Consolidated Summary: E-Discussion on Addressing REDD+ Corruption at the Local Level

March 2013; Cross-posted on the Anti-Corruption Teamworks Space; the UN-REDD Teamworks Space; the and the Environment and Energy Practice's Teamworks Space; the UN-REDD Programme's Online Workspace and DGP-Net. Prepared by Gregory Mock, Discussion Moderator.

Introduction

UNDP's Democratic Governance Group, Energy and Environment Group and the UN-REDD Programme[1] jointly sponsored an e-discussion on 'Addressing REDD+ Corruption at the Local Level' from **21 January to 24 February 2013**. There were over 30 contributions, which were cross-posted on two online platforms for maximum visibility, UNDP Teamworks and the UN-REDD Programme Workspace. *The overall aim of the e-discussion was to identify local governance responses that broadly increase the demand and expectation of transparency at the local level, and specifically counter the corruption risks in local decision-making, compliance, and financial transfers related to REDD+ activities.* The findings of the e-discussion will provide the basis for a Policy Brief that will articulate a common approach and specific recommendations on anti-corruption programming for REDD+ at the local level.

The e-discussion took place in two phases: Phase I focused on *local experience with climate finance and the implications for REDD+*; Phase II focused on *response options to counter local REDD+ corruption*. This was a multi-discipline discussion, with participation from three expert communities: local governance, anti-corruption, and REDD+. This is a summary of the responses from both phases of the discussion, and the key messages that emerged. Readers are encouraged to consult the unabridged responses or read the full discussion on-line to fully appreciate the richness and context of the discussion.

Key Messages of the Discussion

- **Experience with existing climate finance projects indicate that familiar modes of forest sector corruption, influence peddling, favoritism, fraud, and embezzlement, could also plague REDD+.**

- **Local civil society organizations are critical actors in promoting REDD+ integrity.**

- **Enlisting local governance systems—including local government institutions, customary authorities, and civil society groups—to counter the risks of REDD+ corruption will require broad-based action on several fronts.**

- **Embedding accountability and transparency mechanisms within the structure of REDD+ project implementation, monitoring, and benefits distribution will be essential.**

- **At the national policy level, action to clarify forest tenure and carbon rights is necessary to ensure that REDD+ benefits reach the intended recipients and prevent false ownership claims and misallocation of carbon rights—two potential forms of REDD+ fraud.**

- **Although many corruption threats manifest at the local level, they cannot be tackled in isolation from the larger multi-level governance system through which REDD+ will be implemented.**

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[1] The UN-REDD Programme is the United Nations collaborative initiative on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD) in developing countries.

Contributors

Many thanks to the following participants for their illuminating contributions and insights to the e-discussion:

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Phase I: Local Experience with Climate Finance and Implications for REDD+

This phase of the discussion aimed to tap this experience and explore the implications for REDD+ corruption risks at the local level. Most of the contributors drew from the experience of the various forms of climate change finance schemes – to support both mitigation and adaptation activities.

1. **What has been the experience of local government involvement in climate finance or forestry schemes more broadly?**
   - **Local participation in climate finance varies widely, reflecting the extent of local devolution.** Responses from many different countries made it clear that the level of empowerment at the local level varies widely by country, and therefore the level of participation of local governments in climate finance varies widely as well. In

some countries, such as Indonesia, Papua New Guinea (PNG), and many Latin American countries, decentralization has given local authorities a substantial role in forest administration. In these instances, local governments are already involved in climate finance and there is little doubt that they will ultimately take a lead role in REDD+ as well. Recent reviews of climate finance that UNEP and UNDP have conducted in five Asian countries confirm this significant local role. In Nepal, for example, policy commitments have been made that 80% of public resources expended to deal with climate change will be spent at the local level (T. Lemma).

However, it is clear that incomplete devolution of management authority to the local level still restricts the role of local governments in many locations. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, and Kenya—all countries where REDD+ planning is proceeding apace—commenters reported little effective devolution of forest-related authority to local governments to date. This has implications both for the expression of local corruption in these countries and the ability of local governments to participate in anti-corruption programmes. Yet even in these countries, the potential for greater devolution to the local level exists in law, and the expectation is for greater local involvement as REDD+ programme designs take final shape.

- **Governance weaknesses and capacity deficits are endemic at the local level.** Participants were nearly unanimous in pointing out the considerable forest governance weaknesses and lack of technical and human capacity that plague the local level. Indicators of weak local forest governance in Indonesia, for example, were reported to be low capacity to handle forest data, low-quality or absence of local forest planning, and a mismatch between the structure of the local forestry offices and daily forest governance needs (A. Setyarso). Other participants mentioned the lack of financial capacity in local governments and the absence of transparency in receipts and payments. Most respondents mentioned that petty corruption in the form of bribes and favoritism was commonplace at the local level of forest management, for example in the issuance of harvesting permits or other licenses.

  The lack of local forest governance capacity and the inability to control local forest corruption that was reported by discussants is consistent with the findings of a 2011 study of how local governments in Brazil and Bolivia have tackled corruption risks. The study, which was jointly commissioned by UNDP and the UN-REDD Programme, found that "although municipal governments have a role in forest administration and are in some cases better funded, they still lack the technical and human capacity to adequately tackle corruption." (G. Berthin)

  According to commenters, local corruption vulnerabilities are not confined to one particular aspect of climate/forest projects, but span the whole project cycle: from the initial planning decisions on site locations and project activities, to implementation and the management of local contractors, to project oversight and monitoring, to financial transfers and benefits distribution.

  These vulnerabilities may be enhanced by the inherent difficulty of planning and accounting for climate finance at the local level. The UNDP-UNEP review of climate finance in 5 Asian countries (referenced above) found that climate change issues are typically not systematically considered in local level planning or budgeting. In addition, existing reporting classifications and reporting structures don't allow easy tracking of climate-related expenditures. This planning and accounting gap will likely leave local governments in a precarious position if the expected increase in climate finance materializes, and magnify the corruption risk.

- **A number of factors increase the potential for forest-related corruption at the local level.** Factors mentioned included:
  - *Lack of clarity around resource ownership and carbon rights.* This is in many cases exacerbated by conflicts between statutory and customary laws on tenure and land administration. For example, in Ghana, landowners do not automatically hold ownership over the trees that grow on their land, meaning that there is often ambiguity that can be taken advantage of by government officials or enterprising individuals to dispossess local people of their forest resources (G. Ortsin).
  - *Lack of acceptance of corrupt practices as wrong.* The recognition of corrupt practices by local people is by no means universal. In some communities, residents do not regard acceptance of in-kind support, influence, or monetary gifts as corrupt practices, but as legitimate forms of gift-giving or normal commerce.
  - *Endemic poverty*, particularly of local civil servants, which increases the incentive for officials to engage in corrupt practices and abuse their authority to increase their net income.
  - *Lack of easy access to relevant information* on local projects, planning processes, and promised benefits. Without such information, corrupt practices remain hard to detect by local citizens and civil society groups.
  - *Lack of understanding of relevant forestry laws and rights* on the part of the community. Some of this stems from the high illiteracy rates common in rural areas in which forestry projects take place. But much of it comes from lack of outreach or public education on natural resource regulations or what good forest governance should look like.
  - *Lack of accountability mechanisms,* such as systematic audits and independent monitoring and compliance protocols, which would reveal corrupt practices.

- *Lack of transparency* in local decision-making, budgeting, expenditures, and contracting practices, shielding what should be public procedures from public view.
- *Multiple and overlapping enforcement authority*, making it difficult to manage forest resources without harassment: "For example, if I want a permit to cut a few trees in my farm, I am not sure who to approach between the Kenya Forestry Service, the Community Forest Association Officials, the provincial administration, the divisional environmental committee, the Administration police, the Kenya Police and Kenya Wildlife Service. Yet, as soon as I cut, each will want a bribe so as not to arrest me." (K. Sena)
- *A dearth of specific anti-corruption laws, policies, and mechanisms at the local level.* Most such laws and policies are targeted at the national level. Efforts to extend these policies to the local level are often hampered by poor coordination between central government authorities and local authorities (G.Berthin).

2. **Has the participation of local civil society groups materially affected the performance of climate finance schemes?**

- **Local civil society groups have proved to be essential partners in climate finance**. This seems to be true regardless of the level of devolution of forest management to local governments. As expected, these groups undertake a variety of different activities, from oversight to public advocacy and education. Several commenters emphasized the primary role of civil society groups in bringing oversight to the decision-making and MRV processes, and investigating and documenting abuses. For example, in Indonesia, a number of CSOs have established independent monitoring mechanisms such as Forest Watch and Corruption Watch to act as public watchdogs. But they have also been quite involved in political and social organizing, such as by promoting Free and Prior Informed Consent (FPIC) to make sure that climate change and REDD+ projects proceed only after full consultation with communities; or in the crafting of REDD+ Safeguards, to minimize social and environmental impacts of forest projects and maximize their contribution to local livelihoods (A. Setyarso).

  In her contribution to the discussion, Transparency International's Claire Martin mentioned local civil society achievements in nine countries in which TI chapters had worked specifically on climate finance. In Bangladesh, citizens were mobilized to do on-the ground project monitoring; in Mexico, an analysis by CSOs of CDM project documents revealed the extent—or lack—of public participation in these projects; in Vietnam, CSOs engaged with the media to strengthen their capacity to educate the public on REDD+ safeguards; and in Indonesia a new social media platform was created to monitor the implementation of the REDD+ forestry programme. These achievements give a glimpse of the range of ways in which local CSOs can contribute to transparency and engagement in climate/forest projects and combat corruption.

- **Challenges for local groups include lack of access and full participation, and low capacity.** Even while explaining the substantial contributions of local CSOs to climate finance and REDD+ planning to date, commenters made it clear that CSOs' access to participation in the full cycle of project planning, implementation, monitoring, and benefits distribution was still only partial. For example, they might be consulted in the design stage, but not in the implementation stage, or their activity may be confined to monitoring a project that they were not involved in designing (R. Buhereko). In Nigeria, for example, CSOs were involved in the implementation and monitoring of the "Building Nigeria's Response to Climate Change project from 2007-2011, but they were not involved in its design, nor did they carry out independent oversight (E. Usang). Greater access and inclusion of CSOs in the full project cycle was seen as necessary to increase their contribution to climate finance schemes.

  At the same time, capacity constraints are common among CSOs. Indeed, the need for capacity development is just as great among CSOs as it is in local governments, and participants said that when capacity building is included as part of a climate project, it can be very effective. However, such capacity development is not always made available.

3. **In light of current experience, what are the potential corruption risks in REDD+ at the local level?**

- **Familiar forest corruption modes will remain, but these may be exacerbated by the newness of REDD+ processes, the technical challenges of MRV, and the scope of the benefits distribution task.** Commenters warned that REDD+ activities would be subject to tried and true corruption modes such as accepting bribes for permits/licenses; exercising favoritism in selection of sites, contractors, or beneficiaries; fraudulent monitoring and reporting of baselines, seedling survival rates, or other performance data; or embezzlement or diversion of REDD+ payments. However, there was a sense that several factors could elevate these risks, such as the high level of unfamiliarity with REDD+ benefits, rules, and regulatory mechanisms, and the great lack of transparency and financial disclosure at the local level.

  Moreover, these risks are not confined to financial transfers, but extend into areas of land tenure determination, MRV, and the design of REDD+ projects, increasing the scope of corruption. For example, several commenters indicated that fraudulent documents related to the ownership of forest lands, the extent of concessions, and the granting of carbon credits would be an area of special concern that could highjack local REDD+ benefits. Also, the

dependence of REDD+ schemes on accurate baseline forest data and performance reporting means that this is an area ripe for corruption. These observations track well with the comments of Aled Williams of the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre. He said that U4's experience indicates that, among the many potential REDD+ corruption risks at the local level, three main areas of risk deserve particular attention: land grabbing and tenure rights; fraud and conflict of interest in REDD+ MRV; and embezzlement and elite capture of REDD+ revenues.

- **This is a critical period in REDD+ design, during which local transparency and accountability mechanisms must be carefully crafted.** There was a prevailing sense that the current period of flux in REDD+ planning represents an important opportunity with respect to the future integrity of REDD+ activities. As several commenters pointed out, we have entered the phase of "REDD+ readiness" where the structure of REDD decision-making is being spelled out, local roles are being determined, and benefit distributions systems are being designed. Now is the moment to make sure transparency mechanisms and fiscal reporting requirements are robust enough to provide an enabling environment for local REDD integrity.

Phase II: Response Options to Counter Local REDD+ Corruption

This phase of the discussion turned specifically to the options available to increase the transparency of local REDD+ programmes and processes, and to develop REDD+ implementation and oversight capacity in local government and civil society institutions.

1. **How do we enlist local governance systems to counter the risks of REDD+ corruption?**
    - **Local REDD+ awareness is a foundation of REDD+ integrity.** As one commenter noted, the capacity of the local community to question local government on REDD+ management and the allocation of funds is one of the primary determinants of how much corruption will take root in REDD+ projects (L. Kironyi). As such, local knowledge of REDD+ benefits, familiarity with REDD+ processes, and an awareness of the risk that corruption poses to these benefits is enormously important as a precondition for enlisting local communities in the drive to counter REDD+ corruption.
        - *Local REDD+ awareness campaigns* that allow people to understand what REDD+ is, what it means to their livelihoods, and what they should be able to expect from local officials in terms of their management of the programme are the most basic tactic to raise REDD+ literacy and build local demand for good governance. "When [local people] understand local REDD+ projects in simple language, the greater the interest to act." (R. Muchuba). And when they understand how corruption jeopardizes their benefits, they will be on guard against it.
        - *Programmes aimed at youth,* such as inclusion of corruption awareness in school curricula, can also prove quite effective in terms of changing local attitudes about corruption. In Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, 60% of the population is under 35 years old. C. Pangalos of the UNDP Regional Centre in Senegal reported on a week-long "integrity camp" for young people from six countries in West Africa, in which participants learned how to use information communication technologies (ICT) tools to promote integrity, and met with artists, journalists, lawyers, civil servants, and others to learn how to become agents of change in their communities.
    - **More broadly, access to information is critical.** Many respondents spoke to the need for greater local access to official information on REDD+ activities, such as planning documents, project budgets, contracts, and project compliance reports, as well as greater access to basic data on baseline forest conditions. These information sources will provide the basis of oversight as well as political organization and advocacy by local CSOs. As was noted in Phase I, access to this kind of forest development information is notoriously absent in many localities today—a significant contributory factor to current poor forest governance.

      To demonstrate the real-world possibilities of increasing local transparency and information access, Aled Williams of U4, in his Phase 1 comment, cited the example of Vietnam, which required provinces to make their land use regulations, permitting decisions, and transactions such as compensation for appropriated land more publicly available, especially on-line. Encouraging this type of on-line access to decisions on land use and permitting obviously empowers local people to provide oversight on the ownership, management, and exploitation of local forest resources, including local REDD+ projects.

    - **Access to the decision-making processes themselves is also necessary for local buy-in.** Respondents emphasized that the ability of local groups to substantively participate in REDD+ project design, implementation, and monitoring is going to be a big factor in whether REDD+ projects are looked upon by local citizens as something that speaks to their development needs or something imposed on them from afar. Compared to many previous development processes, national REDD+ preparations have included a fairly high level of consultation with CSOs, but there still seemed to be the sense among respondents that local control and significant community

involvement in REDD+ activities were not foregone conclusions, and that an emphasis on facilitating local participation would have to be continually reinforced if local people were to be given the means and motivation to insist on REDD+ integrity.

- **Embedding accountability and transparency mechanisms will be essential.** Respondents called for embedding in all REDD+ activities robust financial accountability mechanisms and fiduciary safeguards, such as timely audits and transparent reporting of funding decisions, as well as MRV safeguards such as independent compliance officers, and third party monitoring. Tsegaye Lemma reminded discussants that the effectiveness of such accountability measures depends on creating an enabling legal environment through the adoption of policies such as freedom of information laws, whistle-blower protections, basic press freedom, grievance procedures, and asset declaration by decision-makers to reveal conflicts of interest. In such an environment, CSOs and other stakeholders are empowered to participate in and make use of these accountability mechanisms.

- **Diagnostic tools can be useful in assessing local corruption risks and focusing anti-corruption efforts.** Two respondents provided detailed accounts of the use of diagnostic tools—a Corruption Risk Assessment and a Participatory Governance Assessment—to assess potential REDD+ corruption. These efforts were resource- and time-intensive, but provided extremely valuable data about those aspects of local, regional, and national governance of forests that are most vulnerable. In Indonesia, UNDP undertook a Participatory Forest Governance and REDD+ Assessment in 31 pilot locations in 10 provinces (A. Situmorang). The assessment used 117 indicators covering topics such as spatial and forest planning, rights regulation, forest organizations, forest management, control and enforcement, and REDD+ infrastructure. Among many useful findings, the assessment results showed that forest governance capacity was highest at the national level, and lowest at the local or district level, reinforcing the conclusion that strenuous capacity building efforts must take place at the local level if REDD+ corruption is to be minimized.

  In the Philippines, the Ateneo School of Government and the Philippines Forest Management Bureau conducted a Corruption Risk Assessment of REDD+ based on stakeholder perceptions gathered in consultation workshops and other stocktaking activities (A. La Viña). The assessment identified existing conditions that make REDD+ corruption likely, the drivers of REDD+ corruption, and various means through which it manifests in the field. The result was a prioritized list of corruption risks in the Philippines, with a special focus on the Philippine National REDD+ Strategy, and a list of suggested measures to mitigate these risks.

- **Effective enforcement must be part of the equation.** As one participant put it: "Without the ability to buttress anti-corruption awareness efforts and policy development through effective enforcement action, corrupt officials are emboldened and the credibility of anti-corruption efforts undermined" (B. O'Donnell). A comment by UNDP's Office of Audit and Investigations suggested that law enforcement officials investigating corruption in REDD+ may benefit from specialized training in environmental fraud, which could be incorporated with other training relevant to corruption investigations, such as cognitive interviewing skills, evidence handling, and intelligence analysis. Another contributor, while acknowledging the important role of civil society groups in local oversight, cautioned against underestimating the importance of traditional top-down monitoring of local authorities by central governments, such as through central government audits. Research in Indonesia showed that such government audits were more effective in reducing corruption in local road projects than local monitoring by grassroots groups (I. de Wit).

  Also important to remember is the key institutional role that official anti-corruption bodies, such as the KPK in Indonesia, can play in policing the forest bureaucracy in countries where forest sector corruption is endemic (B. Steni). It will also be crucial to ensure that REDD+ is a focal area for existing anti-corruption programmes, such as the four years Anti-Corruption Support Project in Tanzania now taking shape (S. Lee).

- **At the national policy level, action to clarify forest tenure and carbon rights is necessary.** The ability to receive REDD+ benefits turns on the question of forest ownership. False claims of ownership and misallocation of carbon rights are recognized modes of REDD+ corruption identified by many discussants. Thus, the most common national policy reform suggested by discussants to deal with potential REDD+ corruption was clarifying local forest tenure rights, including questions of communal tenure, to make sure that REDD+ benefits reach the intended recipients.

- **External input beyond the local level is likely to be required.** While local actors will be central in the effort to reduce local REDD+ corruption, there will also be need for action originating beyond the local level. For example, independent third party audits are likely to be essential to the financial integrity of local REDD+. Other contributions from outside sources can also be helpful, such as social and environmental impact studies conducted by national authorities or independent bodies (R. Muchuba).

  One respondent broached the issue of adopting international standards, such as mandating the use of internationally accepted accounting practices or MRV procedures. This was raised in the context of creating an environment that fosters confidence in the integrity of the international carbon market. Without investor confidence

that REDD+ is functioning with integrity and actually results in promised emission reductions and development benefits, investor interest could be suppressed, thereby reducing the level of benefits and the long-term viability of REDD+. The tension between external conditionalities regarding MRV and empowering local institutions to take the reins of REDD+ is something that was not fully explored in the discussion, but is a potentially far-reaching issue.

2. **What is the appropriate role of civil society groups in preventing REDD+ corruption?**

- **Oversight is the most well-established and well-developed role for CSOs.** Most respondents cited the oversight function of CSOs as their most important, though certainly not their only, contribution to REDD+ anti-corruption efforts. Their public watchdog role is essential to the proper functioning of transparency and accountability mechanisms such as audit procedures, public disclosures of contracts and disbursements, or performance monitoring systems in general. In fact, Abdul Situmorang reported that in Indonesia, CSOs are the ones that typically drive law enforcement issues in the forest sector, not governments. By way of demonstrating the wide-scale anti-corruption effect that CSO oversight can bring, Tsegaye Lemma cited the success of CSO oversight in public procurement in the Philippines. One of the salient features of the 2003 Public Procurement Act of the Philippines was that it empowered CSOs to monitor all stages of the procurement process, which led to greater transparency of these processes and better overall compliance with the law among procurement officials.

- **Realizing the REDD+ oversight potential of CSOs will require serious attention to capacity development.** Training CSOs in REDD+ oversight was a high priority for most commenters: "Developing the capacities of civil society organizations to use social accountability tools such as social audits, public expenditure tracking surveys, participatory budgeting, etc. has the potential to promote independent monitoring and expose corrupt practices in REDD+ processes" (T. Lemma). Several strategies to deliver such training were discussed. Christianna Pangalos reported good results with a CSO training strategy in which the UNDP Regional Centre in Dakar first assessed the capacities of select CSOs in five West African nations and then developed tailored training modules on monitoring and oversight using local, regional, and international experts. A less resource intensive approach was reported by Transparency International, which is developing an e-Learning course to build civil society capacity to engage on a range of climate finance issues.

- **To provide effective oversight, CSOs must practice what they preach.** One critical concern is the need for civil society organizations to exhibit good governance themselves, that is, to practice the same kind of transparency and accountability they demand in government institutions. As one commenter wrote: "The fact is that it is rare to find CSO members and target groups that are truly accountable. They must fully integrate the principles of integrity within their organizations and in the ways in which they conduct their business" (A. Kanza).

- **CSOs have other important roles beyond oversight.** Many comments made it clear CSO involvement was necessary in other critical areas, such as mobilizing public participation in project design and promoting public awareness of corruption risks. In some ways, these are more proactive aspects of CSO action that allow communities to exercise greater control over the REDD+ process. In this way they are an important complement to the largely reactive nature of the oversight function.

3. **What would a transparent and equitable model of benefits distribution at the local level look like?**

- **Design of REDD+ benefits distribution systems is still at an early stage, but examples of transparency in payment systems do exist.** Benefits distribution systems are still largely in the making, but some relevant data points are available to learn from. Tsegaye Lemma cited Brazil's Transparency Portal as an example of how transparency in REDD+ payments could work. The Transparency Portal makes public information on the expenditures of federal agencies, grants to NGOs, and social-welfare payments such as Bolsa Familia— information that CSOs, the media, and academia can use to examine the equity and effectiveness of benefits distribution. In the case of Brazil, a citizen group called Open Accounts provides the local media with training on how to use the portal to uncover the misuse of public funds, again demonstrating how important civil society will be in translating transparency into REDD+ integrity. At the same time, another CSO called the Public Spending Observatory sifts through portal data to look for suspicious patterns.

- **REDD+ pilot projects in Tanzania offer some valuable insights.** Another contributor referenced a 2012 report (Equitable Benefits Sharing: Exploring Experiences and Lessons for REDD+ in Tanzania) on options for benefits-sharing in Tanzania, drawn from the experience of eight REDD+ pilot projects. A major conclusion was that several different models for distribution can work, as long as proper safeguards are in place. Systems may include payments to individuals or to communities (such as to fund community infrastructure such as schools or health clinics); may involve both monetary and non-monetary benefits; and may be administered through a variety of institutional arrangements, using new and existing organizations. Community preference should be an important consideration in deciding among these options, and the scheme should be designed, implemented, and monitored in accordance with the developing national safeguards system.

4. **How can UNDP best support these response options?**

- **An integrated, multi-level approach is required.** Although many corruption threats manifest at the local level, they cannot be tackled in isolation from the larger multi-level governance system through which REDD+ is to be implemented. Addressing challenges at the local level will thus require integrated, multi-level (national, sectoral, subnational) capacity support from UNDP and its partners. For example, at the national level UNDP can, through its technical advisory assistance, help ensure that REDD+ is effectively integrated into the national development strategy and that, via a consultative process, civil society has the capacity to advocate for local interests in national planning around REDD+ (I. Montenegro de Wit).

- **Existing regional programmes can act as models.** Respondents mentioned several support programmes that are already bearing fruit, demonstrating the efficacy of many current approaches. The challenge is to spread the word and scale up efforts as REDD+ is rolled out.
  - Gerardo Berthin brought forward the UNDP LAC Regional Service Centre's experience with its Transparency and Accountability in Local Governments (TRAALOG) initiative as an example of how UNDP country offices, regional centers, and HQ could work together to support local government capacity building and build support within central governments to support local anti-corruption work. The initiative combines policy advice from the Regional Centre; capacity building to mainstream transparency and integrity issue into country office programming; tools for transparency to facilitate innovation and application of best practices; and regional and sub-regional activities to complement the activities at the country office level.
  - C. Pangalos related the UNDP Regional Centre's experience supporting CSO capacity building in West Africa, both through organizing CSO training sessions (see above) and also through the compilation of a CSO assessment and training guide on oversight and monitoring methods. They are now in the process of collaborating with REDD+ practitioners to adapt the manual for application in REDD+ activities.
  - B. O'Donnell explained that UNDP's Office of Audit and Investigations has in the past been involved in developing investigator training courses and could contribute to the development of REDD-specific investigator training, or could identify successful training modules that had been rolled out in other countries that could be adopted more broadly.

- **UNDP/UN REDD Programme should play a central role in coordinating knowledge management at all levels.** UNDP and UN REDD Programme partner agencies should continue to capture, codify, and share knowledge, tools and lessons of innovative ways to promote transparency and accountability at the local level to inform REDD+ readiness as well as implementation of REDD+ strategies. UNDP and the UN-REDD Programme could also target support to CSOs to apply monitoring and accountability tools and encourage the media to publish and disseminate the findings in local languages (T. Lemma).

Resources Provided by Contributors

Following is a list of relevant reports and other ancillary materials referenced or sent as attachments by discussion contributors, with hyperlinks for easy access on-line.

1. **Anticorruption Programmes in Latin America and The Caribbean: Study on Anti-Corruption Trends and UNDP Projects**, UNDP, 2011

2. **Equitable Benefit Sharing: Exploring Experiences and Lessons for REDD+ in Tanzania**, J. Campese, Tanzania Natural Resource Forum, 2012

3. **Climate Public Expenditure and Institutional Reviews (CPEIRs) in the Asia-Pacific Region: What Have We Learnt?**, Mark Miller, Capacity Development for Development Effectiveness (CDDE) Facility, UNDP, 2012

4. **Survey Report on Information Disclosure of Land Management Regulations**, Nguyen Ngoc Anh, et al., Development and Policies Research Center (DEPOCEN), 2010

5. **Keeping REDD+ Clean: a Step-by-Step Guide to Preventing Corruption**, Transparency International, 2012

6. **Local Level Experience with Climate Finance and Forestry in Ghana: Implications for REDD+ / Full Statement**, George Ortsin, UNDP-GEF Small Grants Programme, 2013

7. **Transparency and Accountability in Local Governments (TRAALOG)**, UNDP

8. **TRAALOG Knowledge Products**

9. **[Monitoring and Reporting Corruption: Participatory Methods and Tools for Civil Society Organizations in Africa](#)**, Sarah Simoneau and Christianna Pangalos, UNDP, 2012

10. **[Accountability in Public Procurement: Transparency and the Role of Civil Society](#)**, R. Jeppesen, UNDP, 2010

11. **[Brazil's Transparency Portal](#)**

12. **[Tanzania Governance Notice Board](#)**

13. **[Corruption-Risk Assessment for REDD+ in the Phillippines and Development of REDD+ Anti-Corruption Measures: First Report – Stocktaking Results and Policy Analysis](#)**, Ateneo School of Government, 2012

14. **[Tools to Support Transparency in Local Governance](#)**, Transparency International and UN Human Settlements Programme, 2004

15. **[Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia](#)**, Benjamin A. Olken, Journal of Political Economy 115, 2 (April 2007): pp.200-249