

Piloting Local Decision Making in the Development of a REDD+ Compliant Benefit Distribution System for Viet Nam

Final Report

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List of Acronyms

BDS	Benefit Distribution System
BDS STWG	Benefit Distribution System Sub-technical Working Group for REDD+
CPC	Commune People's Committee
DARD	Department of Agriculture and Rural Development
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FLEGT	Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade
FPD	Forest Protection Department
MARD	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
MONRE	Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment
MRV	Measurement, Reporting and Verification
PaM	Policies and Measures
PFES	Payments for Forest Ecosystem Services
PFM	Participatory Forest Management
PPC	Provincial People's Committee
REDD+	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation
SNV	Netherlands Development Organisation
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UN-REDD	United Nations REDD
VND	Vietnamese Dong

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Executive Summary

This report documents lessons learnt from the piloting of self-selection activities in Lam Dong province, and develops recommendations for local decision-making on REDD+ benefits in future REDD+ programs in Viet Nam and beyond.

Effective, efficient and equitable REDD+ Benefit Distribution Systems (BDS) require procedures for local decision-making on the kinds of benefits villagers expect from REDD+, suitable schedules for their delivery and appropriate institutions disbursing the benefits, performing monitoring and handling complaints. Only if local people actively participate in the choice of benefits, delivery timing and institutional mechanisms will REDD+ benefits take on the incentive function required for performance-based REDD+ and provide inclusive opportunities for equitable inclusion of various sorts of forest communities in REDD+ actions.

To prepare the development of a REDD+-compliant BDS for Viet Nam, the UN-REDD Program in Viet Nam (hereafter “UN-REDD”) commissioned SNV to conduct local self-selection pilots in its two pilot districts of Lam Ha and Di Linh in Lam Dong Province between November 2011 and January 2012. The SNV team conducted a total of 15 self-selection activities in seven villages chosen to represent a variety of conditions characteristic of forest communities in Viet Nam.

The pilots employed an innovative methodology specifically developed for the assignment. The ‘REDD+ game’ provides a simple procedure to communicate key parameters of REDD+ to local people, in particular the conditionality of actual benefits on performance. It is designed to facilitate collective choices of small groups about the kinds of benefits people prefer receiving from REDD+ actions, desirable schedules for the delivery of the benefits and the institutional mechanisms used to disburse benefits, perform monitoring and handle complaints.

The fifteen self-selection pilots facilitated by the SNV team demonstrate that local people can make suitable choices about REDD+ benefits by way of the REDD+ game. The results of the pilots reveal certain commonalities in benefit choices, in particular groups’ tendency to assign part of the benefits to forest patrols, cash payments to individual households and provision of agricultural inputs. The results also attest to significant variation in the kinds of benefits and disbursement schedules favoured by groups. Men and women prioritize different kinds of benefits and delivery schedules, as do groups with members from different wealth strata and possibly groups of different ethnic backgrounds. Furthermore, groups show strong reactions to the conditionality of benefits as soon as they come to understand this defining feature of REDD+ in the process of the REDD+ game. In reaction, groups not only change the choice and timing of benefits but also adjust their preferences in unexpected ways. The latter provide important insights about the reactions REDD+ actions might encounter in the future as well as benefit options suitable to local people’s concerns and aspirations.

The pilots generate important recommendations for the conduct of local self-selection activities in future REDD+ actions in Viet Nam and beyond. This report develops a total of 18 recommendations, which can be summarized as follows:

(1) Logistics: Self-selection activities should employ the REDD+ game in a phased approach conducted by expert facilitators and, if appropriate, supported by translators, starting with preparatory consultations

followed by awareness-raising events and leading into the actual self-selection activities tailored towards the particular conditions of villages.

(2) Recording mechanism: REDD+ Management Boards to be established at the provincial or district level should supervise the self-selection activities and document their results in minutes countersigned by the village head and Commune People's Committee.

(3) Monitoring progress towards benefit realization: Pilot participatory forest monitoring (PFM) as a means serving villagers to monitor the progress made towards achieving the expected gains in carbon stocks hence expected level of REDD+ benefits.

(4) Social and cultural appropriateness: The facilitators of self-selection activities should keep the methodology used for self-selection activities simple and reach out proactively to marginalized stakeholder groups, such as women and poor people.

(5) Anti-corruption measures: On-going and future analysis and action on anti-corruption measures in REDD+ should give explicit consideration to possible risks of corruption arising from the conduct of self-selection activities.

(6) Menu of options: Future self-selection activities should offer local people a wide and open menu of options for REDD+ benefits, including various kinds of 'participation payments', such as payments for forest patrols and participatory carbon monitoring, as well as 'incentive benefits', the latter comprising some options providing upfront delivery of benefits and others concentrating the disbursement of benefits towards the time when actual performance is known.

1. Introduction

Determining how best to allocate benefits from efforts for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) is one of the fundamental components underlying an incentive based mechanism such as REDD+.

The design of Benefit Distribution Systems (BDS) for REDD+ describes the process of allocating international finances that flow into a developing country, all the way to communities, households and other stakeholders involved in undertaking REDD+ activities.

As REDD+ moves from an idea to reality there is growing interest in the design of appropriate BDS to support benefit sharing (Peskett, 2011; Skutch et al. 2011; Peskett et al., 2008; IUCN, 2009). As one of the UN-REDD Programme's implementing countries, Viet Nam is one country developing thinking around the most efficient, effective and transparent mechanism for sharing REDD+ benefits. On-going work is being undertaken by UN-REDD, SNV, I-REDD and other organisations with the intention of providing guidance to the development of a national REDD+ strategy. Viet Nam's experience in delivering benefits through other forestry related initiatives, such as the national Payments for Forest Ecosystem Services (PFES) policy (as directed by Decree 99/2010/NĐ-CP) is also being looked at to provide useful lessons for the design of the REDD+ BDS.

However, for REDD+, traditional 'top-down' systems of payments may not be appropriate for several reasons. Firstly, cultural differences among ethnic groups may lead to different culturally appropriate payment structures; and secondly, the unit of implementation for REDD+ may be the village, commune, or other. Social conflicts have been observed as resulting from cash payments to households under the 661 Programme, and to some extent under the PFES pilots (which have been under implementation for a much shorter period). Such conflicts may be reduced by using different units for payments, and through non-cash payments in the form of improved services or social infrastructure (e.g., schools, health clinics).

Introducing a system whereby local stakeholders are empowered with the choice of their benefit type is an obvious alternative to traditional top-down allocation systems. However, at the same time, such a system may also introduce additional procedures and costs, which may lead to the erosion of the benefits pool that beneficiaries are eligible for.

Given the current thinking around REDD+ BDS internationally and in the context of Viet Nam, UN-REDD set out to test mechanisms to provide local stakeholders with choices on payment structuring, while ensuring that the overall principles governing a REDD+ compliant BDS are respected. The intention of this mechanism is to provide local stakeholders with the ability to self-determine their preferred approach to payment structuring, and specifically the selection of the beneficiary unit (household, village, commune, other) and form of payment (cash or various forms of non-cash benefits).

In October 2011, SNV was contracted to design and pilot test a self-selection system for benefit sharing on behalf of UN-REDD. This work was carried out across a period of 4 months, and included close collaboration with key national and sub-national stakeholders, in addition to representatives of UN-REDD and UNDP.

This report aims to present a series of lessons learnt and recommendations based on the local decision making activities. The report will firstly introduce the intention of the pilot activities, with a focus on briefly presenting the methodology and results of the field work, in addition to a brief background on the context and location of the exercises.

The report will then move on to providing a set of detailed lessons learnt and recommendations. This section will be divided into the following sections, in accordance with the intention of this assignment:

1. Self-selection process
2. Recording mechanisms for benefit choices
3. Monitoring progress towards securing benefits
4. Social and cultural appropriateness
5. Anti-corruption measures
6. Other key insights

Based on the above recommendations and lessons learnt, the report will also include an illustrative example of how similar processes might be conducted. This includes an indication of the resources, time and practical steps necessary to ensure relevant results are achieved and useful in the design of appropriate benefit sharing mechanisms for REDD+.

In sharing these results, it should be acknowledged that the exercises conducted through this work are the first of their kind in the context of REDD+ for Viet Nam, and likely to be some of the first in the world. It should also be recognised that REDD+ is a very novel and largely unknown idea for local people. This makes consultations and activities with local people both challenging and time consuming. In view of this, the team have tested a new, more open-ended style of consultations not known by local people. Finally, it should be acknowledged that the SNV team demonstrated considerable care in trying to conduct an exercise that was realistic enough to elicit interesting and sensible responses, while at the same time ensuring not to create unfounded expectations of future REDD+ payments in the area.

In view of this, it is hoped that the lessons learnt and recommendations reflected in this report will be seen in the context of providing a useful platform and guidance for testing similar practices in other areas of Viet Nam, and in other REDD+ implementing countries.

2. Overview of the Pilot Activities

2.1 Intention & context of the assignment

UN-REDD is a leading organisation in the REDD+ readiness process in Viet Nam through its support for national and sub-national capacity building efforts in REDD+. A major component of this effort has been the development of thinking around the design of nationally appropriate BDS for REDD+.

In 2010, MARD, UN-REDD and Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ, now GIZ) published a comparative analysis of BDS systems to support the national REDD+ processes in Viet Nam (MARD et al. 2010). This work laid the foundation for a series of coordinated projects investigating and testing the recommendations made in this initial work including the pilot testing of the BDS self-selection mechanism.

As part of the focus on BDS, UN-REDD have also supported a series of BDS consultation workshops at the national level and two selected sites in Lam Dong and Bac Kan Provinces. UN-REDD is also in the process of finalising the design of a payment coefficient which would support the delivery of co-benefits through the BDS.

The issue of payment structuring was also raised as an important area needing closer consideration by the original BDS analysis in Viet Nam. Key questions around of what sort of benefit to pay (cash or in-kind), who would be eligible for benefits, and how benefits should be distributed at the local level were identified as key areas for investigation in the context of REDD+. As such, UN-REDD Programme commissioned SNV to conduct piloting activities that would investigate a system of self-selecting benefits with the intention of better understanding local preferences for different benefit types, and also testing a mechanism that would allow open and transparent involvement in the choice of benefits by those directly receiving the benefit. In particular, the UN-REDD Programme was interested in the following key components which form the basis of this report:

1. Designing and piloting management arrangements that provide local beneficiaries with the means to self-select payment structuring arrangements;
2. Designing processes to allow local authorities to record the different choices made by different beneficiary groups;
3. Designing processes to provide all beneficiary groups to monitor their own progress towards securing benefits according to their choices;
4. Designing processes to allow all beneficiary groups to have access to information that allows them to be assured of equitable application of payment structuring across different groups;
5. Designing processes to minimize all forms of corrupt practices in the administration of benefits

The foundation for this work relies on the first objective pertaining to the design and testing of the self-selection mechanism. As such, great care was taken by the SNV consultation team in ensuring that the design and piloting stage was as inclusive of various stakeholders as was possible in the timeframe allocated to the assignment. This included;

- Initial meetings with representatives from UN-REDD and MARD around the design of the self-selection activity and discussion on the criteria for selecting pilot villages

- Initial scoping of potential field sites, awareness raising activities alongside of key authorities in Lam Dong Province and consultations on the list of social criteria for selecting villages with relevant authorities
- Follow-up meetings with UN-REDD and MARD, and open consultations through the BDS Sub-technical Working Group (BDS STWG) to discuss the appropriate villages on the basis of the criteria developed alongside of MARD, UN-REDD and sub-national authorities
- Meetings alongside of the BDS Consultation team, UN-REDD and MARD to inform of our related activities
- Further meetings alongside of UN-REDD and MARD to agree on the self-selection activity, timing and resources of the piloting activity
- Second round of consultation with key interested stakeholders on the design of the self-selection activity through the BDS STWG
- Follow-up communication to local level authorities around the final plans and design of the self-selection activities

Although every effort has been made throughout this assignment to be as inclusive and consultative as possible in the design and implementation phase of this work, the results of the piloting activities should be considered in view of this exercise's exploratory nature and the fact that this is one of, if not the first, attempt to conduct such an exercise in the context of REDD+.

2.2 Field sites

Piloting of the self-selection mechanism was conducted across seven villages within Lam Ha and Di Linh Districts, Lam Dong Province, Viet Nam (refer to Map 1). As mentioned above, and in greater depth in the field report (see Appendix 1), seven villages were chosen on the basis of a range of agreed socio-economic criteria including ethnicity composition; gender; wealth and land tenure status. The villages chosen were:


- Lac Son (Phu Son commune, Lam Ha district)
- Prteng 2 (Phu Son commune, Lam Ha district)
- 1/5 (Phu Son commune, Lam Ha district)
- Phuc Hoa (Phuc Tho commune, Lam Ha district)
- Lam Bo (Phuc Tho commune, Lam Ha district)
- Hang Pior (Bao Thuan commune, Di Linh district)
- Hang Hai (Gung Re commune, Di Linh district)

Lam Ha and Di Linh are the two focus districts for the UN-REDD Programme's field activities in Lam Dong Province. Care was taken by the SNV team to choose villages within the two pilot districts that had been involved in Free, Prior Informed Consent (FPIC) activities conducted previously under the UN-REDD Programme. This was to ensure that the concept of REDD+ was at least familiar in the areas focused under the BDS work. It must be noted however that in two of the seven villages, 1/5 and Phuc Hoa, FPIC had not previously been conducted. In addition, village 1/5 was the only village not to also have undergone previous BDS consultation activities through parallel activities conducted by UN-REDD. However, the villagers were chosen on the basis of their socio-economic make-up and their potential future involvement in REDD+. Care

was taken in these villages to ensure the concept of REDD+ and BDS was well understood prior to conducting the self-selection activities due to the limited exposure villagers had to REDD+ concepts previously.

SNV also ensured that it consistently consulted the relevant agencies involved in BDS Consultation activities which were conducted prior to field testing in the villages under this assignment.

Further information on the villages and activities undertaken are detailed in Appendix 1 of this report.



Map 1: Field sites – Di Linh (pink) and Lam Ha (green) Districts, Lam Dong Province

2.3 Methodology

The pilots employed an innovative methodology specifically developed for this assignment. The 'REDD+ game' is a simple game intended to communicate key parameters of REDD+, in particular the conditionality of REDD+ that makes actual benefits dependent on actual performance. It is designed to facilitate collective choices about the kinds of benefits people prefer receiving from REDD+ actions, desirable schedules for the disbursement of the benefits and the institutional mechanisms used to disburse benefits, monitor and handle complaints. This section provides a brief summary of the REDD+ game. A detailed description of the methodology is contained in Annex 6 of Appendix 1.

The methodology presents groups of around 10 people with a hypothetical situation, asking them to assume a village of 100 households and 500 ha of natural forest. Villagers receive REDD+ benefits equivalent to VND800 million over five years if they achieve the contracted performance. The allocation of this expected/contracted sum to different kinds of benefits is up to villagers, as is the timing of their disbursement. Villagers can concentrate the expected REDD+ benefits in a single type of benefit, such as the upgrade of their village road in year 1, or spread them across various kinds of benefits and years.

Groups are also told that the actual level of overall REDD+ benefits depends on actual performance. Changes in forest carbon stocks are assessed every five years only, which means that villagers only know the actual level of overall benefits at the end of the five-year period. If actual performance meets the contracted performance (scenario 1) villagers receive the contracted benefits. To keep the game simple, scenario 1 assumes that villagers do not use the forest in any significant manner and keep out outsiders (i.e. not giving villagers an additional choice about the type of forest management regime and overall level of contracted benefits). If actual performance was less than contracted performance, people are told that they would be liable for shortfalls. If the shortfall was caused by events beyond villagers' control (e.g., a large forest fire) then villagers and the REDD+ Program would share liability equally (scenario 2). This meant that villagers would only get half of the contracted benefits. If the shortfall was caused by villagers' negligence, however, then they would be fully liable (scenario 3). For example, if villagers opened up agricultural fields in the forest, or allowed others to open up fields, then they would not get any of the contracted benefits in year 5 or would even have to re-pay benefits already disbursed to them in years 1-4.

Each group plays the REDD+ game in several steps:

- The facilitators explain the rules of the game.
- Groups identify possible kinds of benefits.
- Groups play through scenario 1: performance and benefits as expected.
- Groups play through scenario 2: big fire and subsequent loss of 50% of the benefits.
- Groups play through scenario 3: sloppy protection and complete loss of benefits.
- Groups confirm most desirable choice and disbursement of benefits.

In addition, the facilitators consult groups on the following items:

- Preferences on the modalities employed for the disbursement of cash payments
- Institutional mechanism used for disbursement of benefits
- Institutional mechanism for monitoring
- Institutional mechanism for complaint system

The self-selection exercises conclude with the recording of results. The village head, a member of the facilitation team and, if present, a forest protection officer prepare and sign minutes to document group choices (see template in Appendix 3). The minutes explicitly request the documentation of any complaints received about the procedure or results.

The REDD+ game can facilitate self-selection activities in two ways. First, it can serve consultations with representative groups of villagers, as practiced in the villages of 01/05, Lam Bo and Phuc Ho under this assignment. In this case, the self-selection process consists of a single consultation, mirroring common practice in participatory planning and development interventions in Viet Nam. Second, it can support a more inclusive approach to self-selection that seeks to integrate particular stakeholder groups in a proactive manner, as done for the villages of Lac Son, Prteng 2, Hang Pior and Hang Hai. In this case, the self-selection process proceeds through several rounds of consultations, starting with a general village assembly followed by consultations with specific stakeholder groups (e.g. gender- or wealth-based groups) leading into a final consultation with a representative group of villagers.

2.4 Results

The 15 self-selection exercises facilitated under this assignment generated rich insights into group preferences for the kinds of benefits people wanted to receive, schedules for benefit disbursement and the sorts of institutional mechanisms people wanted to see involved in the disbursements of the benefits and handling of complaints. The results of each self-selection exercises are documented in detail in the field report (see Appendix 1). This section provides a brief synthesis of:

- key commonalities in benefit choices,
- significant differences in benefit choices between groups,
- the effects of conditionality on benefit choices,
- the relationship between benefit choices and groups' social attributes (gender, ethnicity, wealth and tenure) and
- group preferences for the institutions to disburse benefits and handle complaints.

Commonalities in benefit choices

The 15 groups generally favoured three broad types of benefits: funding for forest protection, cash payments and support for agricultural production (see Table 1). Other kinds of benefits played a marginal role, including the construction of infrastructure and social support.

Table 1: Benefit choice by group (Scenario 1)

Group	Productive investment	Infrastructure construction	Forest protection	Cash payment	Social support
1	400	200	200	0	0
2				800	
3	320	160	300		
4	500		200		100
5			200	600	
6			100	700	
7	600		200		
8			800		
9	some		some	some	
10	400	200	200		
11	200	400	200		
12			800		
13	200	200	160	240	
14	240		560		
15				800	
Total	2860	1160	3940	3140	100

Note: Group 9 identified priority benefits but did not quantify the distribution of overall benefits among the priorities.

In terms of specific kinds of benefits, financial support for forest patrols came out as the number one priority across all groups. Under scenario 1, most groups decided to allocate some of the finance expected from REDD+ for forest patrols, as only two groups did not do so. In addition, funding for forest patrols was the type of benefit that attracted the highest monetary allocation across all groups. Twelve of the 13 groups requesting funding for forest patrols would use the funding to pay village households, Group 14 preferring to

contract forest rangers for the task. Ten of the 13 groups proposed annual payments for patrols, the other three suggesting one-time payments at either the beginning or the end of the five-year period. In comparison, the groups allocated very minor amounts of expected REDD+ benefits for other forest protection activities, such as the registration of forestland certificates, training, equipment for fire control or purchase of insurance.

Cash payments to individual households came out as a shared second priority across groups. Although only five groups wanted individual payments under scenario 1, the total budget allocated to such payments amounted to three quarters of the money assigned to forest patrols. Only one group expressed a preference for cash payments to the entire village community under scenario 1 (2 groups each in scenarios 2 and 3).

Provision of agricultural inputs showed up as a close third priority across groups in terms of overall monetary allocation. Under scenario 1 the budget allocated to agricultural inputs was just a little smaller than the one assigned to individual cash payments. Agricultural investments were considered by a larger number of groups than cash payments, however, nine in total. In addition, the budget allocated to agricultural investments equalled the allocation to forest patrols if one includes the money dedicated to agricultural training.

Differences in benefit choices between groups

Despite these commonalities, there were significant differences in benefit choices between groups (see Table 1). Under scenario 1, some groups allocated the entire amount or large shares of the expected REDD+ benefits to forest patrols, whereas others did not dedicate a single Dong to such. Similarly, cash payments to individual households were the single most important benefit of choice for some groups but not valued by other groups. The share allocated to agricultural investments varied from zero to three quarters of the expected REDD+ benefits. A few groups decided to allocate some of the benefits to the construction of infrastructure (road upgrade, clean water, communal house, clinic, houses for poor households) or social support (support for expenses on schooling), whereas others did not.

The groups also displayed significant differences in their preferences for the timing of benefit disbursement, even if one looks at scenario 1 only. Group 9 wanted to have all benefits disbursed in year 5 only, in stark contrast to Group 3, which expressed a preference for the disbursement of all benefits in year 1 already. All other groups decided for gradual disbursements, yet still differed in relative allocations between years.


The effects of conditionality on benefit choices

Group choices clearly reflected the effects of conditionality as evidenced by changes in the kinds and timing of benefits between the three scenarios. The preferences voiced by groups changed even though the facilitating team explained the modalities of REDD+ to all groups at the beginning of each self-selection exercise, highlighting conditionality as novel key feature that sets REDD+ apart from the forest protection programs known to people already. The participants only began to understand the significance of conditionality when they were presented with scenarios 2 and 3, under which parts of or entire REDD+ benefits are withheld as a consequence of non-performance.

Understanding of conditionality made groups change their preference for the timing of benefit disbursement between years (see Figure 1). In comparison with scenario 1, groups shifted disbursements to the last year in


scenarios 2 and 3. An extreme case was Group 2, which decided to shift all cash payments to the last year under scenario 3. Group 7 decided to allocate half of the total benefits to cash payments in year 5 under scenario 2 as a way to avoid the potential repayment of benefits disbursed earlier. Group 8 changed the annual allocations for forest patrols from an equal distribution under scenario 1 to increasingly end-loaded distributions under scenarios 2 and 3.

Figure 1: Disbursement of benefits in years 1-5 (in per cent)



Understanding of conditionality also caused groups to modify their benefit choices in scenarios 2 and 3 (see Figure 2). The allocations given to productive activities, particularly agricultural production, increased, as people expected these activities to generate high returns which could potentially fund required repayments of REDD+ benefits. For example, Group 1 dropped the preference expressed for modest infrastructure construction under scenario 1 for productive investments under scenarios 2 and 3. Group 4 moved all expected REDD+ benefits into productive investments under scenario 3, including the payments for forest patrols proposed under the two other scenarios. Group 15 decided to use all expected REDD+ benefits for agricultural investments in year 1 with the same rationale. Group 3 developed the idea to put a large share of the expected REDD+ benefits into a bank account in year 1 to cover possible liabilities and still generate a return on the investment through the accrued interest. In comparison, the overall allocation for forest patrols remained fairly stable across the three scenarios.

Figure 2: Distribution of benefits (in per cent)



The groups reacted to conditionality not only by changing the choices and timing of benefits but also in several unexpected ways. First, six groups declared in reaction to scenario 3 that they would no longer participate in REDD+ actions or were reluctant to commit to a stringent performance base. Group 6, for example, concluded that participation in REDD+ would be too risky for them. Groups 11, 12 and 13 decided that they did not want to accept any benefits if they risked losing them again. Groups 1 and 9 did not provide any preferences for scenario 3 out of reluctance to commit to such as scenario.

Second, three groups questioned the definition of performance base provided under the REDD+ game. Groups 2 and 5 declared that they would insist on exact measurement of the volume of carbon lost. Group 8 said that any repayment of disbursed benefits would need to happen only if preceded by measurement of the actual area of forest cleared.

Third, four groups announced that they would hold liable the particular individuals causing forest loss under scenario 3 and rejected any collective responsibility for forest carbon losses. Groups 2, 5 and 10 stated that they would force the culpable individuals to compensate other households for any losses in REDD+ benefits occurred under scenario 3. Group 5 even threatened to log over the forest if they were held collectively accountable for the forest loss. Group 13 reported that they would reclaim any losses in REDD+ benefits from responsible individuals under scenario 2 and would not even consider participating in REDD+ actions of scenario 3 was plausible.

Fourth, several groups indicated that the performance base of REDD+ benefits pay generate counterproductive outcomes if not dealt with in a suitable manner. Groups 6 and 8, for example, indicated that they would reduce the allocation of REDD+ benefits to forest patrols under scenarios 2 and 3 in an effort to avoid expenses that could later not be recouped. They did not mind that their decisions to reduce funding

for forest patrols may make forest losses due to fire or clearance more likely. Group 5 threatened to log over forests, as mentioned above, if they were held collectively accountable for possible losses. In contrast, Group 14 openly admitted that the conditionality was not credible on the basis of their experience with a government loan programme, where they had successfully resisted the requirement to repay. In reaction to their resistance the government had eventually waived repayment of all outstanding loans. Finally, Group 8 also made it very clear that they did not mind repaying REDD+ benefits as the expected benefits from conversion to agriculture (particularly coffee cultivation) was likely to generate higher returns than participation in REDD+.

The relation between benefit choices and group attributes

Group choices reflected the influence of groups' social attributes. Women prioritized other kinds of benefits and chose different schedules for their delivery than men, and better-off people chose other kinds and timings than poor people. In contrast, the potential influence of ethnicity (Kinh, local ethnic minority, migrant ethnic minority) or tenure status (people holding forest protection contracts or not) did not become apparent.

Men and women selected different kinds of benefits in the two Kinh villages with gender-based groups. In Hang Hai, men (Group 14) allocated most expected REDD+ benefits to payments for forest patrols (see Table 1 as well as the table on the pilot villages in Appendix 1). The women's group (Group 15) assigned all expected benefits to cash payments to households, however. In Lac Son, the women's group (Group 2) wanted all benefits to go into community funds, whereas the men's group (Group 1) distributed the expected benefits among agricultural investments, construction of infrastructure and forest patrols. These differences match common gender divisions in labour and decision-making in villages. As patrols are usually undertaken by men, men tend to have a bigger say about the use of payments for patrols than about cash payments to households. Similarly, men are often the ones applying agricultural inputs, receiving agricultural training and deciding about the use of agricultural inputs.

Men and women also displayed varying degrees of risk aversion leading to different shifts in allocation under scenarios 2 and 3. Women tended to be more cautious than men in the two villages with gender-based groups. In Hang Hai, the women's Group 15 decided to allocate all funds to productive investments in agriculture in year 1 under scenario 3, following the rationale that villagers, if necessary, could repay disbursed REDD+ benefits from the yields of agricultural investments. The men's Group 14, in contrast, did not significantly change the allocation of benefits to forest rangers spread across all 5 years. In Lac Son, the women's Group 2 shifted all cash payments to year 5 under scenario 3, whereas the men's Group 1 rejected the scenario outright.

Better-off and poor people chose different benefits and disbursement schedules in the one indigenous village with wealth-based groups (Hang Pior), differences that matched wealth-specific patterns of need and ability. Group 13 including only average and poor people (and no better-off people) prioritized a house construction program for poor households, support for agricultural investments and equal cash payments to all households under scenario 1 (see Table 1). Group 12 including all sorts of households decided to allocate all expected benefits to funding for forest patrols. Payments for forest patrols often favour average and better-off households as they tend to be over-represented in patrolling activities. Poor households often lack the required time or do not enjoy the trust of fellow villagers in their ability to perform forest protection tasks.

Similarly, Group 13 preferred an earlier disbursement of REDD+ benefits than Group 12, which spread out the disbursement evenly across years.

The insights gained on the potential influence of ethnicity on benefit choices were inconclusive. On the one hand, the proposal to contract forest protection officers came up in two villages only, both of them inhabited by Kinh people (Groups 1 and 14). None of the groups involving ethnic minority participants developed this proposal. The idea to put all expected REDD+ benefits into a bank account also emerged in two Kinh groups only (Groups 3 and 15). These differences fit expected differences between Kinh and ethnic minorities in their relations with forest protection officers and the banking system. Similarly, the two Groups 4 and 5 consist of resident and migrant ethnic minority people, respectively, in Prteng 2 village preferred different kinds of benefits (see Table 1). On the other hand, cross-village comparisons between groups of different ethnic composition did not reveal any systematic variation. For example, the Kinh Groups 1 and 3 came out with similar benefit choices under Scenario 1 as the resident ethnic Group 7 (see Table 1). The only group prioritizing community cash payments over individual cash payments under Scenario 1 was the women's Group 2. Not a single ethnic minority group did so under Scenario 1. Overall, there was always the possibility that some of the overlap between benefit choices and ethnic differences was due to other differences between villages. For example, the preference of Group 11 for the construction of a communal house may be more due to the absence of such in Phuc Hoa village (and the existence of one in neighbouring Lam Bo village) than differences in ethnic composition between Groups 10 and 11.

Similarly, there were no apparent differences in benefit choices between groups including current holders of forest protection contracts and those consisting of people without contracts. The tenure-based Groups 4 and 7 in Prteng 2 village did not reveal different preferences (see Table 1). Group 12 in another village displayed a strong preference for the disbursement of benefits tied to forest patrols, but no direct comparison was possible with a group including people without contracts in the same village. In fact, preferences for funding forest patrols emerged from groups including current contract holders just as much from groups including people without contracts.

Preferences for institutional mechanisms

Group responses to the questions about institutional mechanisms revealed a clear preference for giving village institutions a role in the handling disbursements and suggested a desire for involving the Commune People's Committee in the processing of complaints. Ten out of twelve groups responding to the question assigned a primary role in disbursement to various village-level institutions, including a village management board dedicated to REDD+ and forest management, existing villagers leaders or newly established forest protection groups. Five out of eight groups responding attributed a significant role to the Commune People's Committee for the handling of complaints. Two suggested the utility of a hotline established at a higher-level agency involved in REDD+. The groups did not offer practicable recommendations on suitable institutional mechanisms for monitoring disbursement of REDD+ benefits and village's progress towards benefit realization.

3. Lessons Learnt & Recommendations

The following section sets out the key lessons learnt and recommendations under the headings consistent with the 5 main objectives explored under this assignment (see Section 2.1). It is hoped that this section will be used as guidance for similar activities to be carried out not only in Viet Nam, but also in other REDD+ implementing countries.

3.1 Design and piloting of the self-selection process

The detailed methodology for the self-selection activity ('the REDD+ game') is provided in Annex 6 of the field report (Appendix 1 to this report). As described above, the methodology was agreed upon alongside of members of the UN-REDD Programme following consultation at both the national and sub-national levels.

In general, the REDD+ game was seen to have been very effective in meeting its overall intention of eliciting the responses of local REDD+ beneficiaries under a suite of different scenarios. This is reflected in the insightful results which provide an interesting insight into the preferences of local stakeholders and the variance of the responses according to the agreed socio-economic variables. Experience from the 15 self-selection exercises conducted in Lam Dong province indicates that the REDD+ game provides a socially and culturally appropriate procedure for self-selection activities. The procedure can serve people to make collective choices about the kinds of benefits and disbursement schedules in a variety of social and cultural contexts. The REDD+ game works by communicating trade-offs between different benefits and disbursement schedules in a simple and iterative manner. Different scenarios help people to become aware of the performance basis of REDD+ benefits and make their choices accordingly.

Recommendation 1:

Employ the REDD+ game to facilitate self-selection activities in the future.

However, a number of lessons were also learnt and will help to improve future activities using this model.

One of the most significant lessons learnt from the activities was the coordination and planning of the activities on the ground. As alluded to in the field report, conducting the 15 activities across the 7 villages proved challenging in the time allocated. This led to activities being conducted in the evening times, and often significant time pressures were placed on staff coordinating the exercise.

It was also found that despite separate activities being conducted through UN-REDD around BDS consultation in the areas the BDS piloting was carried out, many participants still were not familiar with the concept of REDD+, and therefore, BDS. As such, the pilot team also invested time in conducting basic consultations on REDD+ and BDS.

Awareness-raising and training remains a daunting task to undertake in preparation for socially and culturally appropriate self-selection activities. The significance of awareness raising and training finds illustration in two observations made in Lam Dong. First, many people expressed serious concerns over the conditionality of REDD+ benefits (see Section 2.4). Their reactions demonstrated that they had not been aware of this defining


feature of REDD+ before despite participation in the FPIC and BDS consultations. Given the FPIC activities were conducted almost 2 years ago, it is reasonable to expect that people had not retained all of the information conveyed through the initial FPIC exercises. This point emphasises the necessity of follow-up consultations. Second, many groups chose to allocate a significant share of REDD+ benefits to funding of forest patrols. It was not clear to what extent this choice was mere reflection of past practice and habits or revealed 'true' preference for forest patrols. The danger is that group choices remain strongly conditioned by past government approaches to forest protection unless villagers are clearly communicated the difference between past protection and future REDD+ and the new options available to them under REDD+ (e.g. conditional tenure transfers for forestland, something that remains unimaginable to people in many areas without forestland allocation, such as in Lam Dong).

Recommendation 2:

To ensure appropriate planning and timing is allocated for future activities, on-the-ground BDS piloting activities should be considered in 3 key phases. These phases are listed below, alongside of Figure 3 which indicates timings suggested for conducting a similar sized pilot trial as conducted here (i.e. 15 activities across 7 villages in 2 districts). A more detailed list of resources to support the Phases is listed in Appendix 2:

- **Phase 1: REDD+ & BDS consultation activities & selection of pilot sites (2 weeks) - It is recommended that the same organisation is used to conduct both the consultation and piloting activities. This will ensure consistency of materials and terminology used, and will ultimately improve the timeliness of activities. These activities should also look to explore points of confusion around terminology and operations of REDD+. This will allow time for exercises to be adjusted prior to conducting the piloting activities. Furthermore, field visits and the collection of hard data should be conducted to assist with the appropriate choice of pilot sites;**
- **Phase 2: BDS awareness raising (2 weeks) – Conducting village-level awareness raising activities in each village. Approximately one day per village is considered appropriate for these activities, to account for travel and the reporting of results from these meetings. These activities should also include the involvement of officials who are involved in overseeing the self-selection exercise (i.e. in this case, the CPC and forest protection officials).**
- **Phase 3: BDS Piloting activities (2 weeks) – Conducting and recording the actual self-selection piloting activities. Specific details on the timing and location of these activities are detailed in the following recommendations.**

Figure 3: Key outcomes of each phase (refer to Appendix 2 for further details and resources)



The insights from Lam Dong suggest the benefits of adapting the REDD+ game to the specific conditions of each village. In Lam Dong, villagers noted that they would prefer doing the REDD+ game on the background of their own village, something that was not done this time in order to avoid creating unfounded expectations. In the future, however, it will be possible to introduce some flexibility to the game which would allow adjustments to specific circumstances (in terms of the number of villagers and forest area). Such flexibility will be necessary when villages are asked to make binding REDD+ contracts under Viet Nam’s future REDD+ program. Adapting the REDD+ game to the specific conditions of particular villages will not complicate the self-selection process from villagers’ perspectives but make it easier for them to understand the available choices and envision their consequences. The adaptations will impose additional demands on facilitation skills and preparation time, however.

Recommendation 3:

Make use of village development or forest development plans during Phase 2 to develop a village-specific scenario that involves a realistic land boundary area that is familiar to participants. An assessment of the existing infrastructure, agricultural activities and other variables which may translate into different benefit types should also be conducted in Phase 2 to assist in the development of the suite of benefits. This will help participants to relate to the scenario presented and thus will improve the responses around benefit choices and trade-offs

The use of translators to assist in conducting the self-selection activity was seen as absolutely necessary to the success of the piloting, particularly for translation into the languages of resident ethnic minorities. Two translators were present throughout the piloting activity, one speaking K’ho, one speaking Tay language. Although ethnic minority representatives were found to take more time to understand and respond to the activity, the presence of the translators was seen as necessary to making these participants feel comfortable to voice their opinion and become involved in the selection of REDD+ benefit types.

A key lesson to be learnt was observed here however in terms of the time that was needed to explain and run the activity in different languages. In some cases, it was found that two translators were needed in one activity scenario, which prevented simultaneous activities being conducted at one time. This obviously slowed down the activities and led to some being conducted at not ideal times in the evening. For future exercises, it is recommended that more time is allocated to consultations involving ethnic minority groups.

Having the translators involved in the early stages of the development of the self-selection activities would also facilitate better understanding of how the scenarios will be played out in the game, and will in turn improve the efficiency of future activities.

Recommendation 4:

Select a large group of translators that is consistent with the ethnic composition of the group. At least one translator should be present for each activity group.

Key lessons were also learnt throughout this exercise relating to the ideal group size, timing and organisation of groups prior to the activity.

As discussed in the field report (Appendix 1), the selection of villages and activity groups was conducted following the initial awareness raising activities. Village heads were also informed up to 5 days in advance of the activities and were requested to notify participants of the groups of their role in the activity. However, it was found that in some cases, this information was not passed on to participants suggesting that follow-up with the village leaders is necessary for future activities. In other cases, not enough time had been given by the pilot team for people to be given enough notice. As such, the pilot team often had to adjust to fluctuating participant numbers, or involve people who were not originally in the planned activities. Furthermore, it was also deemed that at times, group participation became too large to manage for the pilot team. This led to instances where certain people would dominate the discussions, and others would leave as a consequence.

Recommendation 5:

Groups of around 10 people per 2 facilitators (plus translators) are recommended for running future activities. Village leaders should also be given at least one week to notify and obtain consent from the selected village participants of their involvement in the activity. Where the risk of introducing bias is seen as minimal, the village leader could also be involved in selecting the representatives for the activity in order to streamline this process. Finally, more time should be invested in explaining how the self-selection game will work to village leaders (or other village representatives) so that they can better convey to likely participants the intention of the exercise. This could be conducted during Phase 2 of the self-selection activities.

In terms of timing, each small group discussions needed at least 2.5 to 3 hours to complete the instruction, interpretation, collecting of information for the 3 scenarios, management mechanisms/complaints, and the completion of records. As alluded to earlier, the time needed was even longer than that for indigenous groups who often required translations and multiple explanations. Prior to group discussions, plenary meetings were also conducted for about 1 hour. These lengthy discussions made participants tired and lost concentration, especially in the second half of the session.

This problem was compounded by the fact that the activities needed to be conducted at a point in time which straddled key religious and harvesting times. Due to the delayed timing of BDS consultation activities, the piloting activity timing was delayed until January 2012. This followed important Christmas celebrations for many people in the villages of Christian belief. Furthermore, the timing coincided with the lead-up to Tet (Vietnamese New Year) celebrations and harvesting, and coffee drying activities. As such, the pilot team needed to adjust the timings of the meetings to the evening time.

Recommendation 6:

Aim to conduct activities in 1 village per day. Each activity should look at ways of breaking up the discussions into sessions. Dividing the activity and limiting it to one activity for each village, in addition to other recommendations listed here will help to reduce the time required from participants and improve the responses from individuals.

A related issue to the above practicalities of the activity is the location of the piloting activity. The choice of an appropriate venue is important in terms of making people feel comfortable in their surroundings to

encourage open and meaningful responses. As such, wherever possible, SNV conducted the activities in a community space, such as community hall of the people's committee or community house. However, for various reasons, this was not an option, and activities were run in the private houses of village leaders. Although it is difficult to determine the effect this had on people's willingness to participate, ideally this situation would be avoided.

Recommendation 7:

Piloting activities should aim to be conducted at a time and location that is convenient to the participants involved and conducive to participants' involvement. Ideally, activities should be conducted in the mornings to avoid unsociable behaviour, and at times that do not coincide with important ceremonies or productivity periods. Wherever possible, conduct the BDS piloting activity in a community-based venue to encourage open and meaningful participation from all respondents. This must require closer cooperation with the village leader in planning for the activities in advance.

The intention of conducting the activity in a hypothetical 'game-like' scenario was to ensure that people were engaged to make realistic decisions, while still making the activity understandable and enjoyable for participants to be involved in. As such, the support from appropriate visual aids was important.

A full list of the resources used can be found in the field report and included cardboard graphics, presentations and discussion boards. Although these were seen as useful and necessary, it was acknowledged that more graphics and visual aids could have been incorporated to make the activity more enjoyable for participants.

Recommendation 8:

Produce a large set of visual aid per activity group to stimulate greater understanding and interest in the activity.

A final lesson taken away from the piloting activities concerns participation payments. As is consistent with other formats in Viet Nam (e.g. meetings and workshops), participants were compensated for their participation in most activities with a cash payment of VND50,000. The disbursement of a small participation payment was considered necessary to acknowledge the opportunity cost of people's time spent being involved in the activity. It was also viewed as an effective mechanism to encourage meaningful participation in the activities given the common practice in Viet Nam to compensate people for the time spent participating in meetings and consultations. At the same time, the field team witnessed a dispute caused by a community member who was not involved in the activity but wanted to be participate for financial reasons.

In addition, the field team conducted a few activities without paying participants for their time in cash after intervention by the UN-REDD Programme. The field team provided non-cash benefits to participants instead of cash payments, such as T-shirts, notebooks and caps. The team had the impression that the lack of financial compensation discouraged participation, with many people leaving half way through the activity. People's decisions to abandon the activities may have been due to other factors, however.

Future exercises should ensure consistency in the use of compensation for people's time. Moreover, it is important that consensus is reached prior to activities being undertaken, and that the UN-REDD Programme provides clear guidance before field activities are undertaken.

Recommendation 9:

Local participants should be appropriately compensated¹ for their participation in the activity. This should be communicated prior to conducting the activities in order to improve participation, but also to minimise any tension between participants and non-participants. The appropriate type and size of compensation

¹ 'Appropriate compensation' may take many forms, and can include both cash and non-cash (e.g. refreshments, small gifts).

should be determined according to the specific local context, cultural appropriateness and practiced norms in the area.

3.2 Recording mechanisms

The self-selection exercises concluded with their documentation in minutes (*biên bản cuộc họp*) signed by the village head, a member of the facilitation team and, if present, a district FPD staff member. The reason for asking a district staff member to certify benefit choices was pragmatic: they have the mandate to deal with forest-related matters, and there are no institutional mechanisms dedicated to the implementation of REDD+ in place yet. It was not easy for the district FPD staff to make time available for activities not part of their regular duties and not included in their work plans, in which cases, they therefore felt uncomfortable to sign minutes for meetings that they had not attended personally. Particularly in villages where two or three groups would meet concurrently, officers were reluctant to offer the requested signature.

In the future, it will be advisable to actively engage members of the REDD+ Management Boards to be established under Viet Nam's national REDD+ Programme. Members of the Boards to operate at the district or provincial level would need to oversee the REDD+ self-selection activities within their jurisdiction and consequently sign the minutes prepared by the facilitation team. In addition, the minutes would need to be counter-signed by the village head and then be sent to the Commune People's Committee and REDD+ Management Board for countersigning.

This process may look cumbersome but will be unavoidable to make the results of self-selection exercises official, particularly if the exercises should be facilitated by external professionals, as advised in this report. The results will only become official if the relevant government agencies take official notice of them, as it is common practice in the implementation of government policy. For example, when villagers develop forest protection and management regulations under a community forestry project, they sign minutes with the responsible government agency, i.e., the local Forest Protection Unit. The document is usually countersigned (*phê duyệt*) by other governmental units, such as the Commune People's Committee. The counter-signature is a necessary requirement for 'economic activities', under which future REDD+ contracts are likely to fall. 'Economic activities' require the stamp of the People's Committee at the next higher level, i.e. the Commune People's Committee.

The simple template for the minutes served the purpose in Lam Dong and can be expected to do so in the future. See the template provided in Appendix 3.

Recommendation 10:

Members of REDD+ Management Boards to be established under Viet Nam's national REDD+ Programme oversee self-selection activities and document their results in minutes prepared by the facilitation team and counter-signed by the village head, CPC and REDD+ Management Board.

3.3 Monitoring progress towards securing benefits

A key complementary component of a system which allows for local stakeholders to self-select the benefits received through REDD+ activities is a mechanism to allow local participants to monitor their progress towards securing these benefits. This is seen as important for many reasons. Firstly, a mechanism which would allow communities to monitor their progress would empower communities with information to track their progress towards payments. This has a follow-on benefit of improving people's understanding of the link between their performance and the payments they receive. This is vital under a system such as REDD+. Secondly, such a mechanism could be seen as an important measure to prevent local level corruption in the form of the embezzlement of payments meant for local communities. Communities who are informed as to their progress towards receiving benefits are in a stronger position to trace and report any potential wrongdoings in the transfer of benefits for their efforts.

Although the original plan under this assignment was to design training modules for a self-monitoring system, SNV was later given the direction by UN-REDD following meetings with various representatives of the Viet Nam Programme, to instead suggest a system, or systems, which could be used to complement future BDS self-selection activities.

Following further discussions with UN-REDD and other key stakeholders, in addition to reflecting on activities conducted in the field, it is recommended that Participatory Forest Monitoring (PFM) could be tested and incorporated into future piloting activities as a potentially effective mechanism for all beneficiary groups to monitor their own progress towards securing benefits according to their choices.

PFM involves local stakeholders implementing REDD+ activities (i.e. forest owners, villagers, and forest protection rangers) to measure and monitor environmental and social changes as a result of REDD+ in their locality. This would require training of local stakeholders in measuring and monitoring simple yet robust indicators of forest carbon, other ecosystem goods and services, biodiversity, social and governance parameters.

PFM is broader than just the monitoring of forest carbon. Instead, PFM recognises the role of local actors in generating data for a range of REDD+ and broader collaborative sustainable forest management. In particular, in the context of this exercise, PFM could be an effective mechanism for enabling local actors to check against the payments that are being made to them under REDD+. As indicated by the pilots (see Appendix 1 on group 2), villages want to acquire the capacity to estimate forest carbon stocks. In addition, four groups expressed the idea to hold individuals responsible for incurred forest carbon losses, an idea that they could only realize if given the means to assess changes in forest carbon stocks themselves (see Section 3.4).

Already, PFM has been piloted tested in Lam Dong Province through SNVs REDD+ activities in Viet Nam. Initial piloting has been conducted in 2 districts, with 18 villages across 4 communes. Activities include field testing and producing standard operating procedures, as well as developing an operational framework. This work is being carried out in close collaboration with local partners with the aim of demonstrating the value of engaging primary stakeholders in forest monitoring for the national forest inventory, and with future extension possibilities in linking to the development of low-emissions reductions plans.

In addition to the other benefits of this system listed above (i.e. anti-corruption and improved participation), PFM could also be seen as a complementary measure to the Measurement, Reporting and Verification (MRV) framework. Although a participatory generated data would not be an appropriate platform for which the MRV would be based, PFM could act as a useful 'ground-truthing' of remote sensing activities conducted through the MRV system, in addition to contributing Tier 3 emissions factor calculations for certain forest carbon pools.

The potential benefits of using PFM as a monitoring mechanism for BDS payments may also extend to the fact that activities could be linked into a participation-based payment system under REDD+. This idea stems from the proposal that two forms of payments will flow to local REDD+ actors; one for participation, and another results-based payment. The former payment could therefore be considered to be paid for the time spent conducting PFM exercises.

Recommendation 11:

Pilot Participatory Forest Monitoring as a multifaceted REDD+ mechanism, which would allow in the BDS context, local stakeholders to monitor their progress towards achieving the REDD+ benefits chosen in the self-selection exercise. This should include an assessment of the usefulness of PFM as a measure to confer improved forest governance through REDD+, in addition to testing how PFM can contribute to other REDD+ interventions such as the MRV and safeguard information systems, lower emissions development planning, and the monitoring of Policies and Measures (PaMs) effectiveness. Future activities could investigate the potential for payments through PFM.

3.4 Social and cultural appropriateness

The experience from Lam Dong shows that the REDD+ game works with a variety of people from different economic, social and cultural backgrounds and provides a procedure for inclusive and equitable participation in self-selection of REDD+ benefits. Better-off and poor people, men and women as well as members of the Kinh majority and various ethnic minorities showed the capacity to utilize the game effectively for collective decision-making on REDD+ benefits. Some ethnic minority people, particularly those belonging to local resident groups, required translation into their language (see Recommendation 4). The translation prolonged the duration of the self-selection exercises but also allowed their successful completion. Only one out of 15 groups encountered significant problems, a group consisting of local ethnic minority women. Group 9 chose the kinds of desirable benefits from REDD+, but it was not able to quantify the allocation.

The REDD+ game opens up possibilities for equitable participation by various stakeholders in REDD+. The procedure is sufficiently flexible to allow for inclusion of multiple groups based on gender, wealth, ethnicity, tenure or other social attributes. The number of groups and their composition can be adapted in reaction to concrete circumstances. The importance of separate consultations with specific stakeholder groups finds illustration in the different benefit choices and disbursement schedules identified by the gender-based groups in Lac Son (Groups 1 and 2) and Hang Hai (Groups 14 and 15) as well as the wealth-based Groups 12 and 13 in Hang Pior. The REDD+ game, thereby, avoids the pitfalls of simply relying on a 'representative group' for eliciting local people's preferences. Instead, it provides a concrete procedure for calibrating the choices made by a representative group with the choices made by individual stakeholder groups. While this procedure will not entirely rule out the possibility of elite domination or the marginalization of disadvantaged stakeholders, it offers important new opportunities for making collective decision-making more inclusive.

The REDD+ game also provides the flexibility to capture and make constructive use of different notions of equity with regards to benefit choices. All groups consulted in Lam Dong displayed a clear concern with equity, as reflected in the frequent preference for the equitable provision of benefits to individual households (e.g. agricultural inputs, payments for forest patrols or cash payments). At the same time, the experience from Lam Dong also demonstrates that people harbour different notions of what kinds of distribution are equitable. Some groups defined equity as equal distribution, as illustrated by equal cash payments to households. Other groups wanted to provide equal rewards to effort, such as in the case of labour-based payments for forest patrols. Two groups professed to a notion of equity based on need, as illustrated by the proposal to use some of the expected benefits for the construction of houses for the poor. The REDD+ game provides the means to express different understandings of equity, facilitate a discussion about them and eventually recognize different notions of equity underlying benefit choices.

The insights from Lam Dong generate important implications for efforts to scale up the conduct of self-selection activities to larger numbers of villages. On the one hand, the self-selection activities conducted in Lam Dong required significant investments of time and human resources (see Section 3.1). On the other, they also suggested the importance of employing an inclusive approach that reaches out to particular stakeholders in a proactive manner. The latter requires additional time commitments from both villagers and facilitators. Attempts to scale up thus encounter a tricky trade-off between an effective and fair approach, on the one hand, and efficiency in the use of resources, on the other.

The lessons learned in Lam Dong caution against efforts to speed up and simplify self-selection activities, as such efforts would endanger their effectiveness in revealing local people's preferences and fairness in terms of including various kinds of stakeholders. In particular, simple reliance on representative groups of villagers could easily lead to benefit choices not representative of major stakeholders, as illustrated by the difference between men's and women's groups highlighted above. The experience from Lam Dong thus provides strong evidence in favour of employing the REDD+ game for actively including a variety of stakeholders, particularly disadvantaged stakeholders, in self-selection activities.

Recommendation 12:

Incorporate proactive consultations with selected stakeholder groups, particularly marginalized social groups such as women and ethnic minorities, into the design of self-selection activities. Rely on representative groups of villagers only if there is sufficient evidence for accountable and inclusive representation in villages.

The experience from Lam Dong suggests that the REDD+ game operates at an appropriate level of simplification, even though the game will need further testing and development in the future. All groups made productive use of the procedure to choose benefits. At the same time, the insights gained during the self-selection activities caution against modifications of the game which may make it more realistic but also complicate it. For example, it would be desirable to offer people a choice about forest management (e.g. limited clearing for agriculture versus low-impact logging versus strict protection) simultaneously with the choices about the kinds and disbursement schedules of benefits. Such a modification may fit current theoretical ideas about REDD+ but would need to be tested carefully so they do not exceed local people's capacity to visualize the choices available to them together with their implications.

Recommendation 13:

Keep the scenarios presented to villagers at self-selection activities simple to facilitate understanding of key choices and trade-offs. It is better to err on the side of simplicity than present too much information to villagers in very abstract and technical terms.

Similar to simplification, expert facilitation will be a critical precondition for socially and culturally appropriate self-selection activities which provide equitable opportunities for participation and benefit-sharing in the future. Expert facilitation will be crucial because local people have varied preferences for the kinds and disbursement schedules of benefits. The diversity of preferences will only be recognized if expert facilitators encourage and help people to reveal them. Facilitators will need to ensure that people are informed about REDD+ and the purpose of the self-selection exercises well in advance. In Lam Dong, many people were still unclear about even key parameters of REDD+ (such as the conditionality of benefits!) even though they had participated in FPIC consultations in 2010 and BDS consultations just a couple of weeks earlier. Facilitators will also need to pick the right time for the conduct of self-selection exercises, identifying a period in which local people are not busy with agricultural activities or major cultural events. The facilitators will require not only knowledge of facilitation skills but also experience with work in remote rural areas and ethnic minority villages, a combination that remains rare in Viet Nam and may call for strategic investment in the development of suitable facilitation skills by the Government of Viet Nam and donors.

Recommendation 14:

Employ expert facilitators for the conduct of self-selection activities who combine facilitation skills with experience of work in remote areas and ethnic minority villages of Viet Nam.

3.5 Anti-corruption measures

REDD+ is complex and exposed at many levels to different forms of corruption. The UNDP (2010) identifies two principle corruption risks in REDD+:

1. Corruption during the readiness phase. The scale of corruption here is identified as being grand corruption and political corruption. This poses a significant threat in terms of the self-interest that key stakeholders may look to protect through influencing the design of national REDD+ policy
2. Corruption during the implementation phase. Here, grand and political corruption remains a risk. However, petty corruption also becomes a major factor. In this case, lower level officials are open to bribery offers to ignore illegal activities, or create favourable conditions for certain REDD+ actors.

The extent to which corruption is a risk during the implementation phase will be linked to the effectiveness of measures to address corruption during the readiness phase. For example, the formation of transparent multi-stakeholder recourse mechanism boards for benefit distribution during the readiness phase will help send clear messages to stakeholders early-on about the desire to ensure transparency in the distribution of REDD+ benefits. By the time of implementation, the boards' should have well enforced roles and responsibilities to oversee appropriate systems for benefit distribution. Such roles could include acting as a local focal point for conflict resolutions by conducting regular meetings in different villages. The boards could then act as a liaison between local actors and government to resolve conflicts, with a direct reporting line to the national level recourse mechanism board that is being proposed under current national-level design plans for the BDS. The boards would also need to be represented by a broad range of trusted representatives to ensure that local actors feel comfortable in relaying their concerns without threat of any negative repercussions. Local representative groups, such as the Women's Union, Farmer's Union and Fatherland Front are examples of existing groups that could form part of any new recourse mechanism.

The focus of this section of the report will remain on corruption during the implementation phase. This section will also focus on the issue of local level corruption as it is most pertinent to the activities carried out through this exercise. Local level corruption is defined here as being corruption that may occur after money has been transferred from the national level down to the provincial level. Although by this stage a lot of money may have already been appropriated by corrupt activities, the issue of local level corruption in the BDS is still very important and needs close consideration to ensure that the pool of benefits meant for local actors is not (further) eroded once it reaches the sub-national level.

Throughout the design phase of the self-selection mechanism the SNV team worked alongside of key national stakeholders in the BDS STWG to identify potential corruption risks in the steps undertaken in this exercise. The team also consulted with key UNDP officials with expertise in the area of corruption prevention, in addition to representatives of Towards Transparency who are actively involved in anticorruption measures for REDD+ in Viet Nam.

Throughout these consultations, key questions were asked that would help to identify the potential areas of corruption. The questions focused around investigating the dynamics of key stakeholders at the local level, the incentive structures that exist for these different stakeholders, determining how effective existing anti-corruption measures are (such as provincial level anti-corruption bodies), and what people may understand about the issue and scale of corruption.

Following this a list of local level corruption issues, the motivating incentive structure behind each, and the type of corruption for each of the steps undertaken as part of this assignment were identified, and are summarised in Table 2.

Based on the exercises to determine the possible local level corruption issues and the incentive structures behind these risks, a number of socially and culturally appropriate measures to minimise the opportunity for corruption in field activities were discussed in association with representatives of the UN-REDD Programme and consulted alongside of members of the BDS STWG. The measures which were implemented at the field level included:

- Multi stakeholder discussions

Throughout the site selection and awareness raising activities, the piloting team used multi-stakeholder discussions to communicate the ideas of the field work, seek consensus on design issues and reach agreements on the responsibilities of different agents. This included involvement of national and sub-national government, INGOs, local NGOs, and the UN-REDD Programme. In doing so, this minimised the power or control that one agency or organisation had over any one process in the design and implementation of the activities. This process is consistent with internationally recognised best practices for reducing opportunities for corruption (UNDP 2010).

- Authorisation of meeting minutes

A key part of the assignment was to identify an agency (“local authorities”) for managing the self-selection process. The idea here being that a government agency needs to take official notice of the benefits selected by beneficiaries. SNV or other kinds of service providers may facilitate beneficiaries to select benefits, but it requires a formal government agency to make the results of self-selection activities official.

This is common practice in the implementation of government policy in Viet Nam. For example, when villagers develop forest protection and management regulations under a community forestry project, they sign a corresponding protocol (*biên bản*) with the responsible government agency, i.e., the local Forest Protection Department (FPD). The document is usually countersigned (*phê duyệt*) by other governmental units, such as the Commune People’s Committee.

Following each individual self-selection activity at the village level, the piloting team requested a representative of the Forest Protection Department (FPD) to authorise the minutes. Although the FPD was used in this case, as recommended in Section 3.2, it will likely be more appropriate that a REDD+ Steering Committee is developed to undertake such a role in future. However, the FPD representative was chosen to test the idea of authorising the proceedings of the minutes for the purpose of replicating standard procedures and thus, certifying that the minutes correctly reflect the benefits chosen by the stakeholders. This procedure is important to maintain transparency in the self-selection process and minimise the opportunity for vested interests to manipulate the outcomes of households and other beneficiaries.

- Incorporating anti-corruption questions into the self-selection activity

Related to the above point, the self-selection activity also directly questioned participants on the issue of who they would prefer to oversee the monitoring of payments (refer to Appendix 1, Annex 6, page 51). Although this was not an anti-corruption measure per se, the question was designed to help the design of future activities by eliciting direct responses from local participants around trust in the monitoring of payments, which has been identified in Table 2 as a key process that is exposed to corruption.

In considering future activities for preventing anti-corruption in the BDS for REDD+, it is important to recognise existing structures and activities already in place to address corruption in many forms. It is therefore recommended that a review of existing national and sub-national anti-corruption measures is

conducted as a preliminary step to addressing corruption in the BDS. This step should involve a review of the capacity and performance of these existing structures, policies and agencies. In doing so, the review should also consider the existing capacity gaps in terms of the additional future role agencies may play in the context of BDS for REDD+ at the local level.

Recommendation 15:

Conduct a review prior to Phase 1 of the self-selection activity approach of existing anti-corruption processes, policies and key agencies in Viet Nam. The review should be locally specific, and be seen in the context of minimising the key threats of corruption in the self-selection process for BDS (see Table 2). The review will need to include an assessment of the capacity of existing agencies to carry out additional roles under future REDD+ activities.

Table 3 presents a work plan that could be considered for the implementation of culturally and socially appropriate capacity development measures that aim at reducing local level corruption for REDD+ through the BDS. This table attempts to recap on some of the structures tested under this assignment, and also recommends using existing local level agencies such as People's Investment Boards (PIBs) and Community Investment Supervision Boards (CISBs) to support the BDS process in REDD+.

It is also recommended that future considerations of anti-corruption capacity development exercises for BDS in REDD+ be incorporated into other existing national systems such as the Participatory Governance Assessment, conducted by the UNDP Programme in Viet Nam, the Forest Governance Monitoring (FGM) framework led by the FAO in Viet Nam, and related processes under FLEGT developments in Viet Nam. This will avoid overlap, and will ensure future activities relating to anti-corruption in this context are developed alongside of robust national and international processes.

Recommendation 16:

Any future activities and plans to address anti-corruption in the context of the BDS for REDD+ in Viet Nam should consider using existing agencies and structures where appropriate. This is in recognition of the financial and time investment already spent through various non-REDD+ specific measures which could complement the objectives of minimising corruption in the BDS self-selection process. Measures should be developed in association with on-going national processes to ensure consistency and avoid overlap. For example, anti-corruption specialists could be integrated more in the decision making process around the national REDD+ program in Viet Nam, such as the development of the National REDD+ Programme and Phase 2 of the UN-REDD Programme. Furthermore, discussions around anti-corruption in REDD+ could be introduced through existing sub-technical working group discussions for REDD+, namely the sub-technical working group on local implementation.

Table 2: Types of corruption risks corresponding to the 4 key activities undertaken in the BDS piloting exercise

BDS self-selection process	Corruption risk and incentive structures behind the risk	Corruption type
Design of the piloting process	1. In choosing pilot villages alongside of local authorities, a risk emerges that collusion between authorities may take place to skew the village choice for the benefit of certain groups. For example, local authorities may choose villages to participate in REDD+ that are somehow connected to personal interests, such as family or friends.	Cronyism, clientelism, nepotism
	2. Self-selection activities could be either directly or indirectly influenced by powerful local figures who seek to manipulate the benefit choice in their favour. This may occur where, for example, a village head may threaten participants to choose a benefit type that would more directly benefit themselves or a particular group in the village.	Cronyism, clientelism, nepotism
	3. Money may be taken from participation payments for communities involved in the self-selection mechanism. The incentive here is obvious in that people in a position to steal money may do so from funding pools intended for participants in the self-selection game.	Petty corruption
	4. The design of the piloting process is also open to corruption during the engagement of local level authorities with authorities in higher jurisdictional levels. This could include a range of different corruption types which are motivated by lower level officials being pressured to make decisions which would favour officials of higher rank.	Patronage, loyalty, nepotism
Recording mechanism	5. The chosen authority who will verify the benefit choices of local participants is in a position of power to manipulate the proceedings of the benefit choices. This exposes the risk of bribery towards the representative(s) to change benefit choices in favour of certain people in the village in return for payments.	Bribery
Monitoring progress	6. Monitoring efforts of local stakeholders could be undermined in order to reduce the payments flowing to local people and instead being embezzled by higher levels of authority.	Petty corruption
	7. Payments for monitoring efforts could be withheld from local participants	Petty corruption
	8. Contracts to local stakeholders for monitoring efforts and payments could be manipulated by higher authorities (government or private companies) to withhold payments or reduce payments.	Fraud
Monitoring equity in payments	9. Similar to 4, this process is at risk of being undermined by the chosen agency responsible for monitoring payments over time being open to payments to reduce payment flows to local actors or turn a 'blind-eye' to payment irregularities.	Bribery

Table 3: Work plan for capacity development measures required to implement culturally and socially appropriate measures to minimize the risk of corruption

Capacity development measure	Target group	Timing
Creating a consistent format for delivering communication exercises for the self-selection activities to multi-stakeholder forums. This format should include a consistent list of key stakeholders to be included, recommendations on the appropriate format, timing and location of consultations, and facilitation methods to ensure the participation of all stakeholders involved.	NGOs, provincial government and other REDD+ implementing organisations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Within next 6 mths ✓ • 6 mths – 1 yr ✓ • After 1 yr ✓
REDD+ awareness raising activities for People’s Inspection Boards (PIBs) and Community Investment Supervision Boards (CISBs).	PIBs and CISBs	✓
Establish local REDD+ Steering Committees (RSC) to authorise proceedings from the benefit self-selection exercises. This will need to include representation of a wide range of government and non-government community representatives (such as the Women’s Union, Farmer’s Union, PPC etc.) in addition to the design of guiding principles and criteria for the RSC as to their responsibilities of overseeing the self-selection activities for the purpose of ensuring transparency.	Local government and non-government stakeholders	✓
Development of guidance materials and clear terms of reference for PIBs, Fatherland Front Committee (FFC) and CISBs in the context of their respective responsibilities and involvement in preventing local level corruption in BDS for REDD+. This will require close collaboration with the respective agencies, as well as key national stakeholders to ensure that any involvement in REDD+ is consistent with the agencies’ existing mandate.	PIBs, FFC and CISBs	✓
Conducting awareness raising and training in anti-corruption for local level authorities involved in REDD+. Where possible, these activities should be coordinated alongside of broader local level anti-corruption training and capacity building exercises in Viet Nam.	DARD, DONRE, PPC, CPC etc.	✓
Training for PIBs, FFC and CISBs in carrying out the above mentioned roles and responsibilities	PIBs, FFC and CISBs	✓

3.6 Other key lessons learnt & recommendations

As discussed in Section 3.1, one of the key insights gained in Lam Dong was that villagers were not aware of key defining principles of REDD+. In particular, local people had clearly not understood the conditionality of REDD+ benefits on the basis of actual performance. They were unaware of the novelty of REDD+ even though they had participated in the FPIC consultations in 2010 and the BDS consultation at the end of 2011 – a mere couple of weeks before the self-selection activities. At the same time, many groups reacted strongly to conditionality once they came to understand its significance, setting future REDD+ apart from the forest protection programs they were familiar with. Sudden awareness of conditionality caused unexpected and sometimes counterproductive reactions, as discussed in Section 2.4.

The groups' reactions suggest the need for Viet Nam's national REDD+ Program to intensify awareness-raising and training efforts, as recommended in section 3.1. Local people need to understand the conditionality of REDD+ benefits before they are asked to commit to participation. In particular, such efforts should not simply rely on past forest protection programs as illustration of what future REDD+ will be about. Otherwise, local people may easily reject participation in REDD+ actions, as indicated by several groups. They may also perceive the withdrawal of benefits or requirement to return already disbursed benefits as a 'fine'. They may even set out to log over forests or clear agricultural fields in retaliation for perceived injustices, as one group indicated, or on the assumption that REDD+ contracts would entitle them to put forestland to its most profitable use, as indicated by another. Furthermore, village communities may decide to hold individuals liable for benefit losses, possibly causing new conflicts or aggravating existing conflicts over forests in participating villages.

In addition, the groups' reactions to conditionality are indicative of benefit scenarios with high potential to serve effective, efficient and fair implementation of REDD+. The groups showed three major reactions when they were presented with the second and third scenarios. First, they kept the overall allocation of expected REDD+ benefits to funding for forest patrols stable, allocating 35-40 per cent of total contracted benefits. Second, they introduced significant changes to the remaining benefits. They either shifted the disbursement of REDD+ benefits to the final year in order to avoid repayment of benefits received in earlier years. Or they requested early disbursement of benefits as productive investments with the rationale that the returns from these investments could fund potential repayments of REDD+ benefits in year 5.

These reactions have direct implications for potential benefit scenarios under REDD+. First, they provide support for proposals to split REDD+ benefits into two components, one covering annual payments for forest patrols and the other one funding other kinds of benefits. Second, the reactions indicate the potential of offering villagers two different benefit scenarios. Under one scenario, villagers could choose to receive REDD+ benefits upfront through productive investments. Returns from these investments could fund potential repayments, yet would need to resolve the issue of credibility (as villagers have often experience of government 'loans' which do not need to be repaid at the end). Under the other,

villagers would receive REDD+ benefits at the end of the contract period in whatever form they desire. This scenario would avoid the credibility problem pointed out above, but it would require villagers to display significant trust in the promise of benefit delivery five years in the future.

Recommendation 17:

Offer villages a wide choice of possible benefits and remain open to suggestions made by villagers in the self-selection activities. The menu of options should include various kinds of ‘participation payments’, such as payments for forest patrols and participatory carbon monitoring, as well as ‘performance payments’. ‘Performance payments’ should include options providing upfront delivery of benefits as well as options under which the disbursement of benefits is concentrated at the end of the time period.

Consideration of the two scenarios offers support for the idea to use conditional savings books for delivering REDD+ benefits to villagers (see Viet Nam MARD et al. 2010). The savings books would clearly flag the conditionality of REDD+ benefits to villagers, as actual disbursements are released only after performance has been verified. They would also overcome the credibility and trust issues pointed out above. The conditionality would be credible as there was no need to collect already disbursed benefits. And local people may trust the promise of future benefits, as the contracted amounts would be deposited to savings books at the beginning of the contract period.

Recommendation 18:

Identify the institutional and practical possibilities for offering conditional savings books to villagers. Explore interest in conditional savings books with the Bank for Social Policies and develop practical means to communicate the idea to villagers.

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Appendix 1 (to main report)

Background & Intention

The Netherlands Development Organisation (SNV) was engaged by the UN-REDD Programme in Viet Nam (hereafter “UN-REDD”) to design and pilot a self-selection mechanism for benefit choice in the two UN-REDD pilot communes of Lam Ha and Di Linh, Lam Dong Province, central highlands of Viet Nam. This exercise complements separate activities conducted by UN-REDD on the theme of Benefit Distribution Systems (BDS) as part of the Readiness Phase in Viet Nam.

In particular, in 2010, the UN-REDD programme published a comparative analysis of BDS systems to support the national REDD+ processes in Viet Nam. UN-REDD in Viet Nam is also in the process of finalising the design of a payment coefficient which would support the delivery of co-benefits through the BDS. In parallel with the BDS piloting activities, UN-REDD has also supported a series of BDS consultation workshops at the national level and two selected sites in Lam Dong and Bac Kan Provinces.

A fundamental component of the piloting assignment included conducting two key field based activities:

- Initial awareness raising and site selection activities (conducted 7/11/2011 to 11/11/2011); and
- Further awareness raising and piloting of the self-selection process (conducted 9/1/2012 to 13/1/2012)

Each activity was proceeded with close collaboration alongside of the UN-REDD Office as well as key stakeholders through the BDS Sub-technical Working Group (BDS STWG), including national and sub-national government officials, civil society representatives and other interested parties.

The intention of this report is to present the results from these two activities. In particular, the report will illustrate the process followed, results obtained and some early observations and recommendations on conducting similar activities in future. The report will be divided into two sections according to the two field operations conducted by SNV. Section 1 will discuss the initial awareness raising activities conducted and the process of selecting the sites for piloting. Section 2 will present the processes followed and results of the actual pilot testing of the self-selection process and additional awareness raising activities.

This report forms the foundation for the final report focusing on recommendations for future self-selection activities in BDS.

Section 1 – Preparation, site selection & initial awareness raising

Location: Lam Ha and Di Linh districts, Lam Dong province

Field Team: Nguyen Vinh Quang, Vu Van Me and Nguyen Trung Thong

Duration: 7/11/2011 to 11/11/2011

1. Field trip preparation

- A team meeting was convened in Hanoi to further develop the methodology, list of key stakeholders targeted for the awareness raising activities, key site selection criteria, and the logistics of the first field trip.
- A meeting among members of the BDS STWG was held in Hanoi, where the assignment's proposed methodology and types of informants were presented to receive comments from the attendees.
- A discussion via emails with the UN-REDD programme and team members (Thong, Me, Quang and Adrian) on the change of first trip purpose. In particular, it was agreed the trip would not solely include the purpose of awareness raising on REDD+ (due to a shortage of agreed communication materials).
- A meeting among the team's field members (Thong, Me, and Quang) was organized in Da Lat to discuss the responsibilities of each member during the field visit.
- A tentative schedule of the field trip was prepared and shared among the team members
- The field visit's schedule was then shared with representatives of the UN-REDD in Lam Dong province for the assistance in meeting and logistic arrangements.

2. Objectives of the trip

The objectives of the field trip, were agreed among the team members to:

- Conduct initial awareness raising activities for local authorities and communities in the studied sites in Lam Dong, including Lam Ha (two communes: Phu Son and Phuc Tho) and Di Linh (two communes: Bao Thuan and Gung Re) on climate change, REDD+, and BDS issues. Efforts were made throughout these activities to set a platform for related BDS consultation activities that were to take place in late December in the same jurisdictions and would go into more detail about the operation of a future BDS under REDD+. Again, this process was agreed with UN-REDD Programme officials and the BDS Consultation team members.
- Introduce the BDS Piloting assignment to local stakeholders,

- Seek consent and cooperation/collaboration for the deployment of awareness raising and piloting activities in the second field trip, and
- Obtain relevant secondary data, suggestions and feedback from local stakeholders for selection of sites and beneficiary groups for second field trip

3. Proceedings during the field trip

3.1 Change of field schedule

Though the official letter had been sent to inform Lam Dong DARD dated 13/10/2011 then followed by an email to inform UN-REDD Lam Dong representatives on 27/10/2011, there was no official letter from Lam Dong DARD to inform the tentative field trip schedule to the relevant organizations/offices. Therefore, the activities schedule had to be revised and changed accordingly as shown in Table 1.

Table 1: The local stakeholders met during the first field trip

Date/ time	Activities	# of participants
7/11 (PM):	Meeting with local officers of UN-REDD Viet Nam in Lam Dong to discuss and revise the field visit plan	2
8/11 (AM):	Meeting at Lam Ha district with representatives of DPC, district DARD, district DONRE, Nam Ban PFMB, Lan Tranh PFMB	9
8/11 (PM):	Meeting at Phu Son commune (Lam Ha district) with representatives of CPC, commune officials	4
9/11 (AM):	Meeting at Phuc Tho commune (Lam Ha district) with representatives of CPC, commune official, village leaders	13
9/11 (PM):	Meeting at Di Linh district with representatives of DPC, district DARD, district DONRE, Forest Protection Unit, Di Linh One Member Ltd Forestry company, Bao Thuan Forestry Company, Hoa Bac – Hoa Nam PFMB, Tam Hiep Forestry Company	10
9/11 (PM):	Meeting with Di Linh One Member Ltd Forestry Company	1
10/11 (AM):	Meeting at Bao Thuan commune (Di Linh district) with representatives of CPC, commune officials, village leaders	23
10/11 (PM):	Meeting at Gung Re commune (Di Linh district) with representatives of CPC, commune officials.	4
11/11 (AM)	Meeting at DARD Office with DARD leaders, representatives of FPD, Department of Forestry, Provincial Extensional Center, UN-REDD local officers, FPDF representatives, Provincial Department of Finance	6

3.2 Discussion processes and contents to be discussed during the meeting

As agreed during the field trip preparation, the field members conducted meetings in a consistent manner, following the general format outlined below:

- Firstly, the field team gave a presentation of basic information about climate change, REDD+, performance-based payments, and a review of existing payment mechanisms (i.e. 661, PFES). This process of awareness raising ensured that key local stakeholders were aware of the context in which the piloting exercises were to be conducted, and were able to raise questions or concerns that could be addressed by the field team. As mentioned earlier, efforts were made to conduct the awareness raising activities to be consistent with more detailed consultation processes that were set to take place later in December through a parallel consultancy assignment under the UN-REDD programme.
- The field team then introduced the BDS piloting activities which focused on how local stakeholders could be involved in the self-selection of payment arrangements. The team made it very clear that all the activities are “consultations of piloting,” meaning that money or funds derived from REDD/REDD+ does not actually exist. Instead, the piloting was intended to test a benefit self-selection process in view of future plans for a REDD+ financing mechanism in the area.

Regarding consultations with local communities or households, the tentative groups/locations to be consulted were determined on the basis of a mix of different social characteristics and land-tenure, represented as follows:

- (1) Kinh and ethnic minority village with tenure certificates (red book) for production forestland.
 - (2) Ethnic minority village adjacent to a protection forest or national park with forest protection contracts.
 - (3) Mixed village of Kinh and migrant ethnic minority groups adjacent to production forest managed by a Forest Company without forest protection contracts.
 - (4) Location where forest land and resources were, are being, and potentially continue to be exploited or changed the land-use purpose (threats to deforestation and degradation).
- The field team then allowed time for stakeholders to ask questions, clarifications, comments, etc. regarding the introduction.
 - The field team then collected secondary data and information on the locations (data/information at commune level through meetings with district officials, and then at village level through meetings with commune officials) on ethnicity, forest classification, forestland tenure, the level of pressure on forests, local people’s livelihoods, etc. (see Annex 1 for more details).
 - Lastly, the team then discussed and asked for suggestions of which locations would be most suitable for the assignment.

4. Main findings

4.1 How did the criteria and approach work?

Which criteria worked?

- Among the four criteria set prior to the field trip², three fitted fairly well in the studied sites except the first one of ‘tenure certificate’ for natural production forest (PDF). It was found that there are no “red books” for PDF in either district.
- However, another type of tenure for production forest was identified in the areas. Particularly, there exist households who have contracted bare production forestland for forest plantations (red book of forestland for PDF plantation) (see Table 2)

Approach: Since the districts to be included in the consultations had been fixed (e.g., Lam Ha and Di Linh districts), the team started to work with authorities and officials at the district level. From secondary data and comments/suggestions obtained from this level, together with the discussions among the team’s field members, the team then selected communes and later discussed their ideas with commune authorities. Similar to the process of choosing potential communes, villages and groups of people were selected based on secondary data and in consultation with commune authorities and officials.

4.2 Main consultant outputs

Following objectives of the field trip, the team field team made several conclusions, detailed below.

4.2.1 Awareness campaign

More than 70 people were involved in the awareness raising activities in Lam Ha and Di Linh. Throughout the awareness raising activities stakeholders at provincial, district and commune levels were informed about the concept of REDD+ and how a BDS would operate at the local level. These discussions also provided local stakeholders with a chance to review the existing and past benefit mechanisms systems/programs in Lam Dong based on which they were prepared for the discussion on BDS issues under REDD+.

As a result, local stakeholders at the provincial level, the district people’s committees, the commune people’s committees as well as village leaders suggested they had understood the basic information about REDD+ and BDS, and were willing to cooperate in the future BDS piloting activities.

² Criteria were initially drafted by the field team in association with members of UN-REDD and VNFOREST. Following this, the criteria were communicated and agreed upon during consultations with the national sub-technical working group on BDS. The criteria were also checked for their appropriateness and relevance with key sub-national authorities.

4.2.2 Stakeholder consultation

Most of the required secondary data and feedback from local stakeholders for site and informant selections were collected during the field trip. Consulted stakeholders included representatives;

- At provincial level: DARD (FPD, DoF, FPDF, Provincial Agriculture Extension Centre), Department of Finance and UN-REDD local officers
- At district level: 2 districts (Lam Ha and Di Linh), 4 communes and 43 villages
- Nam Ban PFMB
- Di Linh One Member Ltd Forestry Company
- At commune level:
 - (Lam Ha district): Phu Son commune (11 villages) and Phu Loc commune (12 villages)
 - (Di Linh district): Bao Thuan commune (11 villages) and Gung Re (9 villages).

4.3 Results of site and possible beneficiary group selections for piloting

4.3.1 Site selection and data collection

- Feedback from meetings with the DPC, relevant district departments and forest owners in the two districts of Lam Ha and Di Linh enabled the consultation team to identify most suitable potential four communes as follows:
 - + Lam Ha district: Phu Son and Phuc Tho communes
 - + Di Linh district: Bao Thuan and Gung Re communes
- Four meetings with the four communes provided the following information:
 - + Secondary data of their villages in each commune
 - + A summary of feedback and comments from local stakeholders on possible local communities for piloting

4.3.2 Selection of possible beneficiary groups

At the community level, nine different possible beneficiary groups were found suitable for piloting as follows:

- Group 1: Indigenous people (IP) with red books of forestland for PDF plantation (in short, IP + PDF)
- Group 2: Migrated ethnic people (MEP) with red books of forestland for PDF plantation (MEP + PDF)

- Group 3: Kinh people (KP) with red books of forestland for PDF plantation (KP + PDF)
- Group 4: IP with forest protection contract (Prot. contract) (IP + Prot. contract)
- Group 5: MEP with forest protection contract (MEP + Prot. contract)
- Group 6: KP with forest protection contract (KP + Prot. contract)
- Group 7: IP with no direct relationship with forest protection and development (no forest) (IP + no forest)
- Group 8: MEP with no forest (MEP + no forest)
- Group 9: KP with no forest (KP + no forest)

The above beneficiary groups at the community level can be summarized in the following table.

Table 2: The possible forest beneficiary groups

Forestland tenure		Ethnicity		
		Indigenous people	Migrated ethnic people	Kinh
Holding forestland tenure	Contracted forestland for PDF plantation	1	2	3
	Forest protection contract (PTF or PDF)	4	5	6
None forest ownership	No direct relationship with forest protection and development (no forest)	7	8	9

4.3.3 Possible village communities

Scrutinizing the collected data and interviews with local authorities, the team's field members decided to choose the following village communities for piloting:

- Phu Son commune: Prteng 2, 1/5 and Lac Son villages
- Phuc Tho commune: Lam Bo, Phuc Hoa and Phuc Loc villages
- Bao Thuan commune: Kala Tangu, Hang Poir and Ta Ly villages
- Gung Re commune: Hang Lang, Lang Ku and Hang Hai villages

Further information about the ethnicity composition, forest classification, forestland tenure and other socio-economic factors can be found in Annex 1.

4.3.4 Possible beneficiary groups selection and piloting consultation modalities

Based on the discussions regarding piloting consultations with State-owned forestry companies and Management Boards of protected areas, the field team decided to choose the same two entities as proposed earlier, which are:

- Nam Ban PFMB (Lam Ha)
- Di Linh One-member Ltd Forestry Company (Di Linh)

Following the discussions from the focus groups and the analysis of secondary data, the field team identified 11 potential beneficiary groups with 19 potential activities. Due to time and resource constraints, it was determined that 7 beneficiary groups would be targeted. Of the 7, 3 groups were selected to conduct multiple rounds of the activity based on different social criteria. For the other 4 groups, the activity was conducted in clusters that were representative of the groups. In total, 15 activities were conducted. The different groups and the different scenarios are shown in Table 3 below.

Table 3: Potential beneficiary group discussions

	Focus villages (group type) *			Other villages **			
	Lac Son (IP+ no forest)	Hang Pior (IP+ prot contract)	Prteng 2 (MEP + no forest)	Phuc Hoa (no contract, migrant people, high def)	Hang Hai (Kinh with contracts, degradation issue)	Mot Nam (MEP and Kinh, no contract, degradation high)	Lam Bo (MEP with prot contract)
District	Lam Ha	Di Linh	Lam Ha	Lam Ha	Di Linh	Lam Ha	Lam Ha
Small groups	Criteria for differentiation						
Round 1	Ethnicity	Gender (M/F)	With contract/without contract				
Round 2	Red-book/no red-book	Income (rich/poor)	Gender (M/F)				
Representative Group							

* Focus group villages represent those villages where three individual self-selection processes will take place. These villages were chosen on the basis of the criteria discussed at the BDS STWG in November

** Other villages represent four different villages with different characteristics according to the selection criteria discussed at the BDS STWG in November. Focus group discussions were carried out in these villages as a means of comparison with the process conducted in Round 1 and 2 of the focus pilots.

5. Lessons learnt and recommendations

5.1 Lessons learnt

Below are some key lessons/notices the team has learnt after the first field trip:

- The team found that the Bao Thuan Forestry Company is making a proposal to allocate some 500 ha of forest to community in Bao Thuan commune. This means that community forestry will soon be available there. However, since this has not yet officially been approved, the new type of forest tenure is not yet in practice in the area. Therefore the team did not recommend including this type of consultation. However, in the near future, when considering the local beneficiaries of REDD+, this must be included.
- There are private forest companies in Di Linh and Lam Ha districts for which tenure conditions are unclear. However, apart from consultations with local communities and state forest owners, it's necessary to include them into piloting as well as they may play an important role in BDS design.
- For local beneficiary group selection, further attention needs to be paid to:
 - Temporary residents (because they are not eligible for some governmental support programs/policies such as credit access, livelihood improvement programmes, or contracts for forest protection/development.
 - Local livelihoods (this shows the levels of pressure on forest land and resources to meet daily needs for local communities which is a considerable driver of deforestation and forest degradation)
- A mix of different beneficiary groups for focus group discussions is necessary as it allows for different views to be obtained exploring the possible conflicts among different beneficiary groups in a certain community.
- An innovative approach for identifying features of various potential beneficiary groups in order to define locations for piloting was explored during the field trip which has resulted in some changes in the number of potential communes/villages for piloting after the field trip.

5.2 Recommendations

- Timing is critical to the success of future activities in awareness raising and self-selection. In particular, the field team identified considerable challenges facing the pilot activities due to them coinciding with certain cultural events and harvesting periods.
- Follow-up awareness raising should be carried out before each consultation for piloting to ensure that local actors are fully aware of the intention of the activities.
- UN-REDD Viet Nam should support the pilot activities through providing certain materials suitable for different target groups for awareness raising campaign.

Section 2 – Further Awareness Raising and Self-selection Piloting Activities

Location: Lam Ha and Di Linh districts, Lam Dong province

Field Team: Nguyen Vinh Quang, Vu Van Me and Nguyen Trung Thong

Duration: 9/1/2012 to 13/1/2012

1. Introduction to the field trip

From 9-13/1/2012, the field team conducted BDS piloting consultations in two districts, Lam Ha and Di Linh of Lam Dong province. The team consisted of three Consultants and two Interpreters. Participants also included UN-REDD officers in Hanoi (1) and Lam Dong (2), and a film crew (2) to film the consultation process.

The work was divided into three main stages:

- (1) Meeting with leaders of Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (DARD), officers at district and commune levels to consult and seek their support and cooperation. The first day meeting was at DARD. The first working session in each district including meeting with leaders of district, commune and stakeholders at district level.
- (2) Meeting at the community level:
 - Though part of the awareness raising had been done by the BDS Consultation team, further guidance on REDD+, the UN-REDD program, as well as an introduction on the previous and existing payment mechanisms under related forest programs/projects was also conducted by the piloting field team. Plus an introduction of BDS piloting and briefing about the role play exercise.
 - Participants were divided into small groups (which were agreed in advance with village leaders) according to defined criteria for further discussion based on the scenario of plays.
- (3) Preliminary Report to DARD on the results of field trip: After completing the group discussions in selected villages, the consultants promptly synthesized and presented the results to the DARD leaders on the final day of the trip. Details of the work plan are in Annex 2.

The following group consultation methods were used

- For the plenary meeting, for the purpose of further awareness raising, in addition to the introduction / opening remarks by UN-REDD Program Officers (PO), each field team member was assigned with different presentations such as: Introduction of REDD+, UN-REDD program, and the proposed operation of the BDS piloting activities. Questions raised from the participants were answered by the team. Some inquiries were responded by the UN-REDD PO.

- For small group discussions, the team was responsible for guiding participants to discuss/and to give answers. Interpreters (one speaking K'ho, one speaking Tay language) were handy to assist when possible and necessary. Where there were two or three discussions with small groups in a village (concurrently), each member was responsible for guidance of the role play rules and discussion. At the end of each discussion, minutes of meetings were given for signatures of all parties. Forest rangers of commune/district and village leaders also joined the meeting; Consultation representatives and local people signed the minutes. This was seen as a measure to ensure transparency in the self-selection process. A total of 15 groups were consulted as agreed with UN-REDD prior to conducting the field visits. Annex 3 lists all the completed group discussions.

2. Summary of awareness raising and group discussion results

There were more than 200 local people (with around 40% female, see Annex 4) involved in the additional awareness raising, based on which they were provided with further information on REDD+ and related payment mechanisms under forestry activities in their localities. Participants were also given the explanation about the test the role play scenario.

Annex 5 lists the detailed results from the discussions of all 15 groups using the scenario developed by the piloting team (see Annex 6), with main information including:

- Characteristics of groups (ethnicity, gender, economic conditions, with/without involving in forest protection contracts);
- Selection results of each scenario;
- Selected scenario (most preferable) and reasons for choosing;
- Recourse mechanism for the settlement of complaints.

From the results derived from the extensive processes held alongside of the 15 groups, some general results can be observed. These are listed briefly below, but are analyzed in more depth in the main report on recommendations;

- Indigenous people were observed as more likely to consider more of their personal benefits rather than the community benefit compared to other groups.
- Generally, people without forest contracts, and Kinh people preferred to accept cash with the idea of sharing this money equally to every community members.
- Generally people without forest contracts do not pay attention to the costs involved for forest protection and management. As such, they tended to prefer a more equal distribution of benefits.
- Some general gender observations included:
 - Women, especially indigenous women tended to be more cautious because of the fear that they would have to repay part of the money if there was a fire or other impact on the forest

- Women also preferred benefits orientated towards investments into improved agricultural techniques
- Men tended to prefer investments into infrastructure
- A range of different recourse mechanisms were suggested by participants, including establishing a separate management board, establishing a group within the Commune People's Committee (CPC) and developing a 'hot-line' for people to call when disputes arose.
- A suite of different groups were considered for entrusting in the distribution of payments. This suggests potential tailoring of different payment mechanisms in different villages. This would need to however consider the costs associated with such distribution mechanisms.

3 Lessons learnt from the consultations

An important aspect of the piloting activities is to derive the lessons learnt. Given this exercise was the first of its kind to be conducted in Viet Nam, it is important to reflect on the lessons with respect to the design of future activities. Details are given below of lessons learnt from different aspects of the piloting activities.

3.1 Selecting target groups

- Prior to this community consultation, in November 2011 the team had collected data to select target groups and venues. Extra information was collected basing on the reports and discussions with relevant local leaders and officers (in some communes, information was provided by the village leaders and head of forest protection contractors). Based on the trip information, the consultants selected representative groups in some communes to divide into discussion groups.
- Most of the selected target groups were found appropriate and could be interviewed. However, the team was unable to differentiate a Kinh group who either held a forest protection contract, forest plantation management contract or who were owners of a forest red book (those who have forest red book).
- Another case was that secondary information provided by commune officers relating to their community was inaccurate, leading to the inappropriate selection of target groups for interview (for example officers in Phu Son commune provided information about Lac Son village whereby there were indigenous people, migrated ethnic and Kinh people. However, in fact, Kinh was the majority, there were no indigenous people and only 1-2 migrant households). Therefore the consultants just interviewed two male and female groups of Kinh people)
- With regards to the targets being selected for in-depth interviews, in many cases, representatives of selected households for small group discussion did not turn up, due to:
 1. Selected households were busy at the interviewing dates;
 2. Selected households was unable to attend the interview (due to old age, sickness)
- Although information was sent to the commune / village officers for 3-5 days in advance, they did not timely notify to the local people / selected people for in-depth interview, or the

time of notice was too close to the meeting time, therefore, they could not make it (due to other engagements, or being far from the interviewing location)

- In some cases the field team did not notify the commune / village early enough for them to contact with the selected interviewees.

Due to the above mentioned shortfalls, the team had to adjust the small group discussions. Thus in some sessions, attended participants were not originally in the plan.

3.2 Location, time and consultation methods

- With regards to the meeting venue, depending on the facilities available in each commune or village, the meetings and group discussions were held at the hall of the people's committee, community house, or private homes. Meetings/discussions at the hall of the people's committee, community house provided a better space for the participants to follow and interact. However, in some communes and villages, we were not able to conduct the meetings and group discussions at the meeting hall (due to renovation, unavailability of the community house), meetings had to be at the homes of some people, which was uncomfortable for some participants. This may have impeded the quality of the discussion.
- During the dates of BDS consultation (from 9-13/1/2012) households were busy harvesting and drying coffee (although efforts were made to avoid peak period), it was also coupled with closeness to the Tet (Vietnamese New Year) holiday. Thus, in some villages, participation was affected.
- To overcome the required engagement of harvesting / drying coffee in the daytime, in a hope of better attendance, the consultants decided to hold meetings in the evening (in village 1/5, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha district). In fact, however, only around 30 people turned up, similar to the number of the day attendants.
- In several meetings, participants brought along small children, this somehow affected the quality of discussion.
- Small group discussions held after plenary meetings were often intervened/disturbed by unwanted/ uninvited people. Especially in some evening sessions, uninvited people came after drinking, had caused disruptions to the discussion. This resulted in a waste of time and discomforted participants, thus affecting the quality of the discussion.
- In some villages there were 2-3 different rounds of interviews, so the meetings had to be conducted concurrently leaving the team members to independently take responsibility. The concurrent discussions of small groups affected the participation of forest officers and representatives of the village, because in each commune there was usually only one forest officer involved. The lack of local staff to participate in such meetings caused difficulty in the signing of Minutes after the discussion. Some meetings minutes did not have certification of all parties. Some were signed by all the parties, but in fact, this was just a formality, because even though forest rangers and / or village officers signed the Minutes, they had not attended the full length of the meeting.

- In the absence of an allowance for those involved in small group discussions, it was observed that many participants left the meeting halfway, especially women. For example, in a meeting with indigenous people in Prteng 2 village, at first there were 14 participants including 5 women. However, after half an hour, only 8 men were left. By the end of discussion there remained just 4 people. Although no conclusions can be drawn around reasons for the smaller participation in groups not receiving compensation for their time, field staff suggested that it may have been the result of a lack of compensation for people's time in the form of an allowance.

3.3 Content of scenario/role play

- Because the scenario was based on several assumptions (i.e. limited number of households, forest area) and not linked to a village-specific situation, participants found it difficult to relate to the benefits presented. At the same time, the instructor had difficulties when guiding the activity and it took time to explain.
- With regards to the procedures of the scenario, the introduction of the game was combined with guidance to all 3 scenarios. This caused some confusion among participants. This took time to explain and to lead the participants. For this reason, in the next meetings, the field team adjusted by giving general guidance and referred to each scenario separately. Only when finishing the 1st scenario, they moved to 2nd and 3rd.
- Although the conditions "*20% of the cash earned from the sale of carbon is used for other expenses but not to the community ...*" was not related to the detailed discussion, this was important information to help people become aware of the need for other expenses outside the community to ensure compliance with state management procedures.
- The assumptions made people aware of "*responsibility*" in the commitment for forest protection/ carbon storage.
- Despite prior awareness raising activities, and BDS consultation activities, many people still did not understand the concept of REDD+. This made it difficult to guide the scenario and more time had to be invested at the beginning of activities to explain these concepts again.
- With regards to the terminology, most people involved in the discussion were confused when using the term "*carbon credits*". As such, the field team had to change to the word to "*cheque*". However, due to the fact that according to the rules of the game, each "*credit*" or "*cheque*" was worth of 40 million VND, most of groups did not use "*credits*" to apply to their intended activities / investments. Instead, they directly discussed and calculated on the given A0 or A4 paper the specific amount.
- The finalization of specific amounts for a suggested investment (e.g. 800 million VND if investment in schools, etc.) confused some people. Subsequently, the investment suggestions / use of money affected the choice of participants. However, overall, the monetary value was seen to work effectively in terms of providing people with a realistic, and tangible figure for which to calculate the benefit trade-offs over time.

- Conditions set out in the scenario had certain drawbacks, leading to the controversy in the selection process. For example, for scenario 3, the conditions stated "*if people destroyed forests for cropping, they would have to pay-back all 800 million VND...*" but it did not state whether they were allowed to continue working on such field. Therefore, the group selected scenario 3, saying that they would be entitled to continue using the crop area and saw it as their own.
- Scenario 3 caused additional concerns – i.e. the idea of needing to pay-back some amount if a disturbance in the forest occurred. This caused the following responses:
 - Villagers: Some villagers expressed the desire to take an up-front payment and invest in an account which would then yield interest. They mentioned how they would then use interest earnings to invest their crop. At the end of time period they would then withdraw money from bank account to pay back. In this sense, REDD+ was seen not to create an incentive for forest protection and management because they could have at least the ‘interest’ regardless of their efforts towards to forest protection and management.
 - Villagers: if a disturbance happened, they would:
 - Make an investigation to determine the violators and force him/her to pay back the amount owed;
 - Request to measure exactly the carbon loss and would pay back the amount equal to the “carbon loss”;
 - Not take part into REDD+ or collaborate with any other forest protection and management programs as they thought it’s unfair if they had to pay back everything;
 - A representative of a forest company expressed a desire for a fine to be paid in addition to needing to repay the REDD+ money if encroachment occurred. Otherwise participation into REDD+ would allow local people legally encroach forestland for agricultural crops with fast and higher profitability (e.g. coffee) that enables them to pay back. Therefore, the payback was not considered enough of a disincentive.
- Each small group discussion needed at least 2.5 to 3 hours to complete. This time included the instruction, interpretation, collecting information for the 3 scenarios, complaints mechanism, and completion of the records. The time needed was even longer for indigenous groups who did not speak Kinh (it was necessary to translate and explain slowly several times). Not to mention the fact that prior to the group discussions, there was a plenary meeting for about 1 hour, and some participants ended up discussing this twice. Lengthy discussion made participants tired, especially in the second half of the session. Information on the complaints mechanism was generally not discussed in enough detail. Also, people did not pay much attention to complaints since they believed that payments would go through the head of village or head of forest protection management, nor were they aware that relevant agencies may involve in the implementation and monitoring the payments.

With regards to the signing of meeting minutes, as mentioned above, the signature from local forest officers and village representatives was seen purely as a formality. In many cases, they did not attend

the entire meetings (due to concurrent small group meetings, or due to their non-attendance). Some meetings therefore had no records as planned, while others had sufficient signatures but local officers did not sit through the meetings.

3.4 Support activities and logistics

The team received timely and enthusiastic support from provincial, district and commune level leaders. This contributed to the success of the trip.

UN-REDD officers in Hanoi and Lam Dong also assisted in arranging meetings, borrowing printers, projectors, providing communication materials, packing gifts and other administrative activities.

As for the interpretation into ethnic languages (Tay and K'ho), it was necessary for indigenous people to have interpreters. Migrated people typically had good listening, writing and speaking abilities of the Kinh language.

On the payment of allowances to participants, according to the plan, the team paid 50,000 VND/person for those taking part in group discussion (no allowance provided for plenary meetings, just refreshments). However, after a few meetings, it was proposed by UN-REDD officers not to pay participants, and only offer refreshments. At some meetings, people received gifts like hats (advertising for UN-REDD program in Viet Nam) and notebooks. The absence of an allowance (or gifts) for meetings was observed to have possibly discouraged people's enthusiasm, with many people leaving the meeting halfway, thus affecting the quality of discussion, information and minutes signing.

The preparatory work such as contacting the local authority to arrange meetings could have been done more effectively. It was often found that local officers did not notify villagers after discussing with the consultants. Also, in some cases the team did not notify the local authority early enough. Both processes should be improved for future activities and will be supported if a longer time period is allocated for similar exercises in future.

3.5 Other issues

The uneven awareness among people in a group discussion, or between different groups made it difficult for guiding the discussions. For example, people involved in forest protection management in other areas often had a mindset that was not necessarily consistent with the REDD+ approach. As such, this made some discussions difficult in terms of explaining the different concepts.

Also, unforeseen community events (weddings, funerals,) sometimes made it difficult to organize meetings. In one instance, the group meetings and interviews in Lac Son hamlet, Phu Son commune took place when there was a wedding in the village. Participants were therefore distracted and this affected the quality of the discussion.

4 Preliminary Recommendations

Although a more thorough set of recommendations are discussed in the final report, the field team offers the following preliminary recommendations:

- *Selection consultation target*

It is necessary to prepare lists of participants for group discussions prior to the piloting exercises to ensure that the criteria set for each group discussion are met. This can be done by conducting a separate village meeting with all villagers, alongside of consultations with the village leaders.

- *Location, time and consultation method*

Due to the time needed for the consultations, plenary meetings and actual activities, future exercises should be separated into 2 different sessions. The first meeting should be a plenary, followed by notification of the selected households using a list of the selected groups. The individual selected group activities should then be held in a separate session. By doing so, it will reduce the likelihood that people will tire due to the lengthy and continuous discussions. At the same time, it will ensure better participation of the selected households and thus improve the results of the exercise.

Consultations should be conducted in private locations and ensure minimal interference from non-invited participants.

Meetings should be held during the daytime rather than the evening, to avoid the risk / unnecessary intervention from non-invited participants.

The limited invitation to small group discussions should be clearly explained to all villagers, to avoid misunderstandings that affect the community in the future.

Avoid conducting similar exercises during known busy times. In particular, due to external time constraints placed on the field team, the team needed to conduct their activities in the weeks before Tet, and in the middle of busy harvesting periods of many farmers. This was not ideal and likely to have affected participation.

- *Content of the scenario:*

The use of cash value or "*cheque*" will facilitate group discussion of households.

Village plans should be used to design benefit options to make it easier for groups to respond to different choices.

Fixing binding conditions to certain investments and the amount to spend caused concerns. If such conditions exist, they should not be given at the beginning. Instead, groups should play through Scenario 1 first, before introducing the conditions under Scenario 2 and 3.

For scenario 3, it is necessary to add other conditions about the fine for failure to pay back the sum received. In some cases, it was suggested by local people to calculate how much carbon is lost and the pay back should be based on the lost part. Another option worth consideration is where the offender is investigated and asked to pay back the amount equal to the carbon value lost.

- *Logistics*

Allowance or gifts for participants in small group meetings is needed. This is because the meeting usually lasts more than 2 hours, i.e. participants are unable to do their family work, which should be duly compensated. In addition, with an allowance, participants encouraged to discuss and contribute to the meetings in a more meaningful way.

- *Other issues*

For each activity group, the number of participants should be around 7-8 people or maximum 10 people to ensure a focused discussion is had.

Preparation for meetings needs to be more detailed. An additional logistics officer and secretary for the meeting would be necessary for future meetings.

More assistance was expected from local UN-REDD in contacting, organizing meetings, arranging venues and time of the meeting with local people. This could be improved for future activities.

Annex 1: Detailed information about the possible villages for the BDS piloting activities

#	Commune	Possible villages	Ethnicity			Features								
			IP	M EP	Kinh	Contr	With allocated land for prod. forest plantation	Def / forest degra threat	Distance to forest	Livelihood	Forest leased to private enterprise nearby	FLITCH	Distance of crops to forest	Other s
1	Gung Ré (9 thôn)	Hàng Làng	+++		++	C & K		ST3	G	CF & LU				
2		Lăng Kú	+++		+	C & K		ST3 & MR2	X	CF & LU			G	
3		Hàng Hải			+++	C		ST3 & MR2	G	CF				
4	Bảo Thuận (11 thôn)	Kala Tàngu	+++		+	C		ST2 & MR2					C	CF
5		Hàng Piôr	+++		+	C		MR3					C	
6		Ta Ly	+++		++	C		ST2 & MR2	G					
7	Phúc Thọ (12 thôn)	Lâm Bô	+++	++	+	C		MR2						
8		Phúc Hòa (hoặc) Phúc Cát	++	++	+	K		MR3	G					
9		Phúc Lộc	+	+	+++	K		MR2			C			
10	Phú Sơn (11 thôn)	Pr teng 2	++	+	+++	C		MR2						
11		1/5	+	++	++	K		MR3			C			
12		Lạc Sơn	++	++	+++	K	C	MR3			C			

Notes:+++: Majority; ++: Minor C: Yes; K: No; ST3: High threat of Forest degradation; MR3: High threat of deforestation; CF: coffee; LU: paddy rice. CFM: community forest

Annex 2: WORK PLAN (9-13/1/2012)

Dates	Activities/Location
9/1	Da Lat
8.00-11.00	Meeting at Lam Dong DARD.
14.30 – 16.30	Meeting at Lam Ha People’s Committee
10/1	Phu Son Commune, Lam Ha District
7.30 – 11.30	Meeting at Lac Son Village
13.30 – 16.30	Meeting at Village 1/5
11/1 (AM)	Phu Son Commune, Lam Ha District
7.30 – 11.30	Meeting at Prteng 2 Village
11/1 (PM)	Phuc Tho Commune, Lam Ha District
13.30 – 17.00	Group 1: Meeting at Lam Bo Village
	Group 2: Meeting at Phuc Hoa Village
12/1 (AM)	Di Linh District
8.00 – 10.00	Meeting at Di Linh District
12/1 (PM)	Bao Thuan Commune, Di Linh District
13.30 – 17.00	Meeting at Hang Pior Village
13/1 (AM)	Gung Re Commune, Di Linh District
7.30 – 10.00	Meeting at Hang Hai Village
13/1 (PM)	Da Lat
14.00-16.30	Meeting at Lam Dong DARD

Annex 3. List of Discussion Groups

No. of meeting	Characteristics of the Group	Gender of participants	Hamlet	Commune	District	Notes
1	Kinh, not involved in forest protection management	Male	Lac Son	Phu Son	Lam Ha	2 groups concurrently
2	Kinh, not involved in forest protection management	Female				
3	Kinh, not involved in forest protection management	Male+Female	1/5			Evening
4	Indigenous people, with + without involving in forest protection Contract	Male+Female	Prteng 2			3 groups concurrently
5	Migrated ethnic people, with + without involving in forest protection Contract	Male+Female				
6	Indigenous + Migrated ethnic people, with + without involving in forest protection Contract	Male + Female				
7	Indigenous people, without involving in forest protection Contract	Male + Female				3 groups concurrently
8	Indigenous + Migrated ethnic people, with + without involving in forest protection Contract	Male				
9	Indigenous + Migrated ethnic people, with + without involving in forest protection Contract	Female				
10	Indigenous + Migrated ethnic people, with + without involving in forest protection Contract	Male +Female	Lam Bo	Phuc Tho		2 groups concurrently
11	Migrated ethnic people, without involving in forest protection Contract	Male+Female	Phuc Hoa			
12	Indigenous people, involving in forest protection Contract, Male *	Male	Hang Pior	Bao Thuan	Di Linh	2 groups concurrently
13	Indigenous people, involving in forest protection Contract, average + poor household*	Male				
14	Kinh, not involving in forest plantation, Male*	Male	Hang Hai	Gung Re		2 groups concurrently
15	Kinh, not involving in forest plantation, Female*	Female				

* According to the plan, there should be Male + Female, but only Male turned up.

Annex 4: List of participants of focus group discussions on piloting exercises

TT	Name	Gender		Address
		M	F	
1	Nguyen Minh Doan	✓		Lac Son village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
2	Phạm Văn Minh	✓		Lac Son village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
3	Nguyễn Văn Tuất	✓		Lac Son village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
4	Nguyễn Đước	✓		Lac Son village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
5	Phạm Văn Thụ	✓		Lac Son village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
6	Huỳnh Ân	✓		Lac Son village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
7	Nguyễn Đình Trung	✓		Lac Son village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
8	Bùi Minh Hải Anh	✓		Lac Son village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
9	Trần Văn Đùm	✓		Lac Son village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
10	Đặng Ngọc Tuyên	✓		Lac Son village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
11	Nguyễn Hữu Quang	✓		Lac Son village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
12	Trần Thanh Xuân	✓		Lac Son village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
13	Nguyễn Chiến	✓		Lac Son village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
14	Nguyễn Thị Thu		✓	Lac Son village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
15	Nguyễn Thị Kim Oanh		✓	Lac Son village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
16	Nguyễn Thị Nga		✓	Lac Son village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
17	Lê Thị Sang		✓	Lac Son village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
18	Trần Thị Kim Chi		✓	Lac Son village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
19	Nguyễn Thị Hòì		✓	Lac Son village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
20	Nguyễn Thị Hạnh		✓	Lac Son village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
21	Mai Thị Tuyết		✓	Lac Son village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
22	Đặng Thị Rót		✓	Lac Son village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
23	Nguyễn Thị Kim Anh		✓	Lac Son village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha

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24	Hồ Hữu Hạnh	✓		Lac Son village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
25	Huỳnh Nam	✓		Lac Son village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
26	Nguyễn Bá Diễn	✓		Lac Son village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
27	Đặng Hùng	✓		Lam Ha district FPD
28	Nguyễn Thị Lại		✓	Forestry Board - Phuc Son commune
29	Phạm Văn Long	✓		Forest Management Board - Phi Lieng
30	Lương Uyên Thi		✓	Lac Son village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
31	Nguyễn Thị Tố Ly		✓	Lac Son village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
32	Nguyễn Thị Điều		✓	Lac Son village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
33	Nguyễn Thị Nga		✓	1/5 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
34	Trương Văn Vinh	✓		1/5 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
35	Dương Thị Ánh Nguyệt		✓	1/5 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
36	Võ Thị Hoa		✓	1/5 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
37	Trần Thị Thuần		✓	1/5 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
38	Trần Đình Tuyết	✓		1/5 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
39	Nguyễn Văn Khương	✓		1/5 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
40	Lê Thị Mai		✓	1/5 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
41	Phạm Thị Thoan		✓	1/5 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
42	Trịnh Thị Trục		✓	1/5 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
43	Vũ Văn Mốc	✓		1/5 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
44	Nguyễn Văn Tuấn	✓		1/5 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
45	Nguyễn Như Hùng	✓		1/5 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
46	Đặng Hồng Sơn	✓		1/5 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
47	Nguyễn Minh Doãn	✓		1/5 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
48	Võ Quang Sơn	✓		1/5 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
49	Đoàn Quốc Việt	✓		1/5 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
50	Lê Văn Thức	✓		1/5 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha

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51	Nguyễn Thị Lan		✓	1/5 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
52	Y' Bang	✓		Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
53	K' Năm	✓		Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
54	K' Bẫy		✓	Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
55	K' Siêng	✓		Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
56	K' Chai	✓		Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
57	K' Chang	✓		Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
58	K' Đoang	✓		Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
59	K' Hai	✓		Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
60	Y' Năm	✓		Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
61	Y' Nhất	✓		Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
62	Y' Poh	✓		Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
63	Y' Mpek	✓		Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
64	Y' Nhang	✓		Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
65	Lê văn Quyền	✓		Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
66	Trần Xuân Lâm	✓		Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
67	Trần Trung Sản	✓		Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
68	Trần Minh Thanh	✓		Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
69	Đặng Tho	✓		Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
70	Lê Thị Thu Hằng		✓	Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
71	Lê Kim Tòng		✓	Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
72	Lâm Thị Đẹp		✓	Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
73	Trần Thị Đào		✓	Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
74	Ka Minh		✓	Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
75	K' Trang		✓	Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
76	K' Tốt	✓		Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
77	K' Ba	✓		Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
78	K' Chang	✓		Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
79	K' Tin A	✓		Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
80	Ka Phương		✓	Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
81	Ka Y		✓	Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
82	Y Nhất	✓		Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
83	K' Char	✓		Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
84	K' Nguyệt		✓	Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
85	K' Nguyên		✓	Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
86	K' Trang	✓		Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
87	K' Bông A			Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
88	K' Liêng			Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
89	K' Tài			Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha

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90	K' Ba			Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
91	K' Jawng			Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
92	K' Păng		✓	Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
93	K' Bông B			Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
94	K' Măng B			Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
95	K' Yông		✓	Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
96	K' Srong		✓	Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
97	K' Mang A			Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
98	K' Lai		✓	Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
99	K' Tin A			Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
100	K' Ót		✓	Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
101	K' Thái		✓	Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
102	K' Phom		<input type="checkbox"/>	Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
103	K' Đông		<input type="checkbox"/>	Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
104	K' Rom		<input type="checkbox"/>	Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
105	K' Nguyên		<input type="checkbox"/>	Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
106	K' Yuoon		<input type="checkbox"/>	Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
107	K' Se		<input type="checkbox"/>	Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
108	K' Hang		<input type="checkbox"/>	Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
109	K' Loh		<input type="checkbox"/>	Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
110	K' Lâm		<input type="checkbox"/>	Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
111	K' Dang		<input type="checkbox"/>	Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
112	K' Nghiêm		<input type="checkbox"/>	Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
113	K' Xuyên		<input type="checkbox"/>	Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
114	K' Trang		<input type="checkbox"/>	Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
115	K' Duyên		<input type="checkbox"/>	Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
116	K' Nguyên B		<input type="checkbox"/>	Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
117	K' Snong		<input type="checkbox"/>	Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
118	K' Bẫy		<input type="checkbox"/>	Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
119	K' Nho		<input type="checkbox"/>	Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
120	K' Ry		<input type="checkbox"/>	Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
121	K' Râng		<input type="checkbox"/>	Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
122	K' Mâng		<input type="checkbox"/>	Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
123	K' Lai		<input type="checkbox"/>	Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
124	K' Nhắc		<input type="checkbox"/>	Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
125	Trần Thị Anh Đào		<input type="checkbox"/>	Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
126	Lê Thị Lệ Hằng		<input type="checkbox"/>	Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
127	K' Viêl		<input type="checkbox"/>	Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
128	K' Yong		<input type="checkbox"/>	Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha

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129	K' Păng		<input type="checkbox"/>	Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
130	K' Thảo		<input type="checkbox"/>	Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
131	K' Thiếp		✓	Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
132	Nguyễn Thị Tinh		✓	Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
133	Trần Quang Sân	✓		Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
134	Đặng Văn Phước	✓		Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
135	Đặng Thọ	✓		Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
136	Trần Xuân Lâm	✓		Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
137	Trần Minh Thanh	✓		Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
138	Lâm Văn Quyền	✓		Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
139	Lê Kim Đê	✓		Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
140	Ha Y	✓		Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
141	Ha Phương	✓		Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
142	Y MPét	✓		Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
143	Y Pó	✓		Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
144	Y Nhất	✓		Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
145	K' Phương	✓		Prteng 2 village, Phu Son commune, Lam Ha
146	Cư Múp Ha Lâm	✓		Lam Bo village, Phuc Tho commune, Lam Ha
147	Lơ Mu Y Siêm	✓		Lam Bo village, Phuc Tho commune, Lam Ha
148	Hoàng Văn Dậu	✓		Lam Bo village, Phuc Tho commune, Lam Ha
149	Rơ Ông Ha Cường	✓		Lam Bo village, Phuc Tho commune, Lam Ha
150	Cư Pam Ha Kim	✓		Lam Bo village, Phuc Tho commune, Lam Ha
151	Cư Múp Ha Put	✓		Lam Bo village, Phuc Tho commune, Lam Ha
152	Cư Múp Ha Prai	✓		Lam Bo village, Phuc Tho commune, Lam Ha
153	Lom Dinh Ha Krai	✓		Lam Bo village, Phuc Tho commune, Lam Ha
154	Rơ Ông Ha Kim		✓	Lam Bo village, Phuc Tho commune, Lam Ha
155	Lom Dinh Ha Mbieu	✓		Lam Bo village, Phuc Tho commune, Lam Ha
156	Lom Dinh Ha Glang		✓	Lam Bo village, Phuc Tho commune, Lam Ha
157	Rơ Ông R' Thiện		✓	Lam Bo village, Phuc Tho commune, Lam Ha
158	Lom Dinh Ha K' Luyện	✓		Lam Bo village, Phuc Tho commune, Lam Ha
159	Rơ Ông Ha Sôc	✓		Lam Bo village, Phuc Tho commune, Lam Ha
160	Lom Dinh K' Riêu	✓		Lam Bo village, Phuc Tho commune, Lam Ha
161	Rơ Ông K' Glang		✓	Lam Bo village, Phuc Tho commune, Lam Ha
162	Rơ Ông Ha Yai	✓		Lam Bo village, Phuc Tho commune, Lam Ha
163	Rơ Ông K' Nghiêng	✓		Lam Bo village, Phuc Tho commune, Lam Ha
164	Kin Sa Ha Fry	✓		Lam Bo village, Phuc Tho commune, Lam Ha
165	Rơ Ông Ha Kim	✓		Lam Bo village, Phuc Tho commune, Lam Ha
166	Rơ Ông Ha Yai	✓		Lam Bo village, Phuc Tho commune, Lam Ha
167	Ha Gil		✓	Lam Bo village, Phuc Tho commune, Lam Ha
168	Rơ Ông Ha Lù	✓		Lam Bo village, Phuc Tho commune, Lam Ha

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169	Phùng Văn Thắng	✓		Phuc Hoa village, Phuc Tho commune, Lam Ha
170	Sách Văn Hoàng	✓		Phuc Hoa village, Phuc Tho commune, Lam Ha
171	Hoàng Văn cận	✓		Phuc Hoa village, Phuc Tho commune, Lam Ha
172	Lê Văn Dương	✓		Phuc Hoa village, Phuc Tho commune, Lam Ha
173	Nông Văn Khánh	✓		Phuc Hoa village, Phuc Tho commune, Lam Ha
174	Tô Văn Y	✓		Phuc Hoa village, Phuc Tho commune, Lam Ha
175	Phan Thị Mối	✓		Phuc Hoa village, Phuc Tho commune, Lam Ha
176	Lê Thị Bung		✓	Phuc Hoa village, Phuc Tho commune, Lam Ha
177	Màng Thị Thanh		✓	Phuc Hoa village, Phuc Tho commune, Lam Ha
178	Bê Văn Đương		✓	Phuc Hoa village, Phuc Tho commune, Lam Ha
179	K' Brép	✓		Hang Pio village, Bao Thuan commune, Di Linh
180	K Jin	✓		Hang Pio village, Bao Thuan commune, Di Linh
181	K' Bôi	✓		Hang Pio village, Bao Thuan commune, Di Linh
182	K' Briu	✓		Hang Pio village, Bao Thuan commune, Di Linh
183	K' Bráo h	✓		Hang Pio village, Bao Thuan commune, Di Linh
184	Bráo	✓		Hang Pio village, Bao Thuan commune, Di Linh
185	Brép	✓		Hang Pio village, Bao Thuan commune, Di Linh
186	K vôi	✓		Hang Pio village, Bao Thuan commune, Di Linh
187	Jim	✓		Hang Pio village, Bao Thuan commune, Di Linh
188	Brót	✓		Hang Pio village, Bao Thuan commune, Di Linh
189	K' Tin	✓		Hang Pio village, Bao Thuan commune, Di Linh
190	K' Dup	✓		Hang Pio village, Bao Thuan commune, Di Linh
191	K' Tểu	✓		Hang Pio village, Bao Thuan commune, Di Linh
192	Brôi	✓		Hang Pio village, Bao Thuan commune, Di Linh
193	Brêl	✓		Hang Pio village, Bao Thuan commune, Di Linh
194	K' Đim	✓		Hang Pio village, Bao Thuan commune, Di Linh
195	K' Đês	✓		Hang Pio village, Bao Thuan commune, Di Linh
196	K' Đảo (A)	✓		Hang Pio village, Bao Thuan commune, Di Linh
197	K' Brès	✓		Hang Pio village, Bao Thuan commune, Di Linh
198	K' Bring	✓		Hang Pio village, Bao Thuan commune, Di Linh

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199	K' Brô	✓		Hang Pio village, Bao Thuan commune, Di Linh
200	K' Brôi	✓		Hang Pio village, Bao Thuan commune, Di Linh
201	K' Brôih	✓		Hang Pio village, Bao Thuan commune, Di Linh
202	K' Phong	✓		Hang Pio village, Bao Thuan commune, Di Linh
203	K' Đảo (B)	✓		Hang Pio village, Bao Thuan commune, Di Linh
204	K' Ngực	✓		Hang Pio village, Bao Thuan commune, Di Linh
205	K' Kim	✓		Hang Pio village, Bao Thuan commune, Di Linh
206	Trần Thị Sợi		✓	Hang Hai village, Gung Re commune, Di Linh
207	Đỗ Thị Vân		✓	Hang Hai village, Gung Re commune, Di Linh
208	Nguyễn Văn Nạnh	✓		Hang Hai village, Gung Re commune, Di Linh
209	Vũ Văn Bật	✓		Hang Hai village, Gung Re commune, Di Linh
210	Nguyễn Thị Thảo		✓	Hang Hai village, Gung Re commune, Di Linh
211	Nguyễn Thị Nga		✓	Hang Hai village, Gung Re commune, Di Linh
212	Nguyễn Thị Xuân		✓	Hang Hai village, Gung Re commune, Di Linh
213	Phạm Văn Cát	✓		Hang Hai village, Gung Re commune, Di Linh
214	Vũ Thị Đậu		✓	Hang Hai village, Gung Re commune, Di Linh
215	Ninh Văn Chính	✓		Hang Hai village, Gung Re commune, Di Linh
216	Nguyễn Văn Nự	✓		Hang Hai village, Gung Re commune, Di Linh
217	Phạm Văn Thanh	✓		Hang Hai village, Gung Re commune, Di Linh
218	Nguyễn Văn Vinh	✓		Hang Hai village, Gung Re commune, Di Linh
219	Ngô Bá Tới	✓		Hang Hai village, Gung Re commune, Di Linh
220	Ngô Bá Bằng	✓		Hang Hai village, Gung Re commune, Di Linh
221	Nguyễn Trọng Dinh	✓		Hang Hai village, Gung Re commune, Di Linh

Annex 5: Scenario Results

Group 1: Lac Son Village, Phu Son Commune. Participants: Kinh, Male, not involved in forest protection management

Scenario 1:

No.	Investment/cash use	Amount used each year (mil. VND)					Total
		Yr 1	Yr 2	Yr 3	Yr 4	Yr 5	
1	Workshop / training on farming production techniques	40	40	40	40	40	200
2	Purchase plant protection chemical and crop seeds	40	40	40	40	40	200
3	Invest in road repair	20	20	20	20	20	100
4	Invest in clean water for rural area	20	20	20	20	20	100
5	Expenses for forest protection for the group	40	40	40	40	40	200

Scenario 2:

Investment/cash use	Amount used each year (mil. VND)					Total
	Yr 1	Yr 2	Yr 3	Yr 4	Yr 5	
Managed by local forestry division to buy fertilizer, farming production, husbandry	80	80	80	80	80	400
Payment for the forest rangers to patrol periodically	20	20	20	20	20	100
Equally shared to households who involve in forest protection	20	20	20	20	20	100
Register for land use right certificates	10	10	10	10	10	50
Organize dissemination on forest fire	10	10	10	10	10	50

Scenario 3: The group did not know how to complete this scenario, so discussion was suspended.

- Selected scenario (most preferable) and reasons for choosing: Scenario 1, because the community will receive 800 million VND. Requested to have in cash.
- Form / management mechanism, complaints settlement:
- Money should be allocated to the communes and representatives of villages will receive from the commune.
- All complaints should be addressed to the Commune People's Committee, who will help to settle.

*Note: This group discussion was not completed in full due to a local wedding and the desire of participants to attend.

Group 2: Lac Son Village, Phu Son Commune. Participants: Kinh, Female, not involved in forest protection

Selection of results of each scenario

- + Scenario 1: People receive 40 million VND per year for the first 4 years and receive 640 million VND in year 5.
- + Scenario 2: People receive 40 million VND per year for the first 4 years and receive 240 million VND in year 5
- + Scenario 3: Money will be taken in year 5. However they would like to measure the actual amount of carbon lost due to forest clearance so as to compensate the carbon lost only or to trace the forests offenders who clear forest for cultivation and force them to compensate.

Money received from REDD+ each year will be used to pay for forest management and protection; the amount received in the last stage will be used to build schools, caring for the elderly, poor people, to develop study promotion fund and build the village hall;

- Selected scenario (most preferable) and reasons for choosing: Scenario 1, because they may have appropriate plan if situations in scenario 2 and 3 occurs.
- Form / management mechanism, complaints settlement:
- Money should be allocated to the communes and representatives of villages will receive from the commune.
- All complaints should be addressed to the Commune People's Committee, who will help to settle.
- Agency responsible for monitoring and payment: Commune forestry division; local forest rangers;
- The process of checking and monitoring: village meetings, notices;
- Complaints: Notice to head of the village and commune forestry division

Group 3: Village 1/5, Phu Son Commune. Participants: Kinh, Male+Female, not involving in forest protection management

Selection of results for each scenario

Scenario 1:

	Investment/cash use	Amount used each year (mil. VND)					Total
		Yr 1	Yr 2	Yr 3	Yr 4	Yr 5	
1.	Pay households for forest protection	40	40	40	40	40	200
2.	Build community house (not available now)	160					160
3.	Invest in agriculture extension (training in farming technique)	320					320
4.	Purchase labor safety kits for forest inspection and patrol (boots, torch, clothes)	40					40
5.	Arrange risk insurance	80					80

Note: Numbers indicates order of investment priority of the local people.

Scenario 2:

	Investment/cash use	Amount used each year (mil. VND)					Total
		Yr 1	Yr 2	Yr 3	Yr 4	Yr 5	
1.	Build community house (currently not available)	160					160
2.	Pay households for forest protection	40	40	40	40	40	200
3.	Purchase labor safety kits for forest inspection and patrol	40					40
4.	Bank account*	400					400

Note: Numbers indicates order of investment priority of the local people.

* If forest is fired or disturbed due to objective reason this sum will be paid back. If at the end of year 5, this sum does have to be paid back, it will, plus the interest, be used for farming investment in year 6.

Scenario 3:

	Investment/cash used	Amount used each year (mil. VND)					Total
		Yr 1	Yr 2	Yr 3	Yr 4	Yr 5	
1.	Pay households for forest protection	16	16	16	16	16	80
2.	Bank account*	500					500
3.	Develop community fund**	220					220

Note: Numbers indicates order of investment priority of the local people

- According to calculations, with a current interest rate, after 5 years, the amount of 500 million VND (received and deposited from the first year) will be accrue up to 800 million VND if the full pay back is needed.

- Community fund is maintained by the village leader or someone to be elected by the community. This fund is used for lending to members for the purpose of husbandry and farming production. Borrowers may or may not have to pay interest.
- Selected scenario (most preferable) and reasons for choosing: Scenario 1 was selected, because the community is entitled to use all 800 million VND without having to worry about returns. Wish to receive in cash.
- Form / management mechanism, complaints settlement.
A Management Board will be established comprising members who are directly elected by villagers. Village head is a member in the Committee. The Controlling Committee is composed of representatives of Women Union, Farmers, Youth, and others to check and monitor the expenditure and activities.

Whenever there is question/ complaint, applicant may file their complaint / request to the Controlling Committee and Management Board, who will question the stakeholders and find satisfactory solutions. Failure to do so, it will be forwarded to the commune or district (if not being solved by the commune), or even higher.

Group 4: Village Prteng 2, Phu Son Commune. Participants: Indigenous people, Male+ Female, with+without involving in forest protection Contract.

Characteristics of the Group:

The group consists of highlanders. There were a total of 13 people at the meeting including Male and Female (6 Female, 50%). In the group, half of them were poor households (according to local reference). There were also households who involve and not involve in forest protection.

Discussion results of each scenario:

Scenario 1: occurs when forests are well protected and people receive 100% of contract value. With this scenario, priority is given to the following activities:

- Extension: 160 million VND, allocated equally in year 1,2,3,4,5.
- Forest protection: 200 million VND, allocated equally in year 1,2,3,4,5
- Develop production, mainly for coffee plantation and improvement: 200 million VND, allocated equally in year 1,2,3,4,5.
- Husbandry: 140 million VND, allocated equally in year 1,2,3,4,5
- Other activities such as education expenses for local children (buying books, contributions to the school ...): 100 million VND each year, allocated equally in year 1,2,3,4,5

Scenario 2: People will just receive 50% of contract value.

With this scenario, priority is given to the following activities:

- Extension: 80 million VND , allocated equally in year 1,2,3,4,5.

- Forest protection: 100 million VND , allocated equally in year 1,2,3,4,5
- Develop production, mainly for coffee plantation and improvement: 100 million VND allocated equally in year 1,2,3,4,5.
- Husbandry: 70 million VND each year, allocated equally in year 1,2,3,4,5
- Other activities such as education expenses for local children (buying books, contributions to the school ...): 50 million VND , allocated equally in year 1,2,3,4,5

Note: Comments made by members in the group discussion: Where the service of forest protection is good, people receive full payment by the end of year 5, and then the remaining (after all expenses are planned from the first year) will be divided equally for all households who involve in forest protection contract.

Scenario 3: People will not receive any money from the contract. With this scenario, priority is just given to the two activities:

- Develop production, mainly for coffee plantation and improvement: 600 million VND allocated equally in year 1,2,3,4,5.
- Husbandry: 200 million VND , allocated equally in year 1,2,3,4,5

Note:

Like in scenario 2, where people receive full payment by the end of year 5, then the remaining (after all expenses are planned from the first year) will be divided equally for all households who involve in forest protection contract.

- Selected scenario and reasons for choosing

The whole group agreed on the most preferable option: Scenario 1 because they have experiences in forest protection during the last years, they believe that forest will be well protected. Another reason is due to the shortage of capital, people are more determined to protect the forest so as to achieve the results indicated in the scenario 1.

- Form/ management mechanism /and settlement of complaints:

Direct payment in cash to households;

Establish fund management committee including head of the village, secretary and cashier;

Monitoring mechanism: all costs are verified by head of the village;

Complaint: Applicant files to the legal affairs section of Commune Peoples Committee, the file will be reviewed and resolved by inspectors. If the solution is not satisfied, application may be forwarded to higher level.

Group 5: Prteng 2 Village, Phu Son Commune: Migrated ethnic people, Male+Female, with and without forest protection contract

Selection result for each scenario

Preteng 2: Phu Son commune: Participants: Male &Female, migrant ethnic people, with forest contract

Scenario 1:

Villagers receive 160 mil each year. During each year of first 4 years, money is divided into four quarters (40 mil each) and will be used for: i) management fee (2.5 mil); ii) allowance for forest patrollers (100,000 VND/day/per); iii) equally shared. The last year payment (160mil) also is used in the same modalities.

Scenario 2: Villagers receive 100 mil each year for the first 4 years which will be used in the same way as Scenario 1. After year 5, if a forest fire happens, they will use the rest for paying fine.

Scenario 3: They claim to pay back just the carbon loss caused by illegal encroachment or accuse the criminal to pay back the whole fine, otherwise they will not join the REDD+ program or collaborate with any program/project on forest protection and management from outside. (They would even negatively respond to this by destroying forest)

Selected scenario (most preferable) and reason for choosing:

Participants indicated that they want the Scenario 2 due to it being more practical.

Form/ management mechanism /and settlement of complaint.

Organisational arrangement:

- Establishment of REDD+ Management Board to receive money and transfer the individuals via group leader
- Recourse mechanism: establish a 'hot line' to responsible person (likely at provincial level or even national level)
- Agencies involved: forest owners, other agencies at district and provincial levels

Group 6: Prteng 2 Village, Phu Son Commune. Participants: Indigenous+ migrated ethnic people; Male+ Female, with forest contract

Selection result of each scenario

Scenario 1:

	Investment/cash used	Amount used each year (mil. VND)					Total
		Yr 1	Yr 2	Yr 3	Yr 4	Yr 5	
1.	Expenses for forest protection (9 protection groups were selected for 9 different areas)					100	100
2.	The remaining is divided equally in cash for the household	400				300	700

Scenario 2:

The group decided to take full 800 million VND and divide equally among households. Money is received twice: year 1 (400 million VND) and year 5 (400 million VND). In the case that at the end of 5th year or beginning of 6th year, there is requirement to reimburse 400 million VND, households who have received money have will to pay back.

Scenario 3:

This scenario is considered too risky, however the group did not offer any plan for money use.

Selected scenario (most preferable) and reasons for choosing: Scenario 1, due to the receipt of 800 million VND.

Form/ management mechanism /and settlement of complaint: Management: money is given to 9 heads of forest protection groups.

Settlement of complaint: Where there is a question / complaint, groups will meet and resolve or make decision for settlement (if it is true).

Group 7: Prteng 2 Village, Phu Son Commune: Indigenous, Male+Female, without forest contract

Selection result of each scenario

Scenario 1:

	Investment/cash used	Amount used each year (mil. VND)					Total
		Yr 1	Yr 2	Yr 3	Yr 4	Yr 5	
1.	Pay households for forest protection	30	30	30	30	30	150
2.	Purchase seedling	50	50	50	50	50	250
3.	Pay the teams to strengthen forest protection during dry season	10	10	10	10	10	50
4.	Purchase fertilizer	70	70	70	70	70	350

Scenario 2:

Villagers wish to receive cash in two times: first year (400 million VND) and last year, 5th year: 400 million VND.

Scenario 3:

Group makes decision to strengthen the protection and patrolling forest to prevent deforestation for cultivation purpose and dissemination within the community on forest protection.

- Selected scenario (most preferable) and reasons for choosing: Scenario 1 because they have extra money to improve their lives.
- Form/ management mechanism /and settlement of complaint:
Could not be discussed due to the participants' stressfulness/ tiredness (most of them attended plenary and group discussions before).

Group 8: Prteng 2 Village, Phu Son Commune: Indigenous, Male+Female, with+ without forest contract

Characteristics of the Group:

The group includes indigenous ethnic and migrated ethnic people from the North like Nung and Tay; the total number was 13 males without female. People migrating from North had a better life than the indigenous. Households in group consists of those involve and not involve in forest protection Contracts.

Discussion result of each scenario

Scenario 1:

Occurs when forests are well protected and people receive 100% of the contract value. With this scenario, group members discussed and agreed that only 400 million VND would be spent on forest protection. The remaining 400 million VND will be shared equally among the forest protection households (households without contracts are not eligible). The amount will be received each year.

Scenario 2:

Villagers will only receive the 50% of contract value. With this scenario, priority is given to the following activities:

- Forest protection: 400 million VND, allocated equally during year 1,2,3,4,5
- Local welfare service (cultural house, kindergarten): In the case of good protection, people are paid in full by the end of year 5, the remaining 400 million VND will be used as such: 40 million VND will be given to local welfare service, 360 million VND will be equally shared among contracted households.

Scenario 3:

Villagers will not receive any money from the contract. With this scenario, it was suggested that just 200 million VND will be spent for forest protection.

According to their proposal, deduction will be made accordingly to the lost area of forest but not to all the Contract value.

Selected scenario and reasons for choosing

- The whole groups agreed on the most preferable option -Scenario 3, because the lost area will be compensated by deducting from the contract value, therefore not so much deduction will be made. Another argument they made was that: assuming the forest is lost (cutting for coffee cultivation) and deduction is made, they still have land to grow coffee, which may generate more than keeping the forest to save carbon.

Form/ management mechanism /and settlement of complaint:

- Direct payment in cash to contracted households. Head of the village receive money and pay to the people.
- Establish Management Board elected by the local people;
- Clearly define the responsibilities, whoever causes deforestation, their money is deducted;
- Money from REDD should not be used to build roads as this money is generated by those who protect the forest;
- With regard to monitoring, the agency / organization that pays people should monitor the performance and payment at lower levels (those receive payments). The Management Board at village level directly supervises groups. It is necessary to develop a hotline of paying agency / organization so that people may contact promptly.

Recourse:

- There are different ways to make complains, the best, however, people directly call the hotline to report to the agency / organization.
- Application can be made to UN REDD program; to commune or district authority.

Group 9: Village Prteng 2, Phu Son Commune: Indigenous+ migrated ethnic people, female, with + without forest contract

Form/ management mechanism /and settlement of complaint.

Pre teng 2 – Phu Son commune: Participants: female, indigenous people, with forest contract

Scenario 1:

Villagers will receive payment of 800mil after contract term upon the verification result. This money will then be used for: i) management fee (group leaders); ii) agriculture and iii) equally shared to community

members. The villagers will use their own resources (time, money) for the costs involved FPM together with support from other govt. programs

Scenario 2:

Villagers will receive payment of 400 mil after the contract term after the verification. This money will be used in the same modalities as Scenario 1.

Scenario 3:

The participants were not confident to provide information as they said they needed to have the whole village meeting to further discuss and decide.

Selected scenario (most preferable) and reasons for choosing: Scenario 1 because of highest benefit.

- Payment modalities: in cash
- Responsible agencies: village leaders; commune/district authorities
- Monitoring : Village meetings to inform villagers
- Recourse: villager leaders/commune authority

Group 10: Lam Bo Village, Phuc Tho Commune: Participants: Male+Female, indigenous + migrated ethnic people, with + without forest contract

Selection result of each scenario

Scenario 1:

	Investment/cash used	Amount used each year (mil. VND)					Total
		Yr 1	Yr 2	Yr 3	Yr 4	Yr 5	
1.	Payment to household for forest protection	40	40	40	40	40	200
2.	Invest in building medical clinic	200					200
3.	Purchase fertilizer for crop production and coffee growing	200	200				400

Scenario 2:

Like modality in scenario 1. However, if 400 million VND has to be returned, Households who received money for forest protection and purchase fertilizers must pay back.

Scenario 3:

Like modality in scenario 1. Households who disturb the forest have to pay back; those who do not disturb are still entitled to receive the money.

Selected scenario (most preferable) and reasons for choosing: Scenario 3, because only those who destroy the forest have to pay back, those who do not destroy the forest are still benefited.

Form/ management mechanism /and settlement of complaint: Villagers will directly elect the fund management committee. The money received but not yet used will be deposit to the Bank.

Group 11: Phuc Hoa village, Phuc Tho commune. Participants: migrated ethnic people, Male+Female, without forest contract

Phuc Hoa village – Phuc Tho commune: Participants: migrated ethnicity without forest contract and are living nearby forest, male & female

Selection result of each scenario

Scenario 1:

Villagers receive 400 mil up-front for the construction of communal house and the final payment after the contract term and use this money for agriculture and compensate for all costs had been spent for forest protection and management

Scenario 2:

Villagers receive 400 mil up-front for the communal house construction. And if a fire happens at the end of term, they will not need to worry about the fine.

Scenario 3:

Villagers do not receive any payment to avoid fine and they don't care about the costs involved into forest protection and management (FPM)

Group 12: Hang Pior Village, Bao Thuan commune. Participants: Indigenous people, male, with forest contract

Group characteristics: The Group consists of indigenous people with a total of 13. According to the design, there were females, in fact however, no female but only male. In the group, 1/3 was poor and close to poor (according to local assessment). All households in the group signed forest protection contract.

Selection result of each scenario

Scenario 1:

Occurs when forests are well protected and people receive 100% of the contract value. With this scenario, it was proposed that each year the village will receive 160 million VND (800 million VND for 5 years).

The yearly 160 million VND will be shared equally among the forest protection households. Then households will invest and cover for the followings:

- + Improving coffee plant;
- + Farming production;
- + Forest protection

Scenario 2:

Villagers will receive just 50% of the Contract value. With this scenario, the modality of money used is similar to scenario 1, with even distributions preferred of 120 in the first 4 years, with a larger payment of 320 VND in the final year..

Scenario 3:

Villagers will not receive any money from the Contract. With this scenario, villagers made no comment, due to the unawareness of this scenario or yet anticipated their plan

Selected scenario and reasons for choosing:

The group agreed to select scenario 1 because they desired and hoped to be able to protect the forest in order to earn money.

Form/ management mechanism /and settlement of complaint:

- Direct payment in cash to households
- Money received from REDD is generated from forest protection, therefore it should be paid to forest protectors and not to share to non-contract holders, even though they understand that these people may destroy the forest.

Group 13: Hang Pior village, Bao Thuan commune. Participants: Indigenous, male, with forest contract, average+poor households

Selection result of each scenario

Scenario 1:

	Investment/cash used	Amount used each year (mil. VND)					Total
		Yr 1	Yr 2	Yr 3	Yr 4	Yr 5	
1.	Pay for forest protection during wet season	160					160
2.	Purchase fertilizer for farming production		200				200
3.	Build houses for poor households	200					200
4.	Household receive cash (equally shared)				120	120*	240

* Receive upon accepting carbon deposit.

Scenario 2:

Forest protection is organized by villagers, dividing into 4 separate sections. If a fire occurs, villagers have to pay fine. Wherever there is a fire, households belonging to such protection groups are required to pay fine. Others in non-fire areas do not have to pay fire.

Scenario 3:

Villagers will not involve in forest protection (according to REDD+).

Selected scenario and reasons for choosing: Scenario 1, because they receive full money without worrying about risk.

Form/ management mechanism /and settlement of complaint:

There must be commitment with households and the protection is delegated to 4 groups. Protection service should be combined with forest rangers and heads of the village.

Group14: Hang Hai village, Gung Re commune. Participants: Kinh, male, no involvement in production forest

Selection result for each scenario

Scenario 1:

	Investment/cash used	Amount used each year (mil. VND)					Total
		Yr 1	Yr 2	Yr 3	Yr 4	Yr 5	
1.	Payment for forest inspectors (70%)	160	100	100	100	100	560
2.	Invest in farming production (purchase cow, fertilizer) (30%)	240					240

Scenario 2:

No change observed from preferences indicated in Scenario 1

Scenario 3:

No change observed from preferences indicated in Scenario 1

Selected scenario and reasons for choosing:

Scenario 1, because, in fact, many people involved in a loan previous failed to pay back. The amount was up to thousands of billion VND but the Government was unable to handle. So villagers do not concern about having to repay. A participant stated "*take and spend, it does not matter, do not have to worry about prosecution*".

Form/ management mechanism /and settlement of complaint: No discussion on this section.

Group 15: Hang Hai village, Gung Re commune. Participants: Kinh, female, no involvement in production forest

Hang Hai village – Rung Re commune – DL. Participants: Female; No forest contract

Scenario 1:

Villagers receive 160 mil each year for the first two years. These two yearly payments will be both used for agriculture. They will then receive the last 480 mil to invest in a bank account. This money will then be withdrawn and used for agriculture and equally shared.

Scenario 2:

Villagers receive an up-front payment of 480 mil. They will use 400 mil of this to invest a communal house and 80 mil to invest into a bank account. If there is a forest fire happens, they will withdraw the money from bank to pay fine. (Otherwise if they can still receive 320 mil, they will invest in agriculture)

Scenario 3:

Villagers will request the payment of 800 mil in advance and entirely invest in agriculture (e.g. cow, or buy a land for crop). At this end, they will sell this asset to pay fine.

Organisational arrangement:

- Establish 10 groups
- Payment in cash

Agencies involved:

- Villager leaders/group leaders
- Commune authorities
- Forest ranger
- Forest company

Annex 6: The Self-selection Scenario

The REDD+ Game – Draft 5

Thomas Sikor, 23/02/2012

Instructions for the facilitation team:

1) We assume that actual changes in forest carbon stocks are assessed every five years only. The carbon assessment will compare actual carbon stocks to those specified in REDD+ contracts. If actual performance meets the contracted performance (scenario 1) then villagers receive the contracted benefits. Actual performance means that the forest is no longer used in any significant manner, i.e. that it is fully protected (which is an assumption that we make to keep the game simple; this means that we do not give people a choice about the most desirable forest management regime, which may include reduced impact logging or selective clearing for cultivation in the future).

2) We assume that villagers are partially liable for shortfalls in carbon gains. If the shortfall is caused by villagers' negligence then they are fully liable (scenario 3). For example, if villagers open up agricultural fields in the forest, or allow others to open up fields, then they cannot get the contracted benefits or have to re-pay benefits already provided to them. If the shortfall is caused by events outside villagers' control (e.g., a large forest fire) then villagers and the REDD+ Program will share liability equally (scenario 2). This means that villagers would only get half of the contracted benefits if a fire were to wipe out all contracted gains in carbon stocks.

3) We assume that villagers receive 80% of total carbon finance as benefits, the other 20% used for management fees and a contingency/insurance fund.

4) We play the game for a hypothetical village. The village includes 100 households and has a forest of 500 ha. The expected gains in carbon stocks amount to 4 tons/ha/yr (including natural growth of 2 tons/ha/yr and another 2 tons/ha/yr reduction in deforestation or forest degradation). Assuming an international carbon price of US\$5/ton, we get total expected benefits worth \$50,000 over a five year period.

5) If villagers achieve the contracted performance then they can receive benefits equivalent to \$40,000 or VND800 million over five years.

6) Villagers can get the following benefits from the expected VND800 million.

Kind of benefit	Value in VND
cash payments	any amount up to VND800 million
new school building	VND800 million
upgrade of inter-village road	VND800 million
new well for every household	VND800 million
electricity lines to all houses	VND800 million
agricultural extension support	at least VND160 million per year of support
land use right certificate	VND800 million for 20% of forest area
payment for forest patrols	VND40 million per year
[others]	

Other kinds of benefits will need to be calculated accordingly by the team facilitating the self-selection processes on the spot. This may be a challenge and require rough estimates.

Required materials:

For each self-selection exercises, the facilitation team needs to hang up the following materials in a visible place:

- green A1 sheet for forest
- 4 A0 papers for each round of the game (so the results of every round can be documented; it may be useful to indicate the years on the sheet already through numbers 1-5, for example in the form of five rows)
- whiteboard with posted benefit symbols (to be used during each round of the game)

In addition, they need to have the following materials ready:

- 20 cards for each VND40 million (can be re-used in every new round)
- symbols for common benefits: 4*20 A6 cash notes, 4*5 A4 contracts for agricultural extension support, 4*1 A4 forest land certificate, 4*A4 school building
- pieces of colored paper for other benefits
- red A2 sheet for forest fire (scenario 2)
- brown A2 sheet for agricultural fields (scenario 3)
- scissors; glue, blue tag or masking tape

Remember that the team may require support from translators in some villages.

Playing the game:

Now the game can begin.

1) Explain the rules of the game

- emphasize that this is a hypothetical game; it does not lead to any actual REDD+ action; once REDD+ starts, they will be involved in a real self-selection process with concrete outcomes again
- hypothetical village with 500 ha forest (i.e. not their village!) => point to green A1 sheet for forest
- hypothetical REDD contract: village make contract for VND800 million (show 20 cards for VND40 million each) which they can get IF they stop any further use over the next five years; emphasize conditionality! and mention that actual REDD+ contracts will allow some use of the forest for a lower overall amount of benefits (we just try to keep it as simple as possible)
- key principle: actual performance is assessed after 5 years only => VND800 million may or may not materialize! may be VND400 million only, or even nothing
- they can make contract for REDD benefits to be disbursed at any point in time, in years 1, 2, 3 or 4, when actual performance is not known, or at the end of the five-year period, when actual performance is known
- if they do not protect forest well (show brown A2 sheet), they have to make up for shortfall; if shortfall falls outside their influence (e.g. big forest fire; show red A2 sheet) then they are liable for half of the loss
- they can decide what kinds of benefits they want, it can be any kind of benefit; provide examples for possible benefits: cash, agricultural extension support in form of new varieties and inputs, investment in social infrastructure (e.g., school), and forest tenure certificates.

hand over 20 cards for VND800 million

2) Identify possible benefits and value them

post symbols on whiteboard with values on them

- cash payments
- payments for forest patrolling (VND40 million/year)
- new school building (VND800 million)
- agricultural extension support (at least VND160 million/year)

- forestland right use certificate (20% of forestland after 5 years)

ask them for other kinds of benefits and translate into monetary equivalents

3) Play through Scenario 1: Everything as expected

Ask villagers to selected desirable benefits for VND800 million

Hand over benefit symbols against 'payment' with cards indicating VND40 million each.

Use A0 sheet to visualize selected benefits.

Play through Scenario 1: everything as expected

Document results on A0 sheet: villagers would make contract for the following benefits in

- year 1
- year 2
- year 3
- year 4
- year 5

4) Play through Scenario 2: Big fire

Big fire happens (fix red A2 fire sheet to green A1 forest sheet)

=> assessment after 5 years indicates that contracted is not achieved

=> fire is not villagers' fault

=> villagers get VND400 million only

Simulate effects on benefits selected in step 3

- any money left at the end of 5-year period?
- if negative balance after 5 years: villagers have to pay back

Question: Considering the new situation, would they choose different benefits?

=> give villagers 20 cards for VND800 million

=> repeat step 3

Document results on A0 sheet: villagers would make contract for the following benefits in

- year 1

- year 2
- year 3
- year 4
- year 5

Play through fire scenario once again

5) Play through Scenario 3: Sloppy protection

Agricultural fields are opened up in forest (fix brown A2 cultivation sheet to green A1 forest sheet)

=> assessment after 5 years indicates that contracted is not achieved

=> shortfall is villagers' fault as they did not stop people from opening up fields

=> villagers get no any benefits

Simulate effects on benefits selected in step 4

- if benefits have been disbursed in years 1-4, there will be a negative balance after 5 years => villagers have to pay back

Question: Considering the new situation, would they choose different benefits?

=> give villagers 20 cards for VND800 million

=> repeat step 3

Document results on A0 sheet: villagers would make contract for the following benefits in

- year 1
- year 2
- year 3
- year 4
- year 5

Play through sloppy protection scenario once again

6) Confirm most desirable benefit choice and disbursement

Ask villagers about most preferable contract for kinds and disbursement of REDD+ benefits: results of scenario 1, 2 or 3? or another one?

Document most preferable benefit choice on A0 sheet.

7) Additional questions on cash payments (if chosen by villagers)

A) Individual or collective payments?

- individual: to households
- collective: into village fund, or what else?

B) If individual payments, what should be the basis?

- equally-shared: every household gets the same? every person gets the same?
- effort-based: payment depends on effort, e.g. patrolling activity of household

C) If collective payments

- who should decide about the use of the money?
- how should decisions about the use of the money be made?

8) Who should handle disbursements of REDD+ benefits?

possible options (but remain open to suggestions by villagers!)

- district-level agency: Forest Protection Unit, Agriculture and Rural Development Office
- official forest owner: Management Board of Protected Area or state-owned Forest Company
- account managed by Commune People's Committee
- account opened with Bank for Social Policies / Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development
- who should be involved in the financial transactions?

should cash payments be handled in a different manner from the provision of in-kind benefits?

9) How do they want to monitor progress towards benefit realization and disbursement of benefits?

formulate as open question: how do they want to be informed about their performance (each year, over five-year period)?

- provide suggestions if necessary (e.g., participatory forest monitoring)

how do they want to monitor disbursement of benefits?

- who would be most suitable for taking charge of monitoring?

- ask for ideas how corruption could be avoided

10) What expectations do they have for an effective complaint system?

what unit (government or mass organization) should be local recipient of complaints?

what unit (government or mass organization) should review complaints?

within how much time would they expect response to their complaint?

what information would they want to see about the handling of their complaint?

11) Record results of self-selection exercise

Fill in prepared sheet including the following information (see separate sheet)

- place, date

- participants

- purpose and agenda of meeting

- have any complains been received?

- results

- contracted benefits in year 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5
- modalities for cash payments: individual or collective, basis for distribution of individual payments
- agency to handle disbursements
- procedures for monitoring progress
- expectations for complaint system

- signatures by village head and official from Commune People's Committee (with names and date)

Note: In focus villages, the minutes need to specify the results of the selection made by the representative group only.

Playing the REDD+ game in focus villages

In the focus villages of Lac Son, Hang Pior and Prteng 2, the team will need to facilitate several iterations of the game. Each self-selection process will begin with a **general village assembly** to which representatives of all village households will be invited. The team will remind villagers about the necessary background about REDD+ and explain the objectives and procedures of the self-selection exercise, emphasizing the hypothetical nature of the exercise (i.e., the process will neither result in the disbursement of any benefits, nor will its results be binding for the future implementation of REDD+ in the village; also, we make simplifying assumptions, such as the rule that villagers cannot use the forest at

all). Even though the village assemblies will be a logistical challenge – the villages have between 143 and 279 households –, we think it is important to give all households a chance to participate in the first session and, if appropriate, voice their interest in participating in the subsequent small groups.

Remember that the team may require support from translators in some villages. In the case of focus villages, up to two translators may be required for the simultaneous small groups.

The villagers will then be asked to form **small groups** in two rounds (i.e., form groups for round 1 and then re-group for round 2 – which means that you may need to keep the requirements of round 2 in mind when you form groups for round 1). In each round, two or three groups will meet simultaneously. Membership in the groups is voluntary. Ideally, each group would have 5-10 participants. The aim is to have the following small groups in the three villages:

- Lac Son
 - round 1: one group with indigenous people, one group with migrant ethnic people, and one group with Kinh people
 - round 2: one group of Red Book holders and another group of households without Red Books
- Hang Pior
 - round 1: one group with women and another group with men
 - round 2: one group of better-off households and another group with poor households
- Prteng 2
 - round 1: one group with households holding forest protection contracts and another group with households not holding contracts
 - round 2: one group with elderly and another group with young people

Each self-selection process in a focus village will conclude with a **meeting with a representative group of villagers**. In preparation, the facilitation team will ask the village leaders in advance to form a group of ten participants that includes the village head, traditional village leader (*gia làng*), at least 3 women as well as 5 better-off and 5 poor households. The facilitation team presents the results of the self-selections done in the small group and then plays the REDD+ game with the representative group.

The minutes to be signed at the end need to specify the results of the selection made by the representative group only. However, it is of utmost importance that the facilitation team includes the results of all self-selections in the field report!

Playing the REDD+ game in the other four villages

In the other four villages of Phuc Hoa, Hang Hai, 1/5 and Lam Bo, the facilitation team meets with a **representative group of villagers** only. In preparation, the facilitation team will ask the village leaders in advance to form a group of ten participants that includes at least 3 women, 5 better-off and 5 poor households. The facilitation team plays the REDD+ game with the representative group only and synthesizes the results in the minutes.