The term “REDD+” was determined under the UNFCCC, so it should be the determining factor in whether meanings and implications are evolving.</p>	This is a strict reading of the acronym, which we concede to. However, the point we (and many others) are making is about the continuous evolution of how this concept is operationalized and how it is interpreted by stakeholders at the country level. Ongoing discussions on the scope, ingredients and approach of REDD+ in eight subsequent CoPs of UNFCCC, are as such a clear indication of the evolving interpretation (and therefore, the meaning) of REDD+. Words, concepts and ideas acquire their meaning through human interpretation. REDD+ is no different. The word “operational” has been added.
<p>§39 It is called Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative: NICFI (not ICFI).</p>	Noted and amended.
<p>§40 It is not correct to say there is “as yet no final mechanism that can operate at scale.” This is precisely what the Green Climate Fund (GCF) has been created for. The financing may not yet be there, but the mechanism is. Referring to the three phases of REDD+ it would have been useful to provide some insights as to how linear these are and the kind of feedback loops that make REDD+ an iterative process. Furthermore, it is not correct to refer to Costa Rica as having “the first fully operational REDD+ mechanism.” With a submission to the FCPF Carbon Fund it is clear that Costa Rica has made significant progress towards results based payments, but does not yet have an operational REDD+ strategy.</p>	<p>Green climate issue corrected.</p> <p>Linearity & iterative nature of phased approach added in existing sentence.</p> <p>Costa Rica issue amended.</p>
<p>§43 It is not correct to state that agriculture is “altogether absent from the UNFCCC processes” (footnote 31). The LULUCF agenda has been part of the convention since the outset. The latest IPCC report refers to emissions from AFOLU (agriculture, forestry and land use), etc. Furthermore, the implications are that: i) REDD+ only focuses on poor forest management and illegal logging; and, ii) the expanding agricultural domain is beyond the scope of REDD+. Both are incorrect. The UNFCCC REDD+ process does not impose any limits on the type of “drivers” that can be addressed, nor the geographic scope of the actions. On the contrary, COP</p>	<p>Contentious issues (LUC & “no nearer” claim) have been nuanced or amended. The intent of the agricultural remark was not to suggest that REDD focuses only on forests. Rather, the point is that addressing such challenges will require an expansion of the current REDD+ audience and that internally – i.e., within UN agency families – the potential role of REDD is not fully recognized.</p> <p>With regards to the “no nearer” claim, it is both amply substantiated in the literature and not “far-reaching,” as</p>

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<p>decisions specifically highlight the importance of addressing the drivers of deforestation and degradation (see for example 15/CP.19, “the Warsaw Framework”). The evaluation team also makes the far-reaching claim that REDD+ is ‘no nearer’ than similar previous efforts to bring an end to deforestation. This claim is the underlying assumption of the evaluation, but it is not well substantiated. In fact, there is more evidence to the contrary, based on Heads of State attention and key private sector developments on tropical deforestation over the past 5 years: that we have never been closer to solving deforestation. The opportunities were never greater and neither were the stakes. It would be useful to analyse the trends towards tackling deforestation and degradation in different groups of countries (thereby informing the types of activities to be supported through the Programme).</p>	<p>the MG contends. We strongly agree that the opportunities are greater and the stakes have never been more critical but to claim that REDD+ addresses all of the challenges of past efforts misses the point that it creates both new challenges (complexity of form and function) and no nearer to resolving past challenges (e.g., tenure). To be clear, the evaluation team is not bent on ensuring that REDD fails – contrary to tone of the MG’s arguments. We are obliged to “tell it like it is” and point out as best we can the hurdles that lie ahead – whether this be based on the literature or what people say. One thing history and recent history in particular teaches us is that there are no silver bullet solutions to sustainability. REDD+ might be our best shot to date, but it is far from perfect and does not overcome all past challenges. Acknowledging this only puts UN-REDD one step ahead of the game. And last but not least: there might be high level interest in halting deforestation and an enabling environment is being created (through contributions of, among others UN REDD) but deforestation rates keep increasing, even in countries with a strong commitment such as Indonesia, DRC or Ecuador.</p> <p>The last point on trends is a good insight and we strongly recommend that such an initiative be pursued. There are more than three decades of substantive research on sustainable resource governance from which to start.</p>
<p>Exhibit 4.1 The evaluation team makes a laudable effort at identifying REDD+ challenges. It would have been useful to identify the extent to which the Programme is supporting countries in addressing these challenges.</p>	<p>Point well taken. However, the point of this section is to lay out the context. The extent to which the Programme is addressing these is discussed in the findings of the report.</p>
<p>Section 5</p>	
<p>§46 Replace “sustained” by “comprehensive.”</p>	<p>Amended.</p>
<p>§47 PNG and Paraguay were also “quick start” countries targeted through the Programme in 2009 (a total of nine countries were selected at this stage). The number of partner countries in the UN REDD Programme reached 51 in early 2014 (when the evaluation was completed).</p>	<p>Amended.</p>
<p>§48 The work on safeguards - a signature achievement of the Programme – must be added under the areas led by UNEP.</p>	<p>Amended.</p>
<p>§49 The Head of Secretariat is not a member of the Policy Board.</p>	<p>Amended.</p>
<p>Exhibit 5.1. Correct typo in the intermediate outcome to read: “efficiently.” In addition, the ToC misses the fact that the Programme helps countries identify, assess drivers and REDD+ actions, ultimately with the aim of supporting them to address these.</p>	<p>Efficiently is already correctly spelled</p> <p>Drivers – this, according to the 2011-15 Programme & SNA-GP is an output of the capacity to develop strategies/ green economy transformation and direct component of national REDD+ strategies. Paragraph 55 amended to incorporate issue.</p>

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<p>Exhibit 5.2 (UN-REDD Results Framework). There are few references to CBR+ in the text but Exhibit 5.2. is the older of the results framework versions that doesn't have output 4.6 for CBR+. Since CBR+ is mentioned a few times in the text, it should also be shown in the results framework for consistency. There could be a footnote to explain that it's a new body of work.</p>	<p>Noted. Since the exact wording for output 4.6 is not in the revised 2013-14 SNA-GP framework and the Workspace search engine yields nothing, the following output was written: Community-Based REDD+ (CBR+) is initiated to strengthen community capacity and engagement in REDD+.</p>
<p>§59 The Programme does not "posit" that key inputs will be leveraged to "deliver results based emission reductions." This is beyond the level of ambition in the 2011-15 strategy. Maybe this is also the reason why the evaluation team seems to be disappointed with the outcomes so far, as they appear to have understood that the UN REDD Programme is already operating in the "third phase" of the REDD+ process.</p>	<p>Sentence has been nuanced. The point made is however a misread of the full sentence. The second point is MGs conclusion, not shared by the evaluation team.</p>
<p><u>Section 6.1</u></p>	
<p>§66 The example used for the "... investments in climate change mitigation programmes" (being) at an all-time low is "investments under the CDM literally grinding to a halt since Warsaw." But the CDM is not a valid example here to show that climate change mitigation investment is declining. There's no recognition in this paragraph that there has been growing interest in scaled-up mitigation programmes like REDD+, NAMAs, etc., thereby moving away from standalone project-based emission reductions. The evaluation team groups these efforts into the same category, which is a misrepresentation. Furthermore, in this paragraph it is surprising that the REDD+ voluntary database is not used by the evaluation team for data about finance (footnote 69 refers to various other sources). Having invested in the REDD+ Partnership and in the database (as a joint effort of many partners) it is odd that this source of information appears to have been ignored by the evaluation team.</p>	<p>This is a misread of the paragraph. As stated in the report, the CDM example stems from the IFF report. It was used to emphasize the global downturn in carbon financing. REDD+ voluntary database was not consulted because it was not known nor highlighted during interviews. However, our subsequent review indicates that it does not provide evidence of the growing interest alluded to here. We look to the MG to provide us with evidence that can help make a case for the increasing REDD+ financing support in the current context.</p>
<p>§68 The evaluation team seems to consider REDD+ and addressing deforestation strictly as a market triggered process and a monetized reward; the team fails to acknowledge the "+" in REDD+ and the domestic agendas in many countries, such as Indonesia and Zambia which go beyond the strictly monetary dividend.</p>	<p>This is beside the point raised in paragraph 68. However, REDD+ is in principle designed as a market based mechanism. The observation that the evaluation team considers this "strictly" as such, and a "monetized reward", is MG's interpretation which is not shared by the evaluation team.</p>
<p>§69 Again the evaluation team states that agriculture is "altogether absent from the UNFCCC and REDD+ efforts in general." It is true that there has been insufficient focus on agriculture, but as e.g. Kissinger et al (2012) pointed out in their study of "drivers" based on reading the whole set of R-PPs available in the public domain, the pressures arising from land use conversion ("agricultural frontiers") and so on have been partially documented and understood for a long time. The CGIAR and partners initiated an "agriculture and rural development day" at COP15 (2009).</p>	<p>Sentence has been nuanced.</p>
<p>§71 This section ends with an interesting question but fails to</p>	<p>Question is answered in Options 2 (and partially 3) of</p>

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<p>provide answers to it! What is the value added of the Programme according to the ET? Overall it is important to acknowledge that REDD+ is seen as a process moving towards financial incentives but not the sole trigger of behavioral and policy changes.</p>	<p>Recommendation 1, which the MG has refuted. As one of the two multilateral initiatives that has largely defined the overall REDD+ agenda through its normative work, what other organisations are better placed to lead such a global coalition for change? We strongly agree with the last point raised.</p>
<p>§73 The first sentence and the footnote are unclear. Is it a critique, does it imply that the programme is off target or not well communicated? Furthermore, doesn't the rest of the paragraph contradict the argument that countries engage in REDD+ solely for the financial dividend?</p>	<p>Sentence clarified and footnote removed, since it did not add significantly to the argument. The second question presents an argument that the evaluation does not make.</p>
<p>§74 What are the "side arrangements" referred to? Has the evaluation team seen minutes of the validation meetings and processes that constitute a pre-requisite for the submission of NPs for fund allocation requests?</p>	<p>Further clarification of the expression "side arrangements" is provided, in alignment with the cited reference.</p>
<p>§75 With respect to the last sentence it is important to underline that the UN-REDD Programme is a joint Programme, and the agencies have a role in supporting the development of NPs, and providing quality control. Determining priorities for the NPs and fitting those within available budgets is a joint exercise, especially in the beginning when countries first embark on an NP or Targeted Support. Furthermore, in many countries there is quite a bit of "input and debate", which partly explains slow progress.</p>	<p>Point noted and sentence amended to integrate remark.</p>
<p>§76 While the point regarding "weak political ownership in DRC" is fair, it would have been useful to put it in the context of how much the political ownership has improved compared to the initial baseline of when the UN-REDD support started. Also the role the UN-REDD support has played in efforts to strengthen political ownership vis-à-vis other readiness initiatives supporting DRC.</p>	<p>The point is not being made by the evaluation team, but by local stakeholders and referenced citation.</p>
<p>§78 In the case of Cambodia, this is not correct – almost all of the members attend all of the meetings. In addition a REDD+ task force has been created which is a step in the right direction. In Ecuador the REDD+ roundtable was not designed for the government but for IPs and CSOs. There is another platform for government agencies.</p>	<p>Cambodia reference removed and replaced by DRC. The Ecuador REDD roundtable is launched as an official platform between private and public key stakeholders in REDD, for dialogue, involvement, participation, deliberation, consultation and monitoring of the REDD+ mechanism (sic) in Ecuador. In that sense, it is not designed only for IP and CSO and participation from public agencies from different sectors would be expected.</p>
<p>§79 Typo in the last sentence, replace "designed" with "design." Furthermore, the evaluation team concludes that there is no explicit evidence of planned efforts to overcome such barriers. Have timing and sequencing been taken into consideration by the evaluation team?</p>	<p>Corrections made and nuance added. While the evaluation team does not agree with the MG's timing and sequencing suggestion, a more substantive discussion of the reasons why political and cross sectoral support has been weaker until now is provided in a new paragraph 79a.</p>
<p>§80 The evaluation team seems to imply that the Programme engages with service providers and firms involved in the provision</p>	<p>First point is reiterated in footnote Last point added to paragraph 81.</p>

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of carbon offsets through voluntary markets, which it does not. The private sector also includes banking, micro-credit, etc.	Intro to paragraph has been revised. – and numerous other revisions made in this subsection
§81 There is something missing in the box next to this paragraph – editing required!	Sorry – we usually do not temper with quotes! Edits have been made using [...] to add or replace words
§83 The need to work with the private sector is rightly emphasized and the “recent steps” acknowledged, but again a footnote (99) suggests that nothing has been done in this respect in REDD+ and the UNFCCC so far, which is probably incorrect.	Nuance introduced to footnote.
§87 The evaluation team notes that “participation in <i>public decision-making and policy revision</i> processes remains limited ... decisions are solely taken by the government. Similar situations have also been noted or reported for other partner countries, including Cambodia...” It is not possible to say this yet. The country has been assisted in setting up a system to allow active participation in decision making. While ultimately decisions will actually be made by the government-only TF, arguing that this is sub-optimal is a facile – it is the role of government to make policy decisions! Furthermore, a brief outline of the “Panama story” would help any reader not familiar with this.	Cambodia has been removed. The evaluation team does not argue that government decision-making is sub-optimal. However, there are mechanisms such as voting, consensus d-m, and various decision-rules (i.e., constitutional choice rules) that can be used to bolster CSO/IPO involvement in public decision-making arenas. The Panama "story" has been extensively documented in the Panama MTE and several press releases. References added in footnote.
§87 Regarding the comment concerning DRC, it is recognized that the evaluation is reporting the view of CSO representatives. Did the evaluation team discuss this issue with the NP staff in order to gain a full perspective and present an informed position? Please note that 3 key individuals who used to work in the DRC Programme now work in the UNDP REDD+ global team and could easily have been accessed by the evaluation team to discuss the issue.	The answer is yes. A reference to paragraph 185 where the perception of staff is discussed is provided.
§88 It is an over-simplification to say that non-IP communities are always less identifiable and less organised than IP communities – in some countries, e.g., in the LAC region, non-IP communities include organised/identifiable groups such as campesinos who, even when strong national level structures are absent, are organised through local level structures. These groups are currently being identified and included by the UN-REDD Programme, but it should be recognised that the lack of existing national-level representative structures makes this task complicated. In the case of Ecuador it should be noted that there are no regional or national non-IP community structures, and this is why the non-IP seat is occupied by a local group – the way the sentence is currently worded makes it sound like Ecuador has somewhat irrationally decided to go with a local group and bypassed the regional/national organisations. The Report needs to acknowledge that the UN-REDD Programme is trying to build national structures for non-IP communities in countries that don't have this – and this takes time.	The first part of this critique is a misread of the text, not supported by the evaluation team's observations. The subsequent points raised (e.g., lack of representative regional / national structures) only reinforces the team's argument that non-IPs are “comparatively less organized.” The Ecuador issue is the MG's interpretation. The sentence has nevertheless been nuanced to remove any ambiguity. As per the last two sentences of the paragraph, the report acknowledges what UN-REDD staff explained regarding the rationale for lower non-IP engagement to date.
§88 The evaluation team states that: “In Cambodia, the	Cambodia issue amended.

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<p>Programme is making efforts to engage non-IP communities in community-protected areas and through the existing Community Fisheries Network". "Community Forestry" should be added.</p> <p>It's not clear if the following sentence relates to Cambodia or to the UN-REDD Programme in general, but it doesn't apply to Cambodia. The evaluation team appears not to acknowledge the responsibility of CSO and IPs to organize themselves and ensure legitimacy among their own constituencies. Those involved in the Programme are navigating this complex reality as best possible.</p>	<p>Clarification is given to the last sentence, which relates to UN-REDD as a whole.</p>
<p>§89 It is not really correct to argue that the Programme has "failed to address" the issues of land rights, carbon rights, tenure reform and benefit sharing, implying that nothing has been done. But this is, as the evaluation team points out, often a contentious subject, and there is no doubt that more needs to be done. Concerning the risk of "re-centralising" forest rights, there is a lot of evidence in the Programme to the contrary: the work on stakeholder engagement and FPIC has familiarized indigenous and local communities with their rights, which enables them to better assert and defend them. As such, it is important to distinguish between a possible risk from REDD+, and the actual impacts of the Programme. The evaluation team extrapolates from the Kalimantan experience to the rest of the world, ignoring the fact that there are different perspectives on FPIC and the whole AUSAID experience there.</p>	<p>Sentence on "failed to address" has been nuanced</p> <p>Regarding the issue of "re-centralising" – the evidence provided in the footnote cannot be dismissed – and it applies across the world. However, the evaluation team acknowledges UN-REDD efforts and added the points raised in the comments to the paragraph.</p> <p>Kalimantan was used to make a point (see above). An additional footnote was added, referencing the section on Challenges to REDD+ as well as another recent study by CIFOR (e.g., Sunderlin et al., 2014).</p>
<p>§90 Consider replacing the word "introduction" with "inception" or "creation."</p>	<p>Amended.</p>
<p>§91 The evaluation team refers to the UN broadly as a recognized delivery partner (DP) of the FCPF, when actually only UNDP (and IDB) are included in the pilot of Multiple Delivery Partners. Cambodia can be added to the list of countries (in brackets).</p>	<p>Amended.</p>
<p>§92 Although technically the World Bank is part of the UN System, it only is an observer to the UNDG and not a UN institution per se. While the need for coordination and harmonization is well recognized, the evaluation team fails to acknowledge the leadership role of countries and governments themselves in this regard.</p>	<p>"UN system" replaced by "multilateral system" to avoid any discussion.</p> <p>Additional sentence added to support last point made.</p>
<p>§93 Have there been no efforts to jointly address stakeholder participation in countries where REDD+ and FLEGT coincide? There were sessions on this at the FCPF and UN REDD Programme meetings in Berlin in 2011 and in Ghana there has been much debate on this issue. Perhaps not enough has been done, but the evaluation team says "no reported efforts." This is incorrect. There has also been discussion on illegal logging and FLEGT in Vietnam. The East African proposal for work on illegal logging is also a good example and the Cote d'Ivoire submission discussed at PB11 (December</p>	<p>Point noted and paragraph has been amended with these and other examples.</p>

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2013) has this at the core.	
<p>§93 It can be questioned whether quoting one interviewee is correct evidence-based evaluation procedure. This appears to be a very anecdotal methodology. There have been a number of joint efforts between FLEGT and REDD+, for example in DRC, when dealing with forest governance issue (joint workshop and analytical work with the Independent Observer...). Also, in Cote d'Ivoire the NP has been designed to include a joint platform for CSO son REDD+ and FLEGT (the NP has joined the already existing FLEGT platform). Rather than simply quoting one interviewee, there could have been an opportunity to fully explore the issue and gather more evidence.</p>	<p>Concern has already been addressed above. FLEGT was used as an example of the main issue – which is the need to build on past experiences (e.g., sustainable forestry, conservation, ICDPs, etc).</p> <p>Single quotes are never considered sufficient evidence to draw general conclusions. However, they can be very useful to illustrate a finding which is based on other evidence and sound reasoning.</p>
<p>§94 The UN agencies do a lot of “engaging” in many countries, through the NPs. The evaluation team also states that enhanced coordination is needed: who should be ultimately responsible for this coordination? The country? What should be the role of the UN-REDD Programme? Maybe it is to invite the other initiatives for joint coordination? It is not clear whether this is a problem of the Programme or of the REDD+ context and whether the Programme can use this finding to seek leadership on coordination at country level or to work on a revised NP governance structure that would necessarily deal with the multiple REDD+ initiatives at country level.</p>	<p>The paragraph observes that some coordination is occurring and more could be done. In line with the proposition that countries ultimately need to lead REDD+ implementation, the paragraph ends with the suggestion that national focal points or coordinators should lead such structures. There is no allusion to this being a problem of the Programme. However, through its convening authority, UN-REDD can play a key role in supporting national leaders to achieve such ends.</p>
<p>§95 Consistent with the arguments put forward in F4, a strong case is made for greater collaboration which needs to be highlighted in the development of the new strategy and leadership at national level is exactly what is required to advance the REDD+ agenda. Confusion has arisen where readiness activities are undertaken that are not consistent with the UNFCCC guidelines.</p>	<p>Agree.</p>
<p>§96 Finding F5 (as well as several others) relates more to REDD+ than to the UN REDD Programme.</p>	<p>The finding clearly targets the UN REDD programme (programme strategy). The development of this finding explains that the REDD+ concept is evolving, and therefore country demands and expectations are evolving, and therefore the original programme strategy is not sufficient. Being part of the relevance section, this is considered a valid finding.</p>
<p>§100 “If the end goal remains tied to the development of a future market mechanism...” Again this seems like a misinterpretation of the current status of the international REDD+ agenda, which has moved away from this concept and agreed that REDD+ financing will come from both market and non-market sources and will not be tied to a single, global market mechanism.</p>	<p>Sentence has been amended using MG wording and reference to F1 added. The point remains the same however.</p>
<p>§102 The last sentence in this paragraph can be refuted. Through ICA, PGA, analyses of drivers, cost benefit analyses, CAST, PRL assessments the Programme is doing exactly that.</p>	<p>The last sentence holds relative to the 2011-15 strategy which is the central point of this finding. The point raised by the MG is well taken however and the sentence has been revised to highlight the adaptive nature of the</p>

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	Programme and its responsiveness to changing circumstances.
§103 Assumes that the process of “graduation” is linear when it is increasingly recognised that it is not.	Clarity of causal relationships imply that linkages and feedback loops are clear – not that the system is linear.
§104 There is a reference to a ToC in appendix I, but appendix I is the list of references used by the ET. Linking REDD+ and funds “from market sources” (only) is misleading, as this is not the sole intention of the Programme.	ToC reference amended as per reason explained above. Reference to market sources amended.
§105 The statement that in DRC, Ecuador, Indonesia and Vietnam “there is a refusal to even to begin to discuss tenure reform or the enforcement of past decentralization efforts” can be refuted/contested. These issues are on the policy agenda in both Indonesia and Vietnam and the FCPF Carbon Fund has specifically included a land tenure study in the preparatory work to be done in DRC in advancing towards an emissions reduction purchase agreement (ERPA).	Statement amended.
Section 6.2.	
<p>Exhibit 6.1 Observations under Outcome 7 “the three UN agencies and the secretariat...” give the impression that the evaluation team considers the secretariat to be separate from the UN agencies. See also paragraph 144, 231, 235, 237, 238 and 239. It needs to be clarified in the evaluation report that the secretariat is not a separate entity. It is an inter-agency secretariat established by the partner agencies as a means of facilitating inter-agency coordination. It was specifically designed to be a place where staff of the 3 agencies could sit together to encourage and promote inter-agency dialogue. It was specifically not designed along the GEF secretariat model of being separate from the partner agencies.</p> <p>It should also be noted that no other MPTF in the MPTF-Office portfolio has established an inter-agency secretariat (at least not at the time the UN-REDD Programme was established). It is not a requirement of pass-through joint programmes. It would have been useful if the evaluation could have compared the experience of having an inter-agency secretariat to other joint programmes, in terms of enhancing inter-agency coordination (the MDG Achievement Spanish Fund is perhaps the most comparably joint programme in the MPTF-Office portfolio, and it did not establish an inter-agency coordination unit).</p>	<p>Agree and the cited paragraphs and outcome are likewise worded appropriately.</p> <p>Though an interesting suggestion, comparing the UN-REDD organizational structure to other UN joint programmes is beyond the scope of this evaluation.</p>
Exhibit 6.1 indicates a “strong focus on carbon accounting to the detriment of other forest values.” This criticism doesn’t recognize that the work on the other forest values is captured under multiple benefits work in outcome 5. Furthermore, it is noted that “In some countries (e.g., Cambodia), a self-selection process is also underway.” However, this was already complete even when the evaluation team visited and long before the date of the report.	<p>Value criticism amended to include reference to outcome 5.</p> <p>Self-selection issue deleted as it adds nothing to the argument.</p>

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<p>Under outcome 2 (“REDD+ primarily dealt with through environment/forestry sector”), it is worth asking where does the responsibility of the Programme stop and that of the countries start? Under outcome 5, Nigeria does not have a national REDD+ strategy, so how has it placed multiple benefits at the center of it? Ecuador statement: how is that last sentence relevant to the Programme, what lesson and conclusions can be drawn about the Programme’s approach to safeguards?</p>	<p>Programme efforts to address this and reference to the need for PB guidance on how to strengthen existing contributions added.</p> <p>The word “strategies” (not strategy) substituted for “REDD+ efforts”</p> <p>Ecuador statement is further detailed</p>
<p>Exhibits 6.2 & 6.3. could be completed with the ratings as well as the colour code for all boxes, including Paraguay and Ecuador (and in the latter a translation from Spanish is needed).</p>	<p>Ratings for Paraguay and Ecuador included, Ecuador translated from Spanish</p>
<p>Exhibit 6.2 mentions a Panama “external review assessment.” At other places in the report this is referred to as an evaluation (of the national programme) and as a mid-term evaluation. The correct description of this must be applied consistently, especially as the lessons and outcomes of the “Panama story” are important for the UN REDD Programme.</p>	<p>“External review assessment” is consistent with headings used in 6.2 and 6.3.</p> <p>Reference to mid-term evaluation made consistent throughout.</p>
<p>Exhibit 6.2 Did the evaluation team consider using the Regional Assessment results for assessment of readiness in A/P countries instead of making a rather weak link between UN-REDD Outputs and readiness?</p>	<p>Could the MG further clarify the comment and reference? Readiness assessments were drawn directly from NP documentation, information collected during the country visits and existing NP evaluations.</p>
<p>Exhibit 6.3. indicates that the information about Indonesia is based on the evaluators assessment. But this is incorrect. The heading should be “external review” (or evaluation), as the evaluation team did not go to Indonesia. Furthermore, the programme board in Cambodia decided to drop Output 2.4 because of lack of funds, so the “highly unsatisfactory” rating is unwarranted.</p>	<p>Amended.</p> <p>Output 2.4 shaded grey with mention of its being dropped.</p>
<p>§114 The evaluation team fails to recognize that the DRC is in a precarious state, let alone the management arrangements and coordinating bodies. Last sentence: is it realistic to expect that the system would be fully operational?</p>	<p>The evaluation team fully recognizes the multiple challenges faced by the DRC. See points below as well.</p> <p>Last sentence – it seems that the timeframe and target were overly ambitious.</p>
<p>§114 While the evaluation raises some important points regarding the status of the process in DRC, it does not appear to fully appreciate the context. The situation in DRC is particularly complex. Many of the individuals with detailed knowledge of the Programme’s work in DRC are part of the UNDP REDD+ Global Team. We would have been more than happy to discuss DRC with the evaluation team, if asked.</p> <p>In particular, we would have liked the opportunity to provide context on footnote 122. As it stands, we are not aware who was relieved from duty for misconduct.</p> <p>It is not correct to say that the drivers of deforestation were identified without the government and CSO. The process was led by CN-REDD/Government, lots of consultations involved gov. representatives, including in the field, and 2 of the 5 work streams were sub-contracted to CSOs that led to the final consensus.</p>	<p>With regards to DRC’s context, the evaluation team is well aware of DRC’s challenging past and the many social, political and economic challenges it faces. However, many of the challenges it faces on REDD are not dissimilar from what other places have faced and/or stand to face as their NPs come to a close.</p> <p>With regards to misconduct issue, this was discussed by three UNDP senior staff, two CSO reps, three CN-REDD staff (present and past), the previous focal point, and two local partners. The footnote is slanted in favour of UNDP’s version of events. See further comments on this in 167a.</p> <p>The issue of drivers was raised by two CSO representatives</p>

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	and the previous REDD+ focal point, who oversaw the process at the time. The contentious reference has been removed, based on MG comments.
§116-§120 While it is good to highlight the re-positioning of forests in national and global policy arenas, it is unfortunate that the evaluation team considers this an “unintended result” of the Programme. F9 illustrates that the UN REDD Programme strategy has been on the right track.	F9 was placed here because of its indirect relationship to the Programme strategy. It illustrates that the Programme is making a difference. To distinguish between this and the subsequent finding on the complex agenda, the title “Unplanned Results” is used for the former and “unintended effects” is used for the latter.
§118 The finding F10 relates more to REDD+ than to the UN REDD Programme.	The finding clearly relates to the Programme. The argumentation of the finding explains how complex the REDD+ is, but focuses on what the Programme aims to achieve and its sense of direction
<u>Section 6.3.</u>	
§124 It would be good to comment on the predictability of funds and the implications of having to programme on an annual basis rather than with a few years foresight.	Important observation – it is added to paragraph.
§126 The evaluation team seems not to recognize adaptive management and results based approaches.	The point of this observation is unclear.
§132 The statement on MRV contradicts previous one on DRC where the evaluation team states that “it was not fully operational” cf § 114. Also the meaning and intention of the last sentence in that paragraph is unclear.	The evaluation team does not consider this as contradictory. The fact that the system is not yet fully operational does not take anything away from the joint / collaborative process used to develop it. Last sentence – “stakeholder” replaced with “collaborative”
§135 Typo: “it does mean” (not “it does means”).	Corrected
§137 The evaluation team notes that a “strict division of mandates in UN-REDD either limits or inhibits involvement of the relevant departments.” The evaluation team singles out gender, yet the governance work is supported by staff on UNDP. This is not accurate, but maybe more a management type response to contest that point with examples of collaboration across programmes.	Sentence relating to the “division of mandates” has been nuanced to emphasize the fact that the valuation of internal expertise is not always optimal. With regards to gender, the sentence was deleted as it had no apparent relation to the paragraph or point being made.
§138 It is not correct to state that REDD+ funding has led to the development of UNDP EEG and UNDP-GEF as parallel structures. These parallel structures existed long before REDD+ existed as an idea and the development of these structures is due to many factors (see previous evaluations of EEG). On the contrary, UNDP’s REDD+ team is generally recognized as having done more to bridge the EEG/UNDP-GEF gap over the past 6 years than any other initiative.	138 has been revised to emphasize ongoing improvements and breakdown of early barriers
§141 There are positive examples of inter-agency coordination in a number of countries as mentioned. But the evaluation team “only observed inter-agency conflicts” in the countries visited in Latin America. This is due to “differing socio-cultural contexts.” What does this mean? The last sentence in this paragraph is also	Vietnam sentence – agree with comment. It has been deleted. The quotation "only observed inter-agency conflicts" is not from the mentioned paragraph. The evaluation team

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<p>odd. Furthermore, the reference to Bolivia and “separate lobbying” by the agencies to revise the national programme doesn’t tell the whole story. When it became apparent that there were problems in getting REDD+ off the ground in Bolivia (after approval of the grant to the national programme in 2010), a high level mission was organized to negotiate and agree on changes in the national programme. The whole process was dealt with and reported through the Policy Board and the outcome was a revised (downsized) budget with a focus on specific technical inputs dealing only with MRV, given the Bolivian context. This needs to be properly explained in the report.</p>	<p>assumes it is MG's interpretation of the examples presented from several Latin-American countries, which is only partly correct.</p> <p>With "differing socio-cultural contexts" we mean that in general, the social and cultural context of African countries is different than Latin-American countries.</p> <p>The evaluation team is has been well informed about the situation in Bolivia. However, this paragraph explains UN agency coordination within a country and not about how UN REDD deals with requests for changes in a NP, so there is no point to elaborate on the whole story in Bolivia. Reference has been added to the high level mission.</p>
<p>§142 It would have been good if the evaluation team placed this within the broader One-UN approaches - there are a lot of public evaluations or scholarly assessments as the evaluation team points out - that could have been drawn on, in particular in Vietnam and Tanzania which were pilot countries for the UN-delivering as one (for the system as a whole not just the UN-REDD Programme).</p>	<p>Noted –critical lesson of the independent evaluations added in support of the evaluation team’s finding.</p>
<p>§142 The wording suggests the secretariat should be playing a role in UN coordination (“the Secretariat should, in principle, provide the glue that holds all the moving parts together within the UN system”). Presumably the evaluators meant that the secretariat should be the glue among the 3 agencies within the UN-REDD Programme, not the UN system more broadly.</p> <p>In stating that the secretariat does not have the capacity or resources, it would be useful if the evaluation could compare the size (in terms of number of staff and % of overall budget) of the secretariat to those of other initiatives (for example, FCPF, CIF, GEF, the Poverty & Environment Initiative etc).</p>	<p>Sentence amended to focus on UN-REDD Programme</p> <p>Reference to the lack of capacity and resources was emphasized by Secretariat staff. As with anything however, more of the same will not necessarily lead to better results. The real issue in this case is the lack of a clear mandate, that would allow staff to focus their energy in a more productive way. Reference to capacity and resources has been removed.</p>
<p>§144 States that the secretariat’s main tasks include support the delivery of programme services. This could be read to mean the secretariat has a role in implementing the programme. It would be worth clarifying that this is not the case.</p>	<p>Meaning of services has been specified</p>
<p>F15 Has the evaluation team made use of the PB review process and report?</p>	<p>Yes – see reference in 145.</p>
<p><u>Section 6.4.</u></p>	
<p>§152 There are references to “theoretical contributions” used to tackle the drivers of D&D and to the problems arising with the REDD+ early movers programme in Ecuador. These criticisms of the REDD+ process cannot be attributed to the UN REDD Programme. The assertion at the end of this paragraph needs to be substantiated; as it stands it is simply speculation.</p>	<p>The first point is not a criticism, but an observation of the Programme’s approach, and the second is used to illustrate potential drawbacks of the first point.</p> <p>The last sentence has been amended to emphasize the point being made: that these issues (e.g., land rights) will not be resolved overnight.</p>
<p>§152 Fully support the conclusion that more attention needs to</p>	<p>In addition to responses above, the evaluation team</p>

MG Comments	ET Responses
<p>be given to the drivers of deforestation. We have come to the same conclusion in our UNDP REDD+ annual planning meeting held in Feb 2014 and are embarking on a new approach. So the overall conclusion of this paragraph is welcome. But there are some specific points to clarify:</p> <p>Firstly, whether or not another initiative (Germany’s REM in Ecuador) is put on hold is not relevant to the UN-REDD Programme. We are not directly involved, the UN-REDD Programme in Ecuador was not designed to meet the specific requirements of REM, and the Programme cannot be held liable for the decision taken by other initiatives. Moreover, it is not clear whether the statement about the progress of REM in Ecuador is up to date, given the recent German/Norway mission to Ecuador.</p> <p>Regarding the reference to DRC; yes, land rights won’t be solved when REDD+ implementation starts, but it should be underscored that the national REDD+ strategy rightfully plans to contribute to solving the issue.</p>	<p>deems this example relevant for other reasons. It supports the claim that early intervention of the kind now considered by UN-REDD would have been beneficial to Ecuador’s readiness process, thus allowing it to engage in implementation activities, as per the phased approach to REDD+. The evaluation presents the situation at the end of 2013.</p> <p>DRC observation has been added.</p>
<p>§156 (and also §204): The evaluation team notes that: “Today, coordination between these actors is actually considered to have improved as a result of FPIC.” And “The case of Panama provided a challenging though salutary event for FPIC.”</p> <p>Please note that these are inaccurate descriptions of the activities that led to the resolution of the Panama complaint. While the Programme does promote adherence to FPIC, in line with the UN-REDD FPIC Guidelines, FPIC was not the principle that was applied in the case of the Panama complaint. Rather, the Programme applied a process more akin to a compliance review investigation into the validity of the claims, as well as a more traditional programmatic evaluation. It is believed that these two processes allowed for renewed trust and dialogue between relevant parties and a clarification on where the Programme and partners could improve in order to address the concerns and claims brought forward.</p>	<p>Good point. Paragraphs 156 and 204 have been nuanced and a footnote added to explain / address the process used more specifically.</p>
<p>§159 The Programme depends on who the government assigns, it cannot meddle with these matters.</p>	<p>Agreed. However, 159 points to the need for solutions, not reasons.</p>
<p><u>Section 6.5.</u></p>	
<p>The overall section fails to recognize (i) that the Programme started piloting REDD+ and therefore was a learning experience bringing sustainability values not only to the Programme but also to REDD+ in general as it informs the process and readiness efforts; (ii) the value of knowledge that the Programme leaves behind. F19 Implies that all the processes the Programme is supporting have no value outside of REDD+ when in fact all of them will leave capacity and results at country level.</p>	<p>The evaluation team agrees in part with MG concerns. The need to consider the Programme’s contribution to REDD+ and its overall legacy is a point well taken. However, these should be raised at the impact level, not in terms of sustainability. Sustainability asks whether Programme activities and results more specifically are likely to be sustained once support ends. Impact looks at what changes have been produced through these investments. The noted contributions of the programme have been integrated in a revised finding for F17.</p>

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	As such, the evaluation team does not agree with the MG's reading of F19. Moreover, it needs to be stressed that in no part of the report do we imply that capacities and other results have no value outside REDD+.
§164 Exigencies of REDD+ not of the Programme; R-Package: the programme does not use this as a basis, this applies to the FCPF; the joint R-PP template is different.	Noted. Reference to R-package has been removed.
§164 Again we question whether the quotation of individuals represents evidence-based evaluation methodology or is simply anecdotal. The situation in DRC is complex and there are strong views that need to be adequately weighed and cross-referenced within a solid understanding of the context. Given that many of the international NP staff who worked on the DRC NP were not interviewed by the evaluation team (although they are all readily accessible through the UNDP REDD+ global team), we do not believe the evaluation team has sufficiently assessed the context and therefore believe the quotations are anecdotal rather than representative.	See response to 114 above, first and second paragraphs. The MG does not seem to object to the gist of the argument presented in 164. Please clarify whether this is correct. If not, it would be helpful to know what evidence the team failed to consider or what part of the recounted events it misrepresented. To clarify the matter, the “complex situation” is further explained (by changing the order of some of the sentences and ideas), and the quote regarding the implosion of the CN-REDD was removed.
§165 National consultants are and have been involved in the programmes (eg. in Bangladesh, Mongolia and Myanmar). International consultants do not work in isolation. Relying only on the DRC example is misleading.	The DRC example is a case in point – the same issue was raised in nearly every other country visited or consulted. Existing use of national consultants has been added with encouragement to pursue such strategies whenever feasible.
§167 The issue of disparity between national and international staff was also raised by the Programme and government representatives in Cambodia.” This was not the case. What was discussed was the disparity between national staff on Programme (UNDP) contracts versus government salaries.	Sentence amended.
§169 The NC in DRC was part of the Ministry of Environment, not outside (unless we only talk about physical office).	Issue of concern clarified in text.
Section 6.6.	

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<p>§177 Reference is made again to pilot projects which are not part of the Programme; it pilots initiatives, or processes, but does not do pilot projects. In footnote 150, the "Guidance Note on Gender Mainstreaming in REDD+" should be switched to "Guidance Note on Gender Sensitive REDD+." Furthermore, when referring to the regional work in Asia, the evaluation team notes that a regional scoping study was done. Two clarifications:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This work was in partnership with WOCAN and USAID's LEAF program, under a regional Joint Initiative to identify practical entry points for women's inclusion in REDD+. • While a scoping report was prepared under this Joint Initiative, multi-sectorial and stakeholder dialogues were also undertaken within country-specific case studies in Cambodia (September 2013) and Sri Lanka (October 2013). A similar USAID LEAF study was also completed in the Philippines as part of the Joint Initiative (these country specific case studies are not mentioned elsewhere in the report). 	<p>Pilot projects replaced by pilot initiatives though the difference is rather semantic. Footnote 150 amended. Clarifying points integrated in text and footnote.</p>
<p>§185 "Such perceptions [...] CSO and IPO representatives" is this not symptomatic of the non-governmental sphere? What can or should the Programme do about it?</p>	<p>The UN and UN-REDD Programme brings together some of the world's leading experts on stakeholder engagement and social safeguards – the question needs to be raised from within.</p>
<p>§185 It is not correct to say that support to strengthen (CSO & IP) capacity to meaningfully contribute are limited or absent in DRC. Hundreds of thousands of dollars of the NP budget went to allowing civil society to do their consultative work properly. We might agree that more needs to be done, but not that nothing was done.</p>	<p>Noted. The statement was removed since it did not add to the point being raised.</p>
<p>§186 This is a very good point, but why does the evaluation team focus only on tropical and sub-tropical forests? The Programme includes partner countries in different biomes.</p>	<p>Amended. The evaluation team notes however that REDD+ is about tropical and subtropical forests and that the Programme supports more than only developing countries.</p>
<p>§188 The last sentence refers to the requirements of the UNFCCC not the Programme.</p>	<p>Nuance added.</p>
<p>§189 Retention of capacity is a difficult subject for all development work and the Programme faces the same challenges. The evaluation team could note that some stakeholders (e.g. IP's) and countries (e.g. Mexico and Ecuador) are becoming skilled at delivering south-south capacity development and give suggestions as to how to further expand on those successes.</p>	<p>Reference to points raised provided in 195, including suggestions for further expansion.</p>
<p>§191 There is a reference to "...blue print approaches i.e. the R-package" which is not applied by the UN REDD Programme. There is a R-PP agreed jointly with the FCPF, which is a guiding framework. The NP documents then are tailored to address specific needs of the countries.</p>	<p>Sentence shortened by removing reference to the said blue print approaches, which is unnecessary.</p>
<p>§192 it is a factual error to cite Kenya in footnote 158. This is</p>	<p>Agreed – in fact, upon review, the other sited examples</p>

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<p>actually contradicted by the statement about Kenya on page 43 (under outcome 2), clearly showing how capacities are being institutionalized (with creation of a dedicated Task Force). Conclusion: remove the words “the work on anti-corruption in Kenya” from footnote 158. Furthermore, arguing that “...while the performance of NPs can readily be evaluated”, contradicts the earlier statement that assessment is only done at output level.</p>	<p>have also been removed since they do not provide compelling examples either. The entire ending of this paragraph has been revised to shed light on the challenges that the Programme faces in demonstrating the value added of SNA-GP. The last point raised by the MG is not a contradiction. The intended meaning of the sentence has been further specified to avoid confusion.</p>
<p>§193 Rather than referring to “few individuals” it would be better to note that working groups have been set up.</p>	<p>Corrected.</p>
<p>§193 As per previous comments, we would have welcomed the opportunity to discuss the complex issues and trade-offs faced by CN-REDD in DRC. We do not believe the situation was as straight forward as is suggested in the evaluation report.</p>	<p>As per previous responses above, the contentious issues have been addressed and the reference to DRC here does not allude to the previous concerns. The point made here was particularly emphasized by development partners.</p>
<p>§196 The definition of safeguards as used this paragraph has been chosen by the evaluation team, it is not adopted by the Programme. It is not correct to state that safeguards are “not defined in the context of REDD+” under the UNFCCC.</p>	<p>Changed to the Programme’s definition. Safeguards in context of REDD+ / UNFCCC corrected.</p>
<p>§197 The “Social Risk Assessment tool” mentioned may be a reference to the Social Principles Risk-Assessment Tool developed by the Programme in 2010. This tool was never finalized and its content was integrated into the Benefit and Risk Tool (BeRT) currently under revision. In any case, it is inaccurate to present it as one of the Programme’s main guidance documents in relation to safeguards. The Programme’s approach to safeguards is clearly laid out in the UN-REDD Framework for “Supporting the Development of Country Approaches to Safeguards” which is central to this work area, and thus should be mentioned in the final version of the evaluation report. Furthermore, the sentence “to identify the risks associated with good governance [...] coherence” reads as if good governance, stakeholder engagement and policy coherence are risks themselves.</p>	<p>Correction made and remainder of the text following the identified document has been deleted.</p>
<p>§207 There has been substantive progress and active follow-up in Indonesia as a result of the PGA beyond the reference to Jambi included in this paragraph, e.g. developing a set of sanctions for public officials to encourage non-corrupt practices (led by UKP4), the development of a conflict resolution mechanism, and the REDD+ Agency taking up the PGA as their “own monitoring tool”. A more comprehensive overview of the utilization of the PGA data and preliminary results is available on the UN-REDD workspace, updated end of April 2014:</p>	<p>Further evidence integrated.</p>
<p>§208 While we agree with the overall message of this paragraph, it could better reflect the efforts and progress achieved by the UN-REDD Programme, particularly with regards to point (iii). Concrete lessons have indeed been made through the PGA piloting, and <u>key lessons learned are summarized in the PGA practical guide</u> which was sent out for external comments (targeted e-mails, mini round-up and through L-Forest e-mail list)</p>	<p>Noted. Reference to exchange added in 207 and nuance regarding lessons integrated in 208, which is now 209 – having switched 208 and 209 to maintain the logic of argumentation. A note has been added in the limitations regarding the</p>

MG Comments	ET Responses
<p>early April 2014. The draft guide, with lessons learned, is available on the UN-REDD workspace here: Draft Practical Guide to the Participatory Governance Assessment. In addition, a study visit (late April) between Indonesia and Vietnam was set up for the specific purpose of exchanging concrete lessons from the Indonesian PGA process, as well as demonstrating how the PGA data is being utilized by different actors, both at the national and provincial level. As Vietnam is in the process of collecting its data and stakeholders are discussing the potential areas of PGA utilization and how the PGA can feed into Vietnam's Phase II once the report is launched, these inputs were seen as timely – particularly for the Lam Dong representatives who are keen to keep engaging with the Jambi Governor and his staff. The study visit report is available here</p>	<p>fact that data collection for this evaluation ended in January. Many of the developments the MG points to are quite recent.</p>
<p><u>Section 6.7.</u></p>	
<p>§214 The Programme never stated its objective was to reduce emissions, of course it is assumed that by supporting countries in their readiness efforts that would happen.</p>	<p>The sentence does not refer to the Programme's objective but the goal of REDD+ which is, obviously, reducing emissions. This is consistent with UN-REDD's mission and vision statements and ultimate raison d'être.</p>
<p>§219 REDD+ is an area of the UNFCCC that was informed by implementation on the ground; countries negotiating positions being informed by their experience. This is a tangible contribution of the Programme - the understanding built - and underlines the courage to start piloting ahead of the conclusion of negotiations.</p>	<p>Comment added to intro of 219.</p>
<p>§226 UNDP is the selected delivery partner for the FCPF in PNG too.</p>	<p>Added.</p>
<p>§227 Field based projects were dropped from the Paraguay programme.</p>	<p>§227 does not refer to UN-REDD supported pilot projects in Paraguay, but projects supported by other initiatives</p>
<p>§228 Similar to the comment above (§177), the evaluation team notes that UN-REDD partnered with WOCAN and LEAF to carry out "a scoping study on practical entry points for gender mainstreaming in REDD+". However, this text does not mention that multi-sectorial and stakeholder dialogues were also undertaken within country-specific case studies in Cambodia (September 2013) and Sri Lanka (October 2013). A similar USAID LEAF study was also completed in the Philippines as part of the Joint Initiative.</p>	<p>Addressed in 177.</p>
<p>§229 Examples of "formal coordination mechanisms" which do or do not involve the UN REDD Programme agencies would be useful.</p>	<p>Examples are cited throughout the report- reiteration here would be redundant.</p>
<p>§230 The evaluation team states that "relevant experiences of the UNDP-GEF team have yet to be fully incorporated in the design and implementation of programming interventions at the global or national levels". This is not correct. The UNDP REDD+ team grew out of the UNDP-GEF team and it was run through the same business plan for its first three years – including involvement in annual business planning exercises to share experiences. Initially the UNDP REDD+ Regional Technical Advisors had joint REDD+</p>	<p>Noted and text amended.</p>

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<p>and GEF responsibilities, thus ensuring direct incorporation of UNDP-GEF experiences into the design of the National Programmes. The links between the two teams remain very strong. Just for example, UNDP REDD+ RTAs undertook a joint mission in Peru in May 2014 with UNDP GEF RTAs to ensure coordination and integration between the two portfolios and a GEF 5 Programme for Nigeria was designed with support from the UNDP-GEF team dovetailing and building on the existing UN-REDD Programme. The UN-REDD Programme is also collaborating with the GEF Small Grants Programme to design and start the implementation of a community grant intervention at the national level in 6 countries, and will also be sharing lessons from this at the global level (learning from GEF-SGP's practices of doing this).</p>	
<p>§245 "With respect to NPs [...] in the country readiness plans (R-PPs)" – the NPs have their own indicators that contribute to and stem from R-PPs but are not strictly R-PP objectives.</p>	<p>Noted, reference to R-PP was simply removed</p>
<p>§246 The reference to "parachuted responsibilities" begs the question, by whom?</p>	<p>"Parachuted" removed, as it did not add anything to the statement, but according to Secretariat staff, there is a tendency to drop anything and everything that does not seem to fit with the three partners.</p>
<p>C. Comments on the conclusions and ratings</p>	
<p>§ 248 It is not realistic for the evaluation team to claim that the UN-REDD programme would "require bringing an end to tropical deforestation". This should be changed to state: "...require major reductions to tropical deforestation." The second sentence in this paragraph is unreadable!</p>	<p>The evaluation team does not claim that the programme would bring an end to tropical deforestation. However, to avoid misunderstandings, we deleted this part of the sentence.</p>
<p>§250 There is indeed an "undisputed global urgency" to reduce emissions and it is good to note that the UN-REDD Programme is found to be "a relevant response."</p>	<p>Point taken</p>
<p>§251 That there needs to be a stronger focus on addressing the drivers of deforestation will be developed as a key action item for the new UN REDD Programme strategy.</p>	<p>This is a welcomed management response.</p>
<p>§252 The lack of flexibility of the UN REDD Programme is highly debatable. The Programme has evolved significantly during the past 5 years. REDD+ processes originate in the UNFCCC which has been negotiated by countries themselves as the main parties and is deliberately broad to allow for it to be useful and applicable for a very wide range of national circumstances. The idea that REDD is complex correctly identifies a major challenge in that REDD+ has turned out to be more complex than initially expected. However, the framework was built because there was a clear identified need and reason for getting climate change benefits through reducing deforestation and degradation.</p>	<p>Point taken – core issue has been clarified.</p>
<p>§253 Few countries have been able to meet the requirements within a 3-5 year period. The UN REDD Programme timetable may have been too ambitious. The conclusion is that the Programme should keep going and more effort is needed.</p>	<p>The conclusion has been sharpened to address core issues highlighted in the report.</p>
<p>§255 Delivery as one does indeed remain a challenge.</p>	<p>Point taken</p>
<p>§256 Recently rapid progress has been made in opening dialogue with "key players" (agriculture, trade, business, etc).</p>	<p>The recent progress to opening dialogue with private sector has been acknowledged in F3, but also clearly</p>

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	explained why there is still a lack of key players from the relevant discussion fora.
§257 The concept of REDD+ is recognised as separate from the UN-REDD Programme, which in other parts of the report is mixed to the extent that the evaluation team often criticises REDD+ as a concept rather than how the Programme has been performing in implementing it. The evaluation team clearly recognises the difference (in this paragraph) and also that the UN-REDD Programme is mainly testing and implementing the mechanism; which may be better called an "process" than "mechanism", given some particular meanings in conventions.	See comments above regarding the suggested confusion and the process versus mechanism issue.
Exhibit 7.1 on page 80 for the likelihood of impact, it says '...potential impact in terms of reduced emissions is limited at this point'. We question whether this a valid assessment for this criterion. The UN-REDD Programme was designed to support countries with their Readiness. It was not designed, and did not expect, to reduce emissions.	The discussion here is not over the objective or goal of the Programme, but its intended impact. As per the MG approved ToC that was developed for the inception report and presented in Exhibit 5.1, reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation is the expected programme impact, not readiness.
Exhibit 7.1, rating "relevance": The sentence "Relevant but context is changing, and with this, the future outlook of the current strategy" is ambiguous and needs to be clarified. The Programme will become even more relevant as climate change impacts increase and options for mitigation come with increasing costs and difficulties, but this needs to be made clearer, if that is what is intended.	The evaluation team does not consider this sentence ambiguous. In case of doubt, this statement is sustained in detail in F1. The second part of the comment ("the programme will become even more relevant...") is a conclusion of the MG, not shared by the evaluation team and its findings.
Exhibit 7.1, rating "sustainability." In accordance with the terms of reference this criterion should be rated on a scale from highly likely (HL) to highly unlikely (HU).	"U" here stands for "unlikely" according to ToR
Exhibit 7.1, rating "up-scaling" considers as traditional approach from project to national scale, when upscaling in this context also includes uptake of lessons and experiences in other countries.	Point taken. The evaluation team shared this understanding of "up-scaling" and rated it accordingly
Exhibit 7.1, rating "participation": This statement is partly self-contradictory, in saying that UN-REDD has been "highly effective in terms of stakeholder engagement" but then "local decision making areas remain weak". It would be hard to find a global programme that has been operating for only 5 years that has done more to develop networks of stakeholders in so many countries, especially as the UN usually interacts primarily with national governments and there is often a reluctance to allow engagement with other stakeholders at the sub-national level in decision-making. Many would argue that the Programme has increased opportunities for local decision-making (as recognised in other sections noting increased attention to and input from Indigenous Peoples). So should this be reworded to say something like: "Highly effective in terms of stakeholder engagement and although effective participation in local decision-making arenas remains weak, the Programme has improved the opportunities in many situations for a wider range of stakeholders to be informed and engaged."	Slight nuancing added. Among others, F3 (§86-87) sustain our conclusion. Having been effective in enhancing stakeholder engagement in discussion platforms and global fora but not in actual local decision-making is, unfortunately, not contradictory. Moreover, the satisfactory rating attests the Programme's relative effectiveness in this area.
Exhibit 7.1, rating "human and financial resources": What is meant by "Ambiguous management" Does this refer to what the evaluation finds is a lack of clarity in the financial reporting rather than the management?	"Ambiguous" changed to "unclear". As sustained by F33, this refers to all aspects of management, distribution, allocation and use of resources
Exhibit 7.1, rating, "overall performance": It would be useful if the final report could be clearer in this important recommendation	The evaluation team appreciates the importance of this rating. This rating is carefully established, reflecting the

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<p>for the continuation of the support to the Programme. This is important for countries to know, as well as of course the agencies and for donors to provide a clear signal of confidence and direction for the immediate future. Given the relatively short lifetime of the UN REDD Programme and the innovative nature of REDD+, it is unfortunate that the report ends on a fairly negative note rather than recognising how much progress has been made in terms of a framework for REDD+ and how many countries, organisations, donors and people are supporting it.</p>	<p>ratings on all evaluation criteria mentioned in the exhibit, and the findings presented and argued in the report. However, the overall performance rating was revised upwards – not to provide a positive note but for substantive reasons explained in the table.</p>
<p>Exhibit 7.1 Overall, there is no description of methodology applied for the ratings. Was the same weight given for instance to relevance and effectiveness as it was given to cooperation and partnerships or to gender and upscaling? It would be good to know if different parameters had a different weight or if the overall rating of the program was the result of a simple average?</p>	<p>Ratings are subjective in nature, because few quantitative data are used for the findings. However, all ratings are well substantiated by the findings.</p> <p>Regarding the overall rating, while it is a reflection of the ratings of the individual evaluation criteria, it is not calculated using a mathematical formula. It is based on judgment by the evaluation team putting most emphasis on aspects of performance (relevance, effectiveness, sustainability and likelihood of impact) also taking contextual factors (drivers and assumptions) into account.</p>
<p>Missing section 8. Lessons Learned. It is disappointing not to have the lessons learned in the draft report as this would have been an important part of the document.</p>	<p>Point taken. Final report will include this section. Lessons learned will be presented at the PB meeting in July and this will be a good opportunity for discussing them.</p>
<p><u>D. Comments on the recommendations</u></p>	
<p>It is important to stress that the management response to the evaluation will focus on the recommendations. The following comments are aimed at further clarification and greater clarity.</p>	<p>Point taken</p>
<p>Recommendation 1 is straightforward and can easily be taken on board. However the discussion of options is less clear. Some brief comments are as follows: Only Option 1 is feasible. Option 2 goes beyond the Programme’s mandate since it is the UNFCCC that might need to rethink REDD+ at some time in the future and the agenda proposed (“tackling the very architecture of REDD+”) is unrealistic. It is not clear how Option 3 could make any significant improvements to the Programme and the “high level panel” proposed would probably perform the same role as the Policy Board. In short, while the recommendation is helpful, the options proposed are not.</p>	<p>The findings of this evaluation point to a range of critical issues that are unlikely to be addressed if the programme simply adopts a business as usual strategy. The Warsaw Framework does not solve any of the serious questions that need to be asked. In response to the MG comments, the options approach has been nuanced to indicate ways in which the Programme could strengthen its performance, beyond the simple idea of clarifying UN-REDD’s approach.</p> <p>Two comments on the MG reaction to options.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Beyond the UNFCCC negotiations, the requirements of a phased approach to REDD and the myriad guidelines, indicators, frameworks, tools that are now part and parcel of the REDD+ agenda have been developed by UN-REDD and FCPF in particular. And what it has created, it can also change. 2) The PB is unfortunately not composed of disinterested advisors tasked with improving the performance of the Programme. It has so far shown itself incapable of playing such a role.
<p>Recommendation 2 should not be dependent on a particular option accepted under recommendation 1. It might be more useful to indicate that “once the strategic objective is determined (as proposed in recommendation 1), the MG in consultation with other stakeholders in the Programme, should develop a ToC that defines a limited set of objectives and measureable performance indicators.”</p>	<p>Suggestion included in § 268. The rest of the comment is well taken, and the evaluation team looks forward to the management response on this issue.</p>

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<p>The problem here is that REDD+ is not a one-size-fits-all solution, but much depends on the national and often the sub-national context. Having one ToC for all countries does not make much sense, and therefore the Programme will have a rather vague framework. But by focusing more on National Strategies, and on addressing the drivers of deforestation, there will be a clearer and stringent ToC in the next strategy (at least one that is much more directly linked to reducing emissions). Theories of change that outline different scenarios for different types of forest countries could be developed.</p>	
<p>Recommendation 3 to further the collaboration with the FCPF is something that both Programmes are actively working on. However, the specific proposals - “strategic alignment”, to share infrastructure and finance, etc. - will need considerable further consultation. In this context, it is worth asking whether the proposals have been discussed by the evaluation team with the World Bank (FCPF).</p>	<p>The suggested actions have been specified, including the intended meaning of shared resources.</p>
<p>The issue that arises in recommendation 4 is how to ensure ownership at the highest decision-making level? A means of ensuring that REDD+ remains on the radar of Ministers and above for the next 5 years is to link it to the Green Economy/Green Growth debate, and to actively engage Ministries of Finance in the discussion on forest ecosystem valuation, accounting, and the financing of REDD+ (from domestic and international sources, including the private sector). The sub-recommendation to “give full priority to national or regional staff” is contradicted later on in recommendations 9 and 12, which both imply that we might need more (international) staff.</p>	<p>The first part of this comment could be part of MG’s management response.</p> <p>There is no contradiction between R4 and R9/R12. In R9 there is an implication of more staff (for gender expertise) at regional level, in line with recommendation R4. R12 does not imply any increase in staff numbers.</p>
<p>Concerning recommendation 5, it would appear that being stuck in a relatively powerless Ministry (Forests or Environment) with too few cross-sectoral linkages is probably the biggest impediment to REDD+ implementation over the next few years. But unfortunately, what is proposed is not very useful, as it requires policy decisions about REDD+ responsibilities at national level that lie outside the agencies. So this is probably a recommendation that is directed more towards the countries rather than the agencies. The agencies can do their part by ensuring broader stakeholder participation (notably the involvement of the private sector and non-IP forest communities). Under this recommendation it is proposed to give “priority to the provinces or districts selected for pilot projects”. It is not clear what is meant by “pilot projects”. The next sentence goes on to recommend a shift to “jurisdictional-level efforts”. There is the possibility that this again reflects an incomplete understanding of the UNFCCC REDD+ process, what is meant to be demonstrated in Phase 2, and the evaluation team’s concept that REDD+ will work through project-level, REDD+ “credits”. It should be noted that in general the UN-REDD Programme does not support “pilot projects.”</p>	<p>This recommendation does not focus on cross-sectoral linkages but on cross-level approaches (from local to national). The evaluation team does not consider that the recommendation is misdirected. "efforts to harmonise institutional capacities across levels of public administration" is perfectly within the mandate of UN agencies.</p> <p>The evaluation team is surprised that MG questions the term "pilot projects" because the programme either supports these local experimental projects (e.g., Cambodia, DRC, Indonesia, Paraguay,...) or actively engages with pilot project-level initiatives of other donors to test various elements (e.g., Tanzania, Panama).</p>
<p>Recommendation 6 highlights one of the most important lessons from the past 5 years, but in a way, it is also a logical next step for the Programme moving towards results-based actions. Again the paragraphs underneath the recommendation are not as useful as the recommendation itself. There have been some activities in</p>	<p>The evaluation team appreciates that MG considers the recommendation useful. The MG's ideas on the suggestions made in the paragraphs suggest that our explanations are indeed clear.</p> <p>The evaluation team does not consider the idea of</p>

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<p>this direction in the current work including private sector engagement and financing and this can be scaled up in future. The evaluation team encourages "Liberating REDD+ from the confines of the forestry sector – and from a definition limited to payments for verified emission reductions..." The intentions may be admirable but diverge from part of the Warsaw Framework that defines results based actions in terms of CO2 equivalents (Decision 14/CP.19, 4). This does not mean that UN-REDD Programme can't also cover that work, but it does mean that if it does then the work will be much broader and harder to measure results against (which is also a recommendation), thus creating a tension. The suggestions are potentially worth trying to get better engagement of the stakeholders involved in the drivers of deforestation, although this will be a slow and potentially risky process.</p> <p>It would be useful for these tensions to be resolved and for the evaluation team to come out in the final report and clearly say that they think REDD+ is a viable development strategy but that it must be implemented with a long-term horizon and to expect it to have achieved huge successes in the short term was over-optimistic. Including the key stakeholders of the main drivers of deforestation in the process could be an action in the short term, but it's not clear how this will deliver results in the short-term.</p>	<p>liberating REDD+ from the confines of the forestry sector and conditionality-based incentives to be a contradiction in terms of achieving measurable emission reductions in terms of CO2 equivalents, nor an impediment to the development of a robust results framework and clear performance indicators.</p> <p>But as the report makes clear, placing all eggs in the performance-based basket carries risks. Further, if the ultimate goal of the Programme is to help countries reduce their emissions from deforestation and all recognize that it's a long term effort, then the need to include the main drivers of deforestation is not to deliver short-term results but to actually deliver results at some point. Problems cannot be solved and strategies/solutions made coherent if there is no engagement with these interests.</p> <p>The evaluation team does not consider it within its mandate to pronounce itself about the viability of REDD+'s broader development strategy.</p>
<p>A great deal can be said about recommendation 7. It is built on an assumption stated several times in the report, i.e. that securing tenure will reduce deforestation. But the relationship between tenure and forest cover is a lot more complex than presented in the report. Some level of tenure clarity is often needed to identify REDD+ stakeholders and recognizing customary rights of IPs & local communities is indeed important to ensure an effective and equitable implementation of REDD+. But tenure security is certainly not a prerequisite for REDD+ - in fact, only some countries are finding tenure reforms to be a relevant policy option for REDD+ - and the goal of securing tenure (even at the local level) is much beyond what can be realistically expected from the UN-REDD Programme, with the timeframe and resources available.</p> <p>Furthermore, while it is true there have been three decades of commons-related scholarship, there have also been many decades of efforts to try and reduce deforestation through clarifying land tenure, with varying degrees of success. The evaluation team recommends that the Programme move away from supporting countries to get ready for REDD+ and focus on ways to avoid deforestation that don't rely on results-based payments. If efforts to address deforestation without financial incentives had been successful over the past decades (i) there would be no need for the international community to consider REDD+, and (ii) global deforestation rates would not have remained so high. It seems odd for the evaluation team to recommend giving up on REDD+ results-based payments before they have really started (and after only 5 years of readiness efforts) and return to an approach that demonstrably failed for 30 years. It also should be recognised that land tenure issues are complex.</p> <p>In short, a suggested rewording of the recommendation is: "Greater consideration should be given to tenure in the UN REDD</p>	<p>The evaluation team fully agrees that tenure is a complex issue but the strong body of evidence that underlies this recommendation does not support the MG's other claims and extrapolations. Several points need to be considered:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) The report does say that tenure security is a prerequisite for REDD+. 2) The fact that the number of countries that find tenure reform a relevant policy option for REDD+ is limited is not indicative of how critical the issue actually is but rather of how many countries are reluctant to address this issue. 3) The evaluation team does not expect the UN-REDD programme to achieve land tenure security in the countries where it operates but rather to make land rights a priority issue and to strengthen the bundle of rights associated with such concerns where feasible. 4) There have not been many decades of efforts to reduce deforestation through tenure reform and related to this, the mixed success of recent decentralization and tenure reform efforts is not because of a weak link between tenure and sustainability, but because governments and their supporters have limited interest in changing the distribution of benefits. 5) The evaluation team does not recommend to the Programme to move away from supporting readiness for REDD+ or give up on REDD+ results-based payments but suggests that some changes can be achieved without systematic handouts. <p>The recommendation has been modified to state the</p>

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<p>Programme, building on ongoing tenure-related efforts at national and regional levels.”</p>	<p>following: “Building on the technical expertise of UN partner agencies and relevant collaborators, as well as existing efforts at the national, regional, and global levels, the PB, through the implementation efforts of the UN agencies and country partners, should make resource rights (including land, forest and carbon) a priority area for Programme interventions.”</p>
<p>Recommendation 8, as well as other references to safeguards in the report, appears to be ambiguously phrased. It could be interpreted as implying that the Programme has safeguards requirements and that National Programmes must be monitored against a set of social and environmental safeguards. This is inaccurate, the Programme does not have such requirements and only supports the development of country approaches to safeguards, in response to UNFCCC provisions. The evaluation team must refer to the UN-REDD Framework for Supporting the Development of Country Approaches to Safeguards for clarity on this issue. The UN-REDD Programme approach to safeguards is actually by far the most country-friendly and flexible one, and at the same time underpinned by a very solid body of research and information material.</p> <p>Under bullet point 3 (§290) the ET recommends developing a monitoring and reporting framework for SES (this should read safeguards instead of SES). It should be noted that this is not consistent with the UNFCCC decisions. Indeed, negotiators in Cancun spent considerable time on this issue and ultimately resolved to specifically avoid referring to monitoring and reporting in the context of safeguards. It would be extremely problematic for the UN-REDD Programme to accept this recommendation, as it would affect credibility vis-à-vis the UNFCCC process.</p>	<p>The evaluation team does not understand the ambiguity identified by MG. The recommendation as well as concrete lines of action use the terms "continue efforts to streamline" and "clarify how SES ought to be used". The mentioned monitoring support is directed towards national audiences (citizen led) and not towards the UN-REDD programme. This is fully in line to the mentioned UN REDD framework. The last comment (UN REDD approach to safeguards) has been recognized in the report (§198)</p> <p>SES replaced in 290</p> <p>Regarding the M&R of safeguards, language has been changed to COP 19 terminology. The Cancun decision is indeed an unfortunate course of action.</p>
<p>Concerning recommendation 9, there is no need for full-time gender focal points in each region! This would be too expensive, and there is an obvious risk of compartmentalizing a problem. Gender should rather be built more explicitly into the job descriptions and performance requirements of all UN-REDD staff (at least the Regional Advisors, and all senior managers). In point 3 of (§292) the evaluation team recommends using gender training provided by NGOs/CSOs/bilateral agencies. Did the team consider modules used by the three agencies? UNDP has mandatory training for all staff on gender mainstreaming.</p>	<p>All points listed under 9 are suggestions / options – not requirements. The evaluation team does recognize that UN agencies have gender staff (some of which have been interviewed) and all staff has received training, but as finding 22 suggests, this has not yet lead to adequate implementation of gender mainstreaming activities at the country level.</p>
<p>The main lesson from Panama is dealt with in recommendation 10. Stakeholders in countries could be encouraged to take this recommendation on board.</p>	<p>Point taken</p>
<p>There would appear to be some contradictions in recommendation 11. The evaluation team criticises the dominant role of the MG in §296, and then recommends that the MG should play strategic and programmatic oversight functions. Which one is it to be?</p>	<p>The evaluation team recommendation is now limited to the main heading of clarify roles and responsibilities. The appropriate mix is for the Programme to decide.</p>
<p>It is not clear what is meant by “the UN Charter places de facto limitations on the ability of countries to direct the affairs of agency partners”. At least in the case of UNDP, this is not relevant to the concept of country-driven programming. The process for country programming is set out on the UNDG website and is very clear that it should be a partnership between the</p>	<p>Wording stems from an interview with senior UN official. Sentence has been removed.</p>

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country and the UN agency.	
There is however a surprising suggestion to cut back on the knowledge sharing functions of the PB which make up one day briefing session the day before the PB meetings. These are one of the only opportunities for countries to become informed and ask questions on the issues before they are formally discussed in the PB session which are under quite tight timetables.	This is a misread of the statements made. The strategic and knowledge sharing functions of PB have been clarified.
Under recommendation nr. 11, point 4a: It must be noted that the secretariat is not a separate entity. It should not be considered as being independent of the participating UN organisations. It is an inter-agency unit. Under the current legal architecture of the UN-REDD collaborative partnership (i.e. pass-through joint programme), financial accountability rests with the participating UN organisations, following each agency's policies and procedures. It is therefore not possible for the head of the secretariat to have financial accountability over each agency's allocation.	Eliminated.
Recommendation 12 makes some good points on M&E and identifies some directions in which the Programme is already moving, but will only work if the Secretariat continues to be an inter-agency Secretariat and does not develop a life of its own.	Point taken. The second part is strictly MG's interpretation and not sustained by this evaluation's findings
In appendix II , The list is incomplete and uses inconsistent organizational titles	Addressed / corrected.

2. Norway comments

Comments	ET Responses
<p>Responding to the mandate of the evaluation as per the Terms of Reference: The report answers to the main purpose of the evaluation, defined by the TOR as “to assess relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of the programme performance”, in terms of structure and content. The report follows the structure asked for in the TOR and adopted in the Inception report, including a presentation of recommendations.</p> <p>We note the report’s remark that it was difficult for the Evaluation Team further refining the logic proposed in Inception Report as well as test the assumptions, which also forms the basis of one of the recommendations. It is a comprehensive report, with great level of details, but still manages to present findings and conclusions in a concise language.</p>	<p>Noted. The evaluation team acknowledges the positive comments of Norway to our report</p>
<p>Norway has previously pointed to the importance of assessing country readiness in the evaluation report. Readiness work is the key activity of the UN-REDD Programme, and with substantial support given to 18 national programme countries, Norway find it extremely unfortunate that the evaluation team did not prioritize assessing the level of readiness achieved in, if not all, at least some, of the national programmes. Such an assessment could naturally not be very extensive due to the capacity and resources available for the evaluation team, however - we do believe that some form of readiness ranking based on key indicators could have been done for all national programmes without too much effort, and would have added great value to the evaluation report from our point of view.</p>	<p>This recommendation was expressed by Norway after revision of the preliminary findings report, and the evaluation team has taken it on board in the draft final report. Exhibits 6.2 and 6.3 present an overview of progress towards readiness of the countries visited during this evaluations and a few more for which an evaluation was done by others. Output-level results, contained in NP strategy documents, were used as proxies for measuring progress towards national REDD+ readiness. Exhibit 6.1 provides a general overview of the achievement of outcomes overall, many of which refer directly to the advancement towards readiness of the partners countries.</p>
<p>The list of informants seems to be predominantly from the UN-agencies/family. This raises the question of validity, and contributes to a skewed picture. It would be useful to know how many representatives from the UNREDD programme countries or REDD-focal points, out of the 49 participating countries, that is included in the list of the 190 interviewees.</p>	<p>We have completed the countries of residence for each of the informants to ensure transparency.</p> <p>While indeed the number of resource persons for the evaluation is significantly skewed towards UN staff, this does not mean that the report has given their views and opinions any more weight than those of other stakeholders. In fact, comments received on the report by the UN-REDD MG indicate that the UN agencies feel that the report is in many respects not aligned with their views.</p> <p>Also, the very extensive literature review done by the evaluation team was significantly skewed towards non-UN sources, which in a way counter-balances the dominance of UN-sources in interviews and the survey.</p>
<p>When reviewing the list of informants, it is unfortunate to register that it is missing key resource persons, especially considering the chapter on context and the many conclusions and lofty thinking of REDD+ in general and going forward. For example, key people who were involved in the establishment of the UN-REDD programme should have been interviewed. To illustrate, no one from the leadership of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative were interviewed.</p>	<p>The evaluation team has made major efforts to contact as many stakeholders as reasonably possible. The initial (generic) list was presented to EMG, MG and PB in the inception report. All were contacted but not all responded. For instance, the Norway ICFI was approached on two occasions, but unfortunately, no response was received.</p> <p>Please also consider the response made on the previous comment. Interviews were an important source of information for the evaluation, but the ample literature on REDD+ and UN-REDD provided as much if not more information and insights to the evaluation.</p>
<p>There are evaluation reports available that could help inform</p>	<p>The evaluation team acknowledges that Norway draws</p>

<p>some of the findings. An evaluation of Norway’s MRV efforts concludes that it is questionable if UN-REDD provides targeted forest MRV advice and that support is delivered effectively.</p>	<p>renewed attention to the 2013 evaluation of Norway supported MRV activities. We have included some direct citations in the report to support our findings</p>
<p>Findings on linkages and partnerships section miss out on key roles/functions of other REDD+ arrangements. Linkage to FIP is missing. There is a significant source of money from FIP in many key UN-REDD-countries. There is also an ongoing parallel evaluation of FIP that could have helped inform this report as well. Finally, NICFI has a well known real time evaluation that is currently in its final stages and the evaluation of UNREDD would have benefited from that exercise too.</p>	<p>Being an evaluation of UN-REDD, linkages to other REDD+ support activities have been recognized and analysed, but key roles and functions are beyond the scope of this evaluation. The evaluation team is aware of other (ongoing) evaluations, but their reports were not available at the time of reporting of our evaluation. Therefore, not all recent evaluation report findings could be included.</p>